Sacred Words: Orality, Literacy and Religion

ORALITY AND LITERACY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD, VOL. 8

Edited by
A.P.M.H. LARDINOIS
J.H. BLOK &
M.G.M. VAN DER POEL

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PREFACE

In this volume are collected twenty papers that were delivered at the Eighth International Conference on Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World, held in the study centre Soeterbeeck in Ravenstein, the Netherlands, in July 2–6, 2008, and hosted by the Classics Department of the Radboud University Nijmegen and the Department of Ancient History of Utrecht University. In order to create a consistent volume, we had to make certain editorial decisions. Names of ancient authors and titles of texts are, as much as possible, abbreviated in accordance with the list in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd ed. (1996) xxix–liv. In the bibliographies, which follow the individual contributions, titles of journals are either written out or abbreviated according to the list provided in *L'Année Philologique: Bibliographie critique et analytique de l'antiquité Gréco-Latine*. All Greek and Latin have been translated by the authors of the articles, unless noted otherwise.

We would like to thank all participants of the conference for their contributions to the discussions and to the general pleasant atmosphere of the conference, especially the colleagues of our home institutions and the members of the research groups of OIKOS (the Dutch Graduate School of Classical Studies) on 'the Sacred and the Profane in Ancient Greece' and 'Hellenistic and Imperial Literature'. Special thanks go to our assistants, who helped us both with the organisation of the conference and the final preparation of the manuscript: Bert ter Horst, Anton Manders, Caroline Trieschnigg and Paul van Uum. We would also like to express our gratitude to the anonymous referee for her timely and valuable comments to the manuscript, as well as the editor and the staff of Brill publishers, and several contributors who helped to correct the English of parts of this book: Elizabeth Minchin, Niall Slater and Ruth Scodel. Finally we would like to thank the staff of Soeterbeeck, who generously offered us their hospitality, and, last but not least, those institutions that supported the conference financially: Brill publishers, OIKOS, the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (KNAW), Radboud University Nijmegen, including the Department of Classics and the Faculty of Arts, and the Research Institute for History and Culture (OGC) of Utrecht University.

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Vanessa Berger is a teacher at the Toronto French School. She obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Paris 10-Nanterre (2006) and has been working on various aspects of Livy's writing, including the construction of a Roman identity and the transmission of memory in Livy's work.

Josine H. Blok is Professor of Ancient History and Classical Culture at Utrecht University and has published widely on the cultural, political and social history of archaic and classical Greece and nineteenth-century classical scholarship. Her current work investigates the religious aspects of Greek citizenship, on which she is writing a book *Citizenship, Cult and Community in Classical Athens*.

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Christopher A. Faraone is the Frank C. and Gertrude M. Springer Professor of the College and the Humanities at the University of Chicago. He has published extensively on ancient Greek religion, magic and poetry, most recently *The Stanzaic Architecture of Ancient Greek Elegiac Poetry* (Oxford 2008).

Franco Ferrari is Professor of Greek literature at the University of L'Aquila, Italy. He has published extensively on Greek epic, lyric and

dramatic poetry and on the Presocratics. His most recent books include *La fonte del cipresso bianco* (Turin 2007) and *Il migliore dei mondi impossibili: Parmenide e il cosmo dei Presocratici* (Rome 2010).

Michael Gagarin is James R. Dougherty, Jr. Centennial Professor of Classics at the University of Texas. He has written extensively on Greek literature, philosophy, and law, including most recently *Writing Greek Law* (Cambridge 2008). He is also the Editor-in-Chief of the 7-volume *Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece and Rome*.

Sarah Hitch has been a Teaching Fellow in the department of Classics and Ancient History at the University of Bristol since 2007. She has research interests in various aspects of Greek religion and poetry and has recently published *King of Sacrifice: Ritual and Royal Authority in the Iliad* (Cambridge, MA 2009).

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Akio Ito is Professor of New Testament Studies at Tokyo Christian University. He has published on the Pauline epistles and Paul's understanding of the Law, including 'The Written Torah and the Oral Gospel: Romans 10:5–13 in the Dynamic Tension between Orality and Literacy' in *Novum Testamentum* 48 (2006).

Andromache Karanika is an Assistant Professor at the University of California, Irvine. She acquired her Ph.D. from Princeton University (2002) and has published on women and oral traditions in ancient Greece.

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Elizabeth Minchin is Professor of Classics at the Australian National University in Canberra. She has published extensively on the role that memory plays in oral epic composition and on aspects of direct discourse in the Homeric epics, including *Homer and the Resources of Memory* (Oxford 2001) and *Homeric Voices: Discourse, Memory, Gender* (Oxford 2007).

James V. Morrison is Professor of Classical Studies and Humanities at Centre College in Danville, Kentucky in the US. He has published on Homer and Thucydides, including *Reading Thucydides* (Columbus, OH 2006), and is the author of *Shipwrecks and the Re-invention of the Self in Homer, Shakespeare, Defoe, and the Modern World* (forthcoming).

Maria Pavlou is an Associate Lecturer at the Open University of Cyprus; she is also working as a Research Assistant on the project *STYLE: Language and Style in the Speeches of Thucydides* at the Department of Classics and Philosophy, University of Cyprus. She has published on Apollonius Rhodius and especially on Pindar. She is currently revising her doctoral thesis *Time in Pindar* for publication.

Marc van der Poel is Professor of Latin Language and Literature at Radboud University Nijmegen. He has published on various aspects of the history of rhetoric from antiquity to the Renaissance, and on Latin literature, especially in the Renaissance.

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Ruth Scodel is D.R. Shackleton Bailey Collegiate Professor Greek and Latin at the University of Michigan. She has published widely on Greek literature, including *Epic Facework* (Swansea 2008) and *An Introduction to Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge 2010).

Niall W. Slater is the Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Latin and Greek at Emory University. His publications on the ancient theater include *Plautus in Performance: The Theatre of the Mind* (Princeton, 1985; 2nd ed., Harwood, 2000), *Spectator Politics: Metatheatre and Performance in Aristophanes* (Penn 2002), and a forthcoming Duckworth Companion to Euripides' *Alcestis*.

Rosalind Thomas is the Fellow in Ancient History at Balliol College, Oxford. She has published extensively on Greek literacy, orality and on Greek historiography, including *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens* (1989), *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge 1992), and *Herodotus in Context. Ethnography, science and the Art of Persuasion* (Cambridge 2000).

Evelyn van 't Wout is writing a dissertation on *atimia* in the legal sphere at Utrecht University. Her underlying research interest in constructions of authority also extends towards the religious authority of the archaic Greek poets. In 2010, she has published an anthology of classical Greek texts around the theme eyewitnesses, which made a variety of non-canonical texts, ranging from curse-tablets to comic fragments, available to a general Dutch-speaking public.

INTRODUCTION

André Lardinois, Josine Blok and Marc van der Poel

This volume contains a selection of papers presented at the conference 'Orality, Literacy and Religion in the Ancient World,' hosted by the Classics Department of the Radboud University in Nijmegen, the Netherlands, in collaboration with the Department of Ancient History of Utrecht University in July 2008. This conference was the eighth in a series of biennial conferences on orality and literacy in the ancient world and the first one ever held in Europe. Earlier conferences were hosted in Tasmania, Australia (1994), Durban, South Africa (1996), Wellington, New Zealand (1998), Columbia, Missouri (2000), Melbourne, Australia (2002), Winnipeg, Canada (2004) and Auckland, New Zealand (2006).[1] After Nijmegen (2008), the ninth conference was held in Canberra, Australia (2010), while the tenth meeting will be organized in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in 2012.

As of the fifth conference in Melbourne it had become customary to connect the general theme of orality and literacy with a more specific topic, but the interaction between orality, literacy and religion had not been addressed yet. We therefore expected that this topic would meet with great interest. Moreover, we could make use of an old convent, Soeterbeeck, outside the town of Nijmegen, as a suitable place to host the conference. The alluring topic and location attracted over 80 abstracts, from which 30 papers were selected to be presented at the conference. In addition, Rosalind Thomas, author of *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens* (Cambridge 1989) and *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge 1992), agreed to deliver the key-note address. Of these papers twenty are included in this volume. They cover five, partly overlapping, areas of study: Greek literature, Greek law, Greek and Roman religious texts, Roman literature and Early Christian literature.

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[1] For a more detailed description of these conferences and their proceedings, all published by Brill in Leiden, see the introduction of Anne Mackay in *Orality, Literacy, Memory in the Ancient Greek and Roman World* (Leiden 2008). The editors would like to thank the contributors for their valuable comments to parts of this introduction, most especially Niall Slater and Evelyn van 't Wout.

A prevalent view in the current scholarship on ancient religions holds that state religion was primarily performed and transmitted in oral forms, whereas writing came to be associated with secret, private and marginal cults, especially in the Greek world.[2] In Roman times, religions would have become more and more bookish, starting with the Sibylline books and the Annales Maximi of the Roman priests and culminating in the canonical gospels of the Christians. It is the aim of this volume to modify this view or, at least, to challenge it. Surveying the variety of ways in which different types of texts and oral discourse were involved in ancient Greek and Roman religions, the contributions to this volume show that oral and written forms were in use for both Greek and Roman state and private religions. To give but a few examples: one of the first surviving uses of writing in ancient Greece was the recording of secular and sacred *polis* laws (Ch. 5), while the so-called "golden tablets" of the obscure, Orphic sects reproduce oral communications in writing (Ch. 10); a relatively late Church Father, such as Augustine, composed a psalm for oral delivery (Ch. 20), while the Neoplatonist philosopher Iamblichus could contemplate in a written treatise the significance of the 'unknowable names' of the gods, whose correct pronunciations were preserved in spoken ritual (Ch. 14).

Oral and written communications existed side by side and interacted intermittently in Greek polis religion and in the religions and philosophies of the late Roman empire. It seems that from the earliest use of writing the ancients realized its potential to preserve and circulate words beyond the immediate presence of the speaker, and applied it to reach these effects or deliberately decided not to do so. The efficacy traditionally associated with oral forms of communication remained unchallenged and in several cases was drawn upon when transformed into a written form. In other words, the appreciation of oral and written forms in the religious life of the Greeks and Romans had less to do with the kinds of religion they practised than with the differing effects they ascribed to these modes of communication.

The first set of papers in the volume focuses on the role of religion and the divine in Greek literature. It is well known that Herodotus credits Homer, together with Hesiod, with creating the image of the Greek gods (Hdt. 2.53). For our theme, it is interesting to note that Homer did so first in an oral poem, probably composed to be performed at a

[2] See, for instance, Albert Henrichs, "Hieroi Logoi" and "Hierai Bibloi": The (Un)Written Margins of the Sacred in Ancient Greece, *HSCP* 101 (2003) 207–266.

religious festival, which soon acquired a written form that continued to educate the Greeks about their gods long after the archaic era. Elizabeth Minchin (Ch. 1) examines the way the gods of Homer's *Iliad* speak, from the perspective of discourse analysis. In considering the words of the gods as verbal behaviour she studies the ways in which they communicate with each other: how status, generational distinctions, gender, and divinity itself are reflected in their speech, and how social alignments are managed—and disrupted—through talk. She concludes that, with some small but significant exceptions, the gods use the same speech genres as humans do, thus emphasizing their anthropomorphic guises.

Fiona Hobden in her contribution about the Greek symposion (Ch. 2) reminds us how difficult it is to separate sacred from profane types of behaviour in ancient Greece. She argues that in the search for understanding the political and social significance of the Greek symposion, the religious dimensions of the event are often underplayed. Yet these drinking parties began with libations and prayers, their participants sang hymns and told tales of heroic endeavour, and the *andrōn* was decorated with images of the divine and mythological realm, preserved today on the painted drinking vessels used by the symposiasts. Whatever political alignments, social relationships, and personal or communal identities were negotiated in the symposion, it was not a secular affair. Rather, as she argues, symposiasts were imbedded within a web of divine invocation, celebration, and association stimulated by their oral performances of poetry and their readings of the surrounding imagery, especially the figured pottery, which further collapsed the boundaries between the sympotic and mythological domains.

Maria Pavlou (Ch. 3) emphasizes the power of performed poetry to bridge the gap between the present and the mythological past. Examining the way in which Pindar registers the relationship between past and present in his cult songs, especially in his *Paeans* and *Dithyrambs*, she refers to Mircea Eliade's anthropological study *The Eternal Return* (1945), in which he argues that myths and rituals do not merely commemorate but re-enact the religious past (*illud tempus*). Pavlou argues that Pindar explicitly comments on the periodic and recurrent character of the festivals within which his poems are performed, and emphasizes their continuous repetition since their first occurrence back in mythical times. Moreover, Pindar often collapses the quantitative distance between the mythical event celebrated and the ongoing ritual, thus inviting his audience to transcend both time and space. Finally, Pavlou contrasts this fusion

of time frames with Pindar's treatment of time in his *Epinicia*, where he also makes a connection between the mythical world and the world of the victor, but presents the two time periods as more distinct. Unexplored, because beyond the scope of this paper, is the question of what the effect of this poetry might have been once it was written down. Initially the written forms of Pindar's poems must have facilitated the reperformances of the songs.[3] Later, in Hellenistic and Roman times, they helped Greek readers to bridge the gap between their own present and the classical past of Pindar, which had become for them a new kind of *illud tempus*.

In the fourth and last contribution to the section on Greek literature, Ruth Scodel examines the correspondences between the mixture of mystery religion and allegorical and philosophical interpretations found in the so-called Derveni papyrus and in some of Euripides' tragedies. P. Derveni is a fourth-century copy of a fifth-century discussion of a sixth-century poem attributed to Orpheus, and is already in itself of immense interest for the connections between orality and literacy in classical Greek philosophy and religion. Its author's faith lies in natural philosophy, but his book interprets a canonical, but apparently esoteric Orphic text. In some of his tragedies, Euripides exhibits a similar interest in mystery religions, books and natural philosophy. Still, as Scodel points out, these works were produced for very different audiences. Whereas Euripides' plays were orally performed at a state festival for a citywide audience, the Derveni papyrus appears to have been written for a select readership. Again it seems hard to draw any firm distinctions between the interests of public and private cults and the subjects of oral and written forms of communication.

The next set of four papers focuses on Greek law. Among the numerous ancient Greek laws and decrees extant in writing, the majority by far are inscribed in stone. The conditions under which these inscriptions were made, their subsequent histories as objects, and the problems of historical and textual interpretation they pose, differ fundamentally from those of literary texts. In the late nineteenth century, H. von Prott and L. Ziehen selected and published inscribed laws dealing with religious matters such as sacrifice, purification and management of divine property under the name *Leges Graecorum sacrae*. A new collection was made by F. Sokolowksi (1955, 1962, 1966) under the title *Lois sacrées* and

[3] Cf. the contributions of B. Currie and T. Hubbard in *Oral Performance and its Context*, ed. C.J. Mackie (Leiden 2004).

recently E. Lupu published a fresh edition of several key texts.[4] Yet, as Lupu argues and Robert Parker reminds us in a contribution to a volume on Greek law, "sacred law" refers to neither a notion nor a practice in ancient Greece; the Greeks made no difference between laws on sacred matters and other laws.[5] It may be convenient for our present academic purposes to employ a label for a subset of texts that elicit a range of particular questions, but we should be aware that the definition of this subset is of our own making. If the identity of "sacred laws" is therefore ambiguous, always to be envisaged within the wider context of all Greek laws, so is the identity of this corpus as written documents. Like all ancient texts, written laws bear some relation to the oral world around them and need to be understood within that oral context. Michael Gagarin, Sarah Hitch and Evelyn van 't Wout address both issues from various angles, illuminating the intricate connections between oral and written, human and divine in the body of Greek law.

Gagarin (Ch. 5) investigates why "sacred laws" were written down, authorised and displayed in public areas. He approaches them as specific instances of the creation of written laws, a transformation from oral into written regulation that in his view was the result of the increase in scale of Greek communities in the archaic period. More and different people had to share the same areas, requiring rules valid for and observed by all those who previously could go by their own, oral traditions. Gagarin points out that notably early Cretan laws refer to matters 'human and divine' as a fixed formulation covering the entire range of human obligations. He argues that "sacred" and "secular" were distinct concepts, but that "sacred laws" included elements that could be called secular, whereas many secular laws contained religious obligations.

The oral component of ancient Greek laws would seem to be lost without a trace. Conversely, the absence of a body of written sacred texts has suggested that, on the one hand, Greek cult consisted predominantly of ritual acts rather than words, and, on the other, that Greek priests had little authority since there was no verbal creed that they, and they alone, could uphold. Disproving all three assumptions, Sarah Hitch (Ch. 6) shows that many Athenian laws contain clear references to ritual speech, either prayers or proclamations or speech acts performed by religious officials, notably priests and priestesses, as part of cultic actions of various

[4] E. Lupu, *Greek sacred law: A collection of new documents* (Leiden 2005).

[5] R. Parker, What are Sacred Laws?, in *The Law and the Courts in Ancient Greece*, eds. E. Harris and L. Rubinstein (London 2004) 59–70.

kinds, which are, however, not reproduced on the stone. Occasionally, the reasons for not publishing the spoken texts are stated explicitly: such sacred texts are not to be used by those other than the priestly personnel in this particular context. Knowledge of these oral texts, performing them according to ancestral custom and expounding them in accordance with tradition, was integral and fundamental to the traditional priesthoods belonging to certain Attic families. Clearly, these ancestral prerogatives gave the priests and priestesses unmistakable authority, in particular through the ritual speech acts by which they created the connection with the divine. Since religious speech acts were also required at frequent occasions such as the meeting of the council and assembly or the beginning of a battle, the common view that the authority of Greek priests was limited to the area of the temple grounds is untenable. The fact that the texts themselves remained oral and therefore obscure to readers, Hitch argues, reflects both religious scruples and a perception of the limits of the written word.

Whereas these laws contain references to speech acts performed to an audience beyond the inscribed stone, Van 't Wout (Ch. 7) argues that the formula, used in classical Greek laws, that someone be *atimos* ('deprived of social acclaim') is a speech act addressed to the audience of the stele itself. This audience consists of the community involved in making the decision and all its members in the future. Against the prevalent interpretation, Van 't Wout advances evidence that *atimia* was not a well-defined, legal condition of disenfranchisement. Instead, someone who deems that his or her value to the community is underrated, could contend to be *atimos*, an assertion with an inherent claim for social recompense. With the speech act declaring someone *atimos*, a community cut off any such claims. Comparing this formula in the mid-fifth century Athenian decree for settlement at Brea with the archaic oath preserved in the Foundation Decree of Cyrene, Van 't Wout draws a parallel between the self-imprecation by the community at Cyrene in case of defection from the colony, and the exclusion from the community at Brea of anyone who raises his voice against the common agreements. In the latter case, the formula 'will be *atimos*' is used as an entrenchment clause with a quasi-magical effect, to protect the interests of the community against future claimants and the danger of social instability they might pose.

While these three contributions investigate oral elements in written laws, Rosalind Thomas (Ch. 8) addresses the oral surroundings of legislation and other decision making in the classical Athenian democracy.

Recently, some scholars have emphasised the highly literate quality of Athenian policymaking, resulting in numerous legal inscriptions and written decrees. Thomas notes, however, that Athens in these descriptions is equipped with disconcertingly modern features, evoking a social use of writing and written texts reminiscent of modern bureaucratic states. Against this view, she emphasizes the impact of oral attitudes and behaviour, for better and for worse, on the core institutions of the Athenian polis: the assembly, the council and the popular courts. Shouting, booing, laughter and interruption were highly effective in influencing all decisions made in these bodies; oral presentations of decrees and speeches and the verbal responses of the audience were part of every proposal in the assembly and every lawsuit in the courts. The mass audiences of the participatory democracy and the oral pressures affecting the decision making process need to be kept in mind, when we look at the transmitted texts recording these decisions with their beguiling neatness.

The power of speech, especially when cast in poetic metre, has played a prominent role in Greek and Roman religion as far back as we can see. In his essay, Christopher Faraone (Ch. 9) examines an important moment in the history of the incantation when Greeks in the late classical period begin to write down magical charms that had previously been orally performed. This series of inscribed lead amulets from Crete and Magna Graeca provides for the first time important new evidence that the Greeks used hexametrical verses to ward off danger from their houses and persons in a manner similar to those of the mythical Orpheus and the historical Empedocles. Parallels, moreover, between these new texts and literary accounts allow us to see where and how contemporary authors quote or paraphrase traditional charms and how these charms change from one area of Greece to another and from one time period to the next. Variations in these texts point to an even older (and now invisible) oral pre-history. Of great interest is the singer's claim "to know" especially powerful charms. Faraone shows that the inscribed lead amulets, on the other hand, testify to an entirely new phenomenon: the special power of the physical presence of these same incantations once they are preserved in writing.

Interaction between orality and literacy also seems to be at work in what are among the most fascinating ancient ritual objects, the so-called "gold tablets", associated with Bacchic or Orphic mystery cults. These tablets were buried with the dead and were intended to help them on their journey to the underworld. Originating from diverse

places and times in antiquity, these tablets show conspicuous differences and similarities in appearance and wording. Franco Ferrari (Ch. 10) addresses two major questions concerning these tablets: first, is there a single, original model underlying the variations in the texts, and, second, is there a common model of ritual in which the tablets were used? As to the first problem, Ferrari argues for the conception of a fluid "palaeotype" (rather than a fixed archetype) that came into being over time in a process of continuous interaction between oral memorisation and written recording. This palaeotype should not be conceived as a fixed formula or a standard text, but rather as a pattern underlying the extant texts. If the texts on the gold tablets thus appear to be the result of "bricolage", as Ferrari calls it, of oral and written forms, they are also a bricolage in ritual respects. On some tablets, Ferrari identifies two alternating voices in the text and the use of different metres (dactylic hexameters and iambics) normally applied in different (ritual) contexts. The texts represented on these tablets therefore reflect a certain fluidity both in wording and in the ritual contexts in which they were used, despite their fixation in writing.

Could the fixation of an oral text in writing be used for or even prescribe future performance of such a text? In the case of hymns to the gods, as Mark Alonge (Ch. 11) argues, this does not seem to be the case. Discussing examples of hymns inscribed in stone from the late classical to late Imperial times, he observes that a hymn could be inscribed immediately following its performance or as much as five centuries later, depending on the purpose of the inscription. A paean to Dionysus was inscribed at Delphi to commemorate the honours bestowed on its creator, Philodamos, and, by implication, the *charis* of the god the poet had helped to create for the Delphians who performed the hymn. Other inscribed hymns are themselves votive gifts to the gods that recreate their performances in stone. For a particularly enigmatic case, a hymn to Zeus found at Palaikastro in Crete, Alonge argues that the hymn was created in the third century BCE, but inscribed as late as the third century CE. In the meantime it was probably, at least in part, orally preserved. Hymns led separate lives in oral and in written form; the latter appear to be commemorations of particular performances rather than notations for future use.

Ana Rodríguez-Mayorgas (Ch. 12) considers the possible function of the Annales Maximi, a written record produced by the supreme pontiff in Rome and preserved until the late 2nd century BCE. Rodríguez-Mayorgas opposes the idea of some scholars that the Annales Maximi

were a newsletter that disseminated official information in the early republic, and argues in favour of their religious nature: the supreme pontiff recorded prodigies and other revelations that demonstrated the involvement of the gods with the Roman state. Rodríguez-Mayorgas also opposes the view, first voiced by Cicero, that the Annales Maximi were a historical document, arguing that the pontiffs did not concern themselves with the past but with the present state of affairs. In later times, the eighty books comprising the Annales Maximi became a symbol of the power and continuity of the college of supreme pontiffs in Rome.

Religious potency was ascribed to the hexameter line until the end of antiquity and not only in the magical incantations traced by Faraone (Ch. 9). Homeric epic composed in the same metre experienced its own peculiar transformations. Originally composed for oral recitation and subsequently disseminated in written form, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were exploited for divinatory purposes in late antiquity and the early Byzantine world. Andromache Karanika (Ch. 13) shows that a *homeromanteion* ("Homer-divination") consisting of 216 single lines culled from both epics, was created for a new type of performance. When asked a question, the *homeromanteion* would provide the answer through a special procedure that would select the appropriate line. The same process, culling lines from Homer and setting them in a new context, was applied to create other genres at the time, such as the *cento* (a poem made up of recognizable lines from earlier poetry). That many of the lines found in the *homeromanteion* also appear in the contemporary *Homerocentones* of Eudocia, a poem about the passion of Christ stitched together from Homeric lines and phrases, demonstrates their general popularity. The specific lines included in the *homeromanteion*, however, seem to have been selected for their particular purpose: many contain imperatives and future tenses and are culled from direct speeches of the characters in the epics, thus re-inventing homeric performance and authoritative speech in late antiquity.

Evidence for the power of oral speech in magical contexts is also found in other late antique religious texts. Examples of magical formulae are the so-called 'unknowable names' of the gods, often represented by long strings of vowels. They were taken to be the secret names of the gods, and using them would call or even compel the divine to action. Crystal Addey (Ch. 14) finds a new key to the meaning of such names in the work of the Neoplatonist philosopher Iamblichus. In his treatise on theurgic ("god-working") ritual, Iamblichus explains that the 'unknowable names'

of the gods represent *symbola*, elements created in the divine world and linked with the human world. They are part of the language of the gods, which is, according to Iamblichus, non-discursive, paradoxical and enigmatic, unlike the words spoken by the gods in Homer (Ch. 1). An oral tradition preserved the correct use and pronunciation of these names, as also reflected in late antique magical papyri but with distinct features and purposes of their own. In theurgic ritual, Addey argues, using the 'unknowable names' was a speech act allowing the soul of the human speaker to 'assume the mantle of the gods' and ascend to the divine realm.

With the contributions of Rodríguez-Mayorgas, Karanika and Addey we have firmly entered the Roman world. Three further contributions are centred on Roman pagan literature. Niall Slater (Ch. 15) studies how the comedies of Plautus can function as a source for our knowledge of early Roman religion. In particular he examines how the religious language of these plays was received by and interacted with the broader religious culture of the original Roman audience. He discusses a number of passages that focus on aspects of the religious attitude of the Romans, such as the concept of *religio*, the involvement of the gods in human affairs, the figure of the cunning slave who exerts god-like power in the plays, and finally *pietas* or *Pietas*, the abstract divinity who is personified in Plautus for the first time. Plautus' plays, like the epics of Homer or the tragedies of Euripides, were originally intended to be orally performed before a city-wide audience, but through reperformances and as reading texts they continued to influence Roman notions of the divine for a long period of time.

Vanessa Berger (Ch. 16) focuses on the function of orality in Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*, especially in the early parts of the work, the first and third decades. She argues that orality contributes in various ways to the structure of Livy's historical narrative, which was largely based on written sources. First, an appeal to 'tradition' gives the historian a certain degree of freedom in his reconstruction of the remote past: by attributing something to *fama* ('general talk') he can claim things with a certain credibility for which he has no written proof. Furthermore, the historian's appeal to tradition helps build a sense of community, for stories backed up by *fama* represent what the Romans share as a people. The notion of oral communication thus helps Livy to realize one of the main goals of his work, namely to create a common history that can serve as a moral guide for the next generations. Berger further shows that this function of orality also manifests itself within Livy's own work, for example in speeches,

where an orator may stress his proper religious attitude by his invocation of the gods or his appeal to the religious feelings of his audience. It is in such passages that the efficacy of oral speech is recognized even in the written work of Livy.

In the last contribution on Roman pagan literature, Bé Breij (Ch. 17) discusses Roman declamation, a genre of fictional speeches in the deliberative and judicial mode. She concentrates on a hitherto neglected aspect of these declamations, namely the fact that the bizarre fictional world of these texts, which played a role not only in Roman education but also in the literary culture of the Roman elite, created a space for ethical reflection. Careful analysis of the surviving declamations therefore reveals aspects of the moral discourse with which a typical member of the Roman elite grew up as a young man and which he continued to voice as an adult. Breij shows the value of declamation as a source for this aspect of Roman culture by means of an in-depth analysis of its treatment of *pietas*, a key value in Roman culture and society, which Slater also discusses in his contribution to the volume (Ch. 15). The examples Breij discusses reveal that *pietas* is presented in some declamations as a supreme, settled and unchanging virtue, but in others, in which some kind of moral dilemma is brought up, it is the object of critical reflection revealing willingness to probe the moral values inherited by tradition.

Finally, three contributions deal with the literature of the early Christians in the Roman Empire. Akio Ito (Ch. 18) studies the role of orality in the letters of the apostle Paul, especially in his letters to the Romans. First he points out that these letters were read aloud in the communities to which they were sent. They thus record, as it were, the spoken words of Paul brought alive to the community by an official reader. This notion of oral communication is strengthened by the fact that Paul presents himself as a messenger of the gospels. Ito focuses on two roles Paul ascribes to himself in this capacity, namely that of a herald and a teacher. Ito analyzes Paul's self-portrayal as a herald on the basis of intertextual references to passages from the Hebrew Scripture, in which the notion of the herald who publicly proclaims the will of God to the people is central. He shows Paul's role as an oral teacher by focusing on characteristics that his letters share with the genre of diatribe, a popular form of oral discourse in the philosophical schools of Paul's time. Ito's paper thus demonstrates that, even when Paul communicated in writing with Christian communities he could not visit in person, he liked to present himself as addressing them in person and by means of the spoken word.

James Morrison (Ch. 19) recognizes a similar appreciation of the spoken word by the early Christians, but in this case in the revelations of God to the apostles. Morrison focuses on the apostles Peter and Paul in the book of Acts. He argues that, although they are completely different persons—Peter being an illiterate fisherman, Paul the highly literate, bilingual Roman citizen—, the account of Acts shows that they are comparable in one important respect, namely the fact that God revealed himself to them and conferred on them their commission through the spoken word. This paper furthermore shows that in the book of Acts, the oral encounters between God and the apostles are modelled both on passages from the Hebrew Scripture and on famous episodes from Greek literature, such as Euripides' *Bacchae*, so that Jewish and non-Jewish readers alike could identify with them.

Vincent Hunink in his contribution (Ch. 20) examines a relatively unknown work by Augustine in which orality plays a major role: his so-called psalm against the Donatists. This 'psalm' is a poetic text of 297 lines, which Augustine composed for the ordinary believers in his church in 393. Hunink briefly analyzes the structure and content of the text and then discusses in detail its specific metrical qualities. He shows that this is not a regular poem, because it is neither entirely metrical nor entirely rhythmical, but a psalm, which, like the psalms in the Hebrew bible, was intended to be sung to the believers gathered in Church. It thus shows that even in the Christian churches at the end of the Roman Empire importance was attached to the oral performance and delivery of certain religious messages.

This psalm of Augustine, as well as the many sermons he produced, demonstrates the enduring value ascribed to oral communication throughout antiquity in (originally) "marginal cults", such as Christianity, and central cults alike. Written texts regularly imitated or relied on elements of oral communication in order to increase their own efficacy. Writing, however, had its own qualities, such as its durability and its capacity to communicate over great distances of space and time: inevitably, therefore, all evidence we have of orally performed texts from antiquity is preserved for us in writing. The qualities of writing were soon recognized by the early Greeks, as evidenced by their recordings in stone of secular and sacred laws and their writing down of Greek literature and poetry. Homer had an impact on the beliefs of more Greeks as a written than as an orally performed text. Oral texts ultimately depended on literacy for their survival, while written texts relied, to an important degree, on these oral traces for their legitimacy. Both kinds of texts were

considered indispensable as modes of communication in the religions of the ancient world, and each of the contributions in this volume aims to further the larger project of tracing their enduring interdependence throughout antiquity.

PART I

GREEK LITERATURE

CHAPTER ONE

THE WORDS OF GODS: DIVINE DISCOURSE IN HOMER'S *ILIAD*

Elizabeth Minchin

Homer's gods—the gods, that is, of the oral epic tradition which he inherited—are in so many ways different from Homer's men.[1] Always in their prime, ageless and immortal, they have powers that mortal men cannot understand: astonishing speed; strength; the capacity for disguise—and for invisibility.[2] Gods also *sound* different.[3] Their voices can be louder, more penetrating, than those of men.[4] Whereas gods have the power to imitate the voices of mortals, no mortal without divine assistance can speak with the voice of a god: a mortal voice (Homer uses the term *audê*) is different from *omphê* or *ossa*, a divine voice.[5]

Gods not only have different and remarkable powers of voice production, they also have (or once had) their own language. Homer tells us that the gods have their own name for the place which we know as Batieia; the river we know as Skamander; the bird that we identify as the kymindis;

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[1] For useful discussion of the pantheon on Olympos and its representation in the epic tradition, see Kirk (1990) 1–14. I thank the three organisers of Orality and Literacy VIII for the work that they put into making this conference so successful and the participants for their very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

[2] The gods live easily (ῥεῖα ζώοντες, 6.138); they are blessed (μάκαρες, 1.406; 24.99); and immortal (ἀθάνατοι, 5.342). Except where otherwise indicated, all references in this paper are to the *Iliad*. On the nature of the gods, see Clay (1981–1982); Griffin (1980) 189–190. On their speed, 24.77–99 (Iris); their strength, 15.361–364 (Apollo); disguise, 13.43–45 (Poseidon); invisibility, 22.276–277 (Athena). For discussion, see Griffin (1980) 188–189.

[3] Heath (2005) 52.

[4] E.g., Hera disguises herself as Stentor, whose voice is equivalent to that of 50 men (5.784–786); Ares can shout as loudly as 9,000 or 10, 000 men (5.859–861).

[5] On *audê* and *ossa*, see Heath (2005) 56: *ossa* is used only of Zeus' voice (2.93–94). For *omphê*, a divine voice, see 2.41; 20.129; *Od*.3.215. For examples of gods imitating the voices of mortals, see 20.81; 13.216; and 22.227. For an exceptional instance of a mortal being able to speak with the voice of a god, see *Od*.5.333–335 on Ino, or Leukothea, the daughter of Kadmos (she was in former times a mortal, who spoke as a mortal [αὐδήεσσα], but now holds rank as a god).

and for the giant whom they call Briareus, but whom we mortals call Aigaion.[6] The *Iliad*, that is, contains remnants of what is claimed to be a divine language if not completely different from, then at least fuller and richer than, that of men.[7]

Of course, we must recognize that, despite the differences that I have outlined in lexicon and aspects of production, the representation of divine speech in the epics is subject to certain literary conventions: the Olympian gods, for the purposes of epic song, speak the same (epic) dialect as mortals.[8] There are, apparently, no linguistic barriers between the two races.[9] Homer's mortals can understand what the gods say; and so can we, the members of Homer's audience. But, given that the poet has been so careful to bring to our attention those occasional differences in lexicon that I noted above, I ask whether he carries this sense of difference through into other aspects of divine discourse. In this paper I present, from the social perspective of discourse analysis, an account of how the gods communicate with each other using this language that they share with mortals.[10]

Discourse analysis, a relatively new discipline, studies the ways in which people use language to communicate. It investigates how and why speakers (and writers) construct messages for their audiences and how listeners (and readers) work to comprehend them. Such a study enables us to establish crucial links between social motivation, communicative strategy, and linguistic choice. The Homeric epics, which not only arise out of an oral tradition but also include a high proportion of direct discourse, lend themselves particularly well to such analysis. In recent years this approach has enabled scholars to reconsider many aspects of the discourse of the poems as well as of the direct discourse presented within them.[11]

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[6] Clay (1972) 127: for references to *dionumia* see 2.813–814 (Batieia/Myrine); 20.74 (Skamander/Xanthos); 14.291 (kymindis/chalkis); and 1.403–404 (Aigaion/Briareus).

[7] See Clay (1972) 131; Heath (2005) 56–57; and, for further discussion, see Gera (2003) 51–54; Ross (2005) 310.

[8] See de Jong (2005) 12–14.

[9] See Gera (2003) 3–4.

[10] There is an argument for discussing also the ways in which the gods speak (and the ways in which they choose to speak—through messengers and dreams) to mortals. But I have chosen to separate this cross-cultural question (which warrants a separate paper) from speech amongst the divinities themselves.

[11] See, e.g., Martin (1989); Bakker (1996); Bakker (1997); Clark (1998); Lardinois (2000); Minchin (2001); Minchin (2007).

My aim, in this study, has been to observe whether—and, if so, how—status, generational distinctions, gender, divinity and majesty are reflected in the speech of the gods—and how social alignments are managed (and disrupted) in their talk. I have checked the speech genres of divine discourse against the range of speech genres Homer's mortals use (such as rebukes, supplication, and lament; requests, prayers, and supplication); and I have looked for genres used by gods alone.[12] I have also considered modes of communication, or 'discourse options', that is, the strategic choices that speakers make (or, more accurately, that the poet makes for his speakers) regarding the presentation of what they say: the choice of address terms and other aspects of courteous or respectful talk; the use of aphorisms, or *gnômai*;[13] teasing; sarcasm; lies and deceit; the soliloquy; and, finally, expressive silence (instead of speech).

There are several sustained passages of divine discourse in the *Iliad* (in 1.493–611, 4.1–72, 5.357–430, 733–791, 868–909, 8.1–40, 350–488, 14.153–360; 15.1–235 and 21.328–513); and there are many other brief exchanges.[14] I draw on all of these in my discussion, below; I begin this study, however, with a close examination of a series of linked scenes, as a kind of ethnographical study, so that we can get up close to the gods and observe their talk, as Homer presents it. The episode I have chosen includes both that lively account of the *Dios apatê*, the deception of Zeus, in Book 14, and its sequel, Zeus' resumption of control, at the beginning of Book 15.

Hera and Aphrodite

Hera's plan to distract her husband from the battlefield (to allow Poseidon to intervene on behalf of the Achaians) will be realized through a series of verbal exchanges: with Aphrodite, with Sleep, and, finally, with Zeus. After having bathed and dressed with care (14.166–186), Hera first approaches Aphrodite, to ask for a particular sash that will endow her with loveliness and desirability (φιλότητα καὶ ἵμερον, 198).[15] As the

[12] I use the term 'speech genre' following Bakhtin (1986). Most of the speech genres I list here will be illustrated in the episode selected for study, below.

[13] On *gnômai* as used by both mortals and gods, see Lardinois (2000); Edwards (1987) 98–101. Lardinois (2000) 642 describes a *gnômê* as a 'general expression applied to particular case', in the manner of a proverb.

[14] There are just 1107 lines of divine speech in soliloquy or addressed to another divinity: 15 % of all direct speech in the *Iliad*.

[15] Translations, unless otherwise noted, are taken from Lattimore (1951).

interactions of the gods in the scenes on Olympos in *Iliad* 5 have shown us, Aphrodite is relatively low in the hierarchy of the gods. She is the butt of the teasing remarks that Athena addresses to Zeus (5.418–425).[16] So it is amusing to observe the remarkable care with which Hera frames this present request. The goddess prefaces her words with courteous preliminaries: a loving, although (we deduce) insincere, address-term (φίλον τέκος, dear child, 190) and a prefatory double question (190–192), beginning with a polite optative verb (πίθοιο, *would* you obey, 190). Hera's warm address term and her elaborate preface set a tone of conciliation and apparent goodwill.[17] Notice her use of questions here, a clever strategy: Hera calculates that mild Aphrodite would not have the strength of conviction to answer 'yes' to her question, 'would you refuse' (ἀρνήσαιο, 191) what I am about to ask? And, indeed, Hera, in a semblance of deference, brings into the open the reason why Aphrodite might refuse her: they support opposite sides in the Trojan conflict.[18] But Hera knows that if she can persuade Aphrodite to hear her request, she has a chance of succeeding. At this point Aphrodite does not know precisely what she is to be asked. But she is disarmed by Hera's ingratiating approach: her positive response to Hera (she will address her as πρέσβα θεά, honoured goddess, 194) and to her preliminary negotiations (τελέσαι δέ με θυμὸς ἄνωγεν … My heart is urgent to do it …, 195) will go some way to committing her to the request, when it comes. The request itself is delivered briskly (198–199: Hera doesn't want Aphrodite to have time to change her mind).[19] And it is accompanied, as requests so often are, by a statement of reason or purpose (200–210). In this case Hera's statement of purpose is an invention, a false tale concocted for the moment. Her narrative about her 'parents' (for the purpose of this tale) Tethys and Okeanos persuasively addresses themes appropriate to the concerns of Hera herself—who presides over marriage—and, cunningly, to those of Aphrodite—who attends to the works of love. The story she tells is convincing, too, as the sort of

[16] And, indeed, Zeus cannot help but smile in response (426).

[17] On mitigated directives, see Minchin (2007) 203–207. Hera really wants this sash; so she is prepared to declare affection that she does not feel and to use the elaborated, courteous, form of the verb (πίθοιο) to help her achieve her goal.

[18] Goody (1978) 37 notes that people of higher status use a deferential mode (as we observe here) to 'allow the subordinate to approach close enough to interact effectively'.

[19] As the bT scholia note, 'everything is business-like' (πρακτικὰ ἅπαντα). As Janko comments (1992) 248–249, the directness of Hera's request falsely suggests that her explanation is equally direct.

story a woman will tell—about family relationships and a woman's concern to set things right.[20]

Hera's carefully structured request resembles the cautious preface of a mortal in the *Iliad* when one hero, for example, wishes to give what he knows will be unwelcome advice to another, such as when Helenos at 7.47–48 approaches Hektor. But the negotiation that we observe on Olympos is more complex: and it is this complexity that contributes to the humour of the scene. What Hera wants is something that only Aphrodite has. And Hera needs it now. So, although her status is higher, as Aphrodite acknowledges, Hera is temporarily at a disadvantage, because of her particular need and because of the pressure of time. Of course, Aphrodite is readily persuaded: she is, sadly, gullible.[21] She agrees to give Hera what she needs (212–213):

> οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδὲ ἔοικε τεὸν ἔπος ἀρνήσασθαι·
> Ζηνὸς γὰρ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν ἀγκοίνῃσιν ἰαύεις.
>
> I cannot, and I must not deny this thing that you ask for,
> you, who lie in the arms of Zeus, since he is our greatest.

Hera's bland smile to Aphrodite at 222 (μείδησεν) expresses her gratitude; her private smile at 223 (μειδήσασα) indicates her quiet satisfaction at the success of her strategy.

Zeus, Hera and Poseidon

After her negotiations with Sleep (which are omitted in my account) Hera is ready to take on Zeus. Now equipped with Aphrodite's sash (and Sleep's promise that he will help when the moment comes) Hera makes her way to the peak of Mount Ida, to Gargaron (292–293), where she finds her husband. When Zeus asks her what she is doing there, she explains, with false lying purpose (δολοφρονέουσα, 300), that she is planning to go to the ends of the earth and that before she goes, like a dutiful wife, she is asking his leave to undertake that journey (309–311). Zeus, now preoccupied with desire, does not notice the uncharacteristic pretext (when has Hera ever sought his permission before?). The reason for Hera's alleged

[20] On the themes that women tend to choose for their stories, see Minchin (2007) 248–249.

[21] Aphrodite demonstrates in this scene that she lacks the worldly virtues of tough-mindedness and scepticism that Athena and Hera share: she cannot always read other people's motives.

mission is contained within the same false tale that she told Aphrodite (301–306, cf. 200–210). On this telling it has particular resonance for Zeus: a story-fragment that has elements of dispute and alienation—but that also promises the pleasures of reconciliation—parallels his own hopes and expectations at this very moment.

Zeus' declaration of his urgent passion for Hera is, as Janko observes, a version of Paris' for Helen (at 3.438–446).[22] In each case the male speaker dismisses his partner's current preoccupations (Zeus says, 'Hera, you can go and see your parents later': 313, cf. 3.438–440); he invites his partner to bed (314, cf. 3.441); and he spells out the measure of his passion (315–328, cf. 3.442–446). This closing element of Zeus' declaration takes the form of a register of past liaisons—each relationship presented as a fragment of a story; each one a tale of triumph, as Zeus' audit of his offspring testifies.[23]

Homer usually reserves the performance of lists and catalogues for himself, as narrator. The poet entrusts this list, and only this list, to Zeus, for it will be comic on his lips alone. And Hera, who would in other circumstances be deeply offended, is at this moment so intent on bedding her husband that she is prepared to hear out the catalogue without rancour. And yet, eager as she is to get him into bed, she responds to Zeus' proposal of lovemaking with—again feigned—indignation (δολοφρονέουσα, 329: cf. 300). To maintain her deception she must put up some resistance.[24] Hera does not actually resist lovemaking itself; instead, she fusses about the location. She expresses a protest, affecting the dismayed reaction of a woman bound by convention, saying, 'What sort of thing have you spoken!' (ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες, 330)–an exclamation reserved in the *Iliad* for Hera, always as a preface to her protests to Zeus.[25] She sets out the flaws in the proposal, which revolve around the potential

[22] See Janko (1992) 201.

[23] Zeus claims that his desire for Hera at this moment is stronger than desire he has felt for any other woman. For discussion of this list *qua* list see Minchin (2001) 73–99.

[24] In this Hera, goddess and queen, is unlike Helen at 3.438–446, who is held captive by Aphrodite. Helen submits in resentful silence to her husband's proposal; she cannot resist.

[25] See also 1.552; 4.25; 8.462; 16.440; 18.361. The bT scholiast notes that at this point Hera 'reproves' her husband 'just like a woman' (γυναικικῷ τῷ ἤθει). In my view Hera's words are not a reproof but a protest—she admits (for strategic purposes) her lesser status; and although she does not expect to change the proposal itself, she *pretends* that she wishes to effect some small change to the plan. On protests as a speech genre associated with lower relative status (and particularly women), see Minchin (2007) 155–163, 173–174.

for shame on her part should someone come upon them as they make love (331–336); and she makes a counter-proposal (337–340): that they return to Olympos, to the privacy of her own bedchamber.[26]

Zeus brushes this aside. His response to Hera is brief and his actions are masterful. He promises a dense golden cloud. And he gathers his wife in his arms (ἀγκὰς ἔμαρπτε, 346). Grass, clover, crocus and hyacinth cushion them; the promised cloud delivers privacy. And, in time, Sleep does his work (352–353).[27]

Looking back over this whole scene we find some parallels and some contrasts with discourse amongst mortals. We observe two different forms of request: the very courteous request (Hera to Aphrodite) that we see only occasionally on earth in the *Iliad*; and, in the subsequent encounter between Hera and Sleep, the prayer, a form which, ironically enough, even gods use when they are seeking something that will be difficult to procure.[28] We find the protest—a speech form disproportionately frequent on Olympos by comparison with mortal speech. Of all the 36 protests uttered in the *Iliad* nearly half (15) are spoken by gods to gods; nine of these are addressed to Zeus; and all but one of these nine is spoken by Athena or Hera.[29] As for discourse options we find, unusually, the singing of a catalogue, and the telling of lies (to which I return, below).

We all know what happens next. Poseidon is able to spur on the Achaians (14.361–362). Hektor is injured (418–420). The Trojans suffer (511–522). And Zeus eventually wakes (15.4–5), still on Gargaron. He sees the Trojans in disarray, Hektor injured, and Poseidon working the battlefield. His reaction is quick and sharp. Instantly he looks at Hera—angrily (13). And he brings his wife to heel, threatening her with harsh

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[26] For the tripartite formulation of a protest, see Minchin (2007) 149: reaction of dismay or indignation; correcting misapprehension (or highlighting flaws in proposal); proposal for action. For a comparable mortal protest, see 24.201–216 (Hekabe)–the only protest in the *Iliad* uttered by a woman to a man.

[27] Although it was not explicitly part of his brief, he alerts Poseidon to Zeus' slumber (357–360): Sleep understands the way that Hera's mind works (see, for example, 252–256).

[28] On courteous requests amongst mortals, see, e.g., 7.47–53 (Helenos); we see courteous requests more frequently in the *Odyssey*, where young people address their elders: *Od.* 3.92–93; 4.317; 15.195–196 (Telemachos); and 6.57–58 (Nausikaa). On Iliadic requests shaped in prayer-form: Thetis supplicates Zeus (1.498–510); and Hera 'supplicates' Sleep (14.233–241). On this see Janko (1992) 188, who sees Hera's words as a parody of prayer: her initial offer, of a throne and footstool (238–241), echoes the promises made in the prayers of mortals (cf. Diomedes' prayer to Athena at 10.184–194). On Hera's lips, however, the gift-offer, according to Janko, comes closer to bribery. Cf. Crotty (1994) 94–95.

[29] See Minchin (2007) 155–158.

reminders of punishments administered in the past (14–33).[30] I wish to resume my study with the scenes that follow this: namely, Zeus' interaction, through Iris, with Hera's accomplice, Poseidon.

Hera, on Zeus' instructions, has summoned Apollo and Iris from Olympos to Zeus' presence on Mount Ida. Zeus gives Iris the usual initial commands (βάσκ' ἴθι, Ἶρι ταχεῖα, ..., go on your way now, swift Iris ..., 158). There is no need here for courtesies. Zeus is addressing Iris in her capacity as the messenger: she is by definition 'swift'.[31] This is a matter of urgency: hence the directness of Zeus' instructions to her. Note Zeus' progression from 'announcing' to 'ordering': announce (ἀγγεῖλαι, 159); don't be a false messenger (μηδὲ ψευδάγγελος εἶναι, 159); order (ἄνωχθι, 160). Zeus, through Iris, instructs Poseidon to quit the fighting and go back either to the company of the gods or into the bright sea.

Zeus has referred to his brother at 158 as 'lord Poseidon' (Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι): his intentions to this point might be read as polite. But Zeus follows up his command with a threatening rider (162–166) that makes a claim for higher status. What he says is that, if Poseidon appears to dismiss Zeus' instructions, Iris is to remind him that, even though Poseidon denies this, Zeus is both 'much stronger *and older* than he is' (ἕο φημὶ βίῃ πολὺ φέρτερος εἶναι/καὶ γενεῇ πρότερος, 165–166). In structuring this closing statement in this way, Zeus, according to Janko, puts less emphasis on his superior strength and highlights the respect due to age—perhaps, as Janko suggests, a more effective argument. But Zeus' insistence on his pre-eminence shows that he is not entirely confident of his position *vis-à-vis* Poseidon. He is, I suggest, protesting too much.

Iris then rockets down to the plain of Troy. Addressing Poseidon she prefaces Zeus' instructions with tactful preliminaries: she uses her own honorific titles for the sea-god (γαιήοχε κυανοχαῖτα, dark-haired, earth-encircler, 174) and rather than following Zeus' instruction to present his words as a command (160) she chooses to highlight the less provocative term 'message' (ἀγγελίην, 174). Iris delivers Zeus' instructions in indirect speech (as though she is distancing herself from the message she bears) with some variation at 176–183 of the wording at 160–167.

[30] For comparable threats see 3.414–417 (Aphrodite to Helen); 1.26–28 (Agamemnon to Chryses); 24.568–570 (Achilleus to Priam).

[31] On this messenger-role, see Janko (1992: 245), who notes (after the T scholia) that Homer has Iris take the message to Poseidon; the poet avoids bringing Poseidon to confront Zeus in person.

Poseidon, understandably, is irritated. His exclamation of anger (ὢ πόποι, 185) sets the tone for his blustering words. He uses the speech genre that we recognize as a protest (indignation [185–186]; correcting the misapprehension [187–193]; proposal for action [194–199]). Since Poseidon cannot deny that Zeus is first-born he directs his reply, which Iris is to carry back, simply to those parts of Zeus' instructions that carried the threat of force. He accuses Zeus of arrogance (185), and of treating him as though he were a weakling (196). He rests his case on their relationship as brothers, sons of Rheia and Kronos (187–188). He speaks of the division amongst himself, Zeus, and Hades (the third of the brothers) of a universe comprising earth, sea, sky and underworld (189–193), but claims that, since earth and Olympos are regions common to all three, he, Poseidon, is not 'subject to Zeus' wits' (οὔ τι Διὸς βέομαι φρεσίν, 194).

A protest, as we have seen above in Hera's protest to Zeus (14.330–340), is the speech genre of a speaker who is of lower status than his or her addressee. Poseidon will not accept that he is lower in status; but he is in these circumstances at a disadvantage—he has been caught doing what he had been told not to do.[32] Poseidon by his protest implicitly admits his wrongdoing. But his fiery words also convey a degree of defiance. It is to this that the messenger god reacts.

Iris responds calmly, soothingly, using the same honorifics with which she had begun. Notice how she conveys to Poseidon her reservations about what he has said, which she describes as 'these words, which are strong and steep' (τόνδε … μῦθον ἀπηνέα τε κρατερόν τε, 202). She expresses her views not through a statement, but within alternate questions. Thus she appears to reduce the issue, as Janko notes, to a 'matter of protocol'.[33] First, she asks whether that was indeed the reply he would like her to take back to Zeus and, second, she gently slips in the proposal that he might soften his approach a little (ἦ τι μεταστρέψεις; or will you change a little? 203). Clearly, she is in favour of this second strategy.[34]

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[32] Poseidon has, however, made such a concession earlier. At 8.209–211 he had protested to Hera, when she had rebuked him, at 201–207, for not playing a more active role in the defence of the Achaians that Zeus was the greater god. But it is clear that the question of pre-eminence always rankles with him.

[33] Janko (1992) 248.

[34] The second of alternative questions in Homer (as in everyday talk in our own world) is usually the one that is to be followed up, in accordance with conversational preferences for contiguity and agreement. On this see Minchin (2007) 112–113. On Iris' value on

Iris' alternate questions, at 201–203, are a form of the question-type that Goody identifies as a deference-question.[35] This speech-form *appears* to function as an information-question (a question that would take a form of 'do you want me to do this?'); but, in fact, it tactfully deals with the problem of how one should give advice, or suggest a course of action, to a person of higher status—without appearing to do so. Iris, as messenger god, will not say to Poseidon, 'Good heavens, don't say that! It's not a good idea at all.' But she *can* say, deferentially: 'Am I to take this tough message back to Zeus? Or will you soften your words?' Even as she appears to consult Poseidon (asking him to make the decision) she slips in, at 203, a tactful aphorism to support her case (στρεπταὶ μὲν τε φρένες ἐσθλῶν, the hearts of the great can be changed), along with a reminder about the precedent set by the Erinyes, who 'always favour the elder' (204).[36]

Poseidon acknowledges her good sense (μάλα τοῦτο ἔπος κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες, 206). And he then bluntly identifies the purpose that Iris had been so gracefully masking. As he says (207): it is a fine thing when a messenger is conscious of justice. So Poseidon will accept Iris' recommendation, grudgingly—and conditionally. Although he announces that he will give way (211), he does so only after making the point again that he is equal in station (ἰσόμορον, 209) with his brother.[37] But—and this is the condition that salvages his pride—if Zeus spares Troy, then Poseidon will not make a concession such as this again (νῶϊν ἀνήκεστος χόλος ἔσται, there will be no more healing of our anger, 217).

In this series of exchanges we observe how important are the linguistic choices that one makes to the ongoing health of one's relationships with others. Zeus sends orders to Poseidon. He claims he has the power to do so. Poseidon resists. He contests Zeus' supremacy. Iris, whose position in the hierarchy is low, knows how to shape her discourse in order to advocate to Poseidon a change in policy. The gods' responses are no different from those of mortals: Zeus in his insistence on his rights as king of gods and men reminds us in certain ways of Agamemnon (9.158–161);

Olympos, for her ability to soothe angry gods and soften their responses, see also Erbse (1986) 55–56.

35 On deference questions, see Goody (1978) 32–35; Minchin (2007) 119–124. Janko (1992) 248–249, observes that *gar* is usual in rhetorical questions in which the speaker casts doubt on the previous speaker's words.

36 For a comparable use of *gnômê* as a tool of persuasion, see 1.274 (Nestor).

37 For a comparable concession amongst mortals, see Diomedes' conditional agreement at 8.146–150.

Poseidon might remind us of Achilleus (9.369–426). We find a parallel for Iris, who has handled Poseidon's uncompromising response to Zeus so delicately, not in the Nestor of *Iliad* 1 but in one of Homer's forgotten characters, Dolios at *Od* 24.403–405, who also knows the value of a quiet deference-question, by way of guidance, to his superior.

Discussion

Do the Homeric gods speak in entirely different ways from Homer's mortals? The answer from the social perspective is no. Although I shall argue for some small but significant differences, we find that *on the whole* the speech of gods is similar to that of mortals. For example, many of the speech genres used by mortals are used also by the gods: threats, rebukes, protests, and courteous requests, for example.[38] And there are stories: we have noted in the *Dios apatê* fragments of the kind of story that any woman, goddess or mortal, will tell about family relationships; and we find on the lips of Zeus in the same episode fragments of the kinds of stories that (on the evidence of the *Odyssey*) mortal men might tell, about triumphs in love. Gods even use prayer and supplication, as Hera does to Sleep, or Thetis to Zeus (1.498–510).[39]

On the other hand, some mortal speech genres do not appear to be a regular part of the divine repertoire: speeches of consolation or lament, both of which we find only occasionally on the lips of a god, do not resonate in quite the same way as when they are used amongst mortals. Dione's speech of consolation in 5.382–415, as the goddess solemnly consoles her daughter for a surface wound inflicted by a mortal, a scratch that will be healed in a moment, allows the poet to underline the inconsequentiality, for an immortal, of trauma and suffering.[40] Likewise,

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[38] These forms, and others, are, as I have argued elsewhere, stylized versions of everyday talk in the real world of Homer and his audience: on this see Martin (1989) 45 and 225; Minchin (2007) 282–283, 287.

[39] On the format of a prayer, see Pulleyn (1997) 132; on supplication, see Crotty (1994) 94–95; on Thetis's prayer, see Tsagalis (2001). Prayers will include always an invocation and a request; the *argumentum* (that part of the prayer in which the petitioner gives reasons for his or her request) may be omitted. For comparable prayers of mortals: Chryses to Apollo at 1.37–42; Nestor to Zeus, Apollo, and Athena at 7.132–135; the Achaians to Zeus at 7.202–205; Odysseus, succinctly, to Athena at 23.770; Priam to Zeus at 24.308–313.

[40] And indeed, Hera's prompt recovery from her distress at Zeus' threat cannot be entirely due to the warmth of Hephaistos' words of consolation (1.586–594); her smile at 595 must reflect also the special resilience of the Olympian gods.

we come across three divine speeches of lament, each expressing genuine sorrow for an outcome that cannot be averted—Zeus lamenting the approaching death of Sarpedon (16.433–438), or that of Hektor (22.168–176); or Thetis lamenting the imminent death of Achilleus (18.52–64). Although a divine lament has a certain *power* (after all, it is a god who speaks) it lacks the *pathos* of Hekabe's or Andromache's laments for Hektor, as son or husband, or Briseis' lament for Patroklos.[41]

As far as discourse options are concerned, certain modes of verbal behaviour typical of mortals are rare or non-existent in divine talk: the poet of the *Iliad* rarely uses soliloquies in divine speech.[42] I suggest that he shrinks from revealing the private thoughts of his gods, even though he is often prepared to do this in the case of his mortal characters. Of all the gods it is only Zeus who expresses his thoughts thus (at 17.201–208 [of Hektor] and 443–455 [of Achilleus' horses])–and it is only at a time when the narrative is moving towards its resolution after the death of Patroklos that Zeus puts into words (for no one but the audience) his regret about unfolding events, although he has no desire to change their course. As I noted earlier, Homer also allows Zeus, alone of all his characters, to perform a catalogue song, one of the poet's own specialities.

Sarcasm, too, is less common amongst gods than it is amongst mortals.[43] Although we find that Olympian gods are ready to tease and bait one another in ways that mortals never do, the intention to utter biting words of sarcasm is rarely present. For example, Zeus with words of mockery (κερτομίοις ἐπέεσσι, 4.6) *teases* Hera and Athena at 4.7–19 by drawing attention to Aphrodite's energetic intervention on Paris' behalf (7–12) and offering the prospect that Troy may not be sacked (13–19).[44] He is not, however, sarcastic. Athena, on the other hand, in a later

[41] See, e.g., 22.478–514; 24.725–745 (Andromache); 24.748–759 (Hekabe); 19.287–300 (Briseis). The gods do indeed suffer at these moments (Zeus weeps tears of blood on the death of Sarpedon: 16.459–461); but his tears (extraordinary as they are) do not move us in the way that the tears of mortals do. On the other hand, the lament of a god serves to 'heighten the emotional significance' of the event: Griffin (1980) 196.

[42] Soliloquies are not uncommon in the speech of mortals: see, for example, 11.404–410 (Odysseus); 17.91–105 (Hektor); 18.6–14 (Antilochos); 20.344–352 (Achilleus); 21.54–63 (Achilleus), 553–570 (Antenor); 22.98–130 (Hektor), 22.297–305 (Hektor).

[43] Gods tease one another (see below); they speak dismissively (21.410–411); and on rare occasions they are sarcastic (the main players being Athena and Hera). By contrast, we find many instances of sarcasm amongst mortals (7.96–98; 14.454–457; 21.583–585); or on the lips of gods addressing mortals (2.173–178; 20.83–85).

[44] Zeus cannot help himself: he will indulge in further teasing of Athena and Hera (who rise to his bait so readily) at 8.447–456. For their reactions at 4.20–29 and 8.457–468, see below.

episode, at 5.421–425, retaliates with sarcasm: her uncharacteristically hesitant preface and her carefully phrased, over-courteous request for permission to take the floor (421) are intended ironically. With words of mockery (κερτομίοις ἐπέεσσι, 419) she addresses her father, using Aphrodite as her subject material. Certainly, her words are intended to provoke Zeus, but they also convey her hostility towards Aphrodite.[45]

Homer's gods resort to lies and deceit on many more occasions than do the mortals of the *Iliad*. The gods' occasional bouts of unscrupulousness throw into contrast the general openness and uprightness of the heroes of the *Iliad*. The only example of deceit with malicious intent amongst the mortals of the *Iliad* is the false reassurance that Odysseus gives to Dolon at 10.383. As for the use of aphorisms, both mortals and immortals—both male and female gods—use *gnômai*. But, as Lardinois has demonstrated, the wisdom sayings of gods addressing gods are in some ways different from those of mortals to mortals or, indeed, of gods to mortals.[46] When mortals use aphorisms in speech, even when they refer to gods, the point of reference is always human activity. So, when Achilleus says 'if any man obeys the gods they listen to him also' (1.218) or when Aeneas says 'the wrath of a god is hard to bear' (5.178) these *gnômai* refer to mortal behaviour. But when the gods use aphorisms of a similar kind, their *gnômai* reflect on the lives of gods, in some cases producing a change of meaning.[47] Furthermore, when gods speak of other gods in their aphorisms, they inevitably sound more personal.[48] So, when Hephaistos remarks to Hera at 1.589 that 'the Olympian is hard to resist', he is not talking, as a mortal would, about the father of gods and men remote on Olympos but about the individual just across the room whose character is well-known to both of them.

Another discourse option is silence.[49] In the course of conversation gods lapse into silence or are shocked into silence far less frequently

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[45] Athena proposes, teasingly, that Aphrodite's wound was suffered in the bedchamber not on the battlefield (422–425). By aiming a barb at Aphrodite, Athena hopes also to provoke Zeus. For another instance of divine sarcasm, see 24.56–57 (Athena to Apollo). For teasing amongst mortals, see only 10.164–167 (Diomedes to Nestor).

[46] Lardinois (2000) 656–659.

[47] Lardinois (2000) 656–657. When Hektor says to Andromache at 6.492 'war is the concern of men' (πόλεμος δ' ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει) he means 'men' as opposed to women. When Poseidon uses the same aphorism at 20.137 he uses ἄνδρεσσι in the sense of 'human beings' as opposed to the gods (that is, he and Hera should stay clear of the fighting and 'let war be the concern of mankind').

[48] Lardinois (2000) 657.

[49] On silence's potential for eloquence, see Scarpi (1987) 23; Montiglio (2000) ch. 2.

than mortals.[50] The outcome is that we, the audience, take more notice of those occasions on which the poet chooses divine silence as a mode of communication. At 8.28–29 all the gods remain silent, stunned by the severity of Zeus' words, as he threatens to suspend from the horn of Olympos any god who goes down to assist either Trojans or Achaians on the battlefield. The silence of the other gods marks this as a significant declaration and an important moment in the progress of the narrative. At 4.22 Athena, vexed by Zeus' teasing words, and at 8.459, angered by the prohibitions that Zeus has imposed on her and Hera, bites her tongue. Her desire to keep her anger in check is not, however, entirely successful: a daughterly scowl testifies to her resentment.[51] Athena's silence is clearly an effort of will and self-control—and this tells us something about her strength of character. By contrast, Hera, who is equally angry, cannot master her tongue. On each occasion she speaks out in bitter protest (4.25–29; 8.462–468), in her characteristically impetuous way. And, at 1.511–512 (the most expressive silence of all), Zeus remains silent after Thetis has begged him to turn the tide of battle against the Achaians in order to force Agamemnon to do honour to Achilleus. Zeus' long silence (ἀκέων δὴν ἧστο, 512) is a measure of his anxiety both about what would be a major shift in divine policy and about domestic harmony. As he says (1.518–523), he is anxious about how he will present this new agreement, should he make it, to his wife, Hera (who is both anti-Trojan and anti-Thetis). This is what he says at 518–519:

> ἦ δὴ λοίγια ἔργ' ὅ τέ μ' ἐχθοδοπῆσαι ἐφήσεις
> Ἥρῃ, ὅτ' ἄν μ' ἐρέθῃσιν ὀνειδείοις ἐπέεσσιν.
>
> This is a disastrous matter when you set me in conflict
> with Hera, and she troubles me with recriminations.

The poet uses silence here to suggest the import of what Thetis asks; and yet he allows Zeus' subsequent words—hinting at marital disharmony—to undercut its solemnity.

I turn now to generational difference, gender, and status, to see whether they are recognized amongst immortals in the same way that they are amongst mortals. I begin with status and generational difference. Zeus,

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[50] For the most obvious examples of mortal silence, consider the occurrences of the phrase 'all of them stayed stricken to silence' (οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ): 3 95; 7.92, 398; 9.29, 430, 693; 10.218, 313; 23 676. On such silence, see Foley (1995); Minchin (2008).

[51] I assume that the use of *skuzomenê* (4.23; 8.460) indicates some physical manifestation of anger or displeasure.

we observe, is addressed with respect (as Ζεῦ πάτερ, father Zeus) both by lesser gods, such as Thetis (1.503), and by gods who are closer to him, such as Athena and Hera (at, for example, 5.421). More respectful terms are used in special circumstances: by Thetis, for example, at 1.508, or Hera at 16.440.[52] Hera, we notice, can be sharp, and less than respectful, when speaking with her husband (as wives can); but Zeus in turn will remind his wife of his status and she in fear respects that (1.560–570).[53] Hera is of higher status than most other gods. So it is not surprising that, on being angered, she addresses Artemis harshly (κύον ἀδεές, shameless bitch, 21.481) and boxes her ears (21.489–492). In Homer's *Iliad* gods will be even more respectful, as are mortals, if they are making a request of someone higher in the social hierarchy; or if they see that such a strategy will in some way be to their advantage. Thus Thetis' request to Zeus is, as I have noted, properly deferential: she recognizes the great difference between herself, a sea nymph, and the king of gods and men—and, of course, she very much wants her request on her son's behalf to succeed.[54] And when Hera, a senior goddess, negotiates with Aphrodite and Sleep in *Iliad* 14, she is amiability itself, addressing her social inferiors with terms of respect and affection as she blandly tells the lies she must tell if she is to achieve her ends.

As to 'age', although the immortals are said to be ageless, they are not all of one age. Some gods are seen to be 'younger' than others. This generational difference, especially in the case of divine parents and their

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[52] On formal and informal address terms and the measure of social distance see Holmes (1995) 10, 15–19. Negative politeness (using a formal address term) expresses distance and emphasizes power distinctions; the use of an informal address term, such as a nickname, reflects a closer relationship between the participants. Hera's formality at 16.440 may indicate a temporary increase in social distance (a mark of her disapproval). Even so, the address term itself is a mark of Zeus' status.

[53] See, for example, 1.540 (δολομῆτα, treacherous one). Likewise, in the television series *West Wing*, the President's wife is the only person who can call her husband a jackass. In the *Iliad*, Hera, like Dr Bartlet, speaks with stinging words (κερτομίοισι, 539). The use of *dolomêta* (540) reflects a close (but not necessarily happy) relationship between speaker and addressee: it is not a friendly insult.

[54] Contrast Thetis' request of Zeus with her request of Hephaistos at 18.429–461. We do not see the same elaborate address terms in her request of Hephaistos; she omits an *argumentum*; and her request, unlike the request of a prayer, is indirectly phrased. Why do we find such differences? First, her request to Hephaistos is not as momentous in its implications as is her request to Zeus; and second, although Hephaistos is an Olympian, and although he, like Zeus, is in her debt (18.394–405), he is not of the same high status as Zeus (as the laughter of the gods at 1.599–600 shows). Thetis acknowledges Hephaistos' special psychological needs in her use of a less direct form of request. For further commentary see Minchin (2007) 205.

children, is reflected in address terms that indicate parental affection—or parental anger: Dione speaks gently to her daughter Aphrodite at 5.373–374; Zeus chides his daughter Artemis affectionately (21.509–510), but speaks harshly to Ares, his son (5.889–898). Indeed, Ares regularly attracts address terms that mark either his inferior status or his immaturity: Athena's scornful νηπύτι' (you baby!), at 21.410, does both.

And now to gender and power. The squabbles that we observe throughout the *Iliad* between Zeus and Hera illustrate very neatly for us the gender-based tensions that arise when male desire for autonomy runs up against female desire for involvement.[55] Homer, with his instinct for comic potential, has extended the natural tensions of many real-world mortal relationships to the divine couple who rule on Olympos. Hera's unreasonable accusations, her sulky silences, her protests, and her deceit characterize a woman frustrated at being kept out of the loop by her husband. Three speech genres—rebukes, threats, and protests—mark distinctions of gender and power most clearly. Zeus' relationship with Hera—and with Athena, his daughter, the most active pro-Achaian gods—is punctuated by a series of exchanges throughout the poem in which Zeus issues rebukes and utters threats and the goddesses register protests at his injunctions. The poet's attribution of threats and rebukes to Zeus marks his ascendancy; the goddesses' protests register *and realize* their lack of power—at least *vis-à-vis* the king of gods and men.[56] In fact, however, in other contexts Athena is dominant: to her alone amongst the gods does Homer attribute that speech genre that we associate so firmly with mortal men, the heroes of the *Iliad*–the speech of triumph, or the boast.[57] At 21.410–414 and 428–433 Athena exults over, first, Ares, and, second, Ares and Aphrodite. Here, towards the end of the epic, Homer confirms what we have long suspected: that Athena has much more battle-lust within her than does the god of war himself. In this family on Olympos gender stereotypes are both confirmed and challenged.

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[55] On men's and women's talk in the everyday anglophone world, see Holmes (1995) 7; Minchin (2007) 145–147.

[56] Goody (1978) 38–39 argues from her ethnographic perspective that status and social roles constrain the ways in which we speak to each other. But in more recent sociolinguistic work we find the interesting claim that utterances are acts that not only *reflect* status but also *construct* differences of status amongst speakers: see, e.g., Troemel-Ploetz (1998) 449. Certainly, in the *mimesis* of communication, such as we observe here, differences of status are constructed by the nature of the talk.

[57] See Martin (1989) 228 on the boast as the 'warrior's rhetoric of heroism'.

I conclude by drawing a distinction between majesty and divinity. The majesty of the gods—their dignity and their authority—is conveyed through demonstration of the great powers that I noted above: the gods' ability to take on all forms of disguise, their speed; their strength; their ability to cry out, or speak, at a louder volume than any man. The poet also conveys majesty through aspects of non-verbal communication (Zeus' great nod of assent to Thetis at 1.528–530 is a powerful expression of authority). And, of course, we must remember the great respect and reverence felt by mortals for their gods in their rare encounters with them and in their prayers and their offerings.[58] *Their* attitude, *their* responses, and *their* actions are a sure measure of divine majesty. But the only forms of speech used by the gods between themselves that recognize dignity and authority are their formal address terms: 'Hera, honoured goddess and daughter of mighty Kronos' (14.194, 243), 'Zeus of the counsels, lord of Olympos' (1.508). In all other respects (except perhaps the poet's restrained use of soliloquies) there is nothing *majestic* in the speech of the gods. On the other hand, their speech suggests *divinity* (that is, quite simply, that they are gods). The wisdom sayings of the gods, their speeches of lament, and consolation, reveal their different, divine, perspective on the world. The poet's decision to reveal them to us as occasionally petty and bad-tempered, rebellious and defiant, needing to be coaxed into politeness and good behaviour, and his readiness to let them lie and deceive and tease their fellow-gods without compunction reveal the gods as a race that often, and surprisingly to our Judaeo-Christian perceptions, lacks majesty. This deficiency can be best explained if we accept that the gods behave in this way simply because they can. The gods need not fear the consequences of their actions, as mortals must. Their carefree existence, in fact, identifies them as gods, and it throws into relief the lot of mankind, for whom life is a struggle—and always ends in death.[59] The gods' lack of majesty is, in part, a neat solution to a literary problem: how to underscore the general seriousness of the heroes of the *Iliad*, their sense of duty and of responsibility, and their nobility.[60] So it is through the poet's choice of speech genres and discourse options, and through the

[58] Cf. Chryses' address terms at 1.37–39; the Trojans' at 6.305; Achilleus' at 16.233–235. The reaction of Achilleus to Athena, and his words, at 1.197–218, indicate reverence, as do Hektor's words to Hekabe at 6.264–285. For discussion, see Griffin (1980) 148–156.

[59] These thoughts are well-expressed at 24.525–535; and in Griffin (1980) 191.

[60] And, indeed, Redfield (1975) 76 dismisses the gods as 'literary gods' and the religion of the *Iliad* as a 'literary religion'. But see Dietrich (1986) 179–183; Kirk (1990) 1–14. Certainly, the gods of the *Iliad* transcend the roles and functions assigned to them by

intensity with which he deploys some and avoids others, that the contradictory qualities of his gods are evoked. The discourse of the gods will not leave us with a lasting impression of their grandeur, but it will, paradoxically, remind us of just who they are, as divinities.

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CHAPTER TWO

ENTER THE DIVINE: SYMPOTIC PERFORMANCE AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Fiona Hobden

How religious was the symposion? At first glance, the answer seems self-evident. At the symposia dramatized by the fourth-century philosophers Plato and Xenophon, guests pour a libation and sing to the gods before turning their attention towards drinking and entertainment.[1] These ritual elements also feature in a verse composed for the symposion just over a century before. The philosopher-poet Xenophanes of Colophon not only recommends that the sympotic audience perform libations, make prayers, and sing hymns, but also conjures up a symposion bedecked with garlands, perfume, incense, and an altar: the signs of religious celebration (1 W). It is no surprise, then, that to Athenaeus (192b), with his encyclopaedic knowledge of Greek commensal literature from the Archaic and Classical periods, it appeared that 'Every gathering among the ancients to celebrate a symposion acknowledged the god as the reason (*aitian*) for it, and made use of garlands appropriate to the gods as well as hymns and songs'.[2] In these various imaginings, religious ritual and its associated paraphernalia were essential features of the symposion.[3]

This did not escape the notice of early scholars. Von der Mühll (1975, 488–489), writing originally in 1926, recognized 'daß das Symposion eigentlich ein sakraler Akt ist', and he even drew a comparison with Mystery initiation on account of its purification rituals, garland-wearing, and

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[1] I am grateful to Julia Kindt, this volume's reviewers, and audiences at the Universities of Liverpool, Manchester, Radboud Nijmegen, and Sydney for their responses to earlier versions of this paper.

Pl. *Symp.* 176a; Xen. *Symp.* 2.1; cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 249–250, where these sympotic features are projected into Agamemnon's *andrôn*.

[2] πᾶσα δὲ συμποσίου συναγωγὴ παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις τὴν αἰτιάν εἰς θεὸν ἀνέφερε, καὶ στεφάνοις ἐχρῶντο τοῖς οἰκείοις τῶν θεῶν καὶ ὕμνοις καὶ ᾠδαῖς.

[3] Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 615b, where the krater in the middle of the room and the garlands distributed amongst drinkers are set there by Dionysus as a mark of freedom.

communion with the god. These 'cultic' elements fundamentally affected Von der Mühll's understanding of the sympotic group. It was no mere 'Gesellschaft', a community bound by socio-political ties, but a 'Thiasos', a religious band. Yet, since the revival of sympotic studies approximately thirty years ago little has been made of this aspect. That is not to say it is denied. For Easterling (1985, 39–41), pondering the performance of libations and reading Xenophanes' poem, religion was integral to the symposion. However, her interest lies in the parameters of Greek religion, and her analysis proves the insubstantiality of modern notions like 'secular' and 'sacred' which coincide in the action of the symposion. The consequences of this coinicidence, when drinking and socializing meet libations and prayers, are understandably not explored. Lissarrague (1990a, 25–26) too has observed the importance of religious ritual, adding to the mix of evidence an altar in a red-figure symposion scene.[4] But his symposion remains 'near religious' in character, as though any sacred forms must be subordinated to a secular function. And while Murray (1990, 10) extols the on-going recognition that religion cannot be dissociated from commensality, items in his seminal collection, *Sympotica*, do not address the religiosity of the symposion head on.[5] It is as if, with the religious dimension established as imbedded, no further attention need be paid. To take one final example, Henderson's survey (2000, 7) of the 'development, function, activities and nature of the symposion' is also indicative of this attitude. In a short paragraph, he notes that libations and paeans 'constantly emphasized the essentially religious and ritualistic nature of the function' (11), before swiftly moving on. Religion plays no role in his analysis of the processes and sociological functions of sympotic practice. Attention is focused squarely upon the mundane.

In sum, although modern understanding of the symposion has advanced dramatically since Von der Mühll posited his symposion-thiasos, particularly through new readings that place sympotic poetry and art in their performance contexts, the ways in which the symposion can be

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[4] The vessel is an Attic red-figure stamnos attributed to the Copenhagen Painter, c.480: Oxford, Ashmolean Museum 1965.127 (*ARV*^{2} 258.21, 1640). It thus belongs to the same milieu as the cups decorated by the Brygos and Triptolemos Painters and Onesimos that are discussed below.

[5] Again, religious aspects are recognized but not pushed. For Schmitt-Pantel (1990; cf. 1992) and Tomlinson (1990), the influences of sympotic celebrations as a distinct 'ritual of conviviality' are found within civic festivals and at the Perachora *hestiatorion*, respectively. Bergquist (1990) identifies sympotic space within temple and domestic architecture, but does not explore the overlap.

considered a religious phenomenon and might facilitate religious experience have not been tested. Increased awarness that in ancient Greece 'the sacred was seen as parallel to and co-ordinate with the other [non-sacred] realm' has not filtered meaningfully into sympotic studies.[6] It is time, therefore, to cast a fresh eye on the symposion, to ask how it was a 'religious' phenomenon, and to address its significance. Moving beyond ritual practice, this paper will argue that the verbal and visual discourses of the symposion conceptualized and instantiated it as a sacred space and a Dionysian revel, and repeatedly conjured up the divine. This analysis is informed particularly by readings of Greek poetry and art as performative, and it proceeds on the grounds that lyric poetry *qua* sympotic song and the paintings that confronted symposiasts on their drinking vessels were potentially constructive. To follow Calame (1995), songs gain effect in the moment of enunciation: they conjure up presents, create identities for singers and addressees, and build narratives. Thus, when symposiasts sang to one another about the symposion, their performances could influence their awareness of the immediate surroundings.[7] Likewise, images on Greek drinking vessels spoke to their audiences.[8] Hence, as Lissarrague first showed (and others have followed) sympotic scenes enrapt their viewers in dialogues that could challenge, alter, or confirm self- and world-views.[9] The performance of songs and the reading of vase-paintings—the orality and literacy of the symposion—could thereby stimulate and define experience amongst members of the drinking group. By bringing references to religious practice in the literary and material evidence within this interpretative framework, this paper identifies the creation of religious experience in the symposion in its verbal and visual conversations.[10] It thereby enhances understanding of the symposion as a cultural phenomenon and emphasizes the performative dynamics of Greek religion too.

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[6] Quoting Connor (1988) 164, who explores this hypothesis through Classical Athens.

[7] Stehle (1997) 213–261 applies this perspective to the poetry of the symposion, but thinks about identity construction rather than constructing sympotic experience. Hobden (forthcoming) addresses the latter.

[8] For this central dynamic, see Bérard et al (1989).

[9] Lissarrague (1990a, 1990b, 1992); see also, for example, Miller (1991), Neer (2001), Osborne (2007), and Topper (2009).

[10] Note that awarding priority to text and pictures as performative embraces recommendations laid out for the study of religion generally by Pence Frantz (1998).

Divining the Symposion

Sights, Sounds, and Sensations: Enacting Xenophanes' Symposion

In our quest for the religiously significant symposion, Xenophanes' first poem (1 W) is an excellent starting point. It progresses from the description of a ritually cleansed space in which garlands are worn, frankincense is burned, and flowers bedeck an altar, to issue incitements to 'men of good cheer' (*euphronas andras*, line 13) to sing hymns of holiness and purity, pour libations and pray for the guidance of the gods, and always to keep the good of the gods in mind. The imagined event is characterized by purity and holiness: hands, tables, and cups are 'pure' (*katharon*) (lines 1–2), as are the water (line 8) and the words uttered in hymn (line 14), while the frankincense smells 'holy' (*hagnên*) (line 7) and the hymn (again) should be 'auspicious' (*euphêmois*) (line 14). And it provides a setting for communion with and continuous recollection of the divine. By general agreement, Xenophanes' poem projects an ideal and provides instructions to a sympotic audience by promoting a traditional sympotic form and a style of poetic discourse that will guarantee enjoyment and probity.[11] In essence, Xenophanes recommends an occasion where setting, action, and word are religiously attuned.

Yet, the first part of the poem is not merely descriptive, but, when performed in the symposion, deictic:

> Now (*nun*) the floor is clean and everyone's hands and the cups too; someone distributes (*amphitithei*) woven garlands, and another person offers (*parateinei*) sweet-smelling perfume in dishes; a krater stands (*hestêken*) full of cheer; other wine stands ready, which they say will never run out, gentle in jugs, smelling (*ozomenos*) of flowers. In the middle wafts (*hiêsin*) the holy scent of frankincense, and there is (*estin*) water, cool and sweet and pure; golden breads are set (*parkeatai*) and a lordly table heaving (*achthomenê*) with cheese and thick honey; an altar is entirely covered (*pepukastai*) in the middle with flowers, and song and festivity pervade (*echei*) the room.[12] (Xenophanes 1.1–12 W)

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[11] See Ford (2002) 53–58; Collins (2004) 148.

[12] νῦν γὰρ δὴ ζάπεδον καθαρὸν καὶ χεῖρες ἁπάντων /καὶ κύλικες· πλεκτοὺς δ' ἀμφιτιθεῖ στεφάνους, /ἄλλος δ' εὐῶδες μύρον ἐν φιάληι παρατείνει· /κρητὴρ δ' ἕστηκεν μεστὸς ἐυφροσύνης· /ἄλλος δ' οἶνος ἑτοῖμος, ὃς οὔποτέ φησι προδώσειν, /μείλιχος ἐν κεράμοις, ἄνθεος ὀζόμενος· /ἐν δὲ μέσοις ἁγνὴν ὀδμὴν λιβανωτὸς ἵησιν, /ψυχρὸν δ' ἐστὶν ὕδωρ καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ καθαρόν· /παρκέαται δ' ἄρτοι ξανθοὶ γεραρή τε τράπεζα /τυροῦ καὶ μέλιτος πίονος ἀχθομένη· /βωμὸς δ' ἄνθεσιν ἂν τὸ μέσον πάντηι πεπύκασται, /μολπὴ δ' ἀμφὶς ἔχει δώματα καὶ θαλίη.

The opening 'now' locates the singer and his audience temporally and spatially in the moment of performance. From the first, they are locked in the 'here and now', as a real-time symposion unfolds around them in the present or perfect-present tense. In this way reference is made to the immediate action and setting: the anonymous servants performing their tasks, a standing krater, frankinscence floating in their midst (*en mesois*), ready wine jugs, the scent of flowers, a table heaving with food, a flower-strewn altar, and all-pervasive song and cheer. The singer thus directs the symposiasts' gaze around the room, towards the serving staff and amidst the sympotic group, to the sympotic furniture, and beyond, to the prevalent atmosphere. In the process, other senses are stimulated: the listener's nose smells wine and frankincense in the air; the cool sweetness of water is anticipated on the tongue; song fills his ears. Xenophanes' symposion thus becomes the listener's symposion. By following the singer's gaze to the 'purified' tables, cups, and hands and to the altar and by attuning his nose to the 'holy' frankincense—a staple cult offering—the symposiast finds himself in a religiously informed space.[13] And, if the group adopts Xenophanes' gnomic advice, soon auspicious and pure hymns, libations, and prayers for guidance will ensue (lines 13–16). The good of the gods will be held in mind (θεῶν ⟨δὲ⟩ προμηθείην αἰὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθήν, line 24).

Of course, the constructive dynamics of this verse can be read in reverse, so that in the wake of the poem's 'now' a disjunction between the present and imagined event emerges. This song performed in a room without, for example, flowers or an altar or tables loaded with food, or lacking strains of frankincense could reveal the party's inadequacies (no washed hands, no burning incense, no altar). The poem thereby critiques contemporary custom through difference.[14] However, thinking about the self-reflexivity of visual representations of the symposion, Osborne (2007, 34) has noted that 'A sympotic image on a cup puts the viewer in his place [i.e. in the symposion] only if the viewer can imagine that what he sees on the cup he might also see around him'. He continues, using the example of nude *aulos* girls in sympotic scenes: 'While it is not necessary that the viewer will have been at a symposion at which women were brought in who played the *aulos* naked, it is necessary that such a possibility is one that he can entertain.' The same principle of perception

[13] The role of frankincense in cult offerings is explained by Burkert (1985) 62.

[14] So Faraone (2008) 117 reads the poem as a chastisement and a counter-example to on-going entertainments.

could apply to this aurally, visually, and olphactorily construed event. By hooking its description onto standard features of the symposion—cups, garlands, kraters, jugs of wine and water, tables with food—differences are extinguished as the symposiast appreciates his surroundings anew. In this sense, Xenophanes' poem operates as a speech act. It does not simply depict a sanctified symposion, but, in the moment of performance (filling the room with song and cheer, 1.12) it nuances the immediate event in anticipation of further religiously-infused conversation and song.

Dionysian Dramatics

Xenophanes' symposion might be considered a broadly 'religious' event because it is adorned with markers of ritual action: cleansed equipment and bodies, garlands, offerings of incense, and an altar. Moreover, its participants may soon be communing directly with the gods. Two exhortatory poems attributed to the late sixth-century singer Anacreon of Teos, moreover, lend the symposion a distinctly Dionysian air. The first styles the occasion of its performance as a celebration of Dionysus:

> Placing garlands of celery (*selinôn stephaniskous*) upon our brows, let us lead the bounteous feast (*thaleian heortên*) to Dionysus.[15]
>
> (Anacreon 410 Page)

The garlands of celery that the audience are to adopt are more commonly associated with victory at the athletic festivals in honour of Poseidon and Zeus at Isthmia and Nemea. Here, they are preparations for the 'bounteous feast' (*thaleian heortên*) (line 2) to Dionysus that the listeners are invited as a group to keep. This description, of course, does not use the term symposion. It could be argued that the 'feast' precedes the sympotic component of a larger festive celebration, bearing in mind that drinking together usually followed a communal meal. However, such manouevring is unnecessary. Anacreon's instructions highlight the religious associations of his audience's costume, and set the festivities at which they are sung—which for the arch-symposiast Anacreon we would expect to be the drinking party—in a Dionysian frame. Performed at the symposion, his song obtains instant resonance.

While some uncertainty must remain regarding the precise venue for the poem above, the second Anacreontic verse establishes an expressly

[15] ἐπὶ δ' ὀφρύσιν σελίνων στεφανίσκους /θέμενοι θάλειαν ἑορτὴν ἀγάγωμεν /Διονύσωι.

sympotic context through exhortations to a serving boy to bring jugs and mix water with wine:

> Come, boy, and bring us a jug, so that I might drink a deep draft, filling the kyathoi ten of water and five of wine so that I might rave like the Bassara (*anabassarêsô*) without offence (*anubristôs*) once more.[16]
>
> (Anacreon 356a Page)

In this verse, the singer's aspiration to 'rave like a Bassara' (*anabassarêsô*) (line 6) is illuminating because the terminology is particularly associated with Dionysian cult. In Aeschylus' lost play, the *Bassarides*, the eponymous protagonists named for their fox-skin apparel were the female followers of Dionysus charged with dismembering Orpheus on Mount Pangion.[17] On at least one known occasion, these mythical acolytes of Dionysus crossed over into the realm of ritual performance in the polis, during the spectacular Dionysian *pompê* that heralded the accession of Ptolemy Philadelphus at Alexandria in 285 BCE. Behind the fifteen-foot statue of the god, they processed together with Macedonian women called Mimallones and Lydae, their hair streaming, crowned with garlands, and carrying yew, vines, and ivy.[18] Furthermore, the special relationship between the Bassarides and their god informed Dionysus' cultic identity: he is hailed 'Bassare' in two Orphic Hymns.[19] Wishing to 'rave like a Bassara' is thus a loaded desire because it incorporates the singer into a tradition of Dionysian revelry and worship that transforms his sympotic drinking into a devotional act.

The ramifications of this transformation should not be overstated or invested with august solemnity. After all, the singer's self-fashioning as a foxskin-wearing Thracian maenad initiates some playful gender-bending appropriate to both the occasion and the persona of the poem's composer, Anacreon.[20] Yet, fervour can also be detected in the qualificatory aspiration to rave like the Bassara 'without offence' (*anubristôs*). This wish is usually interpreted as an expression of social intent: the singer

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16 ἄγε δὴ φέρ' ἡμὶν ὦ παῖ /κελέβην, ὅκως ἄμυστιν /προπίω, τὰ μὲν δέκ' ἐγχέας /ὕδατος, τὰ πέντε δ' οἴνου /κυάθους ὡς ἀνυβρίστως /ἀνὰ δηὖτε βασσαρήσω. I have adopted the reading of Campbell (1988) in line 5.

17 Ps-Eratosthenes 24 p. 140 Rob = Orph. test. 113 Kern. Anacreon elsewhere alludes to Διονύσου σαῦλαι Βασσαρίδες, 'Dionysus' sashaying Bassarides' (411b Page).

18 Callixeinus 58–62 Rice = Athen. 198e.

19 Orph. *H.* 45.1, 52.12 Quandt. See Morand (2001) 246.

20 On Anacreon's transvestism in the symposion's visual economy, see Frontisi-Ducroux and Lissarrague (1990). Cross-dressing is of course associated with Dionysus as well: see Bremmer (1999), who also highlights the religious-ritual settings for transvestism in myth and cult.

recommends a weak mixture, two parts water to one part wine, in order to avoid disrupting the party with violent or offensive outbursts of the kind detailed by Eubulus when it proceeds to the fourth krater and beyond (fr. 94 K).[21] The poem's companion piece—compressed by Athenaeus (427b) into the same poem but more likely an answering verse—seems to support this reading:

> Come now, no longer amidst clatter and hullabaloo let us pursue Scythian drinking in our wine, but sip to fine hymns (*kalois humnois*).[22]
> (Anacreon 356b Page)

Here too disruptive practices are shunned in favour of modest entertainments, in this case sipping wine to fine hymns. Together, whether delivered as one or uttered responsively or competitively, the verses outline an appropriate etiquette for the symposion with modest drinking and harmonious discourse. But *hybris* can be a religious offence, a transgression against the order of the gods, a stepping beyond the bounds of their propriety.[23] Orpheus' dismemberment at the hands of the Bassarides, for example, was punishment for refusing to acknowledge Dionysus, an act of *hybris*.[24] To rave like a Bassara without *hybris* could mean to behave in a manner appropriate to the Dionysian occasion that will not bring offence to the god. This does not exclude the avoidance of discord (although as discord is an anticipated outcome, as per Eubulus, its propriety is complicated), but it reinforces the religious frame projected by the singer onto this social occasion. It is worth noting, too, that the companion poem calls specifically for fine hymns (*kalois hymnois*) (line 5), echoing Xenophanes' request. In this pair of poems, the singer crafts his revelling as, and urges his companions into a communion with the divine.

Indeed, another Anacreontic composition instigates just such a communion and even invites Dionysus into the symposion. In hymnic fashion it invokes lord Dionysus, establishing him in his lofty mountain terrain, before calling him down for aid:

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[21] Fisher (1992) 205–206.

[22] ἄγε δηὗτε μηκέτ' οὕτω /πατάγωι τε κἀλαλητῶι /Σκυθικὴν πόσιν παρ' οἴνωι /μελετῶμεν, ἀλλὰ καλοῖς /ὑποπίνοντες ἐν ὕμνοις.

[23] This traditonal interpretation is summarized by Fisher (1992) 2–3, although his study demonstrates that *hybris* can also be primarily social. However, there is a conjunction in the conceptualization of 'social' *hybris* and the emphasis on transgressive, overwheening offence that marks religious interpretations, suggesting that this is one more area in which a division between 'sacred' and 'non-sacred' should not be uncautiously applied.

[24] See n. 17.

> O Lord (*ônax*), with whom Eros the subduer and blue-eyed Nymphs and rosy Aphrodite play together, wandering the high mountain tops, I beseech you, come to us (*elth' hêmin*) well-disposed to hear our gracious prayer (*euchôlês*): become a good advisor to Cleobulus, that he receives my love, O Dionysus (*ô Deonuse*).[25] (Anacreon 357 Page)

The invocations (*ônax*, line 1; *ô Deonuse*, line 11) and the imperative laid upon Dionysus to 'come to us' (*elth' hêmin*) (line 7) need not be read as an expectation of literal presence.[26] But it does create an immanence: Dionysus is to become a good advisor to Cleobulus, a divine advocate for the singer's love (lines 9–11). His presence will be an effective one, confirmed in the singer's success with his beloved (or not). This prayer (*euchôlês*), as Anacreon terms his address, mirrors an appeal by Sappho (1 L–P) to Aphrodite for the goddess to come now (*elth'*, 1.5; *elthe moi kai nun*, 1.25) and to pursuade Sappho's beloved to return her affections and assuage her desire. Directed to Dionysus from within the symposion, however, Anacreon's request is more tangibly achieved: to quote Rosenmeyer (2004, 166), 'Dionysus' "playing" with Anacreon means getting his beloved boy drunk enough not to resist his sexual advances'. The singer urges the god to enter the symposion, where he is already physically present as wine.

The assumed assimilation of Dionysus to wine that underscores Anacreon's song is made explicit in Euenus of Paros' playful recommendation for drinking:

> The best measure of Bacchus is neither great nor too small; for he is the cause of grief and madness. And he delights in mixing his four with three Nymphs; for then he is most ready for the bed-chamber. But if he breathes strong, he turns back desire, and dips into sleep, the neighbour of death.[27] (Euenus 2 W)

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[25] ὦναξ, ὧι δαμάλης Ἔρως /καὶ Νύμφαι κυανώπιδες /πορφυρῆ τ' Ἀφροδίτη /συμπαίζουσιν, ἐπιστρέφεαι /δ' ὑψηλὰς ὀρέων κορυφάς· /γουνοῦμαί σε, σὺ δ' εὐμενὴς /ἔλθ' ἡμίν, κεχαρισμένης /δ' εὐχωλῆς ἐπακούειν· /Κλεοβούλωι δ' ἀγαθὸς γένεο /σύμβουλος, τὸν ἐμόν γ' ἔρω- /τ', ὦ Δεόνυσε, δέχεσθαι. See Furley (1995) for these formulae and strategies in Greek hymn generally: the mythical setting (sporting with Eros, Nymphs, and Aphrodite) alludes to the erotic power possessed by Dionysus that the singer seeks to harness. Cf. Goldhill (1984) 88, who emphasizes the Dionysian associations of mountain-tops.

[26] See Pulleyn (1997).

[27] Βάκχου μέτρον ἄριστον ὃ μὴ πολὺ μηδ' ἐλάχιστον· /ἔστι γὰρ ἢ λύπης αἴτιος ἢ μανίης. /χαίρει κιρνάμενος δὲ τρισὶν Νύμφαισι τέταρτος· /τῆμος καὶ θαλάμοις ἐστὶν ἑτοιμότατος. /εἰ δὲ πολὺς πνεύσειεν, ἀπέστραπται μὲν ἔρωτας, /βαπτίζε δ' ὕπνωι, γείτονι τοῦ θανάτου.

Wine is Bacchus, or rather Bacchus possesses the properties of wine. He can be measured and mixed; he causes grief and madness; and he can stimulate desire or submerge the drinker in sleep, depending on his strength. This materialisation of the god in wine recalls Tiresias' description of Dionysus to Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae*. Outlining the benefits of wine, which gives sleep and forgetfulness from daily troubles and is the only antidote to toil (281–283), he concludes, 'Being a god he is poured in libation to the gods, so that through him good things come to mankind' (οὗτος θεοῖσι σπένδεται θεὸς γεγώς / ὥστε διὰ τοῦτον τἀγάθ' ἀνθρώπους ἔχειν, 284–285).[28] The god and his gift are one and the same. Although Euenus shares this understanding, his poem gains a specific force in the symposion, where wine-drinking is in progress. The rhetorics of drinking and moderation that commonly circulate there are innovatively harnessed to project Dionysus into sympotic space: the audience is encouraged to conceptualize its wine as an instantiation of the god that maps onto its drinking experience, divinely infused. An elegiac couplet by Simonides plays a similar game, urging drinkers to cast aside nothing of Bacchus, not even a grape-pip (el. 24 W). Instructions for drinking again visualize Dionysus as the wine the symposiasts (are urged to) consume.

By these readings, the symposion, or more specifically the symposion described in and instigated by these poetic performances, is a self-consciously and self-productively Dionysian space. Symposiasts are celebrants, akin to Dionysus' mythological companions, the Bassarides. Dionysus infiltrates their revelry in action and in wine. A song composed by the fifth-century poet Ion of Chios incorporates these dynamics:

> To our chorus (*hêmeterôi chorôi*), beloved is wine 'which thrysus-bearing (*thursophoros*), greatly revered Dionysus provided', says Ion of Chios in his elegies, 'for it is the excuse of every conversation, the cheerful meetings of all the Hellenes and of lords, since the grape-clustering vine, having sent up subterranean shoots embraced the air in two abundant arms; and crowded children leapt forth from the eyes calling, whenever they fell one upon another, although earlier they were silent. But desisting from their shouts, they were pressed into nectar, the only common happiness (*olbion*) to mankind, the natural drug for gladness. Cheerfulness, dear children, friendship, and choruses (*choroi*): king wine (*basileus oinos*) revealed the nature of good things. For this, father Dionysus, pleasing to garland-loving

[28] In his commentary on this passage Dodds (1944) 100–101 suggests some broader cultic associations between the god and wine. See more recently Obbink (1993) 78–79.

> men, president (*prutani*) of cheerful symposia, greetings (*chaire*)! Grant long life, governor of good deeds, to drink and play and be mindful of justice.'[29] (Ion 26 W = Athen. 447d)

The opening line, paraphrased by Athenaeus, utilizes the generic term for a band of dancers and singers that performed at festivals in honour of the gods to style the symposion as 'our chorus' (*hêmeterôi chorôi*, line 1). The term can also have specifically Dionysian connotations: in the *Bacchae*, for example, the women of Thebes are reported to honour the new god Dionysus with 'honoured choruses' (*timôsas chorois*, line 220). Indeed, Hardie (2004, 19) observes that 'Dionysiac religion was quintessentially characterized by choric dance, where the *choros* represented the god's following, both in its secret *orgia* and also in its public cult manifestations'. The Dionysus acknowledged by Ion, the greatly-revered thyrsus-bearing god, certainly references his cultic persona. This god is a benefactor to the group; he bestows wine on the chorus and also receives a supplicatory prayer. In addition, as the source of wine, Dionysus is also in some sense the chorus' progenitor. In preface to his supplication—the portion of the prayer that normally extolls the gods' power—the singer pronounces an encomium to wine as the excuse for every conversation at cheerful gatherings. The praise culminates in the milking of grapes to produce 'nectar', the beverage of the gods. In this product, a gift of Dionysus, happiness (*olbion*) is guaranteed just as choruses find their geneses (line 9). And once again, through the regal appellation of the wine as 'king' (*basileus*, line 12), a Dionysian title, a collision occurs between the god and his wine.

The close relationship that Ion establishes between the sympotic group, styled as a chorus, and Dionysus, through/as the gift of wine, is extended by the closing exhortation. Using the traditional hymnic formulation, the singer greets Dionysus with a *chaire*. But the singer also addresses the god as 'president' (*prytani*) of cheerful symposia (line 14). Once more the

[29] τῷ δὲ ἡμετέρῳ χορῷ οἶνος φίλος ὃν θυρσοφόρος μέγα πρεσβεύων Διόνυσος, /φησὶν Ἴων ὁ Χῖος ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις· /αὕτη γὰρ πρόφασις παντοδαπῶν λογίων, /αἵ τε Πανελλήνων ἀγοραὶ θαλίαι τε ἀνάκτων, /ἐξ οὗ βοτρυόεσσ' οἰνὰς ὑπὸ χθονίων /πτόρθον ἀνασχομένη θαλερῶι ἐπτύξατο πήχει /αἰθέρος· ὀφθαλμῶν δ' ἐξέθορον πυκινοὶ /παῖδες, φωνήεντες ὅταν πέσηι ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλωι, /πρὶν δὲ σιωπῶσιν· παυσάμενοι δὲ βοῆς /νέκταρ ἀμέλγονται, μόνον ὄλβιον ἀνθρώποισιν /ξυνὸν τοῦ χαίρειν φάρμακον αὐτοφυές. /τοῦ θαλίαι φίλα τέκνα φιλοφροσύναι τε χοροί τε· /τῶν ἀγαθῶν ⟨...⟩ βασιλεὺς οἶνος ἔδειξε φύσιν. /τῶι σὺ, πάτερ Διόνυσε, φιλοστεφάνοισιν ἀρέσκων /ἀνδράσιν, εὐθύμων συμποσίων πρύτανι, /χαῖρε· δίδου δ' αἰῶνα καλῶν ἐπιήρανε ἔργων, /πίνειν καὶ παίζειν καὶ τὰ δίκαια φρονεῖν. I have adopted Gentili-Prato's reading μόνον in line 9 instead of West's reading πόνον.

god is enticed into the symposion, this time in a leading role akin to that of mortal symposiarch or potarch. While King Wine will reveal nature's goodness to drinkers (line 12), Dionysus, as master of good deeds, will ensure drinking, playfulness, and just thinking to his fellow symposiasts (line 16). He is charged with guiding his worshipping coterie.

The above songs construct a discourse on the symposion as a religious space. Their constructive reflections define sympotic space as a venue for prayers, libations, hymns and attention to the gods (Xenophanes, Anacreon) or present their garlanding and drinking (Anacreon) and choral revelry (Ion) as a feat of Dionysian worship. They also directly address Dionysus, enticing him to act in their midst as love-advisor (Anacreon) and president (Ion). And they recognize a divine presence in the symposiasts' wine (Euenus, Simonides, Ion). By consequence, the symposion is projected to listening symposiasts as—and through hymn actually constitutes—a communion with the divine.

Reading Religious Experience

If the spoken conversations of the symposion attuned the enjoyments and endeavours of the symposiasts to the divine, so too did the images that drinkers perused on their crockery. In particular, visual markers of cultic activity and Dionysian revelry in sympotic scenes delineated the depicted event, with potential repercussions for the drinker's real-word perceptions. A selection of red-figure kylikes (drinking cups) produced in Athens between approximately 500 and 480 BCE provide a firm insight into this process. To begin with, the most striking way in which the religiousness of the symposion is accomplished is through the most ubiquitious, and so most unstriking of imagery. Depictions abound of symposiasts garlanded with wreaths. This costume is a precursor to religious celebration (as Anacreon noted) and a constant marker of it (symposiasts are garland-loving in Ion's prayer). Its continual and consistent iconographical presence sets off the sympotic action from the non-ritual world. Hence, at symposia depicted on the three surfaces of a cup attributed to the Brygos Painter, all participants, whether drinking men, serving boys, or female entertainers, are adorned with garlands.[30] Moreover, their garlands—made from ivy leaves—are recognizably Dionysian. Like the grape-vine, ivy is firmly associated with Dionysus; we have already heard

[30] London, British Museum E68 (*ARV*^{2} 371.24, 1649): Boardman (1975) fig. 253.

of it in the hands of Bassarides, and in vase-painting it accompanies the god's epiphanies whether in 'mythological' revelries or scenes of cult worship.[31] Thus, during a Dionysian procession of maeands and satyrs depicted on the outside of another cup decorated by the Brygos Painter, the god himself bears ivy branches which, on the tondo, wrap themselves around the god and his satyric coterie.[32] Moreover, on the interior of our first cup, ivy not only adorns heads but also the table on which sits the symposiast's cup, bringing Dionysus inside again at least figuratively. Whether or not the viewer's real-time symposion was decked out in ivy, its image, cojoined here to another manifestation of the god—wine—encourages the viewer to recall the Dionysian connotations of his current occupation.

Kômos scenes which depict the revelry that brought drinkers to and from a party can also trigger reminders of the religious dimension. These often depict drunken carousals, some occasionally involving violence. But some also reinforce the 'choreutic' dimenson of the revel by prioritizing music and dance. Again, participants are commonly garlanded. Moreover, in a *kômos* painted by the Triptolemus Painter to accompany an interior sympotic scene, music is provided by a bearded man who throws his head back and sings to the accompaniment of his own lyre and by a youth with castanet-like krotala in his hands.[33] Around them, young men prance and tumble to their melody and percursive beat. Their musical frenzy bears comparison with the Brygos Painter's Dionysian tondo, where the god, plucking his lyre, sings with his head right back, and satyrs, garbed in animal skins rather than a cloak, move to the rhythm of their krotala and the lyric melody. Komast and god share the 'ecstatic' pose.[34] Meanwhile, their companions, naked youths and satyrs, execute a rhythmic music and dance of the kind that could inspire trance and which, according to later writers, put performers in touch with the divine.[35] Human and Dionysian choruses merge in the imagery. Moreover, choreutic associations can invade sympotic scenes:

[31] Ivy is a pervasive part of Dionysus' iconography from the earliest black-figure productions: see the images discussed by Carpenter (1986).

[32] Paris, Cabinet des Médailles 576 (*ARV*^{2} 371.14, 1649): Lissarrague (2001) 206–207, figs. 164–165.

[33] Florence, Museo Archeologico Etrusco 1B31 (*ARV*^{2} 421.80): *CVA* Firenze, Regio Museo Archeologico 1, pls. 376, 384, 400, 401.

[34] Lissarrague (1990a) 131, comparing depictions of singing symposiasts to descriptions of Dionysiac revelry in Euripides and Pindar, argues that 'To have the neck bent back is typical of a certain kind of Dionysiac ecstasy'.

[35] See Hardie (2004) 21, with nn. 22 and 42, quoting Strabo and Proclus.

whilst his companions drink and talk, a symposiast to the far right of a second cup attributed to the Triptolemus Painter grasps his krotala, hinting at ecstactic and orgiastic revelry.[36]

Imbued with signs of ritual, these images project a sympotic mode of performance that is religious. However, the images on vase paintings were not only 'active' in the generation of ideas, but could elicit verbal utterances from their viewer. As Slater's (1999, 155) analysis of the 'vase as ventriloquist' observes, words on cups were designed to be spoken aloud, 'to create future performances'. Fragments from two pots decorated with scenes of libation and prayer accompanied by inscriptions therefore not only depict religious activity—like the cups discussed above—but initiate it. So, a prayer to Apollo issues from the mouth of a symposiast on a fragment of another Brygan cup: ΟΠΟΛΟΝ, or 'O Apollo'.[37] As Lissarrague (1990a, 130) notes, 'the salute to Apollo recalls the ritual quality of the symposion'. But the symposiast who traces out loud the written word mimics the depicted symposiast; the prayer to Apollo emanates from both their lips. On this utterance, the god is invoked anew at the symposion. A similar effect is created by the libations depicted on two fragments of a kylix painted by Onesimos.[38] On one sherd, a man crowned with a wreath and grasping a spear holds out a phiale and utters ΖΕΥ ΣΟΤΕΡ, 'Zeus Saviour'. Its companion piece depicts a kantharos held by a disembodied hand; over that hand flows the words ΣΠ]ΕΝΔΟ ΤΟΙ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΙ ΤΟΙ ΑΓΑΘ[ΟΙ, 'I pour a libation for the good daemon'. The former scene may be military, but the kantharos in the second fragment indicates a rare sympotic scene. The interplay between depiction and word is again dynamic. First, as Lissarrague (1995, 128) observes, the painter plays an iconographic game in the second quotation, where the words spoken by the missing figure accompany the trajectory of the proposed libation. But moreover, when the viewer reads those words aloud, he enacts the libation. The lines between the plastic world of the cup and the sympotic world he inhabits blur: Zeus and the Agathon Daimon are called upon to join symposiasts and guarantee their activities once more.[39] When the painted symposiast sings to Apollo or pours

[36] Berlin, Schloss Charlottenburg F2298 (*ARV*² 364.52): Schäfer (1997) pl. 17.1, 3.

[37] Paris, Cabinet des Médailles 546, 583 (*ARV*² 372.26): Lissarrague (1990a) 130, fig. 100, and Lissarrague (2001) 35, figs. 24–25.

[38] Athens, National Museum, Acropolis Collection 434 (*ARV*² 330.5): Lissarrague (1995) 128, fig. 2.

[39] On the communicative purpose of the libation, see Easterling (1985) 40.

a libation, the viewer, recreating the pictorial performance, communes with the gods too.

In the slice of sympotic representation for a sympotic audience studied so far, garnered from a single place in a focused period of time, the imagery of costume and ritual on figured drinking vessels can be instrumental in shaping the sympotic viewer's appreciation of his present employment as religious and drawing him into a relationship with the divine. This process is extended by scenes that introduce gods into the symposion to mix with the mortals there. For example, on the tondo of a Laconian black-figure phiale decorated c.565 BCE by the Naucratis Painter, five bearded symposiasts recline on the ground (albeit inside, as the suspended cups and drinking horns indicate), selecting nibbles from trays of food, holding drinking cups, and turning their heads towards one another as if in conversation. A disproportionately large krater, larger indeed than the boy who serves from it, stands between two of the guests.[40] So far, the stylized event is concomitant with the contemporary and future sympotic iconography, and it chimes with Xenophanes' imagined party too. But this symposion has additional features: two winged youths and two Sirens fly towards four of the symposiasts, each bearing a garland of leaves and a vine in their hands.[41] The winged youths are Erotes, gods of desire, and they bring the gifts of Dionysian festivity. These could be interpreted as abstract symbols of the sexual encounters that might be hoped for in the symposion.[42] But they might also represent a perceptible erotic (and hence divine) force. To return to sympotic song, for Anacreon—who also invites Dionysus along as a love advisor—Eros is a tangible presence who can initiate desire and influence behaviour: the god throws a ball at Anacreon and invites him to play with a braided-sandalled girl (358 Page); he strikes at the poet like a smith with a great axe and douses him in a wintry mountain-stream (413 Page); he causes the poet to fly towards Olympus (378 Page), and the poet flees from him (400 Page). In addition, the poet informs his audience that he can feel the draught of Eros' golden wings as he flies past (379 Page). Alcman too observes Eros landing playfully on the petals of his garland (58 Page). Eros is thus a tangible and active presence, and a pervasive one too. Indeed, participation in a symposion might automatically lead to an encounter with him:

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[40] Paris, Musée du Louvre E667: Dentzer (1982) fig. 107.

[41] Cf. Samos K1203, 1541, 2402: Dentzer (1982) fig. 109, which also features Sirens.

[42] On the erotics of the symposion, see Bremmer (1990) and Calame (1999).

> Bring water, bring wine, boy, bring flowering garlands to us, for I will spar with Eros.[43] (Anacreon 396 Page)

The imagery and the poetry both introduce Eros into the symposion, inviting the viewing and listening audience to identify the role of the god, and the role of desire, at the party they attend.

Conclusion

The conversations of the symposion, in verbal and visual form, thus project the symposion as a divinely inspired religious celebration: in performance, songs and images initiate attention to and communication with the divine. One might add that beyond poems and pictures dedicated to the sympotic experience, drinkers entertained themselves with mythological tales.[44] They sang epinicians, or praise poetry, that above all spoke to the gods, paeans addressed to divinities, and possibly also theoric songs.[45] The symposion was thus pervasively and self-enforcingly religious. It encompassed, first, an awareness on the part of the symposiasts that they engaged in a 'festive' occasion—a bounteous feast, or a Bassaridic revel, or a chorus; secondly, the repeated initiation of conversation with gods; and thirdly, the projection of deities into the sympotic space. Religion at the symposion was not ornamental, limited to a few libations and prayers to get the party started, but instead constituted a communion with the divine that emerged through personal and communal performance. In this respect, it was not so different to civic festivals where performative rituals, prayers, and staged epiphanies brought the worshipping community into contact with the divine.[46]

Thus, by setting songs for sympotic occasions alongside images that depict—and were originally viewed at—the event and exploring their

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[43] φέρ' ὕδωρ φέρ' οἶνον ὦ παῖ φέρε ⟨δ'⟩ ἀνθεμόεντας ἡμὶν /στεφάνους ἔνεικον, ὡς δὴ πρὸς Ἔρωτα πυκταλίζω.

[44] Much to the chagrin of Xenophanes in fact. In the unquoted portion of his metasympotic song, discussed above, the poet-philosopher instructs his audience to avoid tales of strife involving Titans, Giants and Centaurs, branding them as 'fabrications of yesteryear' (*plasmata tôn proterôn*) (1.21–23 W). For his rejection of mythological discourse, see Ford (2002) 57–58.

[45] See Bremer (2008) on the divine preoccupation of epinician, and Rutherford (2001) 50–52 on sympotic paean. Rutherford (2004) 74 proposes the symposion as a venue for songs originating in festivals.

[46] For our discussion of divine presence, Sinos (1998) 83–84, writing on the tangibility of the gods in ritual epiphany, is instructive.

performative dimensions, the symposion becomes indivisibly religious: sympotic experience was religious experience. However, the coherence of the image belies the diversity of the evidence. Our conclusion derives variously from: songs originally composed during the sixth to fifth centuries at disparate occasions in different *poleis*, although likely redeployed at future events; cups decorated by a small selection of painters at Athens during the opening decades of the fifth century that again circulated far and wide amongst non-Athenian audiences; a dish from Laconia, the home of the Spartans whose dining practices later Athenians like Critias (4 G.-Pr.) placed in ideological opposition to their own.[47] The resulting depiction of a religiously infused symposion is thus a composite: it arises from the conversations that men reclining and drinking together undertook, but these men may never have shared an *andrôn*, let alone a couch or a cup. Again, it is indicative of how possibilities for engagement with the divine lurked within communal gatherings that were focused on drinking through their potential conversations, rather than evidence that the symposion experienced uniformly across the board was essentially religious in format.

This is an important distinction because recent research requires us to loosen up the symposion, so that it becomes a mode of commensality with flexible format and effects, rather than an institution, a fixed event defined by clear-cut socio-political functions. The *andrôn* and couch for reclining have been dispensed with as integral components of the form, and the political aspects that supposedly gave sympotic meetings coherence have been re-evaluated and critiqued.[48] In their place remains communality through drinking, an understanding of 'sym-posion' that is both literal and relaxed and highlights the event as process. This allows an elasticity in its imagining by symposiasts. Anacreon does not turn the symposion into a literal feast or Bassaridic revel, for example, but through assertion and instruction his poetry nuances the personal and communal drinking as a Dionysian revel. Dionysus becomes the president of Ion's party as its guardian spirit and not a physically present and dictatorial boss. Indeed, for the period when Xenophanes

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[47] Of the Athenian pots discussed here, Florence 1B31 and Berlin F2298 have an Italian provenance. Only Athens 434 can be placed with certainty in the city where it was produced. Note, Dentzer (1982) 90–95 searches for possible indicators of difference from the Attic tradition in surviving Laconian ware.

[48] On the flexibility of sympotic venue and practice, see Lynch (2007); elite-focused activities and ideologies are problematized by Hammer (2004) and Corner (2005). Cf. Hobden (2009).

and Anacreon were first composing their songs and our painted pots were in production, sympotic gatherings, by and large, may have taken place at sanctuaries, presumably on festive occasions.[49] In physical as well as psychological terms, the celebrations of the symposion need not have been utterly dissociated from cult activity. Furthermore, possible precursors to the Archaic and Classical party have been found in the *stibas* and *theoxenia*, religious celebrations that involved outside dining, in the latter case on beds of twigs and leaves.[50] In such settings, the verbal and visual projections of the symposion as a religious event and the experience of communion with the divine would acquire further force.

If a coherence is to be found for the symposion, then, we must return to Von der Mühll's observation that the sympotic group was not simply a political or social unit, but a *thiasos* of sorts. In the commensal act, its participants were communally engaged in worship, seeking benefit and favour through festivity and hymn for the present gathering. The social bonds that are supposedly established through their shared drinking were further imbedded in religious experience. Men who drank together consumed the god together; in choruses they revelled like Bassarae and satyrs, and they experienced Eros in their sexual relations—again *with one another*. Libations, prayer, choreutic activity, and verbal/visual conversation emphasized the concordance of the sympotic group by uniting each participant in 'personal' and communal interaction with the divine. Separately and together, drinkers connected with the gods through ritual action and oral performance (sometimes stimulated by imagery) in a festive setting, and they encountered them physically through divinely-inspired action (playing, drinking, loving) and the altered pyschological states this entailed (drunkenness, passion). Whether or not a symposion was enjoyed at a specific religious location or occasion, awareness and experience of the divine through performance—implemented through the event's orality and literacy—enhanced the communality of the drinking group.

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[49] Bergquist (1990) posits domestic settings for symposia in the Archaic period, but her study reveals also that archaeologically identifiable dining rooms—with offset door and plinth for couches—are attested only in sacred buildings. But see Lynch (2007) on the flexibility and potential archaeological untraceability of sympotic space.

[50] Burkert (1991) 18.

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CHAPTER THREE

PAST AND PRESENT IN PINDAR'S RELIGIOUS POETRY

Maria Pavlou

Cult songs were composed in order to be performed within institutional festivals and rites which took place recurrently and had a fixed, or at least predictable, position in the religious and ceremonial calendar.[1] Mircea Eliade, in his seminal book entitled *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (1954), argued that, on account of their recurrent character, festivals and other ceremonials contribute to the abolition of time and the return to the mythical time of the beginning of things, which he called *illud tempus*. According to him, any acts, gestures, and narrative structures that take place within such events are not perceived merely as repetitions of the initial divine and heroic acts/gestures, but are believed to take place at that very primordial mythical moment. As a result, profane time and duration are suspended, and the celebrants are projected back into the mythical past and resume contact with the 'real sacred'.[2]

Even though it is a common allegation that festivals interrupt everyday profane time and mark the inauguration of a special time, Eliade's sweeping generalization, that all festivals serve to re-constitute the past and transport the participants to the primordial creative epoch, was much criticized because it throws everything into the same crucible overlooking particularities and variations.[3] Robert Parker, in his book *Polytheism and Society at Athens* (2005), offers a more nuanced approach, declaring that the merging of past and present is not an intrinsic characteristic of all festivals but merely one possible scenario. According to him, festivals can actually play tricks with time; apart from projecting participants into the mists of the past and collapsing past and present, festivals may also treat the past as if it were recurrent or present; they can even retroject

[1] I would like to express my gratitude to Ellen O'Gorman for her valuable and acute comments. Thanks should also go to the audience at the Orality and Literacy Conference for their suggestions and remarks, more particularly to André Lardinois.

[2] Eliade (1954) 34–35, 76, and *passim*. On the temporal qualities of festivals see also, Hubert (1999); Werner et al. (1988).

[3] See, among others, Kirk (1974) 63–66.

the present to the past.[4] In fact, as Parker points out, merely a handful of ancient sources testify to both a qualitative and quantitative collapse between past and present within a ritual framework and refer to the participants as being 'actual actors in the mythical events' narrated or reenacted. He does concede, however, that such 'sober' prose accounts do not necessarily reveal much about, and therefore should not be taken as reflecting, the participants' real feelings and actual experience.[5]

In this paper I will attempt to examine how Pindar speaks of, shapes, and configures the relation between past and present in his cult songs, especially his *Paeans* and *Dithyrambs*. What kind of temporality does his religious poetry serve to conjure up? Is this temporality always the same? Does *he* play any tricks with time? What role does he ascribe to himself, *qua* poet, in all this? What should to be stressed from the outset is that Pindar's cult songs are not merely descriptive of, but are also conducive to, a festival's sacred ambience. Moreover, they profoundly influence the intensity of the audience's religious experience, as well as the way in which they perceive and comprehend the relation between past and present. For purposes of comparison and illustration I will round off my discussion with a brief look at the *Epinicians*, the encomiastic songs that Pindar composed for victorious athletes. As will become clear, whereas scholars tend to treat and examine Pindar's epinician and religious poetry *ensemble*, the way in which Pindar negotiates the relation between past and present, and pitches his poetic *persona* in these two poetic genres differs considerably. This discrepancy, as I will suggest, can be explained by the different aims, etiquettes, and purposes of epinician and cult poetry respectively.[6]

Cult Songs

Let us begin our discussion with *Paean* 12 (Fr. 52m M.). From the opening lines it can be inferred that the poem was commissioned in

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[4] Parker (2005) 377–378. See also id. (1996) 273–274 where he refers to the foundation of 'commemoration' festivals in Greece in the third century BC.

[5] Parker (2005) 377–378.

[6] A note needs to be made here on terminology. There has been much discussion on the complex nature of the Pindaric narratorial 'I' and the various different identities it can assume. For purposes of convenience, in what follows I will be referring to the different 'Is' sylleptically, by using the terms 'Pindaric narrator', 'the poet' and 'Pindar'. The bibliography on the Pindaric 'I' is vast; see among others the informative discussions by Bremer (1990) 44–45 and Schmid (1998) 147–153.

order to accompany a Naxian *theoria* and sacrifice on Delos, while the local adverb *Naksothen* in line 6 seems to indicate that it was probably performed by a chorus of Naxians.[7] After an invocation to the nine Muses and Artemis, the paean embarks on the story about the birth of Apollo and Artemis on Delos. Through the mythical excursus the audience are projected back into the past and are vicariously transported to the time of origins, to that very moment when the divine twins first came into light:

ἔλαμψαν δ' ἀελίου δέμας ὅπω[ς
ἀγλαὸν ἐς φάος ἰόντες δίδυμοι
παῖδες, πολὺν ῥόθ[ο]ν ἵεσαν ἀπὸ στομ[άτων
Ἐ]λείθυιά τε καὶ Λάχεσις· τελέ[.]αι δ' ολ[
κα]τελάμβανον. [...]
..]**εφθέγξαντο δ' ἐγχώριαι**
ἀγ]λαὸς ἅς ἀν' ἔρκε[.]...[[8] (14–20)

The twin children shone like the sun
when they came into the splendid light,
and Eleithuia and Lachesis sent forth
much shouting from their mouths ...
were taking
and the local (women) proclaimed ...
the splendid ...

Unfortunately, the paean becomes fragmentary in line 20 with the reference to the local women who shouted and proclaimed the miraculous birth; accordingly, we do not know whether and how Pindar linked this mythical event to the performative part of the ode. Despite the poem's fragmentary condition, however, there is an element in the account which serves as a hinge between past event and present ritual: song. The birth-shouts of the local women of the myth are in a way reflected in the Naxian paean which celebrates the festive event of the divine birth on Delos *now*.[9] In this respect, the current chorus' reference to the local women functions as what Henrichs has called 'choral projection'.[10] The mythical, off-stage chorus is advanced into a mirror of the ritual chorus' own role and, as a result, the qualitative distance between past event and present ritual collapses. Yet, the association between past and present that Pindar tries to establish here has further, more intricate implications.

[7] Rutherford (2001) 366.
[8] All Pindaric passages and translations are taken from W.H. Race's Loeb edition (1997).
[9] See Kowalzig (2007) 60–63.
[10] Henrichs (1995) 75.

As Kowalzig points out, the local women mentioned in the myth could be associated with the Deliades, a professional group of young dancers and singers on Delos known for its paeans to Apollo and Artemis.[11] The link that Pindar draws between the Naxian chorus and the 'timelessly performing Deliades' fuses the temporal/historical song of the former with the atemporal/mythical song of the latter. Even though Pindar does not explicitly make the connection, past and present voices blend so smoothly that any overt association or parallelism would be redundant. As the poem progresses, the ritual chorus is almost divested of its *propria persona* as a group of Naxians commemorating a past event, and the impression is created that it performs simultaneously in both time spheres. To quote Kowalzig, the chorus 'are at once narrators of and actors in the story, performing in ritual what they are narrating in myth … Through the merging of the two different time levels, of performing and performed time, the chorus achieves the abolition and transcendence of real time.'[12] Seen from this perspective, the song of the Naxian chorus takes on the force of a speech act, as it does not merely describe what happened in the past, but also performs and partakes in the mythical event. Even though the adverb *thama* at 5 serves to counter the singularity and uniqueness of the present performance by linking it to a series of past performances, it is the song that acts as the hinge between past and present and which 'affords the trick of transcending time'.[13]

As yet another example we may consider *Paean* 2 (Fr. 52b M.), a poem composed for the Abderites (Tean colonists) in Thrace. Whereas it is difficult to pin down the poem's exact ritual context, it was most likely sung either during an annual celebration of the colony's founder Abderus, or during a recurrent festival of Apollo.[14] What makes this paean stand out is that the conventional myth section is here replaced

[11] Even though our accounts regarding the professional status of the Deliades come from the Hellenistic period, references to them in a number of poems (see, e.g. Sim. fr. 55; *Hymn. Hom. Ap* 157; Eur. *HF* 687 ff. and *Hec* 462) indicate that they most likely formed a professional group of dancers already in the archaic and classical periods. See Kowalzig (2007) 56–68.

[12] Kowalzig (2007) 67; cf. Calame (1999) who makes similar remarks on Bacchyl.11.

[13] Kowalzig (2007) 68.

[14] Radt (1958) 19; Dougherty (1994) 205. See Rutherford (2001) 267, who proposes that the occasion could have also been a festival commemorating an Abderetan victory in a war against the Thracians, and Jurenka (1912) 209–210, who argued that the poem was performed during the athletic games that Herakles established for the hero Abderus.

with episodes from recent Abderite history.[15] Pindar's divergence from the norm and his decision to narrate non-mythical events in lieu of mythical ones is noticeable. By commemorating recent military victories within a religious occasion, Pindar manages to 'sacralize' the recent Abderite past and put it on a par with the remote mythical past, what we could call 'sacred history'; in other words, he invests transient events with transcendent importance. Consequently, whereas in this poem the audience are not transported back to the mists of the past, as in *Paean* 12, they do become witnesses to the transformation of their recent 'profane' history into 'sacred'.

However, the main reason for considering this paean here is the prophecy of Hecate cited in lines 73–79. The prediction is delivered in direct speech and foretells a military victory:[16]

ἰὴ ἰὲ Παιάν, ἰὴ ἰέ· Παιὰν
δὲ μήποτε λείποι.
"**ἀ]λλά μιν ποταμῷ σχεδὸν μολόντα φύρσει**
βαιοῖς σὺν ἔντεσιν
ποτὶ πολὺν στρατόν·" ἐν δὲ μηνὸς
πρῶτον τύχεν ἆμαρ·
ἄγγελλε δὲ φοινικόπεζα λόγον παρθένος
εὐμενὴς Ἑκάτα
τὸν ἐθέλοντα γενέσθαι. (71–79)

Iē ie Paian, iē ie. May Paian
never leave us.
"But when the enemy has come near the river,
he will confound him with a few arms
against a large army." That day fell
on the first of the month,
and Hekate, the maiden with ruddy feet,
was graciously announcing her prophecy
eager for fulfillment.

What catches our attention here is that the transition to Hecate's utterance is marked with no attributive discourse, an omission which is at variance with Pindar's practice of framing speeches cited in *oratio recta*.[17] Most scholars have explained this as Pindar's attempt to create the effect

[15] For the history of Abdera see Isaac (1986) 73–106.

[16] There is no consensus among scholars whether the speech was delivered in oratio recta. Radt (1958) 66, for instance, argues that the prophecy is in indirect speech.

[17] All Pindaric speeches, with the exception of the speech of Themis in *Isthm*.8, have introductory and capping phrases (attributive discourse). These serve to mark the transition from narrator-text to character-text.

of abruptness.[18] Yet, the prohecy's overall structure (its delivery in direct speech, the verb of speaking which is cast in the open-ended imperfect *aggelle* (77) instead of the aorist *êgkeile*, the unspecified object and subject in the first phrase, and finally its peculiar dating 'on the first day of the month') clearly indicates that Pindar's intention was more subtle than this.[19] In a stimulating study of the poem, Carol Dougherty has convincingly argued that *Paean* 2 was probably sung during a ritual procession, and that the chorus might have actually sung the aforementioned prophecy in front of Hecate's shrine.[20] If Dougherty's conjecture is correct, it would not be far-fetched to argue that the omission of the normal introductory attributive discourse would have served to blend the chorus' and Hecate's voices. This in turn would have created the illusion, if only for a moment, that the chorus does not merely commemorate Hecate's past prediction, but that Hecate is actually speaking through them *now*, thus renewing her past prophecy and foreseeing a new future victory of the Abderites against their enemies.[21] Even though the collapse here is between recent past and present, the audience are once again invited to experience time as a unity.

Paean 1 (Fr. 52a M.) is another fragmented poem which exhibits particular interest. The mere ten lines which survive seem to come from the final epode:[22]

πρὶν ὀδυνηρὰ γήραος σ[.....μ]ολεῖν,
πρίν τις εὐθυμίᾳ σκιαζέτω
νόημ' ἄκοτον ἐπὶ μέτρα, ἰδών
δύναμιν οἰκόθετον.

ἰὴ ἰή, νῦν ὁ παντελὴς Ἐνιαυτός
Ὧρα[ί] τε Θεμίγονοι
πλάξ]ιππον ἄστυ Θήβας ἐπῆλθον
Ἀπόλ]λωνι δαῖτα φιλησιστέφανον ἄγοντες·
Παιὰ[ν δὲ λαῶν γενεὰν δαρὸν ἐρέπτοι
σαό]φρονος ἄνθεσιν εὐνομίας. (1–10)

[18] Wilamowitz (1913) 251; Radt (1958) 65–73; Lefkowitz (1991) 14; Rutherford (2001) 273.

[19] On the tense of the verb of speaking see Radt (1958) 70.

[20] Dougherty (1994) 205–218, at 217. According to Dougherty, the poem 'maps out a processional route that helped the citizens of Abdera structure their sense of civic identity'. On Hecate's shrine at Abdera see Isaac (1986) 107–108.

[21] Radt (1958) 70; Graham (1992) 62–63; Rutherford (2001) 272.

[22] For a detailed discussion of the poem see Rutherford (2001) 254–257.

Before the pains of old age ... arrive,
let a man shelter in cheerfulness
a mind without rancor in moderation, having seen
the resource stored in his house.

Iē, Iē, now have the all-concluding Year
and the Horai, daughters of Themis,
come to the horse-driving city of Thebe,
bringing to Apollo the crown-loving feast.
Long may Paian wreathe the people's offspring
with the flowers of wise order.

From the reference to Thebes in line 7 it can be inferred that the paean was composed for, and performed by, Thebans. It is, however, difficult to pin down the framing festival, not least because the mythical section of the poem has not been preserved. Wilamowitz suggested that this paean was performed during the Theban *Daphnephoria*, a festival held every eight years in honour of Apollo Ismenius or Galaxius.[23] Ian Rutherford challenged this proposition on the premise that the reference to the advent of *Eniaytos* in line 5 outrightly indicates an annual celebration.[24] *Prima facie* Rutherford's scepticism seems reasonable and justifiable. Yet, there is evidence which belies his objection and sweeps away the troubling aspect of Wilamowitz's suggestion, thus rendering the Theban *Daphnephoria* the most appropriate candidate. As we learn from Apollodorus, the word *eniaytos* was used to indicate not only a calendar year but also an *octaeteris*, that is a period of eight years.[25] Indeed, every eight years the lunar months coincide with the solar year; and this lunisolar cycle was considered by many cultures as a kind of 'Great' year and was celebrated accordingly. The sheer fact that the *Daphnephoria* was held every eight years, as well as the prominent and central role played by the moon and the sun within this occasion, are clear indications that this festival was actually a celebration of the 'Great Year'.[26] In light of this, I would suggest that the reference to the advent of *eniaytos* in line 5 should

[23] Wilamowitz (1922) 186–187; see also Stefos (1975) 192.

[24] Rutherford (2001) 256 contends that the reference to *eniaytos* cannot indicate the end of the calendar year, which in Boeotia started at the winter solstice, on the grounds that the mood of the song seems to refer to a period after harvest. Consequently, he takes *eniaytos* as referring to the end of the agricultural cycle in the early summer.

[25] Apollod. 3.4.1: Κάδμος δὲ ἀνθ' ὧν ἔκτεινεν αΐδιον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐθήτευσεν Ἄρει· ἦν δὲ ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς τότε ὀκτὼ ἔτη. On the *eniaytos* as a 'great year' see also the useful and extensive comments by Frazer on Apollod. 2.5.11 and 3.10.3–4.

[26] Procl. *Chrest.* ap. Phot. *Bibl.* 239, 321b. About the Theban *Daphnephoria* see Schachter (1981) 83–85; Lehnus (1984) esp. 83–85.

be taken as a reference to the completion of an *octaeteris*, not of a calendar year. This is perhaps the reason why *eniaytos* is here tagged with the seemingly superfluous adjective *pantelês* (all-concluding).

One of the things that merit our attention in the passage is the juxtaposition of the temporal adverb *nyn* with *Eniaytos* and the *Horae*, two temporal terms which bring to the fore and manifest the cyclical aspect of time.[27] It is important to bear in mind that, apart from its association with the sun and the moon, the *Daphnephoria* festival was closely linked to notions of renewal and rebirth. On the one hand, it was a Spring Festival that served to renew the forces of Nature. On the other hand, it had initiatory significance.[28] To put it in a nutshell, it was a festival about the renewal and rebirth of time, nature and society. The subtle and ingenious way in which Pindar weaves the various strands of the festival together in the epode is remarkable: the advent of *Eniaytos* and the *Horae* points to the renewal of time and nature respectively, while the reference to the *genean laôn* (people's offspring) in lines 9–10 clearly relates to procreation and, accordingly, to the rebirth of society. Thus the performative 'now' and the linear biological time, hinted at in lines 1–4 with the reference to old age, are subsumed under the permanent and eternal.[29] Unfortunately, owing to the paean's fragmentary condition, we do not know whether and how Pindar linked the ongoing ritual with the festival's mythical *aetion*. As a result, it is impossible to say whether he attempted to collapse past and present. Nevertheless, the epode is quite revealing and indicative of his attempt to foreground the idea of time's constant and endless rejuvenation. Consequently, it is the notion of a cyclical time rather than that of an eternal present that *Paean* 1 serves to evoke. What must be

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[27] In contrast to *chronos*, which is the general Greek word for 'time' in antiquity, *eniaytos* indicates a time that moves in circles and always returns back to its starting point. See Philippson (1949) 96: '*Eniautos* designa il concetto del tempo circolare che ritorna in se stesso, sia che questa rivoluzione si compia in un anno delle Peliadi, in un anno solare-lunare o in un grande *Eniautos*.' The term *eniaytos* is frequently used by Homer, Hesiod and within the *Homeric Hymns*. This is the first time, however, that it is personified. As far as the *Horae* are concerned, the adjective *themigonoi* attached to them reflects not only their genealogy, as daughters of Themis, but also their unfailing recurrence and contribution to the order of nature; cf. fr. 33 where Pindar assigns to the *Horae* the adjective *alatheas*, thus emphasising their unfailing recurrence. On the role of the *Horae* in Pindar see Duchemin (1955) 47–50.

[28] Calame (2001) 102–104.

[29] From a reference by the Hellenistic historian Callixenus we know that during the Ptolemaic festival *Soteria*, *Eniaytos* and the *Horae* were represented physically in a sacred procession. Based on this Rutherford (2001) 255 suggested that the advent of *Eniaytos* and the *Horae* could have been re-enacted during this ceremony as well.

noted is that this cyclical time serves to forge links not only backwards but also forwards, insofar as the event's unfailing recurrence in the past and present guarantees and vouches for its continuation in the future.[30]

Paean 15 (Fr. 52p M.) was sung by an Aeginetan chorus in honour of Aeacus, most likely during the annual festival of the Aeaceia:[31]

Τῷδ' ἐν ἄματι τερπνῷ
ἵπποι μὲν ἀθάναται
Ποσειδᾶνος ἄγοντ' Αἰακ[,
Νηρεὺς δ' ὁ γέρων ἕπετα[ι·
πατὴρ δὲ Κρονίων μολ[
πρὸς ὄμμα βαλὼν χερὶ [
τράπεζαν θεῶν ἐπ' ἀμβ[ρο
ἵνα οἱ κέχυται πιεῖν νε[κταρ

ἔρχεται δ' ἐνιαυτῷ
ὑπερτάταν [...]ονα ... (1–10)

On this pleasant day
the immortal horses
of Poseidon are carrying (to Aiakos?) ...
and the old man Nereus follows;
and father Zeus, son of Kronos ...
having cast his eye ... with his hand ...
to the (immortal?) table of the gods,
where nectar is poured for him to drink.

And there comes in a year
the highest ...

The reference to *eniaytos* in line 9 once again brings to the limelight the festival's periodicity, *mise en abyme* performances and, therefore, cyclical time.[32] What distinguishes this poem from the rest, however, is that the mythical event is described in the present tense, thus evoking the impression that it unfolds in the performative *hic et nunc*. As Rutherford rightly observed, what we have here is neither a dramatic dialogue nor an instance of direct speech, but most likely 'a description of a sacred

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[30] One could possibly argue that on a second level the cyclical notion of time expressed by the paean could also relate to its future reperformance. Yet, it is true that the notion of reperformance is not as strong in the cult songs as in the epinicians.

[31] Rutherford (2001) 411–412.

[32] See d'Alessio (2004) 294. and id. (1997) 35. See also the note by Furley and Bremer (2001) 10. Rutherford (2001) 412 n. 4 declares that the dative ἐνιαυτῷ without preposition means 'at a year's end'. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to understand this as a reference to the end of a calendar year. One could argue that the reference might serve to indicate the full cycle traced since the festival's last occurence.

event conceived as happening in present time, like an epiphany of a god'.[33] In fact, it is plausible that this event was actually re-enacted.[34] In contrast to *Paeans* 2 and 12 where through the mythical excursus the audience are transferred back to *illud tempus*, the deictic *Tôd' en amati* emphatically grounds the mythical event in the present. Here, the movement is centripetal rather than centrifugal, for it is the past that 'intrudes', so to speak, into the present and is treated as if it were present. Symbolism is replaced by realism, and the ongoing rite is not seen merely as a commemoration of a past event, but as the event *per se*.

I will close my analysis of Pindar's cult songs with fr. 75, a dithyramb for the Athenians. The poem was most likely performed during the City Dionysia, a vernal festival celebrating the arrival of Dionysus' cult in Athens.[35] The poem opens with an invocation to the Olympians to join the ongoing festival and infuse it with glorious grace.[36] In lines 3–5 we are told that the dithyramb is performed in a central point in Athens, which is described as much-frequented (πολύβατον, 3), rich in frankincense (θυόεντ', 3), and adorned (πανδαίδαλον, 5).[37] In the following lines, Pindar exhorts the gods to receive both wreaths of plaited violets and his songs which he plucked in springtime. After contextualizing the poem, Pindar turns to the receiver of the song, the ivy-god Dionysus, whom he invokes with his names 'Bromius' (Loud-Roarer) and 'Eriboas' (Loud-Shouter).

Interestingly, from line 13 onwards the tone and language of the poem drastically change, and the focus shifts from the description of the ongoing festival to springtime in general:

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33 Rutherford (2001) 412.

34 Rutherford (2001) 413 argues that the festival might have involved physical re-enactment and proposes that the mythological figures involved in the event (e.g. Aeacus and Nereus) might have been represented by statues transported in a sacred procession. Considering that there is evidence for the existence of statue-carrying festivals in antiquity, this is a possible and plausible suggestion. On statue-carrying festivals see the Appendix in Rutherford (1992). D'Alessio (1997) 26 also suggests that the rite might have been 'performed by human beings impersonating mythical characters'.

35 See van der Weiden (1991).

36 On this invocation see van der Weiden (1991) 186 and 190.

37 There is no consensus about the exact place at Athens indicated here; see Lavecchia (2000) *ad* fr. 75.3, who lists a number of suggestions made on this matter. Sourvinou-Inwood (2003) 67–100 suggests that the poem was performed in the Agora during the rite of *xenismos* sacrifice at the City Dionysia (96–98), and that it was probably sung by a chorus approaching the altar.

ἐναργέα τ' ἔμ' ὥτε μάντιν οὐ λανθάνει,
φοινικοεάνων ὁπότ' οἰχθέντος Ὡρᾶν θαλάμου
εὔοδμον ἐπάγοισιν ἔαρ φυτὰ νεκτάρεα.
τότε βάλλεται, **τότ'** ἐπ' ἀμβρόταν χθόν' ἐραταί
ἴων φόβαι, ῥόδα τε κόμαισι μείγνυται,
ἀχεῖ τ' ὀμφαὶ μελέων σὺν αὐλοῖς,
οἰχνεῖ τε Σεμέλαν ἑλικάμπυκα χοροί. (13–19)

Like a seer, I do not fail to notice the clear signs,
when, as the chamber of the purple-robed Horai is opened,
the nectar-bearing flowers bring in the sweet-smelling spring.
Then, then, upon the immortal earth are cast
the lovely tresses of violets, and roses are fitted to hair
and voices of songs echo to the accompaniment of pipes
and choruses come to Semele of the circling headband.

Here the flowers cease to be mere flowers and are now described as 'clear signs' (ἐναργέα, 13), while Pindar calls himself a 'seer' of those signs (ὥτε μάντιν, 13). This statement, in conjunction with the preponderance of religious words (νεκτάρεα, 15; ὀμφαὶ, 18), imparts a reverent and elevated tone to the song.[38] Yet, the poem climaxes in line 16, where Pindar emphatically declares that in Spring the earth becomes immortal (ἀμβρόταν χθόν'). This reference is normally taken as an allusion to the rejuvenation and blooming of nature. Plausible though this interpretation may be, its connotations seem to be denser and more intricate than this. Whereas the recurrent and unfailing rejuvenation of nature renders the earth 'immortal', it is rather the numinous presence of Dionysus (evidenced through the blooming nature) that is at stake here. What grasps our attention in this passage is that, whereas the conjunction 'then' (τότε) at 16 refers to springtime in general, it simultaneously coincides with the 'now' of the ongoing festival, which also takes place in Spring. What is more, the elements featured in this section, that is the violets, the roses, the wreaths, the songs and the choruses are all mentioned in the first part of the poem which, as we have seen, offers a description of the celebration in progress. The sophisticated transition from the 'specific' time of the performance to springtime in general, and to the annual Dionysiac festival—alluded to in the reference to the choruses of Semele—is striking; in this way, the ongoing occasion transcends its particularity, and the audience are invited to experience the mythical event of the deity's advent as happening in the performative here and now. As in *Paean* 15, the past is once again configured as present and recurrent.

[38] In Homer this noun is used to indicate the voice of a god: see, e.g., *Od.*3.215.

Even though the scattered condition of Pindar's cult songs hinders us from drawing any crude conclusions, the few passages cited above starkly demonstrate Pindar's tendency to explicitly emphasise the periodicity of the festivals within which his cult poetry unfolds. To be sure, this characteristic is not intrinsically Pindaric. If we have a look at other cult songs, we will see that the periodicity of festivals and their unfailing recurrence since their first occurrence back in mythical times is often thematised. Yet, as I have tried to demonstrate, Pindar always moves a step further. The ongoing rite is never presented merely as an *hypomnêma* of a past event or an instantiation of its representation ever since. Pindar's main objective is rather to afford his audience a unique experience through the overcoming of time. As we have seen, there are different modes of transcending time: sometimes the audience are transported back to *illud tempus* and past and present are collapsed (*Paeans* 12 and 2), at other times the past is treated as recurrent or present, and cyclical time emphatically and forcefully crops up (*Paeans* 1 and 15, *Dithyramb* 75). But whatever means Pindar utilizes in order to enact the static and cyclical time that he seeks to unveil, the outcome is more or less the same. A caveat is in order here: for song to have such an uplifting effect, the audience should tacitly agree to 'suspend their disbelief' and 'play along'.[39] This is not to say that the fusion between past and present, and the passage from symbolism to realism were never felt as a reality by those witnessing the performance—or at least part thereof—but one should be careful not to stretch this point too much.

Epinicians

In order to understand better the stance that Pindar adopts in his cult songs with regards to time, let me round off this discussion with a brief note on the configuration of time in the epinicians. A cursory glance suffices to reveal that, here as well, the present is depicted as repeating and continuing the past, and that the qualitative distance between these two temporal entities is once again collapsed. Throughout the epinician corpus Pindar sets up explicit parallels between his patrons

[39] On this see Connor (1987) 40–50 and Sinos (1993) 83–86. Connor at 44 cites an example from the novel of Xenophon of Ephesus where Anthia appears in front of the Ephesians dressed as Artemis. Even though some of them are sceptical as to whether she is Artemis or not, they all bow in front of her and tacitly agree to participate in this shared drama.

and mythical heroes, and athletic victories are often likened to heroic deeds and achievements.[40] Whereas it is true that the exemplary nature and paradigmatic value of the Pindaric past relies on a sense of its superiority, this past is never 'walled off' or cast as completely different from the present, as is the case in Homer and Hesiod[41] where we come across what Bakhtin has called 'the chronotope of historical inversion'.[42] The panegyrist's overarching concern is not to praise the glory of the past *per se*, in the manner of an epic bard, but rather to depict the present as continuing and repeating that glory. This is besides the reason why, unlike Hesiod and the first historiographers, whose genealogical concerns are mostly confined to the mythical period,[43] Pindar's legendary genealogies are never autonomous and always come down to the present, thus forging links between 'now' and 'then'.[44] Accordingly, present-day victors are routinely extolled as the glorious scions of mythical heroes, sometimes even of gods, and as their worthy heirs and successors.[45] Often this continuity between past and present is mapped spatially; in *Pythian* 8, for instance, Pindar declares that Aristomenes is following the trail (ἰχνεύων, 35) of his maternal uncles in wrestling, in *Olympian* 6.71–73 the Iamids are depicted travelling along a conspicuous road, and in *Nemean* 2 the victor is said to step on the path inscribed by his fathers (πατρίαν ... καθ' ὁδόν, 6–7).

[40] In *Pyth*.6.19–23 Thrasyboulus is said to uphold the counsel once given by Cheiron to Achilles, namely to honour Zeus and his parents, and in *Ol*.6.12–14 Hagesias is put on a par with Amphiaraus. See also *Isthm*.7.31–33; *Nem*.9.38–42; *Pyth*.1.50–51 and 2.15 ff.

[41] As Homer says in *Il*.12.445–449, people of old could lift stones that not even two people in the present can lift, an idea that comes to the fore time and again in the *Iliad*. Likewise, the past of the past is presented as even superior and more distinguished (see, e.g, *Il*.1.261–267; *Il*.2.707). Only in a handful of cases does Homer allow a vague connection between the past and the present, mainly when Homeric heroes claim that their *kleos* will remain *aphthiton* among future generations (e.g. *Il*.3.351 ff., 6.352 ff., 7.87 ff.; *Od*.1.302). See also Nagy (1979) 114–121 and 342–343.

[42] According to Bakhtin (1981) 147–148 'historical inversion' occurs when an edenic past is measured against an inferior present. See also pages 15–18 where Bakhtin applies this chronotope to all high genres of antiquity, including Pindar (18). Although his criticisms of the chronotope of *epos* have a rationale, he overstates his thesis and ends up in crude generalizations; see Nagy (2002) 71.

[43] Fowler (2000) xxviii; Möller (2001) 251.

[44] On the function and characteristics of Pindaric genealogies see de la Torre (2006) 97–111.

[45] In *Ol*.2.41 ff. Theron's clan is said to have descended from the house of Oedipus: in *Ol*.7.21–24 Diagoras' family, the Eratidae, are said to claim descent from Zeus and Amyntor; in *Isthm*.3.17 Melissus' clan is related to the Labdacidae.

The affinity that Pindar so firmly establishes between past and present, as well as his insistence on the immanence of certain values throughout time, once again conjure up cyclic and static ideas of time, where the past is either seen as eternal or as the subject of periodic re-establishment. In light of this, it is not surprising that Pindar is often cited as the Greek *exemplum par excellence* of the cyclical view. As Toohey has recently remarked *vis-á-vis* Pindar's victory odes:

> Pindar's epinicians perhaps provide the earliest and most striking example of a conception of mythology that relies on a cyclical, non-linear concept of time. For Pindar, as has often been noted, the significance of the competitor's victory resides to a very large degree in that it is envisaged as repeating or re-enacting in the present, past mythical victories ... The past in this way becomes immanent in the present, through the recursive force of the triumph of the games victor.[46]

The temporality that Pindar's encomiastic poetry seeks to evoke is shaped by, and at the same time promotes, what Csapo and Miller have aptly called 'aristocratic temporality'.[47] During the Archaic period aristocratic families privilege the distant past and try to forge strong links with it. Accordingly, they lay emphasis upon their inborn excellence (*phya*) by declaring themselves the offspring of mythical ancestors and the heirs of their supremacy,[48] and by modelling their lifestyles upon that of the heroes of the past. Through the commission of elaborate and extravagant epinicians, this elite seeks to further advance this ideology in order to boost and justify its social and political status and authority. Being an encomiast, Pindar needs, *inter alia*, to tailor his song to meet his patrons' aspirations and to carefully calibrate its structure and rhetoric in order to starkly articulate the continuity between past and present.

From what has been said so far, one could possibly argue that, *mutatis mutandis*, the epinician temporality does not differ much from the temporality evoked in the cult songs. Upon a closer look, however, it becomes clear that this first impression is only partially true. Whereas in the cult songs every 'now' is subsumed under the permanent and eternal, and loses its particularity, in the epinicians this *nyn* does not lose its 'historicity', while the quantitative distance between past and present is never collapsed. Here recurrence is seen as an incremental rather than a merely

46 Toohey (2004) 205.

47 Csapo and Miller (1998) 97–100.

48 See Thomas (1989) 178, who stresses that for the Greek aristocratic families the original ancestor was far more important than the length of the genealogical line.

cumulative process, and it always takes us a step forward.[49] Apart from renewing the glory of the past, present-day victors also leave their own individual trail in history, thus creating history. To put it differently, the epinician present does not just passively find itself being glorified with the glamour of the past but contributes to the increase of this glamour through its own light.[50] This is the reason why the present victor is never de-individualized or lost from sight but is allocated a prominent and equally conspicuous place next to his glorious forefathers and ancestors.[51] All this brings to the fore a time that is not exclusively cyclical. This less obvious linear aspect of time also emerges through the vocabulary and imagery that Pindar employs, and through his constant references to *chronos*' unfailing forward movement, the contingency that characterizes human life and the uncertainty and precariousness of the future.[52] One could further add to this list the great significance that Pindar assigns to *kairos*, a notion which points to the qualitative character of time and denotes the 'right' or 'wrong' time to do something.[53] In a world where everything is predetermined and the present is deemed as merely the repetition of the past, *kairos* would have no place and would have lost its meaning.[54] In the epinicians, man is not merely a plaything

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[49] Even though cyclic recurrence presupposes the passage of time, in the cult songs the linear/progressive aspect of time is normally effaced and never thematised.

[50] In some cases contemporary victors are even claimed to be superior to the people of the past; for instance, in *Pyth.*2.58 Pindar confidently exclaims that, compared to all men of the past, Hieron is superior in wealth and honour. Cf. fr. 23 (Diels) where Simonides declares that his *laudandus* is better than old day heroes such as Polydeuces and Heracles.

[51] At this point it is important to draw attention to a change that occurs in the art of the period and which points to the same thing. As Thomas (2007) 152 remarks, during the sixth century there is 'a shift from statues which form dedications to the god, to statues which are outright representations of the victor himself.'

[52] The past is referred to with terms such as *palaios* and *archaios*, and the adverbs *palai* and *proteron*. People of old are normally called *palaigonoi, palaiphatos genea*, *palaioteroi* and *proteroi*; cf. *Nem.*8.32, 8.51, *Pyth.*11.46, *Nem.*6.31. The present is usually referred to by terms such as *nearon* and *neôteron*; cf. *Ol.*9.49, *Pyth.*8.33. The different vocabulary that Pindar employs serves to disentangle past and present and cast them as two different temporal entities. The imagery of road and of generations as travelling, which Pindar often employs, involve the idea of progression and linear sequencing. Cf. Munn (1992) 101–102.

[53] Unlike *chronos*, *kairos* clearly depends on human action and decision and, as Csapo and Miller (1998) 103 observe, 'permits one to triumph over contingency'.

[54] It should be noted that in some cases Pindar even draws a line between past and present. At the preface of *Isthm.*2, for instance, he states that former poets (οἱ μὲν πάλαι … φῶτες 1–2) did not compose for money; they swiftly shot their hymns of love at any boy who was beautiful and the only thing they needed was their lyre. However, this situation has changed since now (νῦν δ' 9) the Muse has given herself for hire and songs

in the grip of gods, and the causality of events is not ascribed exclusively to external factors, as it is often assumed. It is also worth noting that in the odes *chronos* is often presented as a threat, as an overflowing river that rushes forward bringing destruction and oblivion (*lêthê*).

The different temporality that permeates the cult songs and the epinicians is also reflected in the way in which Pindar pitches his poetic *persona* in each case. Scholars do not normally distinguish between Pindar's encomiastic/panegyric and religious *persona*, and as a result some striking differences between the two have passed largely unmarked. In the cult songs, Pindar adopts a priestly and reverent role, that of the mediator between gods and men. Accordingly, he styles himself as *mantis* (*Dithyramb* 75.13 and *Parthenion* 1.5–6), *prophatas* (*Paean* 6.6), herald of wise verses (*Dithyramb* 2.24), and attendant of the gods (*Paean* 5.45), terms which he never uses to qualify himself as an encomiast. In the *Epinicians* Pindar assumes a somewhat different *persona*; even though he still reveals and extols the continuous, complete and eternal time of the gods, he also casts himself as a master of time. As he repeatedly claims, his poetry affords the only means by which one can transcend time and gain a kind of metaphorical immortality. Through his song, which can travel in time and space, Pindar claims that he can bring time to a halt and cancel out its destructive force, thus rendering both his patrons' and *his* name immortal.[55]

What is striking, and yet has paradoxically escaped the attention of scholars, is that Pindar in his victory odes actually dramatizes his attempt to transcend human/linear time. One of the distinctive features of Pindaric epinicians is what Chris Carey has called 'the oral subterfuge'.[56] Even though the odes are composed before the performance, Pindar often presents his song as an extemporaneous creation, namely as being composed during the performance. This, in conjunction with the pre-

have their faces silvered. What needs to be stressed is that the change which Pindar refers to here is not presented as random or casual but alludes to a broader change that occurred in the society (money economy) and which had a profound impact upon poetry as well. On this matter see Kurke 1991.

[55] Even though in their epinicians both Pindar and Bacchylides always make references to the future re-performance of their song and their own poetic fame, such references are omitted in the cult songs. To be sure, this does not necessarily mean that dithyrambs and paeans were not re-performed or did not contribute to a poet's *kleos*. It does show, however, that both poets pitch their 'religious' poetic *personae* in a different way. On the reperformance of Pindar's epinicians, see Currie (2004) and Hubbard (2004).

[56] Carey (1981) 5. On the 'oral subterfuge' see also Miller (1993); Bonifazi (2000) 69–86 and ead. (2001) 59–73.

scribed *telos* of the performance, conjures up in him a feeling of urgency, openly acknowledged by Pindar himself when he confesses that time presses him; in *Nemean* 3 from the very first line the Muse is summoned to sing because the ode is late (ὀψέ 80), while at the opening of another belated ode, *Olympian* 10, Pindar promises interest on his overdue debt so that *chronos* will not embarrass him again. In *Pythian* 4.247–248 he declares that he needs to take a shortcut because he is pressed by the passing hours, whereas in *Olympian* 6.28 he emphasizes the need to go 'today' to Pitana on his poetic chariot 'in good time'.[57] In addition to being 'pressed' by time, Pindar also pretends to be subject to *chronos*' constant shifts and to the 'eventness of the moment'. This finds its most eloquent expression in the comparison of his poem to a vessel that travels in the open sea exposed to a number of lurking dangers. As a result, Pindar constantly emphasizes the need to be alert and extremely careful of the breezes and the waves in order not to be driven off his course.[58] Consequently, it would not be far-fetched to say that Pindar portrays each performance as an arena within which a 'battle' takes place between the poet and *chronos*. The poet must be quick in order to weave for his *laudandus* a worthy poetic wreath within the limited time of the performance; and he must be careful in order to utter only what is appropriate and fitting for the occasion. Only by doing so can he outmatch *chronos* and single out the fleeting moment of the performance from sequential time.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the way in which Pindar configures the relation between past and present in his cult and encomiastic poems differs considerably. The cult songs bring to the fore and manifest a time that moves in circles and constantly renews itself and/or is 'immobilized' and static. The negative aspect of time as a destroyer and a source of oblivion is glossed over and is not an issue at all. In the *Epinicians*, the qualitative distance between past and present is also collapsed; the present is seen as renewing and continuing forms of the past and, as a result, these two temporal entities are often presented as being identical. Yet, what distinguishes the epinician from the cultic temporality is that in the former the linear/progressive and destructive aspect of time is never

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[57] πρὸς Πιτάναν δὲ παρ' Εὐρώτα πόρον δεῖ *σάμερον* ἐλθεῖν *ἐν ὥρᾳ*.

[58] See e.g. *Pyth.*10.51; 11.39–40; *Nem.*3.26–27.

camouflaged. Despite their similarities, in the victory odes past and present retain their own individual stigma and hypostasis, and one could rather say that they share a reciprocal, not a one-way relationship. As Csapo and Miller have remarked in another context, 'just as past glory lends its numinous power to the present, so present glory empowers the past'.[59] These differences are not surprising, considering the different aims and purposes of religious and victory songs. Cult songs seek to glorify and extol the complete and continuous time of gods, as well as to externalize a society's own historicity.[60] Epinician songs, on the other hand, concern individuals living *in* time, and seek to weld the fragmented, finite and profane human time with the 'sacred'. What is more, an encomiast has to be careful to balance and calibrate his praise between mythical heroes and present-day victors; the present should be assigned a prominent place next to the past and not be overshadowed by it. The distinction between these two poetic genres also helps us to explain the different roles that Pindar adopts in each case. In the cult songs he is the mediator between gods and men, and the one whose song unveils the timelessness of the divine. In the *Epinicians*, not only does he reveal the continuous time of the gods, but he also presents himself as a *maître du temps*, as the one who through his song can inscribe human time on eternity.

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[59] Csapo and Miller (1998) 98.

[60] Of course, the scope of cult songs is not limited to these functions. As many scholars have shown, far from being merely religious occasions, festivals had social, cultural and political implications and were used to transmit and reinforce society's values; see, among others, Connor (1987); Kowalzig (2007).

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CHAPTER FOUR

EURIPIDES, THE DERVENI PAPYRUS, AND THE SMOKE OF MANY WRITINGS

Ruth Scodel

Euripides' use of sophistic and philosophical ideas is a familiar topic of scholarship. Most studies, however, have looked for specific influences more than at Euripides' originality. This paper will present and explore three related, and less familiar, points about Euripides' treatment of contemporary thought. First, Euripides' plays were surely one of the most important mechanisms by which Greeks who were not readers or intellectuals learned about these new ideas. Second, Euripides' characters do not simply re-state arguments made by philosophers and sophists, but recombine them in new ways. Third, his characters do not just recombine and vary philosophical ideas, but also bring together contemporary philosophy with religious ideas and practices. This third strand is reminiscent of the Derveni Papyrus. This charred scroll, probably written between 340 and 320 BCE, was discovered in a tomb near Thessalonica in 1962, but not formally published until 2006. It contains a text most scholars date to the fifth century, most of which comments allegorically on an older poem attributed to Orpheus so that the poem is interpreted philosophically.

Notoriously, Aristophanes' Euripides says that he put his craft on a diet, χυλὸν διδοὺς στωμυλμάτων ἀπὸ βιβλίων ἀπηθῶν, "giving her a decoction of chatter, filtering it from books" (*Frogs* 943). Euripides does not just take the contents of his tragedies from books. He filters and mixes to produce a medicinal juice from his own recipe, in which the contents of the books have been converted to στωμύλματα, talk that is nothing but words, whether or not the books themselves contained more significant matter. Too often, studies of Euripides' relations to contemporary thought treat him as almost a passive recipient of the ideas of philosophers or sophists, a critic perhaps, but not a real participant. Yet even if Euripides was only a device for mixture and filtration, the resulting brew was not the same as the original ingredients. However, Euripides' characters and the ideas they present reached a much larger

audience than the books did. This paper will look at Euripides' creation of characters who are linked with esoteric religious practices, typically in combination with contemporary rhetoric or science.

A variety of Euripidean characters combine, whether consistently or in particular passages, some subset of these themes: mystery religions and other religious activities requiring special purity or secrecy, natural philosophy, books, exclusivity, allegory.[1] Euripides did not invent characters combining some of these features out of thin air. Empedocles, for example, was a real person who combined natural philosophy with claims to religious authority and teachings that look "orphic" or Pythagorean.[2] Euripides, though, presents these characters over and over, and so makes this complex salient. None of these characters is completely unsympathetic and some are admirable, so that however odd these combinations may initially seem, the plays do not treat them as ridiculous or obviously wrong. The plays thus operate along the boundaries between secret and open, elite and popular.

Elitism, Philosophy, Religion, and Books in Euripides

In *Hipp*. 952–954, Theseus accuses Hippolytus of being a hypocritical Orphic:

> ἤδη νυν αὔχει καὶ δι' ἀψύχου βορᾶς
> σίτοις καπήλευ' Ὀρφέα τ' ἄνακτ' ἔχων
> βάκχευε πολλῶν γραμμάτων τιμῶν καπνούς·

> Boast then, after this, and deal in diet, eating soul-free food; with Orpheus as your master, engage in Bacchic reveling as you honor the smoke of many writings.

Most interpreters have assumed that Hippolytus cannot be taken to be a vegetarian Orphic—he is a hunter, after all.[3] Yet the chorus of *Cretans* combines apparently incompatible practices:

> ἁγνὸν δὲ βίον τείνομεν ἐξ οὗ
> Διὸς Ἰδαίου μύστης γενόμην
> καὶ νυκτιπόλου Ζαγρέως βούτης
> τὰς ὠμοφάγους δαῖτας τελέσας
> μητρί τ' ὀρείαι δᾶιδας ἀνασχὼν

[1] Hamilton (1985) discusses the "priests" (Iphigenia, Theonoe, Ion, Tiresias).

[2] So Seaford (1986)10–14.

[3] So Barrett (1964) on 952–955: "That Hippolytus is not an Orphic ought to be obvious." Yet the man cremated with P. Derveni had military gear in his tomb.

μετὰ Κουρήτων
βάκχος ἐκλήθην ὁσιωθείς
πάλλευκα δ' ἔχων εἵματα φεύγω
γένεσίν τε βροτῶν ⟨ ⟩
καὶ νεκροθήκαις οὐ χριμπτόμενος
τὴν ἐμψύχων
βρῶσιν ἐδεστῶν πεφύλαγμαι. (fr. 472 TGrF)

We lead a pure life since I became an initiate of Zeus of Ida and a herdsman of night-wandering Zagreus, having fulfilled the ritual of feasts of raw meat, and having held up torches for the Mountain Mother, with the Kouretes I came to be called a Bacchos, having been made holy. Wearing all-white clothing I avoid both the birth of mortals … and not having contact with burial urns, I avoid eating foods with souls.

Recent evidence for connections on Crete between the cult of Idaean Zeus and that of Dionysus, and between Idaean Zeus and the Mother makes this passage less wildly syncretistic than it once appeared.[4] Still, this song compresses a network of related cults into a seamless whole. While it is possible that the chorus participated in a ritual of *omophagia* during their initiation, and have lived as vegetarians since, it is striking that their special ritual status requires both. So Hippolytus needs to be a hunter because he is intimate with Artemis, but a vegetarian if he is to make claims of special religious purity that would belong not to the world of mythology, but to the lived world of Euripides' audience.

Hippolytus explains how the hero came to Phaedra's attention in Athens: he visited in order to be initiated at Eleusis (*Hipp* 25). He is thus defined as an initiate.[5] So perhaps we should take Hippolytus' Orphism seriously, not necessarily in a literal way that would force us to decide how he reconciles hunting and vegetarianism, but as an allusion to a contemporary milieu that is relevant for understanding the character.

This milieu includes "writings." The use of books in religious activities was in itself peculiar and perhaps open to suspicion.[6] They were not confined to Orphic circles. Demosthenes mocks Aeschines by claiming that as a young adult he would read during his mother's initiations in the cult of Sabazios:

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[4] Cozzoli (2001) 18–26, summarizes the evidence, but in my view goes too far in "regularizing" the passage. See Allan (2004) 132–133.

[5] Throughout this paper, I will repeatedly refer to "mystery-religion" as a shorthand for various groups and practices. Burkert (1977) helpfully treats Orphism, Bacchic mysteries, and Pythagoreanism as sets that could be shown as a Venn diagram: there are both overlaps and distinctions.

[6] Henrichs (2003).

ἀνὴρ δὲ γενόμενος τῇ μητρὶ τελούσῃ τὰς βίβλους ἀνεγίγνωσκες καὶ τἄλλα συνεσκευωροῦ, τὴν μὲν νύκτα νεβρίζων καὶ κρατηρίζων καὶ καθαίρων τοὺς τελουμένους καὶ ἀπομάττων τῷ πηλῷ καὶ τοῖς πιτύροις (*De Cor.* 259)

When you became an adult man you would read the books for your mother when she did initiations and help with the rest of the preparations, at night wearing a fawn-skin and mixing wine and purifying the initiates and wiping them down with clay and bran …

Reading from the books goes along with other ritual activities that in this hostile description seem silly and self-indulgent. The books appear again in *de false legatione* 199, where Aeschines, apparently still as a boy, was "reading the books for your mother when she did initiations." *The* books: Demosthenes expects his audience to expect that books will be part of such a ritual. It is not clear exactly what these books are, but it is unlikely that he was simply reading ritual instructions: would clients trust an initiator who seemed to need constant reminding of what to do? If the reading actually prescribed certain actions as they were performed, it served to authorize them by guaranteeing that they were being done correctly. Cosmological texts are just as likely.[7] In any case, books are part of what makes these rituals marginal. But Aristophanes, in the passage with which I began, makes fun of Euripides' tragedies as decocted "from books" even though he also at 1114 says of his audience, "each one, holding a booklet, learns what is smart." Both written texts and religious practices outside the mainstream have an ambivalent status, and can be valued and mocked almost at the same time.

Perhaps scholars have been reluctant to see more than a misunderstanding in Theseus' jibe not only because hunters are not vegetarians, but because athletes are not stereotypically intellectuals. Euripides elsewhere emphasizes the contrast, familiar from Aristophanes' *Clouds*, between athlete and intellectual (*Antiope* 199, 201, *Autolycus* fr. 281 *TGrF*). Yet Hippolytus is not an anti-intellectual. On the contrary, he claims to be σοφός in the right company, and I think this means that he is, in fact, an elite intellectual:

ἐγὼ δ' ἄκομψος εἰς ὄχλον δοῦναι λόγον,
ἐς ἥλικας δὲ κὠλίγους σοφώτερος·
ἔχει δὲ μοῖραν καὶ τόδ'· οἱ γὰρ ἐν σοφοῖς
φαῦλοι παρ' ὄχλωι μουσικώτεροι λέγειν. (986–989)

[7] Obbink (1997) 39–54.

> I am clumsy at giving an explanation to a crowd, but more intelligent for a small group of men my own age. And this follows norms of apportionment, since those who are inadequate among the intelligent are more "musical" at speaking in a crowd.

Although he here uses a version of the "inadequate rhetorician" topos familiar from orators, his version of it is his own, for he claims, not exactly speaking ability, but *Sophia*, intellectual competence, among his own age mates and in small groups. Δοῦναι λόγον means "explain," as when Electra at *Or.* 150–151 asks the chorus λόγον ἀπόδος ἐφ' ὅτι χρέος ἐμόλετέ ποτε, "explain why on earth you have come." Plato uses it to mean "give an explanation" (Aristotle does also, *SE* 165a, 27). Since the context in *Hippolytus* differentiates two speaking situations, it is legitimate to see here the distinction Plato attaches to the idiom: as at *Phaedo* 76d5: "a man who knows, would he be able δοῦναι λόγον about what he knows, or not?" Plato repeatedly refers to the necessity of being able to give an account, or the ability/inability to give one. Hippolytus must "give an account" of himself that will convince his audience that he would not have raped his stepmother, but by describing the speaking situation as if a large crowd were present, he implies that those who speak well in that situation do not try to "give an account," but to entertain or confuse the question ("more musical" is surely sarcastic). Hippolytus is limited in the social situation in which he can speak well, but he is also committed to the kind of speech appropriate to it. The most obvious parallel for Hippolytus is the Socrates of the *Gorgias*, who can argue circles around Polus or Callicles but who, we are reminded, will be helpless in court (521–522).

It is also interesting, though, that Plato's Socrates uses λόγον ... διδόναι at *Meno* 81a of priests and priestesses who make the effort to explain their ritual practices, and that the explanation is the doctrine of transmigration. Socrates draws a clear, though implicit, distinction between those who care about having an explanation, and those who do not. P. Derveni does not use this expression, but Col. XX concerns people who have participated in rituals without learning what they mean. Clearly, not everyone cares. So Hippolytus' claim to be able to explain himself in a small group is meaningful for his religious as well as his socio-political affiliations.[8]

Hippolytus combines different kinds of exclusivity. He is associated with mystery religions whose secrets require initiation. He is a member

[8] On this aspect of mysteries, see Burkert (1987) 71–88.

of a self-identified intellectual elite, whose members are disqualified from popular discourse by the very qualities that are valued in their own circle. And he is connected with books.

Hippolytus does not have any connection, however, with natural philosophy or allegory. He has beliefs and ideas, apparently, but he does not talk about them. Theonoe in *Helen*, though, combines an extreme concern for purity with philosophical thinking about the nature of the soul. She requires a purification ritual when she goes outside, in case an impure person has stepped across her path:

> ἡγοῦ σύ μοι φέρουσα λαμπτήρων σέλας
> θείου τε σεμνὸν θεσμὸν αἰθέρος μυχούς,
> ὡς πνεῦμα καθαρὸν οὐρανοῦ δεξώμεθα·
> σὺ δ' αὖ κέλευθον εἴ τις ἔβλαψεν ποδὶ
> στείβων ἀνοσίωι, δὸς καθαρσίωι φλογί,
> κροῦσόν τε πεύκην, ἵνα διεξέλθω, πάρος· (*Helen* 865–870)

> Go before me carrying the gleam of torches, and the revered ordinance of sulpher to the inner rooms of aether, so that we may receive a pure breath from heaven. And you, if anyone has harmed the way by stepping with an unholy foot, bestow purifying flame, and shake a pine-torch first, that I may come through.

Her need for a "pure breath from heaven" and her reference to *aether* strongly suggest that she regards her own *pneuma* ("breath") as having a heavenly origin. Her special purity, which links her to the Cretan chorus or to Hippolytus, is accompanied by a particular, philosophical theory about breath and the soul. When she explains why she must return Helen to Menelaus, she apparently again combines language that is reminiscent of mystery-religion before shifting into that of philosophy:

> καὶ γὰρ τίσις τῶνδ' ἐστὶ τοῖς τε νερτέροις
> καὶ τοῖς ἄνωθεν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις· ὁ νοῦς
> τῶν κατθανόντων ζῆι μὲν οὔ, γνώμην δ' ἔχει
> ἀθάνατον εἰς ἀθάνατον αἰθέρ' ἐμπεσών. (1013–1016)

> For there is punishment for these acts both to those below and to all human beings above. The mind of the dead does not live, but it has thought—immortal thought, when it has fallen into immortal *aether*.

This is a very confusing passage, since if we take the first two lines in their usual sense, the dead are "below" and may be punished there. Belief in a judgment in the afterlife for human beings generally (and not just punishment of egregious sinners against the gods) is not just an "orphic" idea, but it is certainly especially salient in the context of mystery-cults.

We may think, for example, of the lake of mud in Aristophanes' *Frogs*. Yet in the next two lines the mind in some fashion survives in the air, not in Hades. So it seems that "those below" may actually be the living, while "those above" are the dead.[9]

Once Presocratics imagined the earth as suspended in air, Hades, if it was to exist, would need to be moved. Allegory and physics again come together, and Hades becomes "air" in some allegorical readings of Homer.[10] Furthermore, Euripides' passage seems to evoke the theories of Diogenes of Apollonia, which identify *noêsis* ("intelligence") with *aêr*—but Euripides speaks of *aethêr* as he so often does, not *aêr*. The emphasis on *nous* ("mind") confirms the philosophical background that aether also suggests.[11]

Yet if Euripides also deliberately reverses the usual sense of terms "above" and "below," the passage may also hint at the further paradox Euripides famously borrowed from Orphic-Pythagorean thought:

> τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
> τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται; (fr. 638; fr. 833 is similar)
>
> Who knows if living is really having died, and dying is considered being alive below?

Such inversions point to doctrines in which the soul alternates between a life in Hades and a life in this world, as it does, for example, in Pindar *O*. 2:

> ὅσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἐστρίς
> ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν
> ψυχάν (68–70)
>
> Those who have endured three times remaining on each side to keep their soul entirely away from injustice …

Two Gold Leaves from Pelinna begin Νῦν ἔθανες, νῦν ἐγένου, τρισόλβιε, ἄματι τῷδε ("Now you have died, now you have been born, thrice-blessed, on this day")[12] Theonoe, then, does not directly rely on mystery-teaching, but evokes it, especially because her intense concern for purity locates her in the same general sphere as the chorus of *Cretans*. Herodotus

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[9] Kannicht (1969) on 1013–1016, II. 260, thinks that this is too great a distortion of ordinary use, but I am not convinced. Cf. Zuntz (1958) 235, and Egli (2003) 103–104 for other hints of a Hades above in Euripides.

[10] Buffière (1956) 121–122.

[11] See Egli (2003) 106–109; Allan (2008) on 1013–1016.

[12] Graf-Johnston (2007) 36–37, 26a and b.

says that the practices Greeks call "Orphic" and "Bacchic" (not using wool in burials) are really Egyptian and Pythagorean (2.81):

> Ὁμολογέουσι δὲ ταῦτα τοῖσι Ὀρφικοῖσι καλεομένοισι καὶ Βακχικοῖσι, ἐοῦσι δὲ Αἰγυπτίοισι, καὶ ⟨τοῖσι⟩ Πυθαγορείοισι
>
> They agree in this with what is called "Orphic" and "Bacchic," but which is in truth Egyptian and Pythagorean.

He also claims, wrongly, that the doctrine of metempsychosis came to Greece from Egypt (2. 123). So an Egyptian priestess is well suited to carry associations with the mysteries. Theonoe then joins mystery-religion, purity, and natural philosophy, but she has no connection with books (and has no links with Empedocles). Her ideas are compatible with allegorical thought (Hades = air), but she does not allegorize.

Other Euripidean characters do. Electra's prologue in *Orestes* links the mythical Tantalus with the philosophy of Anaxagoras through implicit allegory:

> Τάνταλος / κορυφῆς ὑπερτέλλοντα δειμαίνων πέτρον
> ἀέρι ποτᾶται·[13] (5–7)
>
> Tantalus, fearing the stone that hangs over his head, flies in air.

She also gives an Anaxagorean description of the sun at *Or*. 982–986. Hecuba in *Troades* prays to a Zeus who seems to be identified with the air of Diogenes of Apollonia:

> ὦ γῆς ὄχημα κἀπὶ γῆς ἔχων ἕδραν,
> ὅστις ποτ᾽ εἶ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,
> Ζεύς, εἴτ᾽ ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν,
> προσηυξάμην σε· πάντα γὰρ δι᾽ ἀψόφου
> βαίνων κελεύθου κατὰ δίκην τὰ θνήτ᾽ ἄγεις. (884–888)
>
> Support of the earth who has your throne over the earth, whoever indeed you are, hardest to guess at knowledge about, Zeus, whether necessity of nature or mind of mortals, I pray to you. For going along a silent path you guide all mortal affairs according to justice.

This same Hecuba, in her response to Helen's self-defense, allegorizes Aphrodite as Helen's own psychological state (987–990), offering an etymology that links "Aphrodite" with *aphrosyne* ("folly"). The chorus of *Chrysippus* prays to Gaia and the Aether of Zeus while describing an Anaxagorean universe of continual change in which prayer's function is hard to imagine (fr. 839 *TrGF*).

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[13] Scodel (1984); Egli (2003) 39–49.

Tiresias in *Bacchae* joins in Dionysiac ritual while allegorizing the god. In a single passage, he treats Dionysus as the inventor of viticulture, and seems to foreshadow the Euhemerist understanding of the gods, but he also identifies Demeter with the grain-bearing earth itself, Dionysus with the vine:

> Δημήτηρ θεά—
> Γῆ δ' ἐστίν, ὄνομα δ' ὁπότερον βούλῃ κάλει·
> αὕτη μὲν ἐν ξηροῖσιν ἐκτρέφει βροτούς·
> ὃς δ' ἦλθ' ἔπειτ', ἀντίπαλον ὁ Σεμέλης γόνος
> βότρυος ὑγρὸν πῶμ' ηὗρε κἀσηνέγκατο θνητοῖς,
> ...
> οὗτος θεοῖσι σπένδεται θεὸς γεγώς,
> ὥστε διὰ τοῦτον τἀγάθ' ἀνθρώπους ἔχειν. (275–280, 284–285)
>
> Demeter the goddess is Earth—call her whichever your like. This goddess nourishes mortals on dry food. The one who came next, the offspring of Semele, discovered the corresponding liquid drink of the grape-cluster and introduced it to mortals ... This one, a god, is poured as libation to the gods, so that people have the goods they have through him.

He then offers an etymological explanation of the story of Dionysus' birth from Zeus' thigh. Hera wanted to throw the infant Dionysus from heaven, but Zeus tore off a piece of the aether that surrounds the earth and gave it to Hera as a "hostage" (ὅμηρον, explaining the association with the "thigh"—μηρός).

The identification of Demeter with bread and Dionysus with wine comes from Prodicus.[14] Prodicus, however, was an atheist, while for Tiresias the identification of wine with the god does not desanctify the god, but sanctifies the wine.[15] Tiresias brings together different ideas: Dionysus is the discoverer of wine, but he also is wine. Wine and grain are defined as the wet and dry, so that here, too, religion seems to have appropriated natural science.

The etymology, though, is very far from Prodicus. While the new version may not seem a great improvement on the old, it looks as if it may itself be designed to invite allegory. The false Dionysus is earth surrounded by aether—that is, a model of the world. An object made of aether as the hostage of Hera could easily be understood as disguised

[14] Dodds (1960) on 274–285, pp. 104–105.
[15] Prodicus' atheism: Henrichs (1975) 107–115.

cosmogony. Hera is often etymologized as *aêr*, but she is also identified with Earth (P. Der. 22.7).[16]

It is worth bearing in mind here that Tiresias and Cadmus are going to dance on the mountain, almost as if they were maenads—but there are no male maenads. In the episode in which Pentheus interrogates the Stranger, the disguised god insists that Dionysus' ὄργια may not be described:

Πε. τὰ δ' ὄργι' ἐστὶ τίν' ἰδέαν ἔχοντά σοι;
Δι. ἄρρητ' ἀβακχεύτοισιν εἰδέναι βροτῶν.
Πε. ἔχει δ' ὄνησιν τοῖσι θύουσιν τίνα;
Δι. οὐ θέμις ἀκοῦσαί σ', ἔστι δ' ἄξι' εἰδέναι. (*Ba.* 471–474)

PEN. The rites—what form, tell me, do they have?
ST. They cannot be spoken for mortals who are not Bacchants to know.
PEN. And they have what benefit for those who sacrifice?
ST. It is not right for you to hear, but they are worth knowing.

This does not sound like maenadism or most Dionysiac civic religion. While some Athenian rituals for Dionysus were certainly secret, such as the marriage between the wife of the *basileus* and the god, the civic cults of Dionysus did not involve initiations into secret rites. This language of knowledge available only to initiates evokes the Bacchic mysteries: Cadmus and Tiresias are the (sole) members of a *thiasos*. Tiresias explains aspects of the cult that are known to all, but he simultaneously evokes the mystery-cults of Dionysus.[17]

That he is a prophet may point in the same direction, for Plato at *Rep.* 364b speaks of ἀγύρται ... καὶ μάντεις ("begging priests and prophets") who persuade the rich that they can cleanse them of their own or ancestral injustice (and pleasantly!) or cast spells on their enemies. These are the people who provide a "crowd of books" (βίβλίων ... ὅμαδον, 364e) by Musaeus and Orpheus. Although Tiresias has a traditional place as a character of Theban polis-religion, Pentheus, when he calls the Stranger a *goês* ("magician," 234) implicitly invites an Athenian audience to connect the play's religious world with their own, and to realize that while the play's maenads perform rites that will become part of civic cult, they appear to Pentheus like the marginal practices that many of

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[16] On the various possible allegorizations, see Gallistl (1979) 16–19, 42–43, 47–59. For Hera and *aêr*, see Whitman (1970); on the varying identifications, Buffière (1956) 96.

[17] Seaford (1981) 253–254, discusses also the references to mysteries in the *parodos* (64–75). However, I do not believe that the play as a whole represents an initiation. While Leinieks (1996) 123–152 tries to argue away passages that suggest the mysteries, Seaford and other interpreters tend to see them everywhere.

them would view with suspicion.[18] (I do not doubt that *Bacchae*, though composed in Macedon, reflects Euripides' experience with Athenian audiences).

Hippolytus evokes the type of the misunderstood religious intellectual but does not present ideas. Theonoe in *Helen* presents a mixture of natural philosophy and exotic religion, and in her this combination motivates exceptional moral action, when she risks her life on behalf of Helen and Menelaus. Hecuba in *Troades* apparently interprets Zeus in terms of natural philosophy in crisis, when Menelaus' arrival prompts her to hope for justice when she has lost faith in the traditional gods. In *Orestes*, in contrast, the allegorization of mythology is not linked to esoteric religion or to the dramatic situation; it is simply part of the world of the play. Tiresias in *Bacchae*, like Theonoe in *Helen*, expounds his beliefs as a reason for action.

For specific purposes Euripides' contemporaries could distinguish sophists, natural philosophers, rhapsodes who interpreted texts allegorically, and initiators, just as we can; however, in the Euripidean world firm categories are often not useful. Euripides adapts both sophistic and religious thought, sometimes in the same characters or passages. He draws on the thought of people who wrote books, like Anaxagoras, and people who did not, like Socrates, and he uses both the ideas and the personalities. He is not entirely subservient to his sources. Not only does he recombine them in new ways; for example, he consistently speaks of *aether* in contexts that develop Diogenes' views on *aêr*. His characters thereby express a slightly different view of the nature of the soul from Diogenes'.[19]

It is interesting that we can observe allegorizing only in the very late plays. Hippolytus has Orphic traits already in 428, but his purity does not express itself through speculations about *aether* and *nous*. Very hesitantly—for we could learn tomorrow that a new papyrus of *Cretans* has the chorus singing an ode that interprets the birth of Zeus in terms from Anaxagoras—we can trace a development in Euripides' concerns from an interest in mystery religion and sophistic thought to allegorical and philosophical interpretation of Orphic ideas. If we guess

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[18] Roth (1984) compares Tiresias with Euthyphro. Cf. Versnel (1990) 102–129, on Athenian resistance to new gods and cults, and 150–156 on the mystery aspects of Dionysus in the play.

[19] On Euripides and Diogenes, see Egli (2003) 79–117, Assael (2001) 53–57. P. Derveni, like the fragments of Diogenes, speaks of *aêr* where Euripides uses *aethêr*.

that P. Derveni was composed around 420 or a little later, Euripides and the papyrus together suggest that these currents were converging in the last decades of the fifth century.

Books, Intellectual Property, and Secret Ideas in the Late Fifth Century

If we go back to the line of Aristophanes with which I began, another significant point about Euripides should become clear. Socrates in Plato's *Apology* (26d) objects to Meletus' confusing his ideas about the nature of things with those of Anaxagoras

> καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν …
>
> And do you so despise these men here and you think they have so little experience of letters that they wouldn't know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of these arguments? And the young men, furthermore, learn from me what they can sometimes buy for a drachma at most from the orchestra and laugh at Socrates …

Socrates is probably flattering the jurors here. They might well be familiar with these ideas, having heard them in Euripides and from other second-hand sources, but it would be considerably less likely that they would all know precisely who was responsible for them. This passage is frequently cited as evidence about the book-market.[20] It is interesting in another way, too, since it is directed at Meletus, a tragedian. If Euripides is a valid example, at least some tragedians are in the business of conveying contemporary thought without being clear about sources. Since tragedies are set in the mythical past, only texts attributed to mythical characters, such as Orpheus, could be properly identified, even if the poet wanted to provide citations. Meletus accuses Socrates as if they were tragic characters, for whom ideas from different sources typically are not distinguished.

In the *Apology*, Plato's Socrates blames Aristophanes' *Clouds* for spreading a set of false beliefs about him. The play assimilates Socrates to other intellectuals with whom he had profound disagreements (18c). The Socrates of *Clouds* is very much like a Euripidean character. Strikingly,

[20] e.g. Pfeiffer (1968) 27–28.

entry into his school resembles an initiation into a mystery-cult, but it is preceded by an explanation that recasts religious beliefs (Zeus) as natural philosophy (Vortex) through etymology (Διός/Δῖνος, 380–381), and that in this case is impious, since Vortex does not explain Zeus' nature, but replaces him.[21] Only rhetorical framing distinguishes reverent allegory from blasphemy. The comic poet names names, while the tragedian does not—but he does not name all the relevant names, or make it clear which ideas belong to whom. It is remarkable, too, that Plato's Socrates is forced to rely on someone else's books for the proof that these ideas are not his own, because he himself has not written any. It becomes clear that a significant function of the book could be not so much to disseminate one's ideas as to establish ownership of them. Socrates' argument here does not quite hold. Anaxagoras may have formulated these theories about the sun and moon, but that does not mean that Socrates has not been convinced by them and propagated them.

The other text that mixes mystery-religion, allegory, etymology, and natural philosophy in a way that is reminiscent of Euripides is P. Derveni. The work is apparently a treatise on initiation or a similar topic, much of it a close commentary on an Orphic theogony that interprets the text allegorically so that its story is consistent with the teachings of fifth-century philosophy: the scholarship is divided about precise affiliations with Anaxagoras, Archelaus, and Diogenes. Although the author quotes Heraclitus by name, he does not cite authorities for his doctrines about the physical world, which are taken for granted in the text—his arguments concern the meanings of the text and rituals he discusses, not the framework of his interpretation.

P. Derveni stands at the opposite end of the exclusive-public continuum from Euripides' tragedies, performed before audiences in the thousands. It is an esoteric text. Philochorus seems to have read it and through Philochorus it reaches Philodemus, but no other traces have been identified, as far as I know.[22] The poem it explicates announces itself as esoteric: ϑ]ụϱ̣ας γὰϱ ἐπιϑέ[σϑαι κελ]εύσας τοῖ̣[ς] [“ὠσὶ]ν αὐ[τοὺς οὔτι νομο]ϑẹτ̣ẹῖ̣ν” φη[σιν τοῖς] πολλοῖς, “commanding them to close doors against their ears, he says that he does not deliver his laws for the many” (col. VII, 9–10).[23] Bernabé has called the underlying formula, reconstructed as φϑεγξομαι οἷς ϑέμις ἐστί· ϑύϱας ἐπίϑεσϑε βέβηλοι (“I shall

[21] See Janko (1997) 69–70.
[22] Obbink (1994).
[23] For P. Derveni I follow Kouremenos, Parássoglou., and Tsantsanoglou (2006).

speak to whom it is allowed—profane ones close the doors"), "a kind of σφραγίς of Orpheus." He argues that either the text must have been recited only among initiates, so that the profane were literally kept away, or the text circulated without restriction, but only initiates would be able to understand it, and it therefore warns others away. Because the formula comes to be adapted in non-religious contexts (Galen borrows it several times), he thinks the latter meaning is likelier.[24] Yet this is a thin argument.

If it is not *themis* for the profane to listen to the speaker, they will surely suffer worse than confusion and misunderstanding if they intrude where they do not belong. In the ritual context, intruding on rites is dangerous. So what does such a formula mean in a medical context? It may be worth reminding ourselves that the Hippocratic Oath includes a promise both to teach those who are entitled and not to teach those who have not properly enrolled as students (which requires an oath):

> παραγγελίης τε καὶ ἀκροήσιος καὶ τῆς λοιπῆς ἁπάσης μαθήσιος μετάδοσιν ποιήσασθαι υἱοῖσί τε ἐμοῖσι, καὶ τοῖσι τοῦ ἐμὲ διδάξαντος, καὶ μαθηταῖσι συγγεγραμμένοισί τε καὶ ὡρκισμένοις νόμῳ ἰητρικῷ, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί.
>
> To share precept and oral teaching and all the rest of instruction with my sons, and the sons of the one who taught me, with students who have been enrolled and sworn the medical oath, but no one else.

The brief Hippocratic *Lex* constitutes a complaint about how many people claim to be doctors and are accepted as doctors when they are not properly trained. It ends by echoing the Orphic formula:

> Τὰ δὲ ἱερὰ ἐόντα πρήγματα ἱεροῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι δείκνυται·
> βεβήλοισι δὲ, οὐ θέμις, πρὶν ἢ τελεσθῶσιν ὀργίοισιν ἐπιστήμης
>
> Matters which are holy are revealed to holy people. To the profane it is not allowed [*themis*], until they have been initiated in the mysteries of knowledge. (5)

That is, medicine is in some ways like a mystery-ritual. Reading the texts without proper teaching is not just a waste of time. It is dangerous.

A text like the P. Derveni theogony would not necessarily either circulate freely or be restricted to initiates. The circumstances under which an esoteric text (a *hieros logos*) or secret teaching might be communicated are probably more complex than that. Not everything would be of equal sanctity; there is a difference between a text that was actually read

[24] He surveys the history of its use in Bernabé (1996).

as part of an initiation and a text studied or read before or after the ritual itself. An initiate might reveal more in private, among listeners expected to be sympathetic, than to a broad public. Different cults would have different powers to sanction violation of their secrets: revealing too much about the Eleusinian Mysteries, a state cult of Athens, could lead to a price on the offender's head, but non-state cults did not have such resources. Different participants might make different evaluations of what precisely was truly secret. Any ritual in which participation was voluntary needed to let outsiders know something of what it did and promised, or nobody would want to be initiated.

Consider the passage I cited above from the *de Corona*, where Demosthenes makes fun of the cult itself, both its public aspects (Aeschines led processions and was rewarded with goodies by old ladies), and the initiation itself (initiates smeared with mud and bran). Yet he says at 265 ἐτέλεις, ἐγὼ δ' ἐτελούμην, "you conducted initiations, I was initiated." Presumably he means that he was initiated at Eleusis, but the brevity and symmetry of the expression could well make a listener think that Demosthenes was initiated into the cult of Dionysus-Sabazios. Demosthenes here seems to be moving in a tricky field of popular attitudes. Because Aeschines' role is menial and slavish, Demosthenes can make him look bad even if the initiation itself is fully appropriate for an Athenian citizen—but he is willing to mock the cult and to describe features that an initiate would probably have regarded as sacred. How does Demosthenes know what happens during such an initiation, if his own experience is confined to Eleusis? Evidently, the boundaries are not completely impermeable. Whether or not Demosthenes is well informed about this particular cult or is simply citing commonplaces of such marginal rites, some of the material he repeats would surely have been kept secret by a properly indoctrinated initiate.

In the poem on which P. Derveni comments, Zeus swallows something—probably the penis of Ouranos—and thereby comes to contain the world, which he then recreates. He then desires sexual relations with his mother. All this is reminiscent of the comment of Plato's Euthyphro to Socrates that he believes not only in Zeus' binding of Cronus and other stories of violence among the gods, but other even more amazing facts about them:

> Μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἄρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, ἐάνπερ βούλῃ, περὶ τῶν θείων διηγήσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσῃ. (6c5–8)

> Not only [are these true], Socrates, but as I just said, if you like I will narrate also many other things to you about divine matters which you will be stunned at when you hear them, I know it.

Stories that Socrates does not know and that will shock him are likely to resemble those of P. Derveni—they belong to the margins of Greek religion.[25] Euthyphro evidently does not see these stories as secret, but he has experience of being laughed at in the assembly when he engages in prophecy, so he would probably not tell these to anybody. He trusts Socrates, however, as another misunderstood figure. Again, Demosthenes can mention several features of the nocturnal, presumably secret rites as well as those carried on in public by day; presumably these were such standard features of such rituals that he was not giving anything away. In any case, since he is not talking about a civic cult, he would need to fear mainly supernatural retribution if he revealed secrets. Actually repeating a text used during secret rites would surely be taboo—Demosthenes does not say what Aeschines read—but some doctrines can obviously be shared, as Pindar shares them. Herodotus is unwilling to mention even the name of Osiris. He makes a display of his own careful piety, and he is addressing a Panhellenic audience. Others would probably not have been so scrupulous, and he himself might have been less careful among friends rather than in a book. So the boundaries of what can be told do not seem clearly fixed.

The Derveni poem defines itself as exclusive, and we can believe that this exclusiveness has real meaning without having to assume that the text is a *hieros logos* for ritual recitation only. The Derveni author then compounds this exclusiveness by insisting that Orpheus composes in riddles, that is, that he requires allegorical interpretation. Allegorical interpretation is, by definition, elitist, since it claims that the immediately available sense of the text is incorrect and only the special procedure of the allegorist provides access to the true understanding. The audience is already elite, since only the few and initiated are supposed to listen to the text at all, but these are presumably, like Euthyphro, expected to believe the shocking revelations of the poem, while the allegorist interprets them away (the penis becomes the sun, for example). So to offer an allegorical interpretation of a text used in an initiation is to create a higher level of knowledge.

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[25] Euthyphro is one of the candidates for the authorship of P. Derveni (Kahn [1997]). Plato's Euthyphro, however, although he is an etymologist in the *Cratylus*, appears to read his Orphic texts literally.

I do not want to enter the continuing debate of speculations about the possible author of the treatise. Certain points seem clear. The treatise was used in a cremation, which indicates that the dead man or those who arranged his funeral believed that the book was holy. (I find it very unlikely that this particular papyrus should simply have been used to ignite a pyre.) Yet the author claims to know that initiates obtain no real understanding, whether they participate in public or private initiations. This suggests wide experience, although since he identifies real understanding with his own interpretation, he could probably be certain that this was the case even in cults of which he had no direct experience or even good hearsay. The treatise uses the interpretation of an Orphic theogony as part of its argument, although the commentary is only one portion of the work, and he insists, as allegorical commentators typically do, that he is explaining what the author actually intended his ideal readers to understand.[26]

Most interpreters see the author of P. Derveni as a religious professional whose text functions within his competition against others, although there are many disagreements of detail.[27] Not everyone agrees; this understanding of the author's position depends mostly on the first-person plural in Col. V.4: "for them, we go into the oracular shrine to ask." If this passage is a quotation from someone other than the author, there is no strong reason to identify him as a religious specialist.[28] In any case, while he expresses condescending pity for those who are initiated but do not learn, the treatise does not reject any traditional religious practice. It is impossible to tell whether his allegorizing is defensive, aimed at showing that Orpheus' text is not foolish but meaningful, or positive, aimed at giving authority to the author's views about the nature of the world by attributing them to Orpheus. While Orphic teaching and ritual evidently provided genuine meaning and value, some elements of the poem could be offensive. The author removes these while understanding the text in terms of natural philosophy; but the resulting mixture is not cold science, but offers a possibility of giving meaning to human life.

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[26] This tradition sees its texts as αἰνίγματα ("riddles," P. Derveni Col VII); see Struck (2004) 21–50.

[27] Obbink (1997); West (1997) 350–364; Most (1997); Betagh (2004).

[28] Skepticism in Tsantanoglou-Kouremenos' introduction to Kouremenos, Parássoglou, Tsantsanoglou (2006) 46–58.

Here we may want to remember Theonoe or Hecuba or even Tiresias. They evoke philosophy at moments of crisis. Theonoe talks about the soul's link with aether because she believes that the mind, having rejoined the aether of which it is composed, still possesses some consciousness or intelligence. This belief in future consciousness is the basis for her further belief that wrongful actions will inevitably be punished, and that belief explains why she is willing to accept the very serious risk that her brother will kill her if she helps Helen and Menelaus. Diogenes of Apollonia's theories are not just interesting ideas, but are inseparable from religious and ethical beliefs for which Theonoe stakes her life. Similarly, Tiresias in *Bacchae* is advocating that Pentheus participate in the worship of Dionysus. He does not offer his explanations of Dionysiac myth as a neutral intellectual exercise, but as an immediate reason to practice. Tiresias, by acknowledging that the common belief that Dionysus was sewn in the thigh of Zeus is laughable, implicitly makes his understanding of the story a necessary condition for an intelligent person to worship Dionysus. If his own explanation does not seem less ridiculous, it invites allegory.

Conclusions

Euripides presents a variety of approaches to such sacred philosophy or philosophized mystery. Some Euripidean characters, like the Electra of *Orestes* break into philosophy without any hints of the mysteries, while others, like the chorus of *Cretans*, are initiates who do not, as far as we know, preach philosophy. Hippolytus is a misunderstood religious intellectual, but he does not present any doctrine. Theonoe and Tiresias overtly combine philosophy and an exclusive religion. So we cannot separate religion and other intellectual trends into entirely separate categories. Both Euripides and other contemporary intellectuals were combining ways of making sense of the world that moderns might see as entirely distinct.

Euripides, however, regularly uses ideas that were typically expressed in books and in restricted circles. He not only recombines them, but then presents them to a much wider public. His works were not primarily written texts and were the opposite of esoteric. It is thus not surprising if the Athenian public could not always be clear about exactly who was responsible for what, for the books in which (sometimes) named individuals presented their ideas were not necessarily the mechanism by

which most people came to know these ideas. P. Derveni and Euripides' plays present often very similar material to very different audiences, using very different modes of transmission.

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PART II

GREEK LAW

CHAPTER FIVE

WRITING SACRED LAWS IN ARCHAIC AND CLASSICAL CRETE

Michael Gagarin

In a recent book I considered reasons why Greeks in many different cities first decided to write down laws in the archaic period.[1] My study included some texts such as *IC* 4.3, a sacrificial calendar from Gortyn, that are commonly considered sacred laws, but I did not single out sacred laws as a separate category or explore possible differences between these and other kinds of laws. In this paper, I want to take a closer look at the writing of laws in this period, and examine whether sacred laws were treated any differently from secular laws. Questions I will be asking include why sacred laws were written and displayed in certain public areas, who authorized them to be written down and publicly displayed, and who would have been the audience for them. I will conclude that with respect to these questions there is little or no discernable difference between sacred laws and other kinds of laws. My evidence is drawn primarily from the island of Crete, which wrote more laws than any other part of Greece in this period.

It is widely recognized today that although the Greeks used the expression "sacred laws" (*hieroi nomoi*) at least as early as the fourth century BCE, they never distinguished "sacred law" as a category of rules separate from other laws, nor did they ever gather sacred laws together in any recognizable collection. *Leges Sacrae* is a modern category with no exact equivalent in ancient Greece. It first appeared at the end of the nineteenth century in the collection of *Leges Graecorum Sacrae* by von Prott and Ziehen, but is better known today through the three volumes of *Lois Sacrées* published by Sokolowski (1955, 1962, 1969). More recent material is now included in Lupu 2005. Despite being a modern creation, the term "sacred laws" has proven useful, and Lupu's very reasonable criteria for inclusion in the category of sacred laws will be followed in this

[1] Gagarin (2008) esp. 67–92.

paper. According to Lupu, in order to be sacred laws, (1) "the documents must be prescriptive" (2) "their subject matter … must be or pertain to religion and particularly to cult practice" (Lupu 2005: 5–6). Lupu's criteria are consistent with Parker's view that sacred laws are laws and decrees "different in no regard except subject matter from other laws and decrees of the community that issued them" (Parker 2004: 58).

The first texts I will examine are loosely classified as sacrificial calendars, or what Lupu calls "periodic sacrifices." I begin with these because most of the earliest sacred laws concern sacrifice. The first text, which is probably our earliest sacred law, is one of the group of eight texts from Dreros, dated to the second half of the seventh century (Jeffrey 1990: 315), which were inscribed on a wall of the temple of Apollo.[2]

1 - -] ἐν τε Πυτίοι | πεν[τ- -
2 - -] ἐν Ἀγ[ο]ϱαίοι | μήϱος Ρ[- -

- -] in the Pythion five? [- -
- -] in (the) Agoraion thighs [- -

Although this text is short and fragmentary, it is evidently a list of sacrifices: five somethings in the sanctuary of Pythion Apollo and some number of thighs in the sanctuary of Zeus Agoraios. Although this text differs in certain ways from other early lists of sacrifices, it conforms to the general pattern of repetition of a syntactical pattern with variation in the details. The only details we see here are the place for the sacrifice and the items to be sacrificed, but these, at least, are arranged in a parallel structure in the two lines.

A slightly later text from Gortyn (*IC* 4.3), probably from the first half of the sixth century, gives a more typical list of sacrifices.

1 *a-c* - - ἰα]ϱὰ | τετελημέ[να - *c. 6* -] · υι | τõι [ϝ]ελκανί[õι - -
d - -]αι | ἐν τᾶι πένπτα[ι - -
2 *a-c* - -]ν | τέληον | καὶ αἶγα | ἐν [τᾶι ἔκται?] ὄιν θήλε[ι]αν | τõι Ἀπ[έλλονι - -
d - -]εϙ[· ·]ς | ταϝῦϱος | ἐσ · [- -
3 *a-c* - - τᾶι Ἥϱαι | ὄις | θή[λ]ε[ια | τᾶι Δάμ]ατϱι | ὄις | ἐπίτεκ[ς - -
4 *a-c* - - αἰ μὲν δύο | θήλει[αι, οἰ δὲ δύ]ο ἔϱσενες | καὶ τϱ[άγος - -

1 (These) sacred rites have been performed … in the month Welkanios … on the fifth day
2 … a grown (bull?) and a goat on (the ? day?), a ewe to Apollo … a bull

[2] van Effenterre (1946) 603–604, no. 6 = Bile (1988) 31, no. 8.

3 … to Hera a ewe, to Demeter a pregnant ewe
4 … two females and two males and a goat (?)

The parallel structure is even clearer here. Each line mentions the day of the sacrifice together with the name of the god to whom the sacrifice is offered and the animal to be sacrificed to each. This format was typical: "A typical entry in a sacrificial calendar includes the month, the recipient, and the type of victim to be offered; the date within the month may or may not be indicated" (Lupu 2005: 65).

For Lupu the earliest text with this typical information is a very fragmentary inscription from Corinth, which he dates around 600, perhaps a little earlier than Gortyn 3.[3]

A 1 Φοινικ[αίο - -
2–3 - - τέτο]ϱες χοῖϱοι [- -

In the month Phoinikaios … four piglets …

The Corinth text as we have it only gives the month and the type of animal to be sacrificed, but the text almost certainly continued below as well as to the left, and it is reasonable to suppose that the original inscription contained further information about sacrifices.

The Dreros text discussed above is a little different, listing the part of the animal (the thigh) not the kind of animal and listing the place (a god's sanctuary) rather than the god himself. It resembles the other two, however, in providing specific details about sacrifices (all three must originally have provided many more details than what survives today). Because Gortyn 3 apparently begins with a perfect participle ("these sacred rites having been performed"), it (and the other texts) might be understood simply as a record of past events. But even if the original reason for inscribing these texts was to provide a record of sacrifices, when the details were recorded and displayed in a prominent public space, they would *ipso facto* acquire prescriptive force and would thus provide guidance for sacrifices in the future. In this sense, all three are laws.

Whether they were originally laws or records, we must still ask why people in these cities, and in many others from which we have similar calendars in later years, felt the need to write them down? Surely sacrifices of various animals to various gods on various dates and in various places had been carried out for many years, indeed centuries, without people

[3] *Corinth* VIII, I.1 (= *IG* 4 1597), see Lupu (2005) 65–66; Jeffrey (1990) 131, no. 18, however, dates this to 575–550—about the same time as Gortyn 3.

feeling the need to write down this sort of information. Traditionally, priests or other members of the community must have just remembered this information and passed it along orally to successive generations. Even after writing was introduced into Greece in the early eighth century if not earlier, more than a century would pass before these texts were written. Why did communities feel a sudden need to write down these rules in the late seventh and early sixth centuries?

I have elsewhere argued (Gagarin 2008: 67–109) that the publication of the earliest laws in exactly this period was connected with the growing size and prosperity of archaic communities and with the gradual expansion of their control over neighboring territory, which had formerly consisted of small independent villages, a process sometimes referred to as *synoikismos*. This process resulted in larger, more diverse populations, and the traditional rules and customs of these large mixed populations would likely contain inconsistencies or even contradictions concerning how things should be done. This, in turn, would have made it desirable to publicize rules, whether new or traditional, in order to minimize disagreements. Publication in writing would be particularly important for details, especially procedural details, about which there would have been more uncertainty than about general rules of conduct.

All these reasons would be especially relevant in the case of sacrificial calendars. If a polis like Dreros had recently expanded to include several smaller neighboring communities, each of which had previously carried out their own traditional sacrifices, it would become difficult to remember and transmit all these traditional practices orally and still preserve all the dates, gods, animals, and other details unchanged. People would have been particularly concerned to continue their religious practices without change, and only a written record would have been able to accomplish this. This, I would argue, was the main reason why lists of sacrifices began to be written down at this time. Of course, writing down a set of regulations would not have eliminated the traditional means of oral preservation and transmission. Written laws can only have preserved a small percentage of the many rules concerning sacrifice or other sacred matters, and even after these particular rules, which presumably were (for whatever reason) deemed most important, were publicly inscribed, many others would continue to be remembered by priests and others.[4]

[4] The simultaneous coexistence of oral and written rules is also discussed by de Polignac and Thomas in this volume.

But the process of public inscription marks an important step in both the formalization of rules and the growing consciousness of the people as a community, a polis.

Who then would have authorized the writing down of these rules? The vast majority of archaic laws do not include any mention of authorization, and these three texts in their current form are no exception. But interestingly, at least four of the eight seventh-century inscriptions discovered at Dreros include an enactment clause.[5] The first and best known of these[6] begins ἇδ' ἔϝαδε πόλι: "these things were pleasing to the polis"—essentially the same expression as the well-known Athenian formula ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ: "it seemed best to the demos," or "the people decided." We do not know exactly what group of people the term "polis" designated in Dreros at this time, but we should note that one of the other three Drerian texts that have enactment clauses (all of them using the same term ἔϝαδε) is also said to have been enacted by the polis.[7] One other text was apparently enacted by a group called the *agellai*,[8] who are otherwise unknown, but the fourth text at Dreros with an enactment clause contains the expression ἔϝαδε τοῖσι θυστᾶσι: "it was pleasing to the *thustai*."[9] *Thustas*, which occurs only here, is glossed in Hesychius as a Cretan word for "priest" and is probably connected with the verb θύω ("sacrifice"). Thus, the *thustai*—a group of "sacrificers" or "priests"—authorized this text. Only a few more words survive—"whoever gives *misthos* (?) receives"—but these suggest that this text was also connected with sacrificing, and may have stipulated that someone who paid for the victim would in return receive a portion of it.

Now, if two of the eight archaic laws from Dreros deal with sacrifice and at least one of these was authorized by a group of priests or sacrificers, can we speculate that these two formed part of a group of sacred laws relating to a specifically religious subject, sacrifice, which were authorized by a group of priests and displayed appropriately on a wall of the temple of Apollo? And would this mean that the Drerians recognized a separate category of rules whose enactment and application

[5] In the other four early texts from Dreros, including Dreros 6 which we examined above, the beginning of the text is not preserved, so it is possible that one or more of these also originally began with an enactment clause.

[6] Demargne and van Effenterre (1937) = Bile (1988) 29, no. 2.

[7] van Effenterre (1946) 590–597, no. 2 = Bile (1988) 30, no. 4.

[8] van Effenterre (1946) 597–600, no. 3 = Bile (1988) 30, no. 5.

[9] van Effenterre (1946) 600–602, no. 4 = Bile (1988) 30–31, no. 6.

are confined to what we and they would recognize as a sacred practice, separate from the practices regulated by the secular laws enacted in Dreros at the same time? Perhaps, but before drawing such a conclusion about these two laws, we must consider the entire group of eight texts together.

After these eight laws were enacted, all of them were written on the East wall of the temple of Apollo which formed one side of the Drerian agora. This would have been a prime location for posting a public text, easily visible to those who made use of this centrally located public space, and it seems highly unlikely that anyone who wished could inscribe a text there without the approval of some person or group. In other words, someone in Dreros must have decided that these eight texts, which were authorized or enacted by at least three different groups, for some reason deserved to be publicly displayed on the temple wall. Thus, even though different groups apparently had the authority to enact individual laws at Dreros, presumably only a particular person or group had the authority to allow these other groups to display the laws they had enacted in this public space.

There is no obvious feature, moreover, such as size or shape or location that distinguishes any of these eight texts from the others. To us some of the texts may seem more important than others, and some may seem qualitatively different—sacred as opposed to secular—but by inscribing them all together on this wall, the city implicitly placed them all in the category of important public texts, whether their content was (in our terms) sacred or secular (or both). The Drerians, in other words, appear to have thought in terms of one large category, public laws, not in terms of sub-categories of sacred and secular laws.

We must not be misled by the fact that at Gortyn, as at Dreros, the early sacrificial calendar was inscribed on the wall of a temple, and indeed, that the small fragment about sacrifices from Corinth was also found in the vicinity of a temple, though it was probably written on a free-standing stele set up in the temple precinct rather than on a wall of the temple itself. The reason for displaying these rules for sacrifices on or near temples was not because they were concerned with a sacred matter but because all the laws at that time, at least at Dreros and Gortyn (we don't know about Corinth), were inscribed on the walls of the same temple. At Gortyn, moreover, we know that the public space for displaying laws changed late in the sixth century from the temple of Apollo to the agora, some distance away. All the fifth-century laws at Gortyn were inscribed on free-standing walls or steles in this public area, including a law on sacrifices that is

similar to the early law from Gortyn.[10] In addition, the early sacrificial calendars from Dreros and Gortyn were inscribed on a temple of Apollo, but both specify sacrifices to other gods in addition to Apollo—Zeus at Dreros and Hera and Demeter at Gortyn. Thus, inscription on the temple of Apollo would have been relevant only to a small part of each of these laws.

Thus far I have focused on sacrificial calendars since these are the only Cretan laws that appear to be entirely sacred (but see below). Other laws which we may want to classify as sacred also contain non-sacred material. Take, for example, a law from Axos, probably from the fifth century, concerning the division of meat from a sacrifice:[11]

τοῖς δ' ἰαροῦσ-
ι, ὅτι κα πέρονται πὰρ τὰ ἠγ-
ραμένα, αἰ μή τις αὐτὸς δοίη μ-
ὴ ὐπ' ἀνάνκας, τιτουϝέσθο σ-
τατῆρα κατὰν θυσίαν ϝεκάστ-
αν καὶ τõ κρίος τὰν διπλεία-
ν· πορτιπονε̃ν δ' αἶπερ τõν ἄλ-
ον. αἰ δ' ὀ κοσμίον μὴ ἀποδοίη τ-
ὰ ἐπιβάλοντα ϝίσανς τιτου-
ϝέσθο. κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς
Κυδαντείοις διδόμεν τρίτο-
ι ϝέτει τὰν βολὰν ἰς τὰ θύ-
ματα δυόδεκα στατῆρανς.

As for the priests, whatever they carry off contrary to what is written, unless someone himself should give (it to them) willingly, let him pay a fine of one stater for each sacrifice and twice (the value) of meat. One shall bring a charge against (him) in the same way as for the others. If the *kosmos* does not hand over the appropriate amount, he shall pay equal. In the same way, for the Kydanteia (?) the *boule* is to give every third year for the sacrifices twelve staters.

The regulations set a fine for any priest who takes more than his specified share and provides that one may bring charges against an offending priest "in the same way as for the others." Whatever the precise meaning of this last expression, up to this point, this reads like a sacred law. The next two clauses, however, complicate this conclusion. Lines 9–11 provide that the person who is *kosmos* must hand over the appropriate amount or pay a

[10] *IC* 4.65, probably from the early fifth century. It is quite fragmentary, but seems to say, "Gods ... to Zeus the ... a white female sheep, and the hide (?) ... a ewe lamb, and a priest [should take ?] the cow hide ... a ram. To Helios a male sheep ... the additional sacrifices, as neighbors (?) ... three and a ewe lamb, but of the others ... that holds a medimnos, and of cheese." Note that this law begins with an invocation to the gods (*thioi*); this does not signal the religious content of the law, however, since the same or a similar invocation is found in other laws at Gortyn (and in other cities too) that have little or no sacred material in them, including the Gortyn Code.

[11] *IC* II.v.9. The inscription was discovered in 1865, but the stone itself has long been lost; the latest text is Koerner (1993) nos. 106 and 107. An unknown amount of text preceded the preserved text, but we may have the original end of the law.

fine, and 11–14 call on the Boule to provide funds for another festival in the same way—that is, with the same rules applying. Now, provisions specifying that various officials should enforce laws or else pay a fine are found in many early Greek laws, and so the former clause is usually understood (e.g. Koerner 1993: 358–359) to mean that the *kosmos* is supposed to enforce the law, collecting the fine from an offending priest and giving it to the city treasury; if he does not collect it, he must pay the amount himself. But *epibalonta*, which I translate "appropriate amount," is an odd term to use in this regard and another interpretation may be possible in light of the last clause, which implies that our text was preceded by a provision that the Boule (or someone else) should give money for the sacrifice that is the subject of lines 3–9.[12]

It seems, then, that in the part now lost, the inscription would have provided public funding for a sacrifice or sacrifices and would have specified how the meat was to be divided. The preserved text then specifies fines for a priest who violated these rules, and 9–11 may then apply to a *kosmos* who did not provide appropriate funds for the sacrifice—perhaps the funds authorized earlier. Whatever the correct interpretation of this difficult text, however, it is clear that the law contains provisions concerning both sacred matters—priests and sacrifices—and secular matters—duties of the *kosmos* and funding by the Boule. We may treat it as a sacred law, but we must also recognize that it has secular provisions.

More common is the reverse situation, for religious material tends to be scattered all through secular laws. There are references, for example, to slaves and others taking refuge in a temple in the first column of the Gortyn Code, but also in four other inscriptions (*IC* 4.41, 47, 73, 83), none of which are otherwise concerned with sacred matters. Similarly, in a divorce, the woman may be required to swear an oath in the temple of Artemis (*IC* 4.72.3.5–9), but otherwise there is nothing religious about the rules for divorce.

The frequent intermingling of sacred and secular in these laws suggests that we should rethink our earlier observation that the sacred calendars we examined appear to be entirely sacred. The law from Axos shows the Council and the *kosmos* somehow acting together to provide funding for sacrifices, and it is very likely that funding for all the other sacrifices specified in early laws was also provided by the city. Thus, these sacrificial calendars may have been written and even authorized by priests, but

12 *Kata ta auta* (line 11) implies "in the same way" [as has just been specified].

the decision to display them in public places was probably made by the same civic authorities who authorized the public inscription of other (secular) laws in the same places and who would provide the funds for the sacrifices.

The intermingling of sacred and secular in these laws is reflected in the use of the expression "both divine and human" to qualify private and public obligations. We first find this expression in the agreement between a certain Spensithios and the city of Datala, dated to about 600 BCE, where it occurs three times.[13] The agreement states that Spensithios is to receive considerable benefits in exchange for "recording and remembering for the city public matters (*damosia*), both divine and human (*ta te thēia kai ta tanthrōpina*)." The same duties are then stated negatively—"no one else besides Spensithios and his family is to record and remember for the polis public matters either divine or human, unless Spensithios and his family give permission." And a little later the agreement further specifies that "at all occasions, both divine and human, at which the *kosmos* is present, the recorder too shall be present and participate." The same expression is also found toward the end of the Gortyn Code, where the adopted son is to inherit from his adopted father in the same way as a natural son would as long as "he fulfills the adopter's obligations, divine and human (*ta thina kai ta antropina*)" (*IC* 4.72.10.42–43). Here the expression designates the deceased's private religious obligations—tending to family tombs and other matters—together with his debts and other material obligations.

Use of this expression indicates, on the one hand, that Cretans at this time recognized two clearly differentiated realms of activity, sacred and secular, in private lives and public activities alike. Individuals and public officials had recognizable obligations in each realm, and one could, theoretically at least, keep the two separate. On the other hand the law regulates both realms together on an apparently equal basis, specifying

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13 *SEG* 27.631 (see Jeffery and Morpurgo-Davies 1970); the parts of the text I quote are from *A* 4, *A* 6–7, and *B* 2–3. The identification of the polis that made this agreement as Datala rests on the opening words: "It pleased the Dataleis and we the city, five (men) from each of the tribes, guarantee for Spensithios . . ." (ἔϝαδε Δαταλεῦσι καὶ ἐσπένσαμες πόλις Σπενσιθίωι ἀπὸ πυλᾶν πέντε ἀπ' ἐκάστας). It sounds as if two groups are involved (see Perlman (2004) 1155–1157), and perhaps two stages in the process of agreement: the people of Datala voting (?) as a group, and a smaller group of representatives from the tribes, who might have negotiated and drafted the agreement with all its details and then presented it to the people for approval. Compare the earliest law from Dreros (*SEG* 27.620), which begins "it was pleasing to the polis" and later speaks of "the twenty of the polis."

duties and obligations in each realm alike. We may compare the situation in Athens, where Rhodes has recently studied the place of religion in inscriptions. He concludes that although the Athenians could certainly distinguish between sacred and secular, "the organs of the state were organs of the citizens: religion was one of the concerns of the citizens, individually and collectively, and so the organs of the state were neither primarily religious nor distinctively secular, but involved themselves in religion just as they involved themselves in all the other matters that concerned the citizens" (2009: 13). Similarly in Crete, the expression "both human and divine" is best read as conveying the idea of the totality of a person's or a city's activities; its use in formal documents would reinforce the idea that all of life, public and private, has sacred and secular features, and that these are treated together rather than clearly separated.

In sum, in these early laws the realms of sacred and secular, though conceptually separate, were regulated together as the total area of human activity. Texts that we may want to call sacred, such as sacrificial calendars, were enacted and displayed in exactly the same way as other, clearly secular texts because like many other laws, they concerned matters that had both sacred and secular aspects—sacrifices carried out by priests but paid for with public funds. And not only did sacred laws sometimes contain secular provisions but sacred matters were often treated within the context of secular laws. "Sacred law" is thus not a useless category for scholars of early Greek law, but it needs to be used with caution. No laws in archaic and classical Crete were entirely sacred.

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CHAPTER SIX

EMBEDDED SPEECH IN THE ATTIC *LEGES SACRAE*

Sarah Hitch

Sacrifice and prayer were the cornerstones of Greek religious practice. The rites regularly enacted to honor the gods were accompanied by a variety of spoken communications, and the synonymous performance of these rites formed the basis of Greek religious experience.[1] Unlike sacrifice, which is well-attested in ancient sources and much discussed in modern scholarship, prayer and other ritual speech acts are elusive. There were a range of oral performances in honor of the gods, including prayer, oaths, curses, a variety of songs and music (begging songs, hymns, dithyrambs, paians, lament), proclamations, announcements of results of sacrifices, and *exegesis*, the specialist advice given on sacrificial procedure, supplication, and purification. The nature and content of most of these ritual utterances are absent from the written record, an absence which has been interpreted as a consequence of their secondary or marginal role. Without written documentation or attestations of sequence and traditional patterns similar to those found in literary and epigraphic descriptions of sacrifice, religious speech acts have seemed improvisational and therefore relatively less important to modern scholars.[2]

[1] This study will focus specifically on democratic Athens; in this context, the connection between prayer and sacrifice is described by Isoc.*Paneg.*43.4, Lys.4.4, 6.51, Pl. *Euthphr.*14b, (Ps.) *Alc.*148e.5, *Leg.*885b8, 909b4, 910b3, *Menex.*244a5, and Thuc.8.70.

[2] Because they were not committed to writing, Henrichs (2003) 58 laments that, 'with few exceptions, the entire oral dimension of Greek religion—cult songs, public prayers, ritual utterances and exclamations, and the so-called sacred tales (*hieroi logoi*) have vanished without a trace'. Burkert describes the lack of 'liturgical prayer formula' as 'striking' (1985) 74, cf. p. 4. Both Henrichs and Burkert conclude that actions were valued more than words, Burkert (1985) 55 and Henrichs (1998) and (2003) 40. On the importance of hymns and music in Greek worship, particularly as public displays, Furley (2007) 118 ff. Much of the extent evidence is collected in Porta's unpublished dissertation (1999); for an overview of prayer, see Pulleyn (1997), who gives an appendix of inscribed *ex voto* prayers, pp. 218–219; essays discussing lament can be found in Suter (2008); hymns are collected by Furley and Bremer (2001). Inscribed metrical religious texts are collected by Petrovic and Petrovic (2006), none of which come from democratic Athens.

In these theories, written documentation is required for the preservation of traditional liturgies, and the absence of this kind of ritual text, the secondary importance of speech acts in relation to material offerings, and the marginalization of the priesthood, who might be expected to control such texts, are seen as related characteristics unique to Greek religion.[3] Ancient Greek religion is unparalleled among religious systems in the ancient Mediterranean in its lack of formally recognized religious scripture or sacred texts and the relatively powerless position of Greek cult officials, who were subject neither to official training nor the expert knowledge entailed by a canon of sacred texts, which are the exclusive preserve of priests in many ancient cultures.[4] Although writing to gods on inscribed votives, recorded hymns in praise of gods, or texts documenting divine voices in oracles are found throughout the Greek world from a very early stage, there are no formally recognized texts or traditional liturgies for the practice of Greek religion.

A further complication for the intersection between writing and Greek religion is the association in Athens of religious documents with countercultural or foreign religious movements, reinforcing the notion that written texts were not part of the mainstream Greek religious experience. In Classical Athens, references to the possession or use of religious documents are used in court cases and in drama to characterize people as outsiders or ignorant fools, easily susceptible to foreign influences and cheap salesmen, who peddle such documents.[5]

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[3] The absence of ritual liturgies as related to the nebulous form of Greek religious authority is summarized by Pulleyn: 'Ancient Greece had no Book of Common Prayer and knew no centrally organized religious authority', (1997) 156; so also Parker (1996) 54: 'Elaborate ritual texts are the hallmark of a more specialized priesthood and a more autonomous religious order than those of Greece'; cf. Burkert (1985) 4, Harris (1989) 83. I will use the terms 'priest' and 'cult official' interchangeably in reference to people (men and women) charged with religious duties on behalf of the community, although neither adequately suits the various state-appointed religious offices in Athens under discussion; the problematic English terminology is discussed by Beard and North (1990) 3, Henrichs (2008) 4–5.

[4] Egyptian priests used a sacred language known only to priests, and early Sanskrit texts seem to have played a similar role in the caste system. Extensive ritual texts survive from Hittite Anatolia which seem to have been used during ritual performances and prescribe exact words to be spoken; e.g. Rutherford's (2008) study on ritual lament in Hittite culture. Parker contrasts the attestations of extensive ritual liturgies in Near Eastern traditions with the centrality of actions in Greek ritual, (1996) 51.

[5] Henrichs (2002) 223 discusses Theseus' sceptical remarks about Orphic texts (Eur. Hipp.952–954) and Demosthenes' accusation that Aeschines read texts in rituals for Sabazius (Dem.18.259); cf. Parker (1996) 55. Pl. *Resp.* 364e describes Orphic texts being

An important body of evidence for our understanding of Athenian religion are the sacred laws, in which the oral dimension of cult is almost completely absent. It is this silence which will be explored in this paper. Sacred laws are an extremely valuable source for local ritual practice, but, as laws issued by political bodies, are usually motivated by financial or bureaucratic agenda, pertain only to new or revised religious customs, and were never used as part of ritual performances but rather stand as inadvertent records of their performance.[6] Given the financial focus of many of these documents, detailed information about offerings to gods may be included with the aim of creating public notices for the expenditure of state resources, but rarely, if ever, describe the oral dimension of ritual. For example, a relatively detailed 4th century sacrificial calendar from the Attic deme Erchia includes the day, place of sacrifice, recipient deities, type and cost of sacrificial victims, perquisites for priestesses, restrictions on the removal of meat from the sanctuary, types of libations, and some details about specific offerings, such as 'on the same altar' for offerings for particular heroines, but no mention is made of speech acts. Correct procedure in sacrificial offerings on behalf of the deme is important to the creators of this document, but the running financial tallies at the bottom of each column clearly indicate the primary purpose behind this record.[7]

Since these documents were not intended for use in ritual performances and usually present a very abbreviated picture of ritual, at times giving little more information than the type and cost of the victim, sacred laws fit neatly into the general consensus among modern scholars that Greek religion was 'illiterate'.[8] However, the brevity of Athenian sacred laws, and the avoidance of representations of speech acts in particular,

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sold door-to-door and purchased oracles fill the attics of Cleon and the Sausage-seller in Ar. *Eq.*1000–1005; cf. the oracle seller in *Av.*960–965.

[6] The extant inscriptions regulating sacred matters are called *leges sacrae* or 'sacred laws', modern terms, as the Greeks themselves had no label for these particular regulations; they are most easily accessible in the collections of Lupu (2004), von Prott and Ziehen (1896–1906), and Sokolowski (1955, 1962, 1969). The importance of sacred laws in interpretations of Greek religion is summarized by Henrichs (2003) 42; cf. Burkert (1985) 5 and Connelly (2007) 4–5. On the brevity of sacred laws and the incidental record they provide of ritual practice, Jameson (1997), Lupu (2004) 55–56, and Parker (2004).

[7] *SEG* 21.541; on which Jameson (1965) 154–155. Mikalson (1977) 424–425 notes that 43 deities and 35 separate cult sites are detailed in this calendar, which covers 25 days of the year and records a total cost of DR 547. The interchange in cult practices between the demes and Athens is summarized by Osborne (1990) and Whitehead (1986).

[8] Parker (1996) 55 describes inscribed calendars as the 'books of public cult'.

may result from the complex development in the democratic uses of inscriptions and attitudes towards publicity, performance, and communal involvement in the *polis*. Although written documentation increasingly gained authority during the fourth century in areas previously exclusively reliant on oral traditions, such written documentation did not supplant the oral traditions and, in many cases, was incomplete without accompanying speech acts.[9] The lack of written liturgies should not suggest that extensive oral performances did not exist or were not relatively stable: anthropologists have observed complex and formally recognized oral traditions in many cultures which are never committed to writing.[10] However, these oral traditions are preserved in societies without the literary culture of democratic Athens, a culture which witnessed a flourish of written texts in the fifth and fourth centuries, making the transition from an oral to a 'document-minded' culture by the end of the fourth century.[11] Significantly, this trend does not spread to the ancestral religious customs, although some of the earliest uses of writing are on votive offerings to gods and the majority of Athenian inscriptions were displayed on the Acropolis.

This deficiency of documented sacred texts in Greek religion is thought to be related to the lack of a centralized, authoritative network of cult officials, who would be empowered by controlling or enacting such texts.[12] Athenian priests performed visible ritual actions, including ritual speech acts, on behalf of the Athenian *polis*, speech acts which were part of the ancestral customs they inherited from their predecessors. These

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[9] The conclusions of Thomas' 1989 study, e.g. p. 20 ff.

[10] Vansina's work on the oral traditions in societies 'without writing' in the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi in the middle of the 20th century is still the fundamental study (rev.ed. 1985); cf. Goody (1986) 16–22. In the study which inspired this paper, Thomas (1989) 42 ff. describes the development of the use of written texts in democratic Athens. Henrichs (2003) 44 notices an "explosion" of religious writing in fifth century Athens that is confined exclusively to marginal religious sects.

[11] 'Document-minded' is an expression coined by Clanchy (1979), used in reference to Athens by Thomas (1989) 36 ff.

[12] Burkert (1985) 95: 'Greek religion might almost be called a religion without priests: there is no priestly caste as a closed group with fixed tradition, education, initiation, and hierarchy, and even in the permanently established cults there is no *disciplina*, but only usage, *nomos*'; so also Stengel: 'ein eigentlicher Priesterstand hat in Griechenland nie existiert' (1920[3]) 33, Auffarth (2005) 13, Garland (1984) 75, and Bremmer (1999) 7, although he specifically notes the importance of priests in the transmission of local rituals despite their lack of an 'institutional framework'; cf. Bremmer's comments in response to Auffarth's paper, (2005) 20. Henrichs (2008) 10–11 discusses the history of scholarship on priests.

priests play a prominent role in the sacred laws, appearing often as the entrusted officials for the performance of rituals on behalf of the *polis* and as recipients of rewards for such performances. A close examination of the Attic sacred laws from the 5th–4th centuries in conjunction with *testimonia* from contemporary sources suggests that priests performed both traditional rites and liturgies, but only the former is regularly recorded in *polis* sponsored documents. Some limiting factors in the documentation of ritual liturgies enacted by priests may have been the importance of performance in the practice of Athenian religion and Athenian attitudes towards the power of the written word, rather than the general absence or secondary importance of liturgies or lack of an empowered priesthood.

Athenian priests acted as custodians of ancestral oral traditions in the service of the *polis*. The Greek priest's power was more or less confined to the boundaries of the sanctuary he or she was appointed to manage, and this limited authority seems particularly curtailed in democratic Athens, where all cult officials were subject to the oversight of the *demos*, under whose auspices fell the performance of religious rites on behalf of the community.[13] The modern interpretation of the status and prerogative of these Athenian religious officials is controversial, but in contrast to private sacrifices which could be performed by any individual, sacrifices on behalf of the *polis* were always performed by appointed officials, either cult personnel or magistrates. Aristotle indicates that tradition prescribed whether a cult official or magistrate performed the sacrifice: this paper will focus specifically on the former and their role in the preservation of oral traditions.[14] I would like to suggest that priests were empowered through their control of ritual performances, particularly speech acts; one motive behind the avoidance of written documentation of ancestral ritual liturgies is that such publication would have released these speech acts into the public domain, dismantling the power of priests as specialist performers.

[13] On the perceived impotence of the Athenian priesthood in relation to the *polis*, Feaver (1957), Garland (1984), Parker (1996) 129, Sourvinou-Inwood (2000) 38 ff. More moderate views are proposed by Jameson (1999) 376 and Pirenne-Delforge (2005) 3.

[14] Ar.*Pol.*1322b.26–29, Parker (2005) 97; priests are distinguished from other magistracies at Ar.*Pol.*1299a.15–18. 'State cult' is defined by Aleshire (1994) 15; Sourvinou-Inwood (2000) 39 ff. discusses the role of priests as performers on behalf of the *polis*.

Embedded Speech Acts in the Attic Leges Sacrae

The speech of cult officials in inscriptions issued by the *polis* highlights their authority as speakers of religious laws, which are sanctioned by the *boule* in the same ways as any other law. Typical of such inscriptions, priests often speak to broadcast new or revised ritual procedures, and are represented as performers and guardians of ancestral customs, which specialist knowledge is restricted to specific performance contexts. There are three inscribed records of oral proclamations: the announcement of a festival and of new procedures for a sanctuary and offerings at Eleusis. There are three decrees describing *exegesis*, in which this special speech performance authorizes changes or innovations in ritual procedure. Prayers are indirectly recorded in a very few inscriptions, usually in the form 'he prayed' followed by a summary of the content of the prayer. The act of speaking is preserved in the written record, which functions as a demonstration of the controlled performance context: the content of the speech acts remains the preserve of the performer. Individuals are highlighted in their specialist role as ritual speakers on behalf of the *polis*, rather than in an attempt to preserve the content of their speech.

There are two types of oral pronouncements recorded: the proclamation of a festival and the announcement of new procedures in a sanctuary. Both speech acts use the same verb to represent the performance, suggestive of recognizable terminology for such speech acts and indicative of their integral importance in Athenian religion. A late fourth century calendar from Eleusis records what seem to be the Athenian expenditures for Eleusinian religious officials performing sacred duties on behalf of the *polis*. In an entry from the month Pyanopsion, which was originally 30 lines long, the Herald and Hierophant come to Athens on the fifth of the month to the Eleusinion and proclaim the *Proerosia*, a pre-ploughing festival celebrated in several other Attic demes.[15]

[15] This inscription is fully discussed by Dow and Healey (1965), including the identification of this herald as the 'Sacred Herald', p. 18. Mikalson (1977) 426 proposes that the calendar records expenses incurred by demesmen of Eleusis for Athens, probably for festivals being announced in or celebrated in Athens. There are two other inscriptions featuring heralds in similar contexts, which are too fragmentary for conclusive analysis: IG I^3 244 B.1–22 (Skambonidai) and IG I^3 250 (Paiania).

εἰς Ἐλευσίνιο[ν]
πένπτει ἱσταμένου
ἱεροφάντηι καὶ κήρυκι
ε[ἰ]ς ἄριστον τὴν ἑορτὴν
προαγορεύουσιν τῶν
⊢III Προηροσίων.

'to the Eleusinion on the fifth day (of Pyanopsion), brunch for the Hierophant and the Herald when they announce the Proerosia, 1 dr. 3 ob.'
(IG II^2 1363 A.1.1–6)

This inscription provides a nice example of the importance of ritual speech acts. The *prorresis* for the Mysteries, a formulaic, fixed utterance, is the only otherwise attested proclamation of this sort, which seems to have taken place four days before the Mysteries given the preliminary rites and preparations; judging by the subsequent entries for other offerings to Apollo on the 6th, this *prorresis* takes place only one day before the *Proerosia*, as conjectured by Sterling Dow and Robert Healey, and is not motivated by such practical concerns.[16] The date of the festival is fixed, so such a pronouncement is not needed to inform the populace, but rather is an important part of the ritual process.[17] The inscription records the speech performance, for which the cult officials are rewarded with a fairly expensive meal, just as they would be for a sacrifice on behalf of the *polis*: in this context, the speech act is a traditional ritual action all on its own.

A proclamation intended to initiate a new procedure is provided by the prohibitions of a priest of Apollo Erithaseos from a late fourth century inscription found near Athens, which is broken off at the bottom. Unfortunately, the deme is unknown and the cult is otherwise unattested. This priest makes a proclamation regarding deforestation in the sanctuary on his own behalf, that of his demesmen and Athens; the decree continues to describe punishments sanctioned by the authority of the *boule* and the *demos*, a point twice reiterated. His speech act creates new 'sacred law' and is vividly recorded:

ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Ἐριθασέου π[ρ]-
οαγορεύει καὶ ἀπαγορεύει ὑπέρ τε ἑαυτ[οῦ]
καὶ τῶν δημ[ο]τῶν καὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηνα[ί]-

[16] Dow and Healey (1965) 16. The Mysteries were announced by the Hierophant and the Torchbearer in the Stoa Poikile (Hesychius, s.v. ἀγυρμός), see below p. 134.

[17] Parker (1996) 47 notes that the start of the festival is proclaimed, although the date was fixed.

ων μὴ κόπτειν τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος μηδὲ [φ]-
έρει⟨ν⟩ ξύλα μηδὲ κοῦρον μηδὲ φρύγανα μηδ[ὲ]
φυλλό[β]ολα ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ·

'The priest of Apollo Erithaseos
proclaims and prohibits on behalf of himself
and the demesmen and the *demos* of the Athenians
cutting down trees in the holy precinct of Apollo, as well as
removing wood, cuttings, sticks, or
fallen leaves from the holy precinct.' (IG II^2 1362.2–7)

The decree continues to outline the penalty and punishment processes for free and servile offenders, and specific punishments and sums of money are cited. The priest's speech act authorizes the changes to religious procedure, which is endorsed by publication: an exchange between the religious authority of the oral pronouncements of priests and the democratic authority symbolized in inscribed decrees. Among Attic sacred laws of this period, this decree is unique in the use of indicative verbs of speech, and, with the exception of four inscriptions regulating burials in Psidia, προαγορεύει 'he publicly proclaims' is only used here in extant inscriptions. Ἀπαγορεύειν 'to forbid' is also rare; although often used in Athenian decrees of the commandments laid down by law, outside of the formulaic phrase 'the laws forbid', this verb is only found elsewhere in the speech of a goddess and a cult official regarding sacred property.[18] In a similar context, an indicative verb of speaking is also found in a late 4th century decree about a priestess of Demeter in Arkesine on Amorgos (IG XII 7,4), who makes an announcement (εἰσαγγέλλει) to the prytaneis.[19]

The highly unusual indicative verbs of speaking vividly mark the priest's speech act, and his prohibition is described with the same verb, προαγορεύειν, which described the *prorresis* of the *Proerosia*. Both verbs προαγορεύειν 'to proclaim publicly' and ἀπαγορεύειν 'to forbid' are also attested for the *prorresis* of the Mysteries, and hint at the possibility of recognized terminology for authoritative speech acts of cult officials. On this basis, Sterling Dow and Robert Healey suggest that the proclamation

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[18] οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν is found in several inscriptions, e.g. IG II^2 336, 385, 804, 966, 1006, 1008. An early third century decree, IG II^2 1289, describes a lawsuit between two *orgeones* over sacred land; the settlement is represented by the speech act of the goddess and an official, l. 9–12, ἀπαγορεύει δὲ καὶ ἡ θεὸς κ[αὶ ὁ προφήτης] Καλλίστρατος μηθένα ὀ[ρ]γ[εῶνα τῶν κτη]μάτων τῶν ἑαυτῆς μηδ[ὲν ἀποδίδοσθαι μη]δὲ μισθοῦσθαι κτλ., Ferguson and Nock (1944) 84 ff.

[19] TAM III 518, 574, 611, 760.

of the *Proerosia* is a warning about purity and attendance, such as is indicated for the *prorresis* of the Eleusinian Mysteries.[20] The proclamation of the *Proerosia* and the prohibitions of the priest of Apollo Erithaseos highlight the way in which speech acts performed by religious officials are authoritative, whether as performers of ancestral customs or as speakers of new sacred laws, and their general absence in the written record obscures one of the fundamental aspects of Athenian ritual practice, an obscurity demanded by both cultural religious scruples and attitudes towards the written word.

A similar interchange between priests, the governing body and a public inscription characterizes the mid-fifth century 'first fruits decree', in which the Hellenes are invited 'to offer the *aparche* to the goddesses according to ancestral customs and the Delphic oracle'.[21] The Eleusinian Mysteries achieved such widespread popularity that, over time, certain speech acts do seem to have been recorded to enable re-performance, although the official authority for the speech acts remained with the gentile cult officials. The 'first fruits' announcement is a decree authorized by the *polis* and communicated via heralds chosen by the *boule* throughout the cities, and preserves the words spoken by the heralds. This record of the content of the heralds' pronouncement is not surprising, since this speech act is designated for re-performance and mass dissemination outside of Athens. Significantly, the announcement itself is cast as the speech act of the Hierophant and Torchbearer, who are still represented as the 'owners' of pronouncements regarding the Mysteries. It is the speech act of the Eleusinian cult officials that initiates new sacred law, which is then sanctioned by the *polis*, similar to the speech of the priest of Apollo Erithaseos:

> [κέρ]υ-
> [κα]ς δὲ *h*ελομένε *h*ε βολὲ πεμφσάτο ἐς τὰς πόλες ἀ[γ]γέλλον[τ]ας [τὰ]
> [νῦν] *h*εφσεφισμένα τõι δέμοι, τὸ μὲν νῦν ἔναι *h*ος τάχιστα, τὸ δὲ [λ]-
> οιπὸν *h*όταν δοκε̃ι αὐτε̃ι. κελευέτο δὲ καὶ *h*ο *h*ιεροφάντες καὶ [ὁ]

[20] Isoc.4.157, the Eumolpidae and Kerukes proclaim (προαγορεύουσιν) that murderers and barbarians should keep away from the Mysteries; Julian Or.7.25, 239b, ἧ γὰρ οὐ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ ἱεροφάντης προαγορεύει, "ὅστις χεῖρα μὴ καθαρὸς καὶ ὅντινα μὴ χρή", τούτοις ἀπαγορεύων μὴ μυεῖσθαι, on which Dickie (2004) 588–589; Dow and Healey (1965) 19.

[21] ἀπάρχεσθαι τοῖν θεοῖν τõ καρπõ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ τὲν μαντείαν τὲν ἐγ Δελφõν, l. 4–5. For a summary of the issues, including the controversy over the date, Cavanaugh (1996), Meiggs and Lewis (1969) no. 40, Clinton (2005) no. 28. Of note is the 'speaking object' prayer at l. 44–46: as the reader reads this, he re-performs the prayer for good things for those who help Athens. On 'speaking objects', Svenbro (1993).

> δαιδõχος μυστερίοις ἀπάρχεσθαι τὸς *h*έλλενας τõ καρπõ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ τὲν μαντείαν τὲν ἐγ Δελφõν.
>
> 'the *boule*, after they chose heralds, sent them to the cities, who now announce the decrees of the *demos*, some as soon as possible, and the rest whenever they want to. The Hierophant and the Torchbearer for the Mysteries call on the Hellenes to offer the first fruits according to the ancestral traditions and the Delphic oracle.' (IG I^3 78.21–26)

The Hierophant and Torchbearer have the special verbal sacred authority which is the recognizable source for the 'ancestral customs' behind the *aparche*. Their speech performance must be transmitted throughout Greek cities, which are called upon to make offerings. Therefore, the speech act is re-performed by heralds, but the underlying authority of the Eleusinian cult officials is still emphasized through an embedded representation of their speech acts.

An inscription from the mid-third century attaches similar importance to the announcements of Eleusinian officials in the transmission of information about Eleusis abroad; the Hierophant Chaeretius is honored for copying out the ἐπαγγελία 'announcement'. Significantly, the Hierophant makes the copies of the announcement himself: he remains in control of the dissemination of the ritual utterances. Just as these religious officials are the only individuals empowered to make these pronouncements, they continue to control the written copies, when these are needed.[22]

In the 'first fruits' decree, the Eumolpidae are also represented as performers of *exegesis*, which speech act authorizes the new collection of offerings for Eleusis advertised in this decree.[23] *Exegesis*, the public recitation of ancestral religious customs, is another type of authoritative speech act of cult officials embedded in inscribed laws.[24] Jesper Svenbro has proposed that *exegesis* is the recitation of formulae, which may dictate ritual procedures, but the process is one of retained traditional utterances rather than spontaneous explanations: the *exegetes* is a sort of 'oral distributor' of traditional knowledge.[25] The Eumolpidae, as one

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[22] IG II^2 1235.2–7 (248/7 BC); Clinton (1974) 23n. 10. Chaniotis (2008) 19 proposes that most 'sacred laws' were written by priests.

[23] θύεν δὲ ἀπὸ μὲν τõ πελανõ καθότι ἂν Εὐμολπίδαι [ἐχσ*h*ε][γõ]νται, IG I^3 78a.36–37.

[24] Svenbro (1993) 117–122 presents the argument that *exegesis* is recitation, rather than explanation.

[25] Svenbro (1993) 121; he describes a transference of the *exegetika* from oral traditions to written texts, but the evidence is patchy. There is a single reference to an *Exegetika*,

of two *gene* acting as guardians of the ancestral customs and ritual procedures for the Eleusinian sanctuary, verbally authorize the offerings for the goddesses.

There are two other references to *exegesis* on behalf of the *polis*. An early 4th century decree records Euthydemus' *exegesis*, embedded among an inventory of temple property and regulations for the division of meat at the festival in question:

> ἔδοξεν τῶι δήμωι· Ἀθηνόδω[ρος] εἶπεν· περὶ ὧν ὁ ἱε-
> ρεὺς λέγει ὁ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιõ Εὐθύδημος, ἐψηφίσθ-
> αι τῶι δήμωι· ὅπως ἂν τά τε προθύματα θύηται
> ἃ ἐξηγε̃ται Εὐθύ[δ]η[μ]ος ἱερεὺς τõ Ἀσκληπιõ κα-
> ὶ ἡ ἄλλη θυσία γίγνηται ὑπὲρ τõ δήμο τõ Ἀθηναίω-
> ν, ἐψηφίσθαι τῶι δήμωι τοὺς ἐπιστάτας τοῦ Ἀσκ-
> ληπιείο θύεν τὰ προθύματα ἃ ἐξηγε̃ται [Εὐ]θύδη-
> μος
>
> "So it was resolved by the *demos*. Athenodorus proposed. About the things which Euthydemus, the priest of Asclepius says, it should be decreed by the *demos*. In order that the preliminary sacrifices may be sacrificed which Euthuydemus, the priest of Asclepius, expounded and the other sacrifice may be made on behalf of the Athenian people, let it be decreed by the *demos* that the *epistatai* of Asclepius sacrifice the preliminary sacrifices which Euthydemus recited." (IG II^2 47.23–30)

Euthydemus verbally authorizes (λέγει, ἐξηγε̃ται) ritual procedure for the benefit of the *polis*, which authorization is recorded on a publicly displayed *stele*.[26] Typically, Athenian inscriptions of this period mimic

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attributed to Cleidemus (350 BC) by Ath.9.78 and an *Exegetikon* of Anticleides (3rd BC, Ath.9.473b–c); Jacoby (1949) 56 ff., who proposes the possibility of written archives controlled by the *gene* along with oral traditions, concludes that Cleidemus had no precedent in a published written record of *exegesis* and was not a gentile *exegetes* but probably an *exegetes puthochrestos*, who were appointed by the Athenian *polis* in conjunction with the Delphic oracle: 'if a member of that college published the prescriptions in his own name, (i.e. probably without formal authorization) in a book generally accessible ... he delivered the common man from the necessity of consulting the *exegetai* in matters of his daily life', p. 76. In other words, this dismantling of the restricted performance context was deliberate. Jacoby (1949) 237n2 suggests a replacement of *exegesis*, which is scarcely attested outside of Athens, with inscribed sacred laws in the fourth century: the publicly accessible documents release into the communal domain the knowledge formerly restricted to oral pronouncements by *exegetai*. The history of the *exegetai* is not easy to trace: Clinton (1974) 89–92, Garland (1984) 114–115, Jacoby (1949) 8–51, Oliver (1950) 24–52. Parker describes the *exegetes* as the 'official adviser on problems of pollution and purification', (1996) 220.

[26] It is not clear when the cult of Asclepius came to be controlled by the *polis* with an annually rotating priesthood drawn from all the tribes. Aleshire (1989) 72–85 argues

the order of the oral proceedings and record the process of law making as derivative from an individual's speech, so the preservation of the priest speaking about the sacrifice is not exceptional in this regard.[27] However, it is significant that the authority of cult officials is demonstrated through their speech performances, which for Euthydemus is described not only with the standard 'he spoke' designation at the start of the decree (λέγει), but also twice as a ritual performance, 'he expounded' (ἐξηγεῖται). A similar pronouncement of ritual procedure is given by an unnamed *exegetes* for the cult of Athena Nike in a fragmentary mid-fourth century decree.[28] In all three examples, the *exegesis* is recorded in the inscription for the purpose of informing the populace at large of the source for changes or innovations in ritual procedure, the motivation behind most sacred laws. But these examples also demonstrate the consistent representation of priests as performers of ritual utterances, which speech acts demonstrate their religious authority in the *polis*.

The third and final speech acts embedded in democratic decrees from the 5th–4th centuries are prayers and vows performed on behalf of the *polis*. Prayers and vows for the community are performed by both cult officials and magistrates, and in this sense are very different from *exegesis* and proclamations, which are exclusively confined to the mouths of religious officials. There are two types of embedded prayer in inscriptions from this period: decrees which record prayers on behalf of Athens made in diplomatic contexts and those honouring the successful sacrifices made by officials.[29] Two very similar vows to be made by heralds on behalf of the *polis* are recorded in mid-fourth century decrees regarding an alliance between Athens and several other cities and a cleruchy to Potideia.[30] Otherwise, the only extant vows or prayers recorded in Attic sacred laws of this period are the numerous honorary decrees recording the reports of sacrifices which embed the words of the accompanying

that this happens later than the 4th century; cf. Parker (1996) 179n. 94, 181n. 100. Euthydemus (priest ca. 370–350) comes from Eleusis, a deme specially involved with the cult from an early date; he seems to be a ritual expert, Parker (1996) 182, (2005) 92, cf. IG II^2 4962.

[27] Thomas (1989) 60 ff. describes the inscribed transcription of legal proceedings as they unfolded, even when amendments at the bottom of the decree nullify the preceding information.

[28] π]ερί τε τῆς θυσία[ς τῆ]ι θε[ῶι] [θῦσαι τὴν ἱέρε]ιαν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τὸ ἀρε[σ]-[τήριον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δ]ήμου, ἐπειδὴ ὁ ἐξηγ[η]τὴς κελεύει . . 5 . .], IG II^2 403.16–20.

[29] There is also a slightly later decree which regulates prayers by priests in the cult of Bendis (IG II^2 1283.20–26).

[30] IG II^2 112, IG II^2 114.

prayer. Priests and magistrates are honoured for performance of sacrifices and prayers, which performance is commemorated through a record of their announcement to the *boule* and the *demos*, a practice more frequent as democratic activity goes on the wane. It would seem that, once the process of effective law making decreases, honours which would have previously been awarded for numerous activities in the public interest are essentially confined to sacrificial performances.[31]

There are two relatively early examples of this practice, which becomes very common in the third century. Androcles, the priest of Asclepius, is honoured in 328 BC for fulfilling his obligations. By this period, references to inscribing the *stele*, which is part of the reward, are frequent and the end of the decree stipulates that it be inscribed and set up in the temple of Asclepius.[32] A decree from 330 BC describes sacrifices made by the priest of Dionysus and the Hieropoioi, which seems to embed the words of the original prayer:

> [ης εἶπεν· περὶ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσι ὁ ἱερεὺ]ς τοῦ Διο[νύσ]ο[υ..]
> [.........19......... καὶ οἱ ἱεροποι]οὶ οἱ αἱρε[θ]έντε[ς]
> [ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶν ὧν ἔ]θυον τῶι Διονύσωι καὶ
> [τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς οἷς προ]σῆκε θύειν ὑπὲρ τῆς βουλῆς κα-
> [ὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναί]ων· τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ δέχεσθαι τὸν δῆμο-
> [ν], ἃ ἀπαγγέλλουσι ὁ ἱερεὺς καὶ οἱ ἱεροποιοὶ γεγονέναι ἐ-
> ν τοῖς ἱεροῖς οἷς ἔθυον τῶι Διονύ[σ]ωι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θε-
> οῖς ἐφ’ ὑγιείαι καὶ σωτηρίαι τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου τõ
> Ἀθηναίων καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτ-
> ων τῶν Ἀθηναίων·
>
> ‘About the things which the priest of Dionysus and the Hieropoioi chosen by the *boule* announced regarding the sacrifices which they sacrificed to Dionysus and the other gods to whom it was fitting to sacrifice on behalf of the *boule* and the *demos* of the Athenians. The *demos* received the good things, which the priest and Hieropoioi announced happened in the sacrifices which they sacrificed to Dionysus and the other gods for the health and safety of the *boule* and the *demos* of the Athenians and children and women and other possessions of the Athenians.’ (IG II^2 410.2–11)

The role of the priest of Dionysus and the Hieropoioi as spokespeople and performers of ritual on behalf of the *demos* is their primary obligation: it is the performance of both the words and the deeds, first to the gods over the sacrifices, then to the *demos*, that lead to this honour. Their

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[31] On the reflections of changing political circumstances in Athenian decrees, Rhodes and Lewis (1997) 29–31.

[32] IG II^2 354. On the priesthood of Asclepius, see below page 129, n. 45.

announcements become miniature ritual performances in themselves, and it is on the basis of the announcement that they are praised, and the announcement is inscribed.[33]

Both examples feature individuals whose religious roles are not dictated by membership in a *genos*, but their prayers may have nonetheless featured fixed, formulaic wording transmitted generationally through public performance and eventually even the inscriptions themselves. The announcement of the results of these sacrifices on behalf of the *polis* may indicate a formulaic, or indeed fixed, ritual utterance performed on these occasions. The words of the prayers spoken over the sacrifices are presumably represented in the formulaic 'for the health and safety' clause which is found in numerous of these honorary decrees. Two other formulaic ritual utterances are also embedded in this decree: Fred Porta observed that the phrase τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς 'for the other gods' is a typical ritual utterance, and the verb δέχεσθαι 'to receive' is very frequently used by worshippers in inscribed dedications asking gods to 'receive' their gifts.[34] Very similar wording is found in one of the so-called *Exordia* attributed in antiquity to Demosthenes, and in an abbreviated version in Theophrastus, suggestive that this formula, either from the speech performance or the inscriptions, was well known.[35]

The above examples are the only attestations of speech acts in the Attic *leges sacrae* from the 5th–4th centuries, the time during which inscribed decrees flourish in Athens. The avoidance of ritual liturgies in Greek inscriptions preserves the performative nature and holy content of their words, which are restricted to the mouths of the designated religious officials and the contexts in which they are, by custom, deemed appropriate. Written laws are publicly accessible, and therefore associated with democracy and egalitarian access to the law, while ritual performances, even in service of the democracy, remain a realm apart: the procedure of the sacred is confined to certain speakers and audiences on certain occasions. In the context of the Athenian democratic *polis*, written transcripts of ritual utterances would release these sacred performances into the communal domain. The commitment of religious utterances to writing would destabilize the role of religious officials as reciters and, therefore,

[33] Parker (1996) 247 connects this new practice to the general atmosphere of attention to religion provoked by Lycurgus.

[34] Porta (1999) 168–169. Δέχεσθαι also comes up in a citation by a scholiast to Theocritus describing an Attic ritual begging song, δέξαι τὰν ἀγαθὰν τύχαν, δέξαι τὰν ὑγίειαν (PMG 882).

[35] Dem.54, Theophr. 21.

guardians of oral traditions by enabling any potential reader to speak the utterances. Ancient Greeks read aloud, so that every act of reading was an oral performance.[36] Inscribed ritual utterances would undermine the traditional importance of the performance of ritual by making the ritual liturgies permanently accessible.[37]

This self-conscious use of inscriptions in Athens at this time is accompanied by great reflection on the creation, use and maintenance of written laws. This distance between the publicity of inscribed laws and the safeguarding of oral traditions performed by priests is enhanced by the Athenian sensitivity to the power of the *stelai* on which they inscribed their numerous decrees. Rosalind Thomas has demonstrated that numerous references to written documents and the authority to create or destroy them during this transitional period reflects the perception of inscribed *stele* as monumentally significant, even giving the words inscribed an additional, physical weight.[38] The words on the stone were not considered as equivalent to or replacements for speech, but seem to take on a more powerful meaning through the visual memorial and permanence of the monument. For instance, when Athens deals with a rebellion on Ceos, the oaths are to be written up and placed in the sanctuary of Apollo to "give them force".[39] The decree continues to describe the rebellion in terms of a *stele* which was overturned, the symbolic disruption of the treaty it contained. The permanence and authority associated with inscriptions threatened the traditional, oral preservation of ancestral customs, and, like all innovations in religious practice, was to be avoided.[40]

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[36] Svenbro (1993) 46: 'A number of consequences ensue from the act of reading aloud, making it a different act from the silent reading of today ... the writing is there to produce speech destined for the ear.'

[37] In a similar way, Slater (1995) argues that the decree seller and oracle monger mocked in Aristophanes' *Birds* are the subject of ridicule because of their attempt to abuse and profit from writing, reflecting the anxiety of the Athenian populace regarding the developing literacy of the populace and the potential for written 'official' records to bestow authority on unworthy people.

[38] Thomas (1992) 78–88, 1996:29; cf. Detienne (1988) 64ff. The importance of the inscriptions is described by Aeschin.3.116, 3.183, Dem.19.272, and Isoc.4.180.

[39] IG II^2 111.17–22, ὅπως δ' [ἂ]ν κ[αὶ] οἱ ὅρκοι καὶ αἱ συνθῆκαι ... κύριαι ὦσι ... ἀναγράψαι ... ἐν στήληι λιθίνηι καὶ στῆσαι ἐν τῶι ἱερῶι τõ Ἀπόλλωνος τõ Πυθίο ...; Thomas (1989) 46, cf. (1992) 68.

[40] We can compare the lawsuit brought against Nichomachus regarding inscribed sacrificial calendars, Lys.30.

Athenian Priests and Oral Traditions

The presentation of the speech acts of priests in Attic sacred laws during the democracy draws attention to the authoritative role these individuals played on behalf of their community. Athenian priests were the specialist ritual performers on behalf of the Athenian *polis*, which oversaw religious practices on multiple levels. Athens is unique in the enforcement of punishment for religious offences and *asebeia* trials, reflecting the notion that harm done to gods affects the entire community, and that it is the responsibility of the *polis* to see that rites are performed correctly and routinely.[41] In Athens, priests and priestesses who pray on behalf of the Athenians are subject to audits; there are debates in the *boule* over sacrifices, processions, prayers, and oracles; and anxieties over the purity of priests and the potentially damning effect this could have on communal sacred well-being are a concern for the governing body.[42] Cult officials played a very prominent and visible role at the center of public ceremonies as the leaders of sacrifices and spokespeople for the community to the divine: they wore distinctive clothing, received special seats in the Theater of Dionysus, and collected conspicuous rewards of sacrificial meat and skins for their ritual performances.[43] The relationship between priests and the *polis* was mutually beneficial: the power of priests, as the central performers of ritual, is reinforced by the authorization of the *polis*, and *polis* efforts for the collective benefit from correct religious performances are visibly manifest in these ritual displays. The *polis* endorses these performances, but the performers are responsible for the execution of rites in the correct way and are rewarded for such public efforts.

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[41] *Asebeia* trials unique to Athens: Parker (2005) 63. *Asebeia* as a 'state crime', Clinton (1974) 16, Garland (1990) 85–86; Turner (1988) 925 ff. Prayers on behalf of the city by cult officials are discussed below, page 130, n. 49.

[42] Audit: Aeschin.3.18; debates: Lys.6.33; purity: Lys.6.4, 6.33, Aeschin.3.188; benefit city receives: Lys.30.19; anxieties about purity and communal well-being: Pl.*Leg*.10.909–910, Aeschin.3.121.

[43] Special clothing: Clinton (1974) 32–33, Connelly (2007) 85–116, and Parker (2005) 95; von den Hoff (2008) provides an overview of Athenian iconography of priests until the 1st c. BC. Seats in the Theatre of Dionysus are attested in the Roman period, but on the basis of *proedria* in the demes can be assumed for the Classical period: Connelly (2007) 206, Parker (2005) 95. Many sacred laws from all cities and time periods focus on priestly prerogatives at sacrifices: for Classical Athens, e.g. IG II^2 410, 354, 1356. Other examples are given by Hermary et al. (2004) 120–122.

Athenian priesthoods were never sold, as was the practice in many Greek cities in Asia Minor, and most priesthoods, even those controlled by the *polis*, were life-long positions filled only by members from the particular *genos* which had traditionally supplied priests for the cult. Significantly, gentile priesthoods were left untouched in the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes.[44] A few new cult positions were created by the *polis* and were appointed annually by lot, but this process does not seem to have been so egalitarian in practice: some newly created priesthoods were held for life or associated with particular individuals from the start.[45] Within the *gene*, selection for the priesthoods was probably allotment, with varying possibilities for pre-selection of candidates, which probably served as a model for the democratic cults. Sara Aleshire has argued that selection by lot for both gentile and the new democratic priesthoods was most likely by selective sortition from a short list, so that even the annually elected priesthoods could be drawn from a select group and some gentile priesthoods seem to have been controlled by individual families.[46] Based on an analysis of the extant evidence for the major gentile priesthoods before the Augustan reforms of 21 BCE, Josine Blok and Stephen Lambert propose that gentile allotment did not involve pre-selection, but in many cases a similar result was created by the voluntary abstention of candidates or a lack of eligible candidates; they draw attention to the strict rules of inheritance in the transmission of *genos* membership,

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[44] On the maintenance of gentile priesthoods in the democracy, Arist.*Ath. Pol.*21.6; Feaver (1957) 132–133, Turner (1983) 17, 29, 233, Parker (1996) 129–130, Blok and Lambert (2009). Overviews of gentile priesthoods in Athens, which governed almost all of the major cults, are given by Parker (1996) 284–327, Turner (1983) 35–38 and Blok and Lambert (2009).

[45] The priesthoods created in the democracy are discussed by Aleshire (1994) 326ff. and Pirenne-Delforge (2005) 6–7. Priests selected by lot were scrutinized before taking up office: Dem.57.46, cf. Arist.*Pol.*1329a 30ff., Pl.*Leg.*759c–d, Morrow (1960) 414–415. Parker (1996) 127 observes two examples of *ex novo* deme priesthoods associated with individuals: Euthydemus for the cult of Asclepius in the Piraeus, and Demon for the same cult in Paiania. The priestess of Athena Nike was a newly created post for which all Athenian women were eligible, the first of which, Myrrhine, held her office for life (IG^3 1330 + SEG XII 80, Lewis (1955); doubts about the primacy and tenure of Myrrhine's post are summarized by Parker (1996) 126n. 20).

[46] Selective sortition for priesthoods, probably in practice equivalent to inheritance, is attested for deme priesthoods and, given the scattered examples for inheritance of priesthoods, seems to have been the case for Athenian gentile priesthoods as well: Dem.57.46–48, 62, Aleshire (1994) 328ff., Parker (1996) 130, 292–293, 301; cf. Clinton (1974) 67, Foucart (1914). A comparable example is the selective sortition for the office of *Archon Basileus* so that only men from the most prominent families were considered, Arist.*Ath. Pol.*7.3, 8.1, Badian (1971) 19–20.

which increasingly left few or single candidates eligible for gentile priesthoods in the Hellenistic period.[47] There is also evidence for intermarriage among the *gene*, a practice which Judy Turner believes produced a network of priestly family ties comparable to dynasties within nineteenth century European royal families.[48]

These hereditary gentile priesthoods persisted relatively unmolested in the democratic context, and were exceptional among Athenian magistracies for their lifelong tenure and that they seem to have been largely confined to select hereditary groups. Such exceptional circumstances also enabled the preservation of oral traditions among these groups; the importance of priests as performers of ritual speech acts and guardians of ancestral customs on behalf of the *polis* is repeatedly discussed in Plato and the orators.[49] In a discussion of groups of people who possess knowledge, Plato describes the dual role of priests as performers of both words and deeds:

> καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἱερέων αὖ γένος, ὡς τὸ νόμιμόν φησι, παρὰ μὲν ἡμῶν δωρεὰς θεοῖς διὰ θυσιῶν ἐπιστῆμόν ἐστι κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις δωρεῖσθαι, παρὰ δὲ ἐκείνων ἡμῖν εὐχαῖς κτῆσιν ἀγαθῶν αἰτήσασθαι.
>
> 'And then, too, the class of priests, according to custom, has expert knowledge about giving the gods, by means of sacrifices, the gifts that please them from us and by prayers to ask on our behalf the gain of good things from them.' (*Politicus* 290c–d)

Plato describes the importance of both the sacrifices and speech acts of priests, who are the customary experts in prayers to gods on behalf of the people.[50] As the traditional specialists in prayers for communal benefit, cult officials controlled the performance context for such ritual utterances; only the cult officials sanctioned by the *polis* could perform these sacred speech acts on behalf of the community, as opposed to private prayers and offerings. At a climactic moment during the disembarkation of the Athenian fleet for Sicily, Thucydides describes a herald leading the navy *en masse* in the 'customary prayers'. The *polis*-appointed official has

[47] Blok and Lambert (2009).

[48] Turner (1983) 240, (1988) 927.

[49] Oral traditions are often preserved through confinement among elite groups: Thomas (1992) 111, Vansina (1985). Priests pray on behalf of the state: Aesch. 3.18, 3.119, Antiph.6.45, Dem.19.190, Lys.6.4, 30.19; other public prayers: Aeschin. 1.2, Andoc.6.45, Thuc.8.70.

[50] It is significant that Plato describes priests as possessors of expert knowledge, on which Rowe (1995) 218.

the authorized voice for the pronouncement of traditional prayers, publicly performed for the benefit of all.[51]

The protection of authorized voices in the performance of traditional ritual speech acts on behalf of the *polis* is a topic of great interest for Plato in the *Laws*, a dialogue which probably describes religious practices very similar to those of contemporary Athens. Plato is concerned by the possibility of blasphemous words spoken by individuals or in choral songs during public sacrifices performed by an official. The Athenian proposes three laws, one regulating *euphemia* 'auspicious speech', a second law allowing only prayers to gods over sacrifices, and a third law that poets must submit their prayers to judges for approval before performance at public rituals.[52] He also proposes that all sacrifices should be performed by cult officials in public shrines, allowing the donors to participate only by joining in the prayers spoken by priests, thus removing the threat posed by people asking the gods for personal requests which might be opposed to the interests of the *polis*.[53]

Similar controls on performance of oral traditions are well documented by Jan Vansina, who emphasizes the importance of the reception of such speech acts. Performances are held for audiences and are supported by the collective memory of the group; traditions are preserved through imitation. Officially controlled information is well-known and recognizable, but often confined to certain performers and performance contexts to prevent competition or developments in the traditions, as well as for reasons of prestige. In Polynesia, sanctions are enforced on official

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[51] Thuc.6.32 τῇ μὲν σάλπιγγι σιωπὴ ὑπεσημάνθη, εὐχὰς δὲ τὰς νομιζομένας πρὸ τῆς ἀναγωγῆς οὐ κατὰ ναῦν ἑκάστην, ξύμπαντες δὲ ὑπὸ κήρυκος ἐποιοῦντο ('The signal for silence was given by the trumpet, and the customary prayers made before putting to sea were offered up, not by each ship, but all together following the herald'). Hornblower does not think that this ceremony should be considered 'extraordinary', (2008) 393. Pulleyn (1997) 176–177 compares this rare description of group prayer to Dem.18.259, where Aeschines leads initiates in a ritual utterance: he concludes that this kind of participation was probably frequent at other public ceremonies. He finds the reference to 'customary prayers' a tantalizing indication of fixed words, although it may only indicate the type of prayer. On heralds, see above pages 118, 122 and below page 133.

[52] Pl.*Leg.*800b–801d. The choruses he describes here seem to be the dithyrambic contests in honor of Dionysus; he also refers to ᾠδαί (800e), which are elsewhere defined as hymns, prayers, threnodies, dirges, paeans, hymns of thanksgiving, dithyramb, and citharoedic songs (700b, Morrow (1960) 310). Morrow (1960) 399–499 discusses the very close correspondences between the religion of the imaginary State and Athens.

[53] Pl.*Leg.*909b–910a, cf. *Leg.*908d; England (1921) 508. Plato hypothesizes both hereditary and annual priesthoods, appointed by the 'Temple Custodians', others chosen by lot for annual positions, and *exegetai* elected by tribe for lifelong tenure (759a–e). A general discussion of prayer in Plato is given by Meijer (1981) 234–245.

performers who fail to perform 'word perfect' speech acts; such speech acts are confined to a small group of performers, but are familiar to the community as a whole who repeatedly witness such public ceremonies.[54] Greek religion is above all else conservative, and great emphasis is placed upon the performance of rites 'according to ancestral custom', a point to which we will return. Greek prayers were spoken out loud so that the gods can hear them, but the importance of reception by the larger communal audience is also at stake, and only prayers for harm to befall others or regarding love matters are performed in silence.[55] Since Greeks seem to have read out loud, inscribing ritual utterances for public display would enable anyone to perform them, dismantling the controls on performance of these ancestral traditions and exposing them to possible innovations or improper use through mass dissemination.

Not only were ritual speech acts considered to be performances in front of audiences, but at least some had fixed words which were preserved across generations as oral texts through restricted performance contexts. The above reference in Thucydides to 'customary prayers' may imply formulaic speech, and private prayers on votives often demonstrate formulae.[56] An example of a formulaic ritual speech act on behalf of the *polis*, preserved across generations, and restricted in performance context, is found in the speech *Against Neaera*. The speaker calls the Sacred Herald as a witness, so that he may perform a bit of the oath which he administers in conjunction with the 'sacred marriage' of the Basilinna to Dionysus.[57]

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[54] On audiences as receptors and enforcers of traditions, Vansina (1985) 149–154; on control of performances, Vansina (1985) 41–42. Plato describes the imitation of ancestral traditions, *Leg.*821d3 and below. Similar observations are made by Malinowski (1984) 200 about Trobriand story telling: stories are 'owned' and may be recited only by the owner, who is the only person who can authorize the story's retelling by another person. Thomas (1996) 11 describes the enforcement of laws in Classical Athens through the knowledge of individuals, since there was no 'automatic machinery' to enforce written laws.

[55] Dover (1974) 257–258; Pulleyn (1997) 184–188; Versnel (1981) 25–26.

[56] Formulae in votive offerings are discussed by Versnel (1981) 8–9, 61, who describes the continuity throughout antiquity of 'fundamental elements and structures' in prayer, p. 3: a small bibliography on Greek votives is given at p. 69n. 19; cf. Pl.*Cra.*400e on the customary prayer formula οἵτινές τε καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι. Pulleyn (1997) 218–220 gives an appendix of formulaic words in private prayers.

[57] This speech is transmitted in the corpus of Demosthenes, but was doubted already in antiquity; Kapparis (1999) 49–50 gives an overview of the argument and attributes the speech to Apollodorus, the named prosecutor, with a date of 343–340 BC (p. 28). Kapparis defends the authenticity of the oath of the Gerarai, noting that Apollodorus assumes that his audience is generally familiar with the Gerarai and the ritual ((1999) 339–341), which

> Βούλομαι δ' ὑμῖν καὶ τὸν ἱεροκήρυκα καλέσαι, ὃς ὑπηρετεῖ τῇ τοῦ βασιλέως γυναικί, ὅταν ἐξορκοῖ τὰς γεραρὰς ἐν κανοῖς πρὸς τῷ βωμῷ, πρὶν ἅπτεσθαι τῶν ἱερῶν, ἵνα καὶ τοῦ ὅρκου καὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἀκούσητε, ὅσα οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν ἀκούειν, καὶ εἰδῆτε ὡς σεμνὰ καὶ ἅγια καὶ ἀρχαῖα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστιν.
>
> 'I want to call the Sacred Herald who attends the wife of the Basileus when she administers the oath to the Gerarai in the ceremony at the baskets by the altar before they touch the sacrificial victims, so that you may hear the oath and other things that are said—as much as it is legal to hear—and so that you may know how holy, sacred, and ancient these customs are.'
>
> (*Against Neaera* 78–79)

This passage illustrates two central aspects of the performance of speech acts in Greek religion: in public rituals which concern the well-being of the *polis*, cult officials perform the speech acts, and such speech acts are restricted to the sanctioned performance context. So, the Sacred Herald must be called to present a small portion of the oath, which no one else may speak, and this is done to demonstrate that the oath is an ancestral custom. Secondly, great importance is attached to the performance of the words themselves, considered 'ancient' and 'customary', words which are restricted in speaker, context, and audience. The prosecutor of Neaera cannot repeat the words of the oath himself, nor can he ask a secretary to read out a written copy- in contrast to his request that the Clerk 'read out the text' of the law pertaining to debauchery in section 87 of the speech. After the actual words of a portion of the oath are given, Apollodorus once more reiterates that the words are traditional: 'you have heard the oath and the ancestral customs, as much as is permitted to hear' (τοῦ μὲν ὅρκου τοίνυν καὶ τῶν νομιζομένων πατρίων, ὅσα οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, ἀκηκόατε, 79).

The paramount importance given to the preservation of ancestral rites through correct performance on behalf of the *polis* is further illustrated in Apollodorus' remark that the citizen status and virginity of the Basilinna are dictated by law so that 'according to ancestral custom she might sacrifice the secret offerings on behalf of the city, and the traditional customs are carried out for the gods with piety and that nothing is abolished nor are innovations made'. He says that the law governing the background of the Basilinna was inscribed on a *stele*, which was placed in

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is only elsewhere mentioned in lexicographers: Burkert (1985) 232–233, Carey (1992) 124–125, Deubner (1932) 105. On 'both the oath and the things which are spoken', Carey (1992) 125. Parker (1996) 297 discusses the possible *gene* from which this herald was drawn (Euneidai or Kerukes), as well as the Gerarai (Theoinidai), Parker (1996) 300.

the temple of 'Dionysus in the Marshes' so that it would not be generally accessible to the public (76–77).[58] Such precautions demonstrate the Athenian sensitivity to the publicity of inscribed documents. This speech emphasizes the resilience of these sacred oral rituals, which, in keeping with the characteristic conservatism of Greek religion, are 'ancestral' and passed down to each Basilinna by the Sacred Herald. Unlike the law regarding the Basilinna's social and sexual status, the speech acts are not written down, even though the exact words of the oath are not only of supreme importance, but also demonstrate that the oath is ancient and traditional.

The most prominent example of the restriction of a traditional ritual speech act to an official performance context is the *prorresis* for the Eleusinian Mysteries. A scholiast to the *Frogs* of Aristophanes identifies the ceremonial language used in a call for initiates to change their clothes as a parody of the Hierophant's *prorresis* of the Mysteries, indicating that this pronouncement was both fixed and extremely well-known.[59] On the basis of style and syntax, Matthew Dickie has suggested that this *prorresis* was probably the model behind the formulaic ritual utterance regarding purity found in many post-Classical sacred laws, priestly announcements, funerary epigrams, and Christian proclamations.[60] The 'ownership' of fixed speech utterances concerning the Eleusinian Mysteries is not surprising given the power and prestige of the *gene* in charge of these cult positions, the Eumolpidae and Kerukes. The *gene* controlled the ancestral religious customs through their exclusive rights to performance, which rights were sanctioned by Athenian law. The importance of protecting these restrictions on performance is made particularly explicit in the charges brought against Alcibiades and Andocides. The former called himself the Hierophant and proclaimed his friends as initiates, which is restricted to the *gene* of the Eumolpidae and Kerukes by law, while the latter is accused specifically of speaking forbidden words to non-initiates.[61] It is not a question of keeping the words a secret, since

[58] κατὰ τὰ πάτρια θύηται τὰ ἄρρητα ἱερὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα γίγνηται τοῖς θεοῖς εὐσεβῶς καὶ μηδὲν καταλύηται μηδὲ καινοτομῆται (75–76). cf. Pl.*Epistles* 2.314c 'It is not possible that what is written down should not get divulged', οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν τὰ γραφέντα μὴ οὐκ ἐκπεσεῖν.

[59] *Schol. ad Ran.*354–355. The Eleusinian Mysteries were in effect an Athenian *polis* cult, Clinton (1979) 8–9, Feaver (1957) 127, Oliver (1950) 67, and Turner (1983) 233. The Eumolpidae and Kerukes were held accountable for audits, Aeschin.3.18.

[60] Dickie (2004).

[61] τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἑταίρους μύστας προσαγορεύοντα καὶ ἐπόπτας παρὰ τὰ νόμιμα

they were evidently well-known, but rather an issue of performer, audience and context.

Conclusion

Just as the priests were employed, so to speak, by the *polis* to perform the religious rites properly, without authoritative power as a group, the *polis* also controlled the written record of their performance. Inscribing these words would empower others to speak them, which would destablize the role of these religious officials as keepers and performers of the ancestral customs, the 'unwritten laws' which characterize Athenian religion.[62] In Lysias' speech *Against Andocides*, the speaker contrasts written laws with the unwritten laws pertaining to offenses at Eleusis, which are controlled by the Eumolpidae, 'although they say Pericles once advised you that, concerning impious people, you should not only enforce the written laws about these matters, but also the unwritten laws, which the Eumolpidae expound'.[63] If writing is associated with democracy, unwritten laws are often associated with religion.[64]

In Lysias' speech, the unwritten laws pertaining to religion can be found through the oral performance by the Eumolpidae, the official

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καὶ τὰ καθεστηκότα ὑπό τ' Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ Κηρύκων καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τῶν ἐξ Ἐλευσῖνος, Plut. Alc.22.4; εἶπε τῇ φωνῇ τὰ ἀπόρρητα, Lys.6.51. Parker concludes that the two families were not only performers of religious traditions, but also the source for these traditions, (1996) 294. The Hierophant for the Eleusinian Mysteries was drawn from the *genos* Eumolpidae, while the Torchbearer and the herald came from the Kerukes, the earliest attested *genos* (ca. 590 BC, Parker 1996:300). Clinton (1974) summarizes the extant evidence for the holders of these positions, including methods of appointment. Both families have names reflective of oral performance: the Eumolpidae, 'singing right', and the 'Kerukes', 'heralds' (Svenbro (1993) 120).

[62] Osborne (1998) has suggested that often the gap between what is said in the Assembly and what is inscribed is politically important: the publicly accessible inscriptions deliberately elide certain information. He suggests that careful editing de-politicizes inscriptions: democratic Athenian inscriptions are 'politically neutralizing' through lack of specific details, allowing for the future performance of the inscription to maintain this 'depoliticized' effect.

[63] καίτοι Περικλέα ποτέ φασι παραινέσαι ὑμῖν περὶ τῶν ἀσεβούντων, μὴ μόνον χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις νόμοις περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀγράφοις, καθ' οὓς Εὐμολπίδαι ἐξηγοῦνται, *Against Andocides* 10.

[64] e.g. Eur.*Supp*.433–437, 'But when the laws are written down, both the rich and weak have equal justice'; Thomas (1989) 32. She proposes that the lack of a unified conception of 'unwritten laws', noticed by Ostwald (1973), reflects the only gradual acceptance of 'written laws' as a potential opposition, (1996) 18. Kearns (1998) 515 observes that 'unwritten laws' originate in areas 'beyond human legislation'.

exegetai of Eleusinian matters.[65] The Eumolpidae had strict control over the performance of *exegesis* in relation to Eleusis, as attested in Andocides' account of a false *exegesis* by Callias, who has no right to expound as a member of the Kerukes, another family holding hereditary priesthoods at Eleusis, but not that of the *exegetai*. Andocides contrasts the authority of an ancestral religious law, which can only be recited by the Eumolpidae, with the law inscribed on a *stele* which can be observed by all:

> πάλιν ὁ Καλλίας στὰς ἔλεγεν ὅτι εἴη νόμος πάτριος, εἴ τις ἱκετηρίαν θείη ἐν τῷ Ἐλευσινίῳ, ἄκριτον ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ποτ' αὐτοῦ Ἱππόνικος ἐξηγήσαιτο ταῦτα Ἀθηναίοις, ἀκούσειε δὲ ὅτι ἐγὼ θείην τὴν ἱκετηρίαν. ἐντεῦθεν ἀναπηδᾷ Κέφαλος οὑτοσὶ καὶ λέγει: ὦ Καλλία, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀνοσιώτατε, πρῶτον μὲν ἐξηγῇ Κηρύκων ὤν, οὐχ ὅσιον σοι ἐξηγεῖσθαι: ἔπειτα δὲ νόμον πάτριον λέγεις, ἡ δὲ στήλη παρ' ᾗ ἕστηκας χιλίας δραχμὰς κελεύει ὀφείλειν, ἐάν τις ἱκετηρίαν θῇ ἐν τῷ Ἐλευσινίῳ.
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> 'Again, Callias, standing up, said that under an ancestral law, if someone put a suppliant's bough in the Eleusinium, the penalty was instant death, as expounded on a former occasion for the Athenians by his own father, Hipponicus, and he had heard that I put the suppliant's bough there. Then this man Cephalus leapt to his feet and said: "Callias, you are the most impious of all men, first you, a member of the Kerukes, are giving *exegesis*, although it is not permitted for you to give *exegesis*. Then you talk of an 'ancestral law,' but you are standing beside a *stele* which dictates, if someone puts a suppliant's bough in the Eleusinium, the penalty will be a thousand drachmae".' (*On the Mysteries* 115–116)

Andocides contrasts the exclusive performance context for *exegesis* with the plainly visible law inscribed on the *stele*. Writing empowers multitudes, who would be able to read ritual inscriptions for themselves, and would therefore enervate the position of religious officials in their communities as keepers of sacred knowledge. Andocides also distinguishes the *stele* from the ancestral customs which dictate religious law, one of numerous references in the orators to the correct performance of ritual according to these traditions.[66] Michael Jameson astutely observes

[65] Exegesis by the Eumolpidae is also described in IG I^3 78.36–37, IG I^2 3490; cf. Dem 22.27; Parker (1996) 295–296.

[66] Ancestral customs (*kata ta patria*) are described as forming the basis of religious practice in Aeschin.1.23, 2.87, Lys.6.4, 6.8, 6.10, 26.6, 30.18, Isoc.2.20, Dem.19.327, 21.52, 43.66, 59.75; they are referred to in some sacred laws as well: IG II^2 1283.25–26, 1289.6–8, 1325.23–24, 1326.11–13, 1327.7–8. The ancestral customs in religion are part of a more general trend of emphasizing ancestors during the democracy, on which Thomas (1989) 88 ff.

that the ability to perform rituals *kata ta patria* is tantamount to possessing the specialist or secret knowledge which otherwise seems to be lacking from Greek priesthoods.[67] These ancestral customs seem to have been preserved by cult officials through performance, and through such restrictions on performance context, these oral traditions largely remained the 'unwritten laws' of Athenian religion during the gradual evolution of the use of documents and archives by the *polis*.

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[67] Jameson (1999) 338; cf. Yunis (1988) 53.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

FROM OATH-SWEARING TO ENTRENCHMENT CLAUSE: THE INTRODUCTION OF *ATIMIA*-TERMINOLOGY IN LEGAL INSCRIPTIONS

Evelyn van 't Wout

In classical Athens, the term *atimia* could refer to the deprivation of certain privileges, many of which are associated with the concept of citizenship. There are numerous references to a penalty or condition of this kind in fourth-century oratory, which mainly concern state debtors, persons convicted of military offences, frivolous prosecutors and enemies of the democracy. The scholarly *communis opinio* follows M.H. Hansen in recognising behind all such references a penalty for which the technical legal term was *atimia*.[1] Although Hansen in his description of this penalty limits his conclusions to the fourth century, his account does presuppose that the conception of *atimia* as an institutionalised legal condition extends back into the early classical period, and that this in turn evolved from a pre-existing archaic penalty.

If the evolution of *atimia* in the legal sphere spans a period in which a predominantly oral society gradually started incorporating literacy in its key institutional structures, it may be fruitful to investigate how this change affected the application of *atimia*. In this paper, I develop the hypothesis that the notion of *atimia* as a legal instrument is in fact a product of the introduction of legal inscriptions.

There has been considerable discussion about the possible evolution of *atimia*, and especially about its character in the archaic period: as several scholars have noted, to punish an offender with 'disfranchisement' makes little sense at a time when the rights of citizens were not yet legally defined.[2] In general, it is assumed that archaic *atimia* must

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[1] Hansen (1976) 54–98; earlier accounts of *atimia* include Kahrstedt (1934) 106–121, Paoli (1936) 304–339, Ruschenbusch (1968), Harrison (1971) 169–176.

[2] So e.g. Manville (1980) 216–217, Poddighe (2001) 37–40. For the gradual emergence of legally defined citizen rights in the late archaic/early classical period, cf. Manville (1990) 76–77 and the essays of F.J. Frost, P.B. Manville and A.L. Boegehold in Scafuro & Boegehold (1994).

have amounted to outlawry or proscription,[3] and that this penalty was still operative in early laws such as Draco's homicide law (as reported in Dem. 23.62) and the tyranny law cited in [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 16.10;[4] but that it must have evolved into a moderate restriction of political rights before the oldest surviving legal inscriptions were made.[5]

The idea that archaic *atimia* was a legally defined form of outlawry is based on the assumption that a proper understanding of *atimia* in the legal sphere must take its character *qua* legal concept as its starting-point. This assumption forces us to distinguish between a legally defined technical usage of the term *atimia* and its cognates on the one hand ('disfranchisement'), and a non-technical usage ('dishonour') on the other. However, no such distinction is reflected in the orators' use of these terms: they are always used in a primarily evaluative way.[6] This evalua-

[3] Cf. Hansen (1976) 75: "Whereas in classical times it was possible to assault an *atimos*, in the archaic period it must have been almost a civil duty". Hansen and other scholars sharing this view assume the equivalence at this period of the phrases νηποινεὶ τεθνάτω ('he must be killed without retribution'), ἄτιμος τεθνάτω ('he must be killed *atimos*') and ἄτιμος ἔστω 'he must be *atimos*'. By contrast, Youni (1998) 111–147, (cf. *eadem* (2001) 124–131) argues that proscription/outlawry and *atimia* were, and always had been, distinct penalties, suggesting—implausibly, in my view—that the word ἄτιμος itself in the legal formula ἄτιμος τεθνάτω had a different lexical meaning from ἄτιμος in the formula ἄτιμος ἔστω.

[4] For the dating of the law cited in Dem. 23.62, cf. Gagarin (1981) 119–120. The law cited in [Ar.] *Ath. pol.* 16.10 was purportedly current in the time of Pisistratus: on the question whether it goes back upon Solonian or Draconian legislation, cf. Ostwald (1955) 106–108; Rhodes (1981) 220–221; Gagarin (1986) 72–73. The bribery law cited by Dem. 21.113 is generally regarded as archaic; but cf. below n. 25.

[5] Hansen (1976) 75–82 would date this development to the late sixth/early fifth century; Manville (1980) to the age of Solon. The evolutionary view takes a lead from a passage in Dem. 9.44–47, where the orator suggests that *atimia* in the past was a severe penalty, amounting to death without retribution, in contrast to *atimia* as his audience knows it, which concerns exclusion from participation in the Athenians' *koina*: citing a decree which declares Arthmius of Zeleia *atimos*, Demosthenes explains that this is not 'what you or I would call *atimia*' (Dem. 9.44, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οὐχ ἣν οὑτωσί τις ἂν φήσειεν ἀτιμίαν). The passage found its way into the scholarly discussion of *atimia* through Swoboda (1893) and (1905), but too little weight has been accorded to its retorical context: as I will argue elsewhere, it is not a disinterested testimony to the nature of *atimia* or its evolution.

[6] Hansen (1976) 60–61 notes that *atimia* probably implied "socially a loss of honour besides the legally well defined loss of privileges", but excludes from consideration the numerous passages from the fourth century orators in which *atimia* and cognates are used in a manifestly non-technical sense. See however Wallace (1998) 77–78: "community sentiment, personal rivalries and politics (among other factors) sometimes played an equal if not more powerful role than legal rules in determining who was *atimos*, how far he was *atimos* and at what time"; and Poddighe (2001) 38: "Il termine ἀτιμία definisce la condizione morale e … anche giuridica, dell' individuo che, per ragioni diverse, abbia

tive aspect can even be seen in references to prototypical cases of *atimoi*, such as military offenders. Whereas in classical Athens convictions for draft-dodging (ἀστρατεία) and desertion (λιποταξία) could both result in *atimia*,[7] Isocrates praises the Spartan constitution, under which men who are afraid to die in battle are 'more *atimos*' (ἀτιμότερος) than those who leave the ranks and discard their shields.[8] Isocrates' use of the comparative shows that he regarded the *atimia* of Athenian military offenders as reflecting a value judgement rather than a legal status.[9]

Hansen's main reason to regard *atimia* as a legal penalty in a strict sense is the fact that the term *atimos* occurs in numerous Athenian laws and decrees, both reported and preserved, and ranging in date from the archaic period to the second half of the fourth century.[10] In this paper, I investigate some of the earliest direct attestations of *atimia* in legal documents, and on the basis of their characteristics suggest a radically different genesis for the role of *atimia* in the legal sphere. In my view, *atimia* was not originally conceived as a penalty; rather, it was the product of a verbal strategy to construe authority for communal agreements.

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cessato di fare parte di una communità, dopo esserne stato escluso perché considerato incapace di soddisfare i requisiti che la collettività ha imposto per la selezione dei suoi membri".

[7] In his catalogue of legal *atimoi*, Andoc. 1.74 groups together persons convicted of ἀστρατεία, λιποταξία, δειλία ('cowardice'), τὸ ἀποβεβληκέναι τὴν ἀσπίδα ('discarding one's shield') and ἀναυμαχία ('refusal to serve in the navy'); cf. Aeschin. 3.175–176 (ἀστρατεία, λιποταξία and δειλία) and 1.29 (ἀστρατεία and τὸ ἀποβεβληκέναι τὴν ἀσπίδα), and for an overview of supplementary attestations Hansen (1976) 72. Lipsius (1905–1915) 2.452–454 suggests that all these offences were covered by a single law; cf. e.g. Carey (1989) 143–144.

[8] Isoc. 8.143: οἱ μὴ τολμῶντες ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ἀποθνήσκειν ἀτιμότεροι γίγνονται τῶν τὰς τάξεις λειπόντων καὶ τὰς ἀσπίδας ἀποβαλλόντων.

[9] The same argument can be made with regard to what Hansen (1976) 54 describes as "undoubtedly the largest category of *atimoi*": debtors to the state. First, *atimoi* and state debtors (ὀφείλοντες τῷ δημοσίῳ) are often distinguished from one another in the sources (Hansen (1976) 67–68); and second, numerous state debtors are known to have engaged in precisely the type of activities that we should expect them to have been prohibited from engaging in, if *atimia* were a consistent, legally defined phenomenon (cf. Hansen (1976) 59). Occasionally, state debtors were punished for engaging in prohibited activities (e.g., earning juror's pay: Dem. 21.182); but in our only extensively documented case against a debtor who appeared in public, the offender is explicitly treated as something of an exception by his prosecutors (see esp. Dem. 25.85–91). Such exceptions and contradictions are most economically explained by assuming that the label *atimia*, when applied to state debtors, designated a value judgment rather than a legal status.

[10] Cf. Hansen (1976) 70: "Both inscriptions and laws cited in forensic speeches show that ἀτιμία was the proper legal expression used officially", *contra* Ruschenbusch (1968) 16–21, who regarded ἀτιμία as an "umgangssprachliche" circumlocution used by the orators.

First, I observe that the inscriptional attestations often occur in so-called *sanctiones legis* or 'entrenchment clauses': clauses designed to ensure the authority of inscribed communal agreements, and distinguishable, as such, from penalties proper (section 1). Secondly, I compare the function of such a *sanctio legis* in inscribed decrees to the act of communal self-imprecation, as exemplified by the oath-swearing ritual of the Theran settlers of Cyrene. The parallel between the function of a *sanctio legis* and such an oral ritual extends to the mechanism by which these two procedures attempt to safeguard a communal decision. To prescribe that an offender 'is to be *atimos*', is, I suggest, a quasi-magical speech act comparable to self-imprecation, intended to protect the interests of the community. To elucidate the mechanism by which such a *sanctio legis* 'works', I will subsequently discuss briefly the use of the term ἄτιμος and its cognates in other types of contexts, with some examples from Aeschylus' *Eumenides*. In the next paragraph, I argue that the formula '... is to be *atimos*' ostentatiously disqualifies a straightforward strategy to express legitimate discontent, which is to complain 'I am *atimos*'. I conclude that *atimia* did not enter classical-period legal discourse as a well-defined punitive response to particular offences, but as a verbal strategy to manage the threat of conflicts that might destabilise a community. The standard complementary stipulation that the offender's property be confiscated must have played an important role in the formalisation of civic *atimia* attested in fourth century oratory (section 4).

Laying Down the Rules

Among the earliest Attic legal inscriptions that feature the term ἄτιμος is the so-called 'colonisation statute' of Brea, a decree from the middle of the fifth century BC that covers religious, practical, legal and financial arrangements for the settlement of a colony (*IG* I^3 46 = ML 46 [pp. 128–133]). Part of the decree reads as follows:

ἐ]ὰν δεῖ τις ἐπιφσεφίζει παρὰ τὲ[ν στέλ-
εν ἒ ῥρέ]τορ ἀγορεύει ἒ προσκαλε͂σθα[ι ἐγχερ-
εῖ ἀφαι]ρε͂σθαι ἒ λύεν το τõν hεφσεφι[σμένον,
ἄτιμον] ε̃ναι αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας τὸς ἐχς [ἐκένο
καὶ τὰ χ]ρέματα δεμόσια ε̃ναι καὶ τε͂ς [θεõ τὸ ἐ-
πιδέκα]τον, ἐὰμ μέ τι αὐτοὶ οἱ ἄποικ[οι ...
... δέ]ονται κτλ.

'If anyone brings to the vote a proposal that goes against the *stēlē*, or if a *rhētōr* publicly counsels or proclaims the suggestion to diminish or undo

> anything from the things that have been voted on, that he be *atimos* and his children, and that his possessions be *dēmosion* and the tenth for the goddess, unless the *apoikoi* themselves [...] anything. &c.'[11]

The passage quoted above aims to ensure the authority and inviolability of the inscribed decree. Comparable passages, all involving the prescription that the offender 'shall be *atimos*' *vel sim.*, occur in e.g. the colonisation statute of Naupactus,[12] in a decree settling a conflict between Athens and Chalkis,[13] in a treaty between Athens and Milete,[14] and in Nikophon's law on coinage (the 'coinage decree').[15] Such passages are conventionally known as a *sanctio legis* or entrenchment clause: J.M. Rainer, in a survey of *atimia* in the epigraphical record, characterises them as formulaic protection of the provisions in a decree and distinguishes them from penalties proper.[16] The notion of 'formulaic protection' in these early legal inscriptions raises the question how the legal apparatus would back up an entrenchment clause.

In the Brea inscription, the nature of the offence punishable with *atimia* is defined in the first instance as transgressing 'against the *stêlê*' (παρὰ τὲν στέλεν, 24), and only in the second instance as transgressing

[11] Despite the damage to the stone, the textual constitution of the *sanctio legis* is unproblematic: there are ample parallels for the formula ἄτιμον] εἶναι κτλ., and there are no plausible alternatives to supplement the text. In lines 29–30, ML suggest [... *h*εαυ-] | [τοῖς δέ]ονται, and translate 'unless the colonists themselves have some request to make for themselves' (the editors of *IG* I^2 similarly suggested [... περὶ] | [σφῶν δέ]ονται).

[12] *IG* IX i 334.37–40 (= ML 20 (pp. 35–48); 500–475 BCE): *h*όσστις : κα τὰ ἐϝαδεϙότα : διαφθείρει : τέχναι καὶ μαχανᾶι : καὶ μιᾶι, : *h*ότι κα μὲ ἀνφοτάροις : δοκέει *h*οποντίον : τε χιλίον : πλέθαι καὶ Ναϝπακτίον : τõν ἐπιϝοίϙον : πλέθαι, : ἄτιμον εἶμεν : καὶ χρέματα παματοφαγεῖσθαι ('who subverts these decisions on any pretext or by any means, save so far as is resolved by both parties, viz. the Assembly of the Opuntian thousand and the Assembly of the Naupactian settlers, must be *atimos* and his possessions confiscated').

[13] *IG* I^3 40.36 (= ML 52 (pp. 138–144); 446/5): *h*ός δ' ἂμ μὲ ὀμόσει, ἄτιμον αὐτὸν ἐ͂ναι καὶ τὰ χρέματα αὐτõ δεμοσία καὶ τõ Διὸς τõ ἐπιδέκατον *h*ιερὸν ἔστο τõν χρεμάτον ('who refuses to take the oath must be *atimos* himself and his possessions befall to the *dēmos* and the tenth of the possessions must be for the temple of Zeus').

[14] *IG* I^3 21c 26–27 (450/49): τ] | [õν χσυ]μμάχον *h*ό τι ἂμ μὲ Ἀθε[ναίοις ... ἄτ] | [ιμο]ς ἔστο καὶ τὰ χρέματα α[ὐτõ δεμόσια ἔστο τε͂ς τε θεõ τὸ ἐπιδέκατον κτλ. ('of the allies, who does not ... with the Athenians ... must be *atimos* and his possessions must befall to the *dēmos* and the tenth for the goddess').

[15] *IG* I^3 1453c 10 (= ML 45 (pp. 111–117); mid- or last quarter of fifth century): ἐὰν δέ [τ] | [ις ἄλλος τõν ἀρχόντων ἐν τ]ε͂σι πόλεσι μὲ ποιεῖ κα[τ] | [ὰ τὰ ἐφσεσισμένα τõν πολι]τõν ἒ τõν ξσένον ἄτιμ[ος] | [ἔστο ... δε]μοσία [ἔσ]το καὶ τε͂ς θεõ τ[ὸ] | [ἐπιδέκατον κτλ. ('when a politician in the cities acts against the decisions of the citizens or the *xenoi*, he must be *atimos* and his ... must befall to the *dēmos* and the tenth for the goddess').

[16] Rainer (1986) 163–164: "formelhafter Schutz des in einer Bestimmung Angeordneten" *versus* "eigentliche Strafe".

against 'the things sanctioned by vote' (τὰ *h*εφσεφισμένα, 26).[17] The agreements about the colony's settlement and their physical recording in stone are thus presented as very closely related: to object against, or disobey, any part of the agreement is conceptualised to some degree as an offence against the inscription. This suggests that the communicative setting is central to the construction of authority for the agreement; and particularly, that the inscription itself plays an important role in continuously reproducing that authority.[18] While the *sanctio legis* is thus explicitly keyed to its communicative setting, the necessity to provide a safeguard for the authority of communal agreements predates the use of inscriptions. On the assumption that we may expect both a measure of continuity and change, the phenomenon of an inscribed entrenchment clause will in the following section be compared to an oral equivalent.

Coercing Compliance

Thanks to a curious inscription from Cyrene, the Lybian city colonised from Thera probably around the eighth or seventh century BC, we can form some idea of possible oral strategies to safeguard a set of communal decisions.[19] The inscription records a fourth century decree granting *isopoliteia* to citizens of Cyrene's *metropolis*, Thera.[20] The grant of *isopoliteia* is made conditional on the Therans swearing the oath of Cyrene's original founders, and the decree incorporates the text of this oath in full. The Theran founding oath records a set of arrangements concerning the foundation of a new community: it therefore shows us what a document like the Brea decree may have looked like in an oral context. The historicity of the Cyrenean text is not above suspicion; but even in so far as the oath is a fourth century (re)invention, it still testifies to the Cyre-

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[17] This type of self-referentiality is common in early classical-period Attic inscriptions: cf. e.g. *SEG* xxxii 3.23 ἀλλὸ ἒ κ[ατὰ τὲν στ]έλεν; *IG* I³ 498.2 κ]ατὰ τὲν στέλε[ν]; *SEG* iii.4.18 κατὰ τὰ ἐς τ]ὲν στέλε[ν] γεγραμ[μ]ένα; also e.g. *IG* I³ 254.1 *h*ε στέλε.

[18] As is commonly the case with inscribed decrees, the decision to inscribe the text is included in the inscription itself (lines 21–22, γράφσαι δὲ ταῦτα | ἐν στέλει καὶ καταθε̑ναι ἐμ πόλει).

[19] Chamoux (1952) 69–111 distinguishes the 'historical' foundation from a 'legendary' colonisation in the late Bronze Age; the complicated relationship between Herodotus' account of the foundation (4.150 ff.) and the version attested in the Theran decree is discussed most extensively by Calame (1988) and (1990); see also Létoublon (2003).

[20] *SEG* ix.3 (= ML 5 (pp. 5–9)). Chamoux (1952) 105–108, Graham (1960) 94–111 and ML all print modified texts based on autopsy; the most recent re-edition is that of Dobias-Lalou (1994).

neans' own conception of their past and its significance to their present: it shows that in their imagination, a communal agreement would have been safe-guarded through the act of self-imprecation during a communal oath ceremony.[21]

The account of the Theran founding oath concludes with a description of this procedure of self-imprecation:

> … ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅρκια ἐποιήσαντο οἵ τε αὐτεῖ μένοντες καὶ οἱ πλέοντες οἰκίζοντες καὶ ἀρὰς ἐποιήσαντο τὸς ταῦτα παρβεῶντας καὶ μὴ ἐμμένοντας ἢ τῶν ἐλλιβύαι οἰκεόντων ἢ τῶν αὐτεῖ μὲν ὄντων· κηρίνος πλάσσαντες κολοσὸς κατέκαιον ἐπαρεώμενοι πάντες συνενθόντες καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ παῖδες καὶ παιδίσκαι· τὸμ μὴ ἐμμένοντα τούτοις τοῖς ὁρκίοις ἀλλὰ παρβεῶντα καταλείβεσθαί νιν καὶ καταρρὲν ὥσπερ τὸς κολοσός, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γόνον καὶ χρήματα· τοῖσι δὲ ἐμμένοισιν τούτοις τοῖς ὁρκίοις καὶ τοῖς πλέοισι ἐλλιβύαν κ[αὶ] τ[οῖς μέ]νοισι ἐν Θήραι ἦμεν πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐ[τοῖς καὶ γό]νοις.

> 'On these conditions they swore oaths, both those who stayed and those who sailed to establish a colony, and they made curses against those who would transgress these oaths and fail to adhere to them, whether they were of those who settled in Libya or of those who remained there. They made waxen *kolosoi* (statues) and burned them, cursing everyone altogether, men and women and boys and girls alike: that whoever would not adhere to these oaths but would transgress them would melt and dissolve like the *kolosoi*, he and his offspring and his possessions: and for those who would adhere to these oaths, both for those who sailed to Libya and for those who stayed in Thera, that there would be plenty and good things for themselves and their offspring.'

By equating the consequences of burning for waxen images with the consequences of oath-breaking for individuals participating in the ritual, these curses (*arai*) and the accompanying ritual aim to guarantee the authority of, and adherence to, decisions made by the community as a whole; and as such, they serve the same coercive purpose as an

[21] While the wording of the oath seems anachronistic in places, it is probable that the Cyreneans have attempted to preserve a historical account: the arguments of Graham (1960) to the contrary are not convincing. The current *communis opinio* is that the Cyrenean text goes back on a genuine oral tradition: see Jeffery (1961), the comments of ML, and esp. Létoublon (1989). Faraone (1993) 60–80 demonstrates that the use of sympathetic magic in the oath does not need to push its dating upwards (*contra* Dušanic (1978), who claims that the practice was confined to the Hellenistic era).

inscribed entrenchment clause.[22] The circumstances under which the Theran colonists were sent off, as sketched in the oath, certainly required provisions for the eventuality of legitimate protest:[23] the oath specifies that if someone was unwilling to sail, not only he himself, but also anyone who offered him shelter would be liable to capital punishment, 'even if it was a father protecting his son or a brother protecting his brother' (*SEG* ix.3, 39). Anyone who has conditionally cursed himself in the oath ceremony can be legitimately forced to cooperate in the implementation of the arrangements; conversely, if he is willing to cooperate, he is excused for violating other social demands in the process.[24]

The entrenchment clause of the Brea decree also parallels the Theran *ara* in its inclusivity. In the Kyrenean inscription, we read that not just the oath-breaker himself, but also his offspring and his property were to suffer (καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γόνον καὶ χρήματα); similarly, the Athenian decree targets not just those who attack the decree, but also their children and property (ἄτιμον ἒναι αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας τὸς ἐχς ἐκένο καὶ τὰ χρέματα δεμόσια ἒναι).[25] Because the oral procedure of self-imprecation (imagined or not) is similar to the inscribed entrenchment clauses in function and in scope of application, the mechanism by which such a curse operates may help to further our understanding of the *atimos*-formula.

The first thing to observe is that the self-imprecation ritual is different from a penal provision proper, which is included elsewhere in the content of the oath.[26] The *ara* aims to assist the legitimisation of puni-

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[22] In the Chalkis decree (*IG* I³ 40, cf. n. 13 above), the entrenchment clause covers the eventuality that someone might refuse to take the oath imposed by Athenians. On the oath of the Chalkidians, cf. Balcer (1978) 26–50.

[23] As Faraone (1993) 78 observes, the use of sympathetic magic in oath ceremonies, widespread in the eighth and seventh century BC, was reserved for situations "in which compliance with the oath was believed to be exceptionally difficult for one or both parties".

[24] A parallel for this procedure can be found in the Athenian decree against the oligarchs Antiphon and Archeptolemus ([Plut.] *Vit. dec. or.* 834b), which declares that not only the offenders, but also those who offer them shelter, shall be *atimos*.

[25] Archaic laws cited in fourth-century literary sources speak of the offender's property to 'become *atimos*' itself (e.g. Draco's homicide law cited in Dem. 23.62: ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ παῖδας [ἀτίμους codd.: secl. Taylor] καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου)—just as one's property could be '*epitimos*' (Dem. 23.44). This is generally taken to imply that in this laws *atimos* still meant 'outlawed' (so Hansen (1976) 78)); and the occurrence of the expression (ἄτιμα) τὰ ἐκείνου in the bribery law cited in Dem. 21.113 is regarded as an argument for its archaic date (see MacDowell (1990) 337); I will argue against this assumption elsewhere.

[26] Cf. *SEG* ix.3, 37–40: ὁ δέ καὶ μὴ λῆι πλὲν ἀποστελλοίσας τᾶς πόλιος, θανάσιμος τένται καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἔστω εὐτοῦ δαμόσια· ὁ δὲ ἀποδεκόμενος ἢ αδήιζων ἢ πατὴρ υἱὸν ἢ ἀδελφεὸς ἀδελφεὸν παισεῖται ἅπερ ὁ μὴ λέων πλέν ("That he who is not prepared to sail while the *polis* has sent him off, be put to death and his possessions be *damosia*:

tive measures should they be necessary, but by itself does not prescribe a well-defined response towards oath-breakers. Rather, the melting of the *kolosoi* evokes an image of consequences that automatically becomes effective through the transgressors' own act of pronouncing the accompanying curse.[27] The causal connection between breaking the oath and suffering as the images do exists only because of this curse: no future action is envisaged to accomplish the effect should that be necessary.

Just like the Theran self-imprecation by itself does not prescribe future action against oath-breakers, so the *atimos*-formula in a *sanctio legis* by itself does not prescribe what future action is to be undertaken against people subject to the clause. As in a performative speech act, the effect of the formula 'let so-and-so be *atimos*' lies in the use of the words themselves and depends on the quasi-magical power of language to shape reality.[28] This formula, like an *ara*, and with the same purpose, construes a causal relation between transgressing against the decree and becoming unable to fulfil one's social role within the community; and, as I will show, the mechanism by which it does so need not depend on a legal definition of *atimia*.[29]

That is not to say that there would have been no real consequences if someone was found guilty on a charge for which a law prescribed

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and whoever takes him in or protects him, even a father his son or a brother his brother, that he will have the same fate as the one unwilling to sail").

[27] In this context, Tambiah (1973) speaks of 'persuasive analogies', expected to shape present reality in accordance with an envisaged future; cf. Faraone (1993), and, on the magical function of analogy, e.g. Graf (1994) 153–154, Frankfurter (1995) 463–464, Versnel (2002) 147–154.

[28] On performative speech acts, cf. Austin (1975) 8: "the uttering of the words is … *the* leading incident in the performance of the act … the performance of which is also the object of the utterance"; on their quasi-magical power, cf. Searle (1990) 383–384, "ordinary humans … have a quasi-magical power of bringing about changes in the world through our utterances; and we are given this power by a kind of human agreement". For ancient Greek and Roman prayers, curses, legal formulae etc. as performative speech acts, cf. e.g. Prins (1991) 183–189; Rosenmeyer (1995) 205–206; Giordano (1999) 13–16; Stehle (2005).

[29] Austin's notion of 'performative' *vs* 'constative' utterances was introduced in the study of magic by Tambiah (1968) and (1973), and has remained influential (e.g. Frankfurter (1995) 457 & 466–467); but as Smith ((1995) 15; cf. *idem* (2002) 89–90) points out, the applicability of the notion of performative speech transcends the problematical category of 'magical' action. Kurzon (1986) 9–12 describes the legal statute as found in modern law-codes in terms of performative speech acts, observing that complex utterances need not take the basic structure of the performative ("I hereby …") in order to be considered as a performative speech act. On the wide range of "implicit" performative speech acts, cf. e.g. Levinson (1983) 234 and—more fully, in reply to Searle's restrictive definition of performativity—Bach & Harnish (1992).

'*atimon einai*'; the consequences may have been real enough. For the fourth century, the orators document a variety of possible consequences regularly associated with *atimia* or the restriction of legal privileges, ranging from the prohibition to speak in the assembly or participate in public religious activities to the physical exclusion from the *agora*.[30] From the same evidence, however, it is clear that even in the fourth century, a person could become *atimos* without being formally convicted; that *atimia* did not need to take immediate effect; and that the selection of consequences was determined wholly by the *atimos*' present social circumstances.[31] The haphazard nature of the possible consequences of becoming *atimos* through a legal stipulation can be best understood by regarding any consequences as a by-product of a verbal strategy to make decrees binding and authoritative, in the same way as the misfortune possibly befalling an oath-breaker is a by-product of the procedure of self-imprecation, not its aim. Both strategies, collective self-imprecation and to declare *atimos* whoever challenges a decision, are primarily aimed at coercing compliance, rather than at dealing with offenders.

ἄτιμός εἰμι as a Conflict Strategy

How then could the *atimos*-formula be effective as a speech-act? By what mechanism did it construe inviolable authority for an agreement? I will attempt to illustrate in this section that the effect of the formula that someone 'is to be *atimos*' in legal inscriptions follows naturally from the everyday usage of the term *atimos*. The form ἄτιμος is cognate with the verb ἀτιμάζειν, which is usually translated as *to dishonour*. This translation is very approximate: more accurately, the primary function of the term is to refer to interpersonal behaviour that does not conform to expectations considered to be legitimate within the wider cultural framework. To refer to particular actions in terms of ἀτιμάζειν is to construe them as taking place within a specific relationship; and it presupposes a general consensus that existing relationships should unproblematically dictate certain kinds of behaviour. Accordingly, ἀτιμάζειν is regularly used in straightforward reproaches or complaints; and the prohibitive

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[30] See Hansen (1976) 61–62 for a concise survey, and Youni (1998) 149–238 for a full presentation of the evidence.

[31] Hansen (1976) 63–70; on 'potential' and unconvicted *atimoi* see also Wallace (1998). I regard these oddities as indications that *atimia* may not have originated as a clearly defined legal penalty.

subjunctive, μή μ' ἀτιμάζῃς, can be glossed as "do not do something that I could legitimately hold against you".[32] *Atimia* terminology can also be used to address problems with an individual's social identity and position, often in the expectation that the community at large should be interested in resolving them. For instance, when the speaker of Dem. 39 (*Against Boeotus* 1) claims that sharing his name with his half-brother 'entails *atimia* for the two of us', this is an appeal to the *dikastai* to put an end to this situation.[33]

So while the verb ἀτιμάζειν is used for head-on reproaches or requests, ἄτιμος and ἀτιμία avoid the verb's natural focus on the agent of such an act, and are hence often used to open up space for negotiation without openly targeting anyone. These complementary conflict strategies can be illustrated from the trial scene in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, first produced as part of the poet's *Oresteia* trilogy in 458 BC, contemporary with the earliest Attic legal inscriptions. When the Furies, prosecuting the matricide Orestes, 'counsel' the Athenian jurors 'not to disregard their oppressive presence in this land in any way', the verb (ἀτιμάσαι) indicates that to acquit the defendant would constitute an undue devaluation of the Furies' acknowledged role as avengers.[34] Then, when Orestes is acquitted after all (albeit under a tied vote), the Furies voice their indignation:

> ἰὼ θεοὶ νεώτεροι, παλαιοὺς νόμους
> καθιππάσασθε κἀκ χερῶν εἵλεσθέ μου·
> ἐγὼ δ' ἄτιμος, ἁ τάλαινα, βαρύκοτος
> ἐν γᾷ τᾷδε ... (*Eum.* 778–781)

> 'Younger gods, you have ridden roughshod over ancient laws and snatched the prey from my hands. I am *atimos* and miserable and oppressively angry in this land.'

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[32] This phrase is used for example by Socrates to urge Euthyphro not to dodge a question: Pl. *Euthyphr.* 15d: ἀλλὰ μή με ἀτιμάσῃς ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προσσχὼν τὸν νοῦν ὅτι μάλιστα νῦν εἰπὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Cf. e.g. S. *OC* 49–50: πρός νυν θεῶν, ὦ ξεῖνε, μή μ' ἀτιμάσῃς, | τοιόν' ἀλήτην ὧν σε προστρέπω φράσαι ('By the gods, friend, don't do me wrong, give me the information for which I have asked you')—and the reply: σήμαινε, κοὐκ ἄτιμος ἔκ γ' ἐμοῦ φανῇ (51: 'Indicate your meaning, and you will not be *atimos* on my account!').

[33] Dem. 39.6: ... εἰ μὴ τὸ μὲν ἡμᾶς μεταθέσθαι μεγάλην ἀτιμίαν ἔφερε καὶ ἀνανδρίαν, τὸ δὲ τοῦτον ἔχειν ταὔτ' ὄνομ' ἡμῖν διὰ πόλλ' ἀδύνατον ἦν ('[I would not be here in court,] if it was not so that our substitution brought maximal *atimia* and unmanliness, and if having the same name was not on all accounts impossible for us'). I discuss the text and interpretation of this passage in van 't Wout (2010).

[34] Aesch. *Eum.* 711–712: καὶ μὴν βαρεῖαν τήνδ' ὁμιλίαν χθονὸς | ξύμβουλός εἰμι μηδαμῶς ἀτιμάσαι.

In these lines, the Furies use the term ἄτιμος to draw attention to the fact that they have been wronged by the verdict, and as a consequence are unable to fulfill the role in society to which they are entitled.[35] It takes great tact and insight on Athena's part to reconcile the decision of the court with proper respect for the social worth of the Furies.[36] She cannot admit that the verdict leaves the Furies *atimos* and offer compensation: to do so would imply that the court had failed to take into account the Furies' well-founded claim to recognition and respect for their social role, and thus would threaten to reopen the conflict. However, Athena cannot deny the legitimacy of the claim either. Instead, she denies that the outcome of the trial should be taken as a communal value judgement concerning the Furies' social worth:

> οὐ γὰρ νενίκησθ', ἀλλ' ἰσόψηφος δίκη
> ἐξῆλθ' ἀληθῶς οὐκ ἀτιμίᾳ σέθεν. (*Eum.* 794–795)

> 'You are not defeated: what has come about is a verdict based upon a tie, which truly does not entail *atimia* for you.'[37]

By denying that the Furies' defeat entails *atimia*, Athena upholds the authority of the court, while inviting the Furies to reopen the negotiations concerning their social position. She even explicitly accepts responsibility in that respect:

> οὔτοι καμοῦμαί σοι λέγουσα τἀγαθά,
> ὡς μήποτ' εἴπῃς πρὸς νεωτέρας ἐμοῦ
> θεὸς παλαιὰ καὶ πολισσούχων βροτῶν
> ἄτιμος ἔρρειν τοῦδ' ἀπόξενος πέδου. (*Eum.* 881–884)

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[35] Aesch. *Eum.* 778–781 are repeated verbatim as *Eum.* 808–810; cf. also *Eum.* 791–792 ἰὼ μεγάλατοι κόραι δυστυχεῖς | Νυκτὸς ἀτιμοπενθεῖς ('How greatly afflicted we are, unlucky daughters of Night, grieved in dishonour', = 821–822) and *Eum.* 845–846 ἀπό με γὰρ τιμᾶν δαναιᾶν θεῶν | δυσπάλαμοι παρ' οὐδὲν ἦραν δόλοι ('the gods' tricks deprived me of my ancient *timai*' = 879–880).

[36] Cf. Sommerstein (1989) 240 on *Eum.* 778–891: "it falls to Athena to fight this battle on behalf of the Athenians; and she fights it solely with the weapons of persuasion".

[37] On the vexed problem of the precise nature of Athena's vote (did it create a tie, or did it resolve a tie in Orestes' favour?), see the discussions of Sommerstein (1989) 221–226 on *Eum.* 711–753 and Podlecki (1989) 211–213. Sommerstein (1989) 224 on *Eum.* 711–753 confronts *Eum.* 795 with 741 (νικᾷ δ' Ὀρέστης κἂν ἰσόψηφος κριθῇ—'Orestes wins, even though the verdict is based upon a tie') and concludes that Athena's representation of the result to the Erinyes in 795 is "disingenious"; but it should be noted that the emphasis of the conflict has shifted from the outcome of the trial as such, to the question who has gained the upper hand in the conflict between the Furies and Apollo.

> 'I shall not tire of telling you the good things, so that you may never say that through me, a younger god, and through the Athenians, an old divinity was forced to dwell *atimos* in exile from this land.'

This assertion paves the way for the eventual integration of the Furies into Athenian society.[38] In retrospect we can see that the Furies' claim 'I am *atimos*' forces Athena to accept her responsibility towards the Furies. These passages illustrate the mechanism by which the claim 'I am atimos' functions as a conflict strategy: in the face of an unfavourable communal decision, an individual can complain that it leaves him *atimos*; i.e., that it is irreconcilable with the social role to which he is entitled.

I suggest that the legal formula '… is to be *atimos*' was designed to render this potentially destabilising conflict strategy inoperative. To contribute to someone becoming *atimos* was by definition *atimazein*, reproachable behaviour; the basis of authority for a communal decision could therefore be effectively undermined if an individual would succeed to posit the claim that it made him *atimos*.[39] The *sanctio legis* counters this threat by accepting as a consequence of a communal decision that some individuals are disadvantaged by it: by appropriating terminology suited to the negative evaluation of interpersonal behaviour, it signals that individual discontent should not be allowed to endanger the authority of the agreement—even if it is grounded in a shared moral framework and in that respect legitimate.[40]

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[38] After ascertaining that the *timē* offered is to their liking, the Furies accept; and from this point on the Furies are treated as Athenian metics: cf. the literature cited by Podlecki (1989) 192 on *Eum.* 1028 and, on the Furies' change of status rather than identity, Bacon (2001).

[39] This ideal holds even in the context of a legal verdict: at Lys. 31.29–33, the speaker attempts to make it easier for the *dikastai* to deliver a negative verdict against his opponent by insisting that 'they will not be the ones to make him *atimos*'—he himself has brought this on (οὐ γὰρ ὑμεῖς νῦν αὐτὸν ἀτιμάζετε, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὑτὸν τότε ἀπεστέρησεν).

[40] The decree concerning Naupactus (*IG* IX i 334.38–39, cited n. 12 above) excepts from the entrenchment clause 'modifications authorised by both parties: the Assembly of the Opuntian thousand and the Assembly of the Naupactian settlers' (*h*ότι κα μὲ ἀνφοτάροις δοκέει *h*οποντίον τε χιλίον πλέθαι καὶ Ναϝπακτίον τõν ἐπιϝοίϙον πλέθαι). It is perhaps no coincidence that inscriptions recording arrangements for colonial communities feature some of the earliest attested uses of the '… is to be *atimos*'-formula: the issue of community coherence, and its relative importance over private interests, is especially relevant in such a context.

Authority versus Discontent

The mechanism by which the '. . . is to be *atimos*' formula construes and protects the authority of a communal agreement is simple and effective: by subverting the language of legitimate discontent into a statement of authority, it asserts the priority of the agreement over individual interests. The close analogy of this quasi-magical or performative use of the term in legal documents with the mechanism of cursing is corroborated by an early-fourth-century Attic judicial curse tablet in which a litigant is cursed with the phrase "let him and his possessions be *atimos*".[41] However, the way in which the phrase 'let him be *atimos*' functions in the context of an entrenchment clause is more complicated than the mechanism of a curse as such. The *sanctiones legis* typically contain a complementary stipulation concerning the offender's property: the Brea decree stipulates that it befall to the *dēmos* (χρέματα δεμόσια ἒναι), and the Naupactus decree asks for it to be confiscated (χρέματα παματοφαγεῖσθαι). Such regulations to confiscate property are the hard basis for any consequences that offenders against the clause will suffer.[42]

From a modern perspective, we might say that the early *sanctiones legis* occupy a middle ground between a curse and a punitive measure: although the inclusion of property is an integral part of the practice of cursing, the part of the clause concerned with property takes the form of a prescription to confiscate it, which is a straightforward punitive measure. To us, such a clause may seem conceptually fuzzy; but it is perfectly clear how it could be effective. The stipulation prescribing confiscation of property must have been interdependent with the formula 'let him be *atimos*' in terms of effectuation and legitimisation: because property is essential to many types of social relations, confiscation of property ensures a radical discontinuity in the type of social persona the offender is able to produce. To declare that someone is to be *atimos* legitimates these social repercussions, and at the same time creates an opportunity

[41] *DTA* (= *IG* I³ iii) 107.4–5: ὡς οὗτος ὁ βόλυβδος ἄτιμος καὶ ψυχρός, οὕτω ἐκε͂νος καὶ τὰ ἐκένο ἄτιμα | καὶ ψυχρὰ ἔστω καὶ τοῖς μετ' ἐκένο—'just as this lead is *atimos* and cold, so this man and his possessions must be *atimos* and those who support him'. Whereas self-imprecation to safeguard an oath is a public and legitimate affair, this curse exploits the expression ἄτιμος ἔστω for communal exclusion of an individual for personal interest. I discuss this text in van 't Wout (2011), developing an argument parallel to the one in this paper on the continuity between *atimia* as a social and as a legal phenomenon.

[42] The reported laws cited in n. 25 above may reflect an earlier stage in the use of the formula ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ παῖδας καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου *vel sim.*, which more closely parallels the model of a curse and is less explicitly prescriptive.

for other members of the community to redefine their relationship to the offender. As a whole, such a *sanctio legis* may thus have effectively posed the threat of complete social death.[43]

In matters which do not involve the interests of the community as a whole, *atimia* is a simple matter of perspective and loyalty: if you agree that someone is *atimos*, you should side with him in a conflict. But as a product of an authoritative communal decision, or in direct consequence of a legal clause, *atimia* can also be a term for deliberate exclusion from the process of decision-making that shapes the community and the agreements it lives by. This use of the term is, however, very rare; the explicit claim that someone should be made *atimos* is normally found only in inscriptions and properly belongs to a voice of disembodied authority.[44]

When the term *atimos* is applied to a person as an evaluation of his position in the community, this suggests that he has reason to deny, confront or at least resent the authority of the *polis*: the label *atimos* conveys that the rules by which the community is governed have not guaranteed him the place in society that he should be entitled to. This explains why in several extant speeches, individuals attempt to clear their name from the suspicion of oligarchic sympathies by saying 'I was not *atimos*', in support of the claim 'I had no reason to oppose the democracy'. For example, the orator Antiphon, in his defence against the accusation of participating in the oligarchic coup of 411, claims that since he 'was not *atimos* and had not committed a crime' (fr. 1a.1–2), he had no motive to

[43] Xenophon's idealising account of the Lycurgan constitution gives us an idea of what social death could be like: he reports that in Sparta, men judged 'cowards' (κακοί) were excluded from games and choruses, prevented from marrying their daughters and generally compelled to keep the lowest social profile possible; he concludes that it is unsurprising that 'with such *atimia* being the consequence for cowards, they tend to choose death over such an *atimos* and reproachful life' (*Resp. Lac.* 9.6.4–5).

[44] One important exception is Demosthenes' advise to the Athenians to make his opponent Aeschines *atimos* (Dem. 19.262: ἕως οὖν ἔτ' ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ, φυλάξασθε καὶ τοὺς πρώτους εἰσαγαγόντας ἀτιμώσατε ['now that you are still safe, make sure that you *atimōsate* those who first introduced this disease']; cf. *ibid.* 313: αὐτὸς ἂν τῆς ἐπιτιμίας δικαίως νῦν στερηθείη ['he will justly be stripped of his *epitimia*']). To suggest that someone should be made *atimos* puts the speaker in an extremely unsympathetic position, openly taking exception to the view that another individual's legitimate role in society should be accommodated. Demosthenes' choice of words testifies to the exceptional nature and circumstances of his conflict with Aeschines, in which they competed for authority within the Athenian community in defence of their widely divergent political views.

hope that a new government would ameliorate his situation.[45] 'I was not *atimos*' appears to have been a natural way to express that you had no quarrel with the authority of the *polis*, just like 'I am *atimos*' might be used to challenge that authority.

Conclusion

I hope to have shown that the effectiveness of an inscribed *sanctio legis* should partly be seen in terms of the quasi-magical power of the legal inscription to shape social reality: a power which relies directly on the inscription itself and the social construction of its function, not on any external definition of *atimia* as a legal concept. By analysing *atimia* in the legal sphere as a 'legal penalty', and as such by definition as something conceptually distinct from 'social sanctioning', we implicitly and anachronistically favour a 'rule of law'-interpretation of the legal sphere in classical Athens over a conflict-resolution model, whereas both seem to play a role in the contemporary perception of litigation. The interpretation of the use of *atimia*-terminology in early legal inscriptions offered in this paper on the other hand allows us to chart the continuity between legal and non-legal *atimia*, and particularly to recognise the function of *atimia*-terminology in regulating social processes through its evaluative character. Both may help to solve many of the acknowledged problems in the interpretation of *atimia* in the legal sphere.

If, as I have argued, *atimia* terminology did not enter legal documents to label a legally defined condition, but as a way to proclaim and establish communally accepted authority, then the practical meaning and application of *atimia* in consequence of a legal stipulation must originally have been dependent on social factors, and may have varied considerably per case. The regular combination with the confiscation of property provided a hard basis for a certain degree of exclusion from participation in the political community. But meanwhile, throughout the classical period, for an individual to be *atimos* in consequence of a debt or a legal verdict meant not just to be labelled a political danger to the state, but also, at least potentially, to *pose* such a danger: the authority by which an individual was *atimos* was by the very nature of the term not above legitimate criticism.

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[45] The same argument can be found at [Lys.] 20.35 and Lys. 25.11; for the notion that *atimoi* can pose a political threat, cf. also [Xen.] *Ath. pol.* 3.12–13.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

'AND YOU, THE DEMOS, MADE AN UPROAR': PERFORMANCE, MASS AUDIENCES AND TEXT IN THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY

Rosalind Thomas

The Greek world was a world of open-air gatherings, festivals, processions and performances of all kinds, yet it is extraordinarily difficult to imagine what these might have been like in reality, how very large audiences of thousands might have behaved, or how they might have affected an event for which the only surviving evidence is a slight mention in a written text. While the performance contexts of tragedy and comedy have been much scrutinized, the great mass audiences of the Athenian democracy still remain hazy: the dynamics of citizen audiences, speakers and politicians, had tangible results, made concrete decisions, and yet it is frustratingly hard to reconstruct or envisage the atmosphere or behaviour of these huge audiences of citizens alongside the written documents which emanated from them. Nor does it help that we only hear about such audiences if they appear in some form in our written evidence, for it is therefore the written evidence which has the final say.[1]

It is not only performances that we are missing, but part of the very character of the Athenian democracy. Our picture of the Athenian democracy must continually change in accordance with new evidence that comes to light, as is very proper; yet an obvious point still needs making that more and more inscriptions appear while our impressions (and they are only impressions) of what went on without writing—the assemblies, juries, etc.—remains comparatively static.[2] Some recent work on

[1] Thus, e.g., it is mainly from inscriptions that we hear about Hellenistic performances of literature or history, yet these inscriptions went up to record thanks or honours from the city: for a good example at Xanthos, see A. Chaniotis (2009).

[2] Note the new archive found at Argos by Prof. Kritsas; and the thousands of lead tablets at Dodona which were on the verge of being published by Prof. Christidis at the time of his death.

literacy and written documents in Athens argues for far more writing, broader and higher levels of literacy and more sophistication in the use of writing than historians, including myself, have tended to accept.[3] These recent studies tend to argue that oral modes of communication and elements which we might crudely label in short-hand as 'archaic' or 'primitive' do not really have a place in classical Athens; they also implicitly reject the possibility that degrees of complexity and sophistication existed in the use of writing. So while Athenian inscriptions attract ever greater attention and the finds increase, the space for performance, large audiences, and all that is implied by open-air politics, seems to get increasingly squeezed from the picture of Athenian political life. The results of some of this new work seem strangely modern, strangely anachronistic, as I will argue below: while we should certainly take into account the insights drawn from close study of the inscriptions, some claims seem to present an exaggeratedly contemporary image. Was politics in Athens driven by speeches and assemblies—as would appear from so much of our evidence—or by formalized written record and a bureaucracy reminiscent of modern administrative practice? Or a bit of both? An over-formalized picture of Athenian democracy with very extensive and sophisticated written records may not be incompatible with the behaviour of the mass citizen body which we will examine below, but we need to consider fully the combination, or the implications of such a combination, in order to attain a rounded picture of the democracy. We cannot look at the written records alone.

The situation in Athens was extreme by comparison with other *poleis*, with its enormous citizen-body, large assembly, mass jury-courts and large-scale participatory festivals, though some of this relatively rich evidence for Athenian audiences may help envisage other smaller city-gatherings. We concentrate here on the dynamics of very large audiences in Athens, what they imply for the importance of the written documents produced, stored, and displayed around the city, and therefore the character of the democracy. I start with some observations about the context of written documents.

[3] Particularly Pébarthe (2006)—see below; Sickinger (1999). *Contra*, R. Thomas (1989), ch. 1; Thomas (1992). Note also the important article by Boffo (1995).

Participatory or Documentary Democracy? Texts and Method

I initially embarked on this research driven by curiosity about the mass psychology implied by the large democratic audiences and an over-exposure (on my part at least) to Thucydides' criticisms made of the Athenian demos,[4] but it rapidly became clear that this material also has a large impact on how we interpret the written records. In part I wish to challenge some aspects of the recent research on literacy in Athens and defend an interpretation of the Athenian democracy which retains a determinedly un-modern character, and which is, indeed, quite alien in several respects to modern democracy. There is a wider question of method too, relevant to any study of literacy and orality, which boils down to the problem of interpreting the written evidence: it is essential to emphasise that the use, function and significance of writing in any society needs interpreting in the context of the whole society, and that the wider nature of Athenian society (in this case) and attitudes to the use of writing, have an impact on the significance of the written evidence. The same is true of the non-written elements. What is at stake is how we interpret the role of writing and written record in a society for which we have lost so much that was not recorded. What is the significance of the use of writing and how does it fit into the whole culture? Despite certain universal possibilities offered by the written word, this is something which I believe is very largely culturally determined.[5]

Let us look more closely at these modernizing visions of Athenian democracy. Earlier work saw a powerful 'oral' or non-written element to much of Athenian life, and a relatively gradual increase in the use of written documents and archives with a sea change in public attitudes to writing especially at the end of the fifth century and again in the mid-fourth;[6] this was partly trying to readdress the balance and 'reinscribe' into our picture of Greek life the non-written, non-inscribed elements, arguing for a subtle and complex combination of the two rather than a development from the 'oral' to the 'written'. Sickinger has now argued that the Athenians were making, storing and reusing written records in

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[4] For example, Thuc. II 65; VI 8–26; VIII 1, discussed below.

[5] On the wider debates on the potentials and cultural embeddedness of literacy, see for instance, from a vast bibliography, Street (1984); Olson & Torrance (2001) on 'The Making of Literate Societies'; Street ed. (1993); Olson (1994).

[6] Thomas (1989), esp. 38–45, 68 ff.; (1992), ch. 7; Thomas (1994), 43–49 on increase of documentation during the Athenian empire; Davies (1994) on accounts and accountability.

considerable quantity before 450 and indeed back into the late 6th.c., and that their access to them and actual reference to them was (in effect) recognizably similar to those methods of the modern historian or civil servant:[7] the implicit model is that of modern, well-organized administrative practice. While some of his careful study of inscriptions certainly shows evidence for secretaries and more storage and retrieval of state records before 400 BC than many have come to believe, the general picture is not entirely plausible, most particularly the argument that extensive written administration was already in place in the mid to late sixth century. There is a danger of creating a picture of infinite regression, that is, the presence of documents known to exist in (say) the late fifth century being read back on *a priori* grounds to the mid or early fifth century, and then assumed to be in place also in the late sixth century. An important question of method arises. When there is no written evidence at all, as is the case, for instance, for state-apparatus for most of the sixth century, the historian might assume that the Athenians were rather like us in their careful storage and filing systems—or alternatively rather like late 5th.c. Athens, or rather like fourth-century Athens—and that this simply left no evidence. Or more plausibly, the historian might consider at least that this absence simply reflects a less complex stage of development in the use of writing. The possibility of development seems preferable. Moreover, it seems dangerous to leave out of the account altogether the possibility that much activity and business could have been done with merely non-written methods of communication, or with very slight pieces of writing indeed.[8] I would like to argue afresh, while taking into account new evidence that has come to light, that the role of writing cannot be fully appreciated without thinking firstly about its social and cultural significance, and secondly about what is not written down and never had been.

A more comprehensive and thorough scholarly study is by Christophe Pébarthe in his 'history' of literacy, *Cité, Democratie et écriture. Histoire de l'alphabétisation d'Athènes à l'époque classique* (2006). This does not deny the importance of orality but sets out systematically to look at the role and use of writing in Athens. He sees extensive literacy at a rea-

[7] Sickinger (1999). Cf. also Sickinger (2002).

[8] As Sickinger (1999) tends to do. Pébarthe (2006) is more nuanced, though note e.g. p. 289 on inscriptions forming public opinion, apparently ignoring Assembly debates; cf. p. 113 on Sickinger sharing nevertheless a general idea of 'disorder' in the Athenian records. Samons (2000) shows a marked increase in publication on stone of financial documents from c.432 BC.

sonably high level amongst most Athenians by the fifth century, mass 'literacy' (though it is unclear quite what type of literacy is envisaged) by the time ostracism was instituted, and a very extensive and sophisticated bureaucracy attached to the democracy and the Athenian empire throughout the fifth century.[9] Among his many claims, he wishes to push back many features of literate practice attested for the fourth century to the fifth while still agreeing that the fourth century sees further intensification. Amidst much interesting discussion of written documentation, he explicitly claims that the pertinent model for Athens, if any model is relevant, is not an anthopologically derived model, or a medieval model, but a modern one.[10]

How 'modern' was Athens, then, in its use of writing and the relation of writing to non-written means of communication? There are many features which should serve to caution us against seeing a 'modern' democracy here, not least the role of rhetoric and the mass audience in decision-making in the assembly (below). As for comparisons from anthropology or earlier historical periods, sometimes criticized,[11] it is important to emphasise that they do not offer firm proof or even evidence, but they do offer alternative suggestions and models by which one might be able to make sense of the ancient evidence; where the evidence is ambiguous or admits alternative interpretations, they may enable scholars to ask different questions rather than jump to conclusions based on assumptions about what is going on: and they may offer alternative models to the modern western system we are used to. One famous example will illustrate the problem of interpretation from partial evidence. Xenophon mentions in the *Anabasis* a place where ships regularly ran aground, and how the Thracians would collect the contents, including the *bibloi* in them. The Thracians collect beds and boxes, and 'πολλαὶ ... βίβλοι γεγραμμέναι and all the other things *naukleroi* carry in wooden chests' (*Anab.* VII 5.13–14). This passage presumably refers to a period around the 390's. Pébarthe confidently sees this as attesting to the mass of

[9] See also Pébarthe (2000).

[10] Pébarthe (2006) 348: *Si un modèle doit être cherché, il est préférable de s'orienter vers l'époque moderne qui, en dépit du développement de l'imprimerie, semble offrir des concepts à même de décrire la réalité athénienne*. Stroud (1998) dismisses the relevance of anthropological or any other historical comparison for Athens. Note also Samons (2000), esp. Appx.3 (p. 314) claims that public documents in archives were 'as readily accessible (and comprehensible) to the average Athenian as a "public" document is to the average citizen in any modern democracy (at least before the age of the internet)'.

[11] E.g. Pébarthe (2006), Introduction, esp. 22 ff. and note 10 above.

'paperwork' carried by merchants on ship and sees it as part of his picture of cargoes which were strictly recorded and examined for provenance with accompanying written documents by Athenian officials in the period of the fifth-century empire. In accordance with his modernizing view, this provided a state of documentation that was necessary for their control of sea routes.[12] Yet other scholars have seen the *bibloi* equally confidently as part of the book trade, a sign of widespread purveying of Greek literature into the cities and communities of the Black Sea region.[13] Xenophon does not really help us much here. It is certainly possible that what the *naukleroi* kept in chests was more than the cargo to be sold at their destination, that is, that the *bibloi* are not crafted books for sale. But then are they likely to be the elaborate documentation that Pébarthe needs for his argument? *Bibloi* could simply denote pieces of papyrus, but why 'written *bibloi*'? *Bibloi* more usually denote book-rolls (though Euripides' books in *Frogs* are τὰ βιβλία (1409)). These might be simple lists, or more complicated ones, but not necessarily the official 'paperwork' of a voyage in the midst of Athenian dominated seas.

Another example in the Methone decrees of the latter half of the fifth century concerns the Athenian uses of writing and her control of allies and trade in the Hellespont, and they illustrate how Athenian written texts have a significance which is intertwined with political and cultural assumptions of the time. Historians effectively end up interpreting remarks about writing according to their wider interpretations of Athenian control of her allies. The Athenian decrees concerning Methone were erected on a large, finely cut inscription in 423:[14] there were probably four decrees, the first probably from 430, giving useful privileges to Methone, which was an important Athenian ally on the edge of Macedonia. The second decree, the decree of Kleonymos, 426/5, gives a fascinating glimpse of the 'Hellespontine guards', the *Hellespontophylakes*, who are mentioned only here in all our evidence (lines 36–37, 39–40). They are taken for granted in the decree, but it is unknown how long they had existed with their apparent control (or partial control?) over corn movements through the Hellespont.[15] Is this a war measure, a recent emergency addition to safeguard Athens' supplies and control of her allies?

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[12] Pébarthe (2000) 61–62.

[13] Davison (1962) 109, amidst a useful summary of book use: 'by 401 the book trade with the Black Sea cities was so active that Xenophon ... could include crates of books among the wreckage of ships washed ashore at Salmydessus'.

[14] ML 65, IG I(3) 61.

[15] ML sees, with line 35, reserve supplies in Byzantium.

The Methonians are exempt from tribute and allowed to import a certain amount of grain from Byzantium, and 'the Hellespontine guards are not to prevent them' (lines 34 ff.). Literally, it reads, 'Having written (γραφσαμένος) to the Hellespontine guards, they are to export up to the permitted amount' (39–40).

Apart from the extraordinary vision of Athens apparently dealing out permissions to import grain from the Black Sea, there is a real dilemma about what this implies for the use of the written word. Meiggs and Lewis simply interpreted γραφσαμένος as meaning that the people of Methone had to give notice to the guards, and suggested it was a war measure (ML p. 180). Pébarthe on the other hand thought it could only work with an elaborate super-structure of proper records along the whole north Aegean and Hellespontine coast, inventories and duplicated records for all appropriate Athenian officials.[16] The nuances are quite different if we interpret 'having written' / γραφσαμένος as 'register' or simply as 'write'. Alternatively, the nuances are different again if we assume this is one tiny example from a uniform system, or one instance in a system which is more irregular or arbitrary, adapting piecemeal to the needs of different allies:[17] a special privilege for a favoured and important ally rather than part of an elaborate superstructure?[18] We should also add that it might have been an attempt to impose authority and control via a decree, using written communication and Athenian officials to assert authority and express a hope or aim, but the decree in itself does not actually show that this worked so smoothly in practice. Writing could be used to impress and intimidate even though the appropriate infrastructure was not fully in place in practice.

It is impossible to tell with absolute certainty but I favour the theory that this was a tightening up in a particular case (one of few or many cases), driven by the needs of war and attempting to intimidate at the same time. A certain *ad hoc* element to Athenian use of writing and treatment of her allies, rather than a standard system, is highly plausible.[19] One virtue of written record is that in the right hands it can give the impression of order and authority. We see with the tribute collection itself how Athenians kept increasingly careful lists of paying

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[16] ML p. 180; Pebarthe (2000), 62–63; (2006) 300–310: p. 305 translates 'Après avoir fait une déclaration écrite'. Cf. *LSJ* s.v. γράφω, B. med. 'write for oneself'.

[17] Now examined by Low (2005) 93–111.

[18] Aphytis gets identical concessions in 428/7, IG I(3) 62—but no mention of the guards in the surviving fragments. See Moreno (2007) 165–166.

[19] See now Low (2005), and the essays in Ma, Papazarkadas & Parker (2009).

allies and added further measures to prevent fraud,[20] yet they also tried an extreme increase of both tribute levels and number of tribute payers in 425, solemnly catalogued in the decree of Thoudippos and finely engraved on stone (IG I(3) 71, ML 69). Despite all this neat listing of tribute they could not hope to gather it all, and they had also sent off 'money-collecting ships' in 427 BC down to Caria which are emergency measures rather than the normal tribute collectors (Thuc. III 19). These ships apparently went round simply extorting money and the general in charge was murdered somewhere in Caria. There is a strong possibility, therefore, that records or *grammateia* listing tribute payments were being used to assert authority to seize and control rather more than was agreed by mutual consent, though we cannot know how often this might have occurred.

The grand stone inscriptions like the one above present another aspect of the workings of Athenian society and democracy which does not accord well with any 'modern' model. These move us to a different sphere from the floating *bibloi* looted by the Thracians, one in which massive documents of public importance are visible on stone in monumental form in the public spaces of the cities. There were, of course, documents made on perishable material, and much not recorded on stone. This is not the place to go into this question in depth, but I would remark here that inscriptions raise in acute form the question of the special character of the Greek world. The more we think the inscriptions were meant primarily to be consulted (rather than admired, respected, and read only if necessary), let alone consulted by large numbers of Athenians, the further we are, in fact, from a sophisticated bureaucratic system. The picture of smoothly working and accessible archives as the core of Athenian written record that some scholars suggest[21] is not entirely supported by the presence of great inscribed laws and decrees set around the city. It seems plausible that in some cases an important inscription of a law or of tribute contributions was there both to be consulted by whoever wished, and as a large monument to impress and confer authority. The Athenian lists of the sixtieth of the tribute dedicated to Athena were grand monuments of the tribute paying allies listed one by

[20] Cleinias decree, *ML* 46, IG I(3) 34, introducing symbola and sealed tablets; Kleonymos decree, IG 1(3) 68 (ML 68) of 426.5 BC; cf. Thomas (1994) 46–47.

[21] As Sickinger (1999) argued; Pébarthe (2006), esp. ch. 4–6; but note Boffo (1995), and Pébarthe (2006) in fact presses for the role of many inscriptions to give information while also performing important functions of public commemoration and approbation—more than simple documents. Cf. Hedrick (1999).

one; they are there to be checked if anyone wished, perfectly legible, but they must primarily have been monuments for Athena, for they list the sixtieth that went to the goddess only, not the full tribute payments. These latter did not go up on stone. As Samons has recently argued and David Lewis commented in passing long ago, the other fifth-century accounts that have been erected so impressively on stone must have been erected because they were seen to pertain to the gods.[22]

I would argue, then, that in some cases written documents could be produced precisely in the hope of claiming control or enforcing authority (while other documents were meant to be reused, or preserved, for administrative or recording purposes). Whether they were successful is another matter. Pébarthe suggested in an interesting argument that the administration of the Athenian empire could function precisely because the democracy already relied a lot on writing.[23] But the empire was itself a powerful impetus to *generate* more writing, more lists of allies and tribute, more catalogues: the Athenian empire in itself should have propelled innovations and extensions in the use of writing just as it extended its control in so many other areas, symbolic as well as physical. That in turn would propel more and more Athenians to learn to read and write, or read and write with more proficiency in a widening spiral.[24] It is a pity to ignore the likelihood that controlling allies and responding to further problems themselves generated further developments in the use of written documents—to control fraud, tighten up on collection, keep Athenian officials in check, impose authority on the allies.

How do these relate to the debates and controversies in the mass gatherings of the Assembly and jury-courts? The issue is not whether or not Athens was an 'oral society' in the fifth or fourth century, something which is demonstrably untrue whatever it means (it also implies a uniform citizen body), but the combination and interrelation of the democratic performances of assembly and jury-courts and written documents

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[22] Samons (2000) in an important study, argued that 5th.c. financial records do not go on stone for 'public accountability' but because they are connected with the gods, and show the citizens' piety especially at a time when the gods were helping finance military operations. Note also Blok (2010) on inscribed deme accounts, with a similar conclusion. Cf. the complex Grain Tax Law of 374/3, recently discovered, responding to financial problems decades later: Stroud (1998); text in Rhodes & Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404–323 B.C.*, no. 26. Note that the ten men are *elected* from the Assembly to supervise the grain selling, which implies the job was important and needed special expertise (as RO p. 125).

[23] Pébarthe (2000) 63; (2006) 300–310.

[24] Thomas (2009) explores these different literacies further.

or inscriptions.[25] Let us turn to the mass audiences which generated these decisions, decrees and laws, the assembly and courts, in other words to the day-to-day mass gatherings which lie alongside the remaining written records.

Mass Audiences, Mass Psychology and the Assembly

The two are combined in late fifth-century comedy—more words, more documents, it is lamented. A creeping spread of both low-level recording and talk or 'chatter' in late fifth-century Athens is the impression conveyed by the jokes in Aristophanes' *Frogs*. Among the bitter jokes about Euripides and the decline of Athens are semi-serious accusations that Euripides taught the Athenian people to talk, chatter, answer back, use sophisms (1069 ff.: λαλία, στωμυλία (wordiness)). Intermingled with this in some way is the charge by Aischylos that 'the polis is full of undersecretaries (ὑπογραμματεις)' (v. 1083 f.).[26] Performed in 405 BC, at the very end of the Peloponnesian War when Athens had already seen catastrophic reverses, these remarks seem to be expressing regret at both excessive 'chatter' and increasing low-level record-keeping, and both, the poet implied, were sapping the military effectiveness and very backbone of the Athenians. Perhaps the two aspects were indeed developing hand in hand.

It is important to try and envisage what these mass meetings might have been like. They make one increasingly uneasy with the thorough but somewhat formalizing constitutional treatments, important though they are on one side of the democratic picture.[27] These mass gatherings are an element of Athenian society which deserve considerably more attention in any discussion of literacy, orality, performance and in particular the functions of the written texts relating to the democracy.[28]

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[25] See e.g. Thomas (1989) 9 and 45 ff. on the *mixture* and interaction of oral and written activities.

[26] Ar. *Frogs*, 1083 f.: κᾆτ' ἐκ τούτων ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν / ὑπογραμματέων ἀνεμεστώτη. Cf. also 954, 1070 ff. with Dover, Comm. p. 22 on *lalia*.

[27] See esp. Hansen (1987), (1991), though both treat audience participation very briefly: (1987), 70–72, and (1991) 146, 280, 285–286. Calhoun (1913) 121–123; Rhodes (1994) on concerted action. Even Ober (1989) has little on the actual dynamics of assembly performances though he is acutely aware of the relations between orators and masses in the assembly—e.g. p. 104 stresses interactive process of communication, p. 134, and ch. 3 generally.

[28] I recently had the privilege of experiencing a form of direct democracy in the

The speeches which were written for delivery either before the Assembly or in the jury-courts are crucial here. They are more directly representative of the atmosphere of democratic Athens than the comments of historians writing at a distance, and since they were composed and delivered for the demos themselves, they must offer the most direct image of the workings of debate and rhetor/audience interaction that we can find. As we all know, the speeches we still possess have probably been revised, and they may not even have been delivered fully. It is notoriously hard to glean much about the actual performance of a speech itself from the text we have of that speech. Alcidamas recommended that orators dispense with a written text altogether, for they would be more convincing if speaking freely (improvising) and they could thus adapt better to the audiences' interest or boredom.[29] Over-preparation in an orator might be distrusted as a non-democratic sign of professionalism, and worse, of sophistry. As Aristotle claimed in the *Rhetoric* (2.22), 'in front of the crowds the uneducated are more convincing than the educated'.

On the other hand, these speeches are eloquent in describing *previous* assemblies and trials: there are many reminiscences or passing remarks, and sometimes even extended narrative of an earlier occasion. All no doubt have some persuasive force in the context of the argument, yet they are all the more interesting for that. Even if there are exaggerations, distortions or slanted accounts, as we would expect, we are in a better position to understand these in the context of a speech which we possess in full. Furthermore, the orator would be unlikely to be describing a situation that seemed totally implausible to the audience and the rhetorical or political slant he might put on an account of an earlier assembly can itself tell us something about the ideals of such exchanges. The material is very rich indeed, almost overwhelming and far too extensive to cover comprehensively here: its implications have not, so far as I am aware, been taken fully on board by historians. There is a strong disjuncture between Assembly behaviour as described in such speeches and the dry decrees and laws that issued from them. To anticipate, the impression one derives is of very regular noisy heckling, laughing, shouting and disorder; this was regarded as part and parcel of democratic procedure,

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'Congregation' of Oxford University in 2007: the Sheldonian theatre packed tight with members of the university, a series of speakers for and against the motions being put to it, and the vote immediately after the debate. The atmosphere was tense.

[29] Alcidamas, *On the sophists*; Schloemann, diss. 2000 has examined in detail the attitudes to improvisation; cf. also Schloemann (2002). Dorjahn (1950) for a case study.

and just as central as the solid stone inscriptions and formal decrees. In which case the dynamics of huge audiences and the importance of mass psychology are central too.

We start with two notorious examples, both from the late fifth century. These examples seem for their narrators to be characteristic of the excesses of the late fifth century Athenians and the disarray of political decision-making in the last years of the Peloponnesian war. Both in 415 and in 406 the demos made disastrous decisions in assembly and Thucydides and Xenophon both tried in their differing ways to emphasise their picture of the workings of mass emotion to catastrophic consequences: *eros*, fear, elation and hope were all too present.

Early in Thucydides' account of the decision-making process leading to the Sicilian expedition, Nicias' first speech mentions seeing people sitting next to Alcibiades who were summoned by him (VI 13.1) and he appeals to older men sitting nearby 'not to be ashamed' if they put up their hand to vote against the expedition. This is one of the clearest indications of intimidation and the operation of mass psychology surrounding the voting by show of hands that was customary in the democracy. The psychological pressures of a show of hands seems obvious, one of the justifications of the secret ballot.[30] It is also one of the rare references in Athenian evidence to seating arrangements in the Assembly, since Alcibiades' supporters are sitting around him. After Alcibiades' rousing speech, then, Thucydides continues:

> ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν τῶν πλεόνων ἐπιθυμίαν, εἴ τῳ ἄρα καὶ μὴ ἤρεσκε, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀντιχειροτονῶν κακόνους δόξειεν εἶναι τῇ πόλει ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν. (VI 24.4)
>
> because of the excessive enthusiasm of the majority, the few who did not like it were afraid to appear unpatriotic by raising their hands against it, and so kept quiet.

Finally someone (*tis*) came forward and called upon Nicias (παρελθὼν ... παρακαλέσας) that he should not put them off but say how many ships they would need. This last intervention might have been someone speaking from the floor of the Assembly, or stepping up to the *bema*. Either way, the atmosphere portrayed by Thucydides is a tense and excited one in which—so he says—the dissatisfied minority kept quiet.[31]

[30] Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides* Vol. III (2008) has a good note on VI 13.1, esp. on the other issue of whether the assembly has been packed or more likely, appealed to—παρακελευστούς (cf. Rhodes (1994) 93 arguing for groupings).

[31] Tacon (2001) 186, stresses importance of the *thorubos* here, but note too the hints

In another notorious account, Xenophon narrated with relish how the assembly debates after the battle of Arginusae in 405 ended up with the acceptance of an illegal proposal. There was an uproar over the generals who failed to pick up the drowning and drowned. He tells us how the strictly illegal proposal is made to try the generals as a group rather than individually: Euryptolemos son of Peisianax and others said that this was illegal.

> τοῦ δὲ δήμου ἔνιοι ταῦτα ἐπῄνουν, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ μή τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν ὃ ἂν βούληται. (*Hellenika* I 7.12–13)
>
> 'But some of the demos approved it, and the great mass (*plethos*) shouted that it was an intolerable thing if the people was not allowed to do what it wanted to do'.

Then the *ochlos* shouted again (I 7.14) that if the prytaneis refused to put the matter to the vote, they would prosecute the prytaneis. And they were terrified, and did so. The first debate lasted so long that it grew dark before it was finished.

Thucydides' language seems somewhat more respectful of the mass of the democratic citizens by comparison with the openly hostile expression of Xenophon who refers with distaste to the *plethos* and *ochlos*. Both indicate the importance of the mass psychology of the majority which takes over, the unspoken urges of the very large number of people present, then the interventions or shouts, or (in 405) the open threats shouted from the floor. While Thucydides gives a more ordered impression of the Assembly even in 415, in both there is an unstopable momentum, and of course in both, they vote immediately in this heightened state.

Should we read both these accounts as indicative mainly of the disturbed and leaderless condition of the Athenians towards the end of the fifth century, one episode in a state of overconfidence, the other in (perhaps) a state of heightened emotional and physical exhaustion? Neither author wished to absolve the Athenians, and Xenophon was openly hostile. Assembly pressure also occurs in less disastrous circumstances in the Assembly debate about Pylos, the Athenians 'were in a state of near uproar against Cleon' (ὑποθορυβησάντων)[32] and the more he retreated, the more the *ochlos* pressed him to take the generalship (Thuc. IV 28.1 ff.).

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of lively interaction in assembly and the potential for mass fear; Gomme's commentary had no comment on this; cf. Hornblower, *Commentary* ad loc. and on VI 24.3—taking the silent minority mainly to be upper-class.

[32] Hornblower's translation, *Commentary* ad loc. (4.28.1); *LSJ* gives 'beginning to make a clamour against' for ὑποθορυβέω.

On the other hand, the large number of jokes in Aristophanes about repartee and shouting from audience to speaker might be interpreted in either direction depending on one's judgement about Aristophanes' views about the democracy or his comic methods. For instance in the *Acharnians*, Thucydides is said to have been able to shout down three thousand bowman when younger (*Ach.* 708–712: κατεβόησε). In the *Wasps*, the prosecuting dog in the dog's trial keeps getting interrupted, and Bdelycleon has to beg his father to hear him out (912 ff.).[33] As we shall see, this kind of interruption is often mentioned in fourth-century speeches also.

Plato painted a vivid and hostile picture of the disturbing effect on a young man's morals of popular clapping and shouting, mass approval or disapproval; indeed the masses are the corrupting influence, who, he adds with superb oxymoron, 'are themselves sophists on a grand scale' (μεγίστους σοφιστάς, *Republic* 492a–b). He continues:

> 'When they crowd into the seats in the Assembly or law courts or theatre, or get together in camp or any other popular meeting place and, with a great deal of noise (σὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ) and a great lack of moderation, shout and clap their approval or disapproval of whatever is proposed or done (ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες), till the rocks and the whole place re-echo, and redouble the noise of their boos and applause. Can a young man's heart remain unmoved by all of this? … He will be carried away with the stream'.[34] (*Republic* 492b–c)

The intoxicating effect of popular applause or disapproval will have the most damaging effect on young men in Plato's view, and this is obviously part of his anti-democratic views. A similar picture is given in the *Laws* where the Athenian says, 'Sometimes we find in a city that the juries are useless, dumb things; the individual jurymen keep their opinions a mystery known only to themselves and give their decisions by secret ballot. It's even more serious when so far from keeping silent when they hear a case they make a tremendous disturbance as though they were in a theatre and hurl shouts of applause or disapproval at the speaker on either side in turn' (IX 876 b).

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[33] Hall (1995) portrays the drama well. Note also that Aristotle mentions in the *Politics* the potential problem of juries conferring amongst themselves, κοινολογοῦνται, *Pol.* II 1268b lines 6–11, which perhaps implies even more murmuring: this is interesting but probably referring to a different form of jury participation and it seems somewhat hypothetical in any case.

[34] Lee's translation. Tacon (2001) 180–181 who also cites *Laws* IX 876b—below; cf. Newman's note on 'shouting dikasteries', commentary on *Politics of Aristotle*, vol. II (1887), Pol. II 1268b, p. 305.

It is easy to see that this vivid picture belongs to an anti-democratic writer, and might form a piece with the jaundiced observers of late fifth-century Athenian mistakes (Thucydides), or downright opponents (Xenophon), yet it is surprising that exactly the same kind of behaviour is plentifully described by writers one would suppose to be fully supportive of the radical democracy, the orators and politicians themselves. This conjunction is not sufficiently brought out by the useful discussions of the phenomenon of 'thorubos' by Bers, Tacon and Wallace on free speech:[35] such audience participation is mentioned in fifth and fourth-century writers, democratic and non-democratic; the implications and details deserve further examination.

Noisy Audiences, Thorubos *and the Demos*

Before we turn fully to the fourth-century democratic writers, a point about nomenclature. Bers' article was entitled 'dikastic thorubos', Tacon's in imitation, 'Ecclesiastic thorubos'. But these somewhat clumsy part-anglicized expressions are in danger of clouding the reality that these important articles sought to address. *Thorubos* is anything from shouting, murmuring, to heckling, hubbub; but in any case we should not devote all attention to the one Greek word *thorubos*. There are also numerous other descriptions of simple shouting, laughter and interrupting, other vocabulary, other types of audience participation. This means that the Assembly or Jury-court could be a terrifying—or equally inspiring—mass of people. As Dikaiopolis says in the *Acharnians*, 'I have come [to the Assembly] absolutely prepared to shout, interrupt, abuse the speakers if anyone speaks about anything but peace' (*Ach.* 37–39: βοᾶν, ὑποκρούειν, λοιδορεῖν, τοὺς ῥήτορες).[36]

How do we imagine this? It is interesting to observe that when parliamentary debates were first recorded and then televised in Britain in the 1980's, British citizens were shocked at the sheer noise and the quantity of formalized abuse and repartee hurled around, cheering, booing and so on, not to mention the presence of alcohol. Much of this is indeed formalized with ritualized language of repartee and debate, but it is noteworthy that most people, unaccustomed to being present in parliament, had never imagined this kind of behaviour behind the orderly reports

[35] Bers (1987), Tacon (2001), Wallace (2004).

[36] LSJ gives 'break in upon, interrupt' for *hupokrouein*.

of debates in the newspapers or in Hansard (it is worth noting that the televising has made them somewhat more decorous). A powerful leader like Margaret Thatcher often had to shout down opposition in the House. The members of Parliament number only 646, and most debates are held with far fewer present.[37] How much more noise might be generated with thousands? No doubt Athenian heckling had its own cultural character, even if it was not quite as formalized as British parliamentary debates, but it was shouting nevertheless. The point about differing cultural expectations is also crucial.

Such shouting was clearly just as common in the somewhat modified and reformed democracy of the fourth century. If we simply take the one speech *On the False Embassy* of 343 BC (Dem. XIX), Demosthenes' rhetorical and barbed reminiscences of previous assemblies are particularly revealing. In this lawcourt speech he narrates at 22 ff. an episode in the Assembly in which he rises and tries to repeat the statement he made in the council:

> 'but Aeschines posted himself on one side of me and Philocrates on the other, shouting, interrupting (?) and finally jeering at me (ἐβόων, ἐξεκρούον με, τελευτῶντες ἐξλεύαζον). You all laughed', and Demosthenes simply could not carry on. (19.23)

The verb ἐκκρουω denotes driving back, 'repulsing', and LSJ in fact cites this example for the sense 'hiss an actor off stage',[38] so 'interrupting' above is too bland a translation—perhaps more like 'hissing'. It is interesting too that Demosthenes admits that the laughter was natural, careful to accept the democratic verdict of the mass audience. It was a painful and frankly humiliating episode, and Demosthenes carefully explains that he recalls it precisely so that the demos realises that they were prevented from learning the truth by the accused, Aeschines (ch. 25–26). This too is revealing: Demosthenes is again careful to absolve the democratic citizens en masse. He could not blame the demos, surely, but he could blame the politicians for leading them on and leaving them ignorant. In other words, the violent or near violent shouting and jeering mentioned are presented not as a horrific aberration of democracy or as boarish behaviour on the demos' part, but as a natural reaction within the

[37] Tacon (2001) 176–177, gives a fascinating comparison of contemporary accounts of a famous parliamentary debate in 1940 alongside the Hansard account. Dutch MPs in the Chamber are on the contrary supposed to debate quietly and politely (I thank J. Blok for this observation).

[38] Cf. Sparathas (2006), 376 f. for literal meaning of 'knock out'.

proper democratic organs, given that they were being grossly misled by Demosthenes' opponent. Even if this account had embroidered the truth of the original events, it must retain a high level of probability—it must have been the kind of thing that *could* occur—in order for Demosthenes' claims to be rhetorically effective. The ideals assumed here must also have been thought to be acceptable.

A little later, he recalls how he rose to speak in the Assembly to say something, 'when you refused to hear' (ὡς δὲ ἀκούειν οὐκ ἠθέλετε, 19.45). There followed some repartee or exchange between Aeschines and Demosthenes to which Philocrates added, '"No wonder Demosthenes and I disagree, men of Athens. He drinks water; I drink wine". And you all laughed (καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐγελᾶτε)' (ch. 46). Later on, in a much cited incident, Aeschines tried to speak in support of the envoys but people shouted/raised a clamour (θορυβούντων) and finally Aeschines was forced to come down off the platform, saying πολλοὺς … τοὺς θορυβοῦντας εἶναι but very few soldiers' (Demosthenes 19. 112–113).[39] The clamour was this time being cited as proof of Aeschines' guilty connection with Philip.

Aeschines' speech on the same subject of the embassy talks also of excessive shouting by the Assembly: hearing Demosthenes' claims, they shouted out, Aeschines says, some that Demosthenes was δεινός … καὶ σύντομος, more that he was πονηρὸς καὶ φθονερός. (*On the Embassy* II 51). It is hard to see any feeling here that this shouting is in any way un-democratic or inappropriate behaviour on the demos' part. Nor is there any sense, so far as one can see, that such shouting is regarded as behaviour more suitable to barbarians or any other lowly categories of being. Later there is a suggestion (by Demosthenes) that the Assembly was overwhelmed by Aeschines' persuasion, yet as Aeschines insists, the Assembly went straight to a vote without debate (II 63 ff.).

'Thorubos' did not always work. A sinister earlier occasion was recalled by Lysias in *Against Eratosthenes*, XII, from the time of the Thirty Tyrants. Theramenes had suggested entrusting the city to Thirty men and 'you, the demos, made an uproar (ἐθορυβεῖτε), showing you were not persuaded'. Theramenes said he cared nothing for this uproar, then Lysander threatened the Assembly and they went quiet—and then went home (XII 73–75). This seems to imply that the shouting from the floor was actually a fine and legitimate sign of democratic sentiment on the

[39] Cited by Tacon (2001) 183.

part of the demos and one which only oligarchs and Spartan commanders would seek to suppress.

We can easily multiply such cases of *thorubos*, laughter, shouting, and questions shouted out from the floor. The extant speeches are extraordinarily rich in such remarks about earlier episodes, even if the Demosthenes-Aeschines rivalry gives us the most plentiful examples. They give an impression rather different from the ordered rules of Mogens Hansen's *Athenian Democracy* and prompt one to wonder if certain rules such as the law about the εὐκοσμία τῶν ῥητόρων (Aisch. III 2) were in place precisely because of the more messy reality of everyday mass audiences and those who addressed them: in fact Aeschines cites this law in order to say that its strictures about thorubos and 'ταραχή' from the floor and the order of speakers were now swept aside (III 2–3), and the '*akosmia*' of *rhetores* could not longer be controlled (III 4). Moreover, the orators do not talk of such crowd behaviour as if it were improper or unusual, or characteristic of lesser characters or cities, and that in itself served to validate it further. The behaviour of mass audiences is dignified by these very reminiscences, for each reminiscence of a previous uproar in an assembly can perpetuate the impression that this is indeed acceptable behaviour. Here the orators in fact confirm Socrates' remark in Plato's *Protagoras* that when the Assembly needed expert opinion, they would shout down any amateurs who tried to speak (*Protag.* 319 c):[40] the context is one in which Socrates remarks to Protagoras that he doubts the art of politics can be taught:

> 'Now when we meet in the Assembly, then if the State is faced with some building project, I observe that the architects are sent for and consulted about the proposed structures, and when it is a matter of shipbuilding, the naval designers, and so on with everything which the Assembly regards as a subject for learning and teaching. If anyone else tries to give advice, whom they do not consider an expert, however handsome or wealthy or nobly-born he may be, it makes no difference: the members jeer at him noisily and make an uproar (ἀλλὰ καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσιν), until either he is shouted down (καταθορυβηθείς) and desists, or else he is dragged off or ejected by the archers on the orders of the presiding magistrates. That is how they behave over subjects they consider technical.'
>
> (*Protag.* 319b–c; Guthrie's transl. adapted).

[40] Cf. also Glaukon's treatment, who makes a fool of himself, Xenophon, *Mem.* III 6.5–6.

We note the antagonistic language here, the *kata-* compounds, and the almost casual mention of the archers, Athens' nearest equivalent to the police, finally having to 'drag away' the offending amateur from the platform. It is interesting that Socrates uses this as an example of how the Assembly behaves when someone tried to speak on a technical matter he is ignorant of, while on broader political questions anyone can speak. As we have seen, there is ample room for booing and laughing on the wider political matters as well, but it is significant that here the behaviour of the Assembly's disapproval is presented as validating the argument of Socrates (whatever Plato himself thought about crowd wisdom!), presenting a communal wisdom that is meant to tell against Protagoras' idea about teaching the art of politics.

The massed Assembly could, then, effectively veto certain speakers, forcing them off the *bema*. There may be darker hints too of mass collusion or of the mass power of popular prejudice (possibly seen as 'knowledge' depending on the point of view). Aeschines in *Against Timarchus* mentioned how the demos raised a shout at Leodamas' name (I 69); on revising the citizen rolls, a name was read out to the jury to be either excised or removed on their own knowledge—that is, popular knowledge—'and you applauded' (θορυβεῖτε, I 77–78):

> 'When the prosecutor said, "Jury men, the men of the deme have under oath excluded this man on their own personal knowledge (συνειδότες), although nobody brought accusation or gave testimony against him", you immediately applauded, assuming that the man before the court has no claim to citizenship'. (*Ag. Timarchus* I 78)

He continues that he supposed this applause was because when someone knows something perfectly themselves, they do not actually need argument or witness testimony in addition to persuade them. It is interesting to see this idea of 'communal knowledge' used so powerfully. This is the rough justice of the crowd which it suits Aeschines at this juncture to follow. Similarly, 'How you laughed and shouted at Timarchus' words' (I 80) which the audience saw were full of *double-entendres*. Still worse, when Autolycus, a pious Areopagite, spoke to the people in Assembly about Timarchus (I 81–85), the crowd kept erupting into laughter as he talked innocently of Timarchus' acquaintance with the lonely area of the Pnyx, and several more remarks continued, all taken as double-entendres by his audience. When the people were rebuked, they retorted that the truth prevailed. In other words, the laughter and guffawing from the democratic audience was itself testimony that they knew—and did not need any proof of—the sexual activities of Timarchus. The obvious worry is

whether we could be so sure they were laughing at the unwitting coincidence with the truth, or whether they might rather be spotting possible sexual jokes—which kind of laughter was it? Sparathas uses this passage as a prime example of vituperative laughter.[41] But presumably it mattered little to Aeschines whose interest was to prove Timarchus had prostituted himself even though Aeschines could provide no real evidence.

So far we have been considering only the crowds who were the official audience within the Assembly audience and the jury courts. But there were other throngs or crowds. To take Demosthenes' *On the False Embassy* alone as an example, he mentions at the very start that people were accosting the jurors at the casting of lots, the παραγγελία (ch. 1); later he mentions business in the *bouleuterion* and adds that there were plenty of extra witnesses for the *bouleuterion* was thronged with *idiotai* (XIX 17). Thus it turns out that there was a possibility that there were non- *boule* members milling around in the *bouleuterion*, something we probably would not have expected. Similarly, in Aeschines' *Against Ctesiphon*, Aeschines claimed that when he charged Ctesiphon with murdering his host, 'he gave an answer that called forth a cry of protest (ἀνεβόησεν) from the citizens and all the foreigners who were standing about the assembly' (III 224). Thus we must consider not the silent spectators of a modern institution like the House of Commons which carefully keeps visitors silent in the 'Strangers' gallery', but apparently active participants joining in some of the cries of protest.

Rhetorical Reactions and Implications

Orators took these dangers on board and, as many of Demosthenes' *Exordia* do, they begged the democratic audience to hear both sides and the whole of the present speaker's speech. The writers of rhetorical theory can sometimes sound distant from this kind of problem, but one wonders if Aristotle's stress on anger and calmness (πραότης) in the *Rhetoric* might have unspoken relevance to the need for an orator to remain calm when the audience was not (*Rhetoric* II, 1379a–1380b). The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* had advice on how to deal with hubbub:

> 'If the audience/listeners go on making a noise nonetheless (θορυβῶσιν), you must make some brief remark in the form of a maxim or *enthumeme* to the effect that it is extremely odd of them to have come there for the

[41] Sparathas (2006) 381–382.

> purpose of taking the best counsel about the matter, and yet to fancy that they can take wise counsel if they refuse to listen to the speakers; and again, that the proper course is either to stand up and offer counsel themselves, or to listen to those who do so and then express their opinion by a show of hands. This is how to use anticipation and to meet *thoruboi* in assembly speeches (ἐν ... ταῖς δημηγορίαις)'.[42] (Rackham (Loeb), adapted)

Yet this is advice on anticipation: what if an orator cannot forestall or second-guess the audience? The rhetorical handbooks in this respect may only get us so far. It is fascinating that they try to imply such clamour is not democratic (by reminding the audience that they came to listen and deliberate), yet the advice seems somewhat too stilted and formalized to deal with the really severe shouting of the kind described by the orators themselves. Besides, the English translations may betray some reluctance to admit the level of disruption: Rackham translated *thorubos* in the *Rhetoric* as 'interruption', which implies a slightly coy reluctance to confront the messy and noisy reality of a mass audience. Aeschines actually gives his audience advice on how to prevent his opponent speaking, an ἀποτροπή of such speeches (III 201–202)—they should quietly (ἀθορύβως) suggest Ctesiphon read the laws alongside his proposal, or refuse to hear him, or refuse to hear a sophist (i.e. Demosthenes), and do not cry 'call him, call him' if Demosthenes is to be summoned. Once we start looking for remarks about audience laughter, shouting or interrupting, they are ubiquitous—considerably more frequent, as I have said, than the already impressive collections of occurrences by Bers and Tacon. No wonder speakers had to be able to speak *ex tempore*; but far more than that, they must have had to be able to control a huge audience, deal rapidly and wittily with interruptions, impatience, hubbub, and calmly withstand laughter which might threaten to derail their composure altogether.

It is absolutely clear, then, that this crowd interruption and clamour was equally familiar in the fourth-century democracy as in the fifth, and this despite the somewhat more moderate character of the fourth-century democracy, the greater element of professionalism, and possibly a narrower social range in the assembly (as sometimes argued). Nor is

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[42] *Rhet. ad Al.* 18.4–5. It is interesting, incidentally, that the 1936–1937 Loeb translation by Rackham translated *thoruboi* as interruptions and the last three words as 'in parliamentary speeches', thus unconsciously signalling a 'civilizing' and modernizing of the Greek picture. cf. also 1432b 34ff.–1433a 29, *thorubos* at the start, either from a few or from the *plethos*. An eg. of rhetores creating a hubbub round the *bema* occurs at Dem. 59.43 (τῶν παραβοώντων παρὰ τὸ βῆμα).

it only the 'crowd' which engages in this kind of behaviour: as we have seen, *rhetores* do it too.

There are disturbing implications. It must mean that crowd psychology was absolutely central and also distinctly unpredictable. An orator had to be able to make the audience laugh with him rather than against—laughter is infectious and brings the group together (as Hall 1995 points out), and it disconcerts the speaker. Laughter could also be aggressive or humiliating, closely linked to slander; it could be deployed to destroy the seriousness of the opponent as Gorgias saw.[43] The orator had to hold a large audience spell bound by his authority, presence and command; turn a mood when it starts to become ugly; deal with opponents who tried to stir up a crowd. The profound implications do not seem to be fully confronted by the standard constitutional or legalistic works. Hansen is of course aware of the phenomenon and devoted a short section to 'preventing demagogy and mass hysteria'[44] but that in itself takes the Platonic view that the masses are irresponsible and may be thought to prejudge the problem.

In addition to all of this, we cannot forget the spectators or bystanders who we have briefly met already. In an excellent piece Lanni showed how numerous bystanders, οἱ περιεστηκότες, watched the court sessions.[45] Demosthenes can say in *On the Crown* (18.196), 'All this is intended for you, the jurors and for those who are standing around listening'. Assembly business could be watched by bystanders on the Pnyx. There was even a kind of 'dikastic tourism', foreigners seeing the notable sights of Athens including the courts.[46]

Lanni thought the 'corona' or bystanders could have had a controlling or moderating influence on the jurors and speakers, acting as an unofficial 'euthyna' for the jurors, especially if, as she believes, many bystanders were more educated than the jurors. But it is questionable whether the American ideal, which she adduces, of a public trial ensuing greater fairness is relevant here,[47] and it is one thing to have twelve jurors, another

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[43] See Gorgias B 12 DK (= Arist. *Rhet.* 1419b3–5) and Sparathas (2006) who criticises the narrowness of rhetorical theory; Halliwell (1991). Cf. the Assembly laughter against Cleon which forces him to take the generalship offered him by Nicias, Thuc. IV 28.4.

[44] Hansen (1991) 307f. (also 146, 285–286); (1987) 70–72, and 72–86 on political groupings.

[45] Lanni (1997).

[46] Many more egs., for which see Lanni; note the comic writer Eubulus frag. 74, a fragment of dialogue making comic capital of the fact that everything mingled together in the agora, from grapes to summoners, myrtle, and waterclocks.

[47] It should be added that this was written before President Clinton's impeachment.

to have 1501. One would think that if large numbers of listeners were thought to increase fairness, the very large Athenian juries would suffice even without the bystanders. As Edith Hall has shown (1995), the strong elements of drama and dramatic performance were similar to many of those on stage. These bystanders would provide an even larger audience than the legally prescribed one, an especially charged atmosphere for a big case, and they were not bound by civic duty or jurors' oath. Cicero was aware of the need to entertain the *corona* at Rome; can we be so sure that entertainment did not come into the Athenian situation too, an entertainment that Thucydides made Cleon mention for members of the Assembly themselves (III 27–28)? For these reasons, then, I am not convinced that the bystanders in Athens could be interpreted simply as a moderating influence; rather, it seems more likely that they added more dimensions to the audience, the throng and the potential for more audience participation. Aeschines can use the reaction of the bystanders to good effect in *Against Ctesiphon* (ch. 224, above), and even if there was some exaggeration or embroidery on Aeschines' part, it is significant that he could mention them so casually as part of the normal scenery of democratic Athens.

Audiences would be split in their reactions and different days might presumably see mood swings, as was well known in Athens. But crowd dynamics do not depend entirely on education or status. Mood and atmosphere could be created by the audience itself, laughing, shouting, booing, as much by the speaker and the speaker's words. People were indeed afraid of being shown up or unfavourably exposed in the Assembly, as Thucydides shows for the Sicilian debate. Voting by show of hands cannot have been a neutral process, hence votes on citizenship were unusually made by secret ballot to avoid intimidation (Dem. 59, 90). Crowd reaction could be unpredictable, 'like a restless wave of the sea' as Demosthenes put it in *De Falsa Legatione* (136).

Such interruptions might partially conform to democratic ideals, ideals which conceived of the Assembly as having a democratic right to object to being lectured by a long-winded or otherwise objectionable orator.[48] The orators construe it as a democratic element, as we have seen, though in one respect they have to, since they must treat their judges and fellow citizens with respect. They also try to construe as democratic the fact of listening to both sides without interruption. And yet,

[48] For the argument for the democratic right: Wallace (2004), Tacon (2001).

how far is heckling and shouting really democratic in any meaningful sense of the word? Or rather, where might one draw the line between a democratically meaningful interruption, and simply shouting, using crowd momentum to stop debate on any level? There surely has to be such a line and the momentum of the crowd could indeed destroy deliberation if it got out of hand. Listening to debate was the virtue of the Athenian constitution in Pericles' *epitaphios* (II 40.2). A certain amount of disorder, or of incipient disorder, is therefore implied. The Scythian archers who patrolled the Assembly and the 346/5 law on *eukosmia* in Assembly (Aeschines III 2) also imply that sheer crowd disorder was recognized as a problem. This was in part surely an inevitable result of such large audiences in which crowd dynamics might dominate. But the fact that both rhetorical handbooks and orators try to see both interruption and listening, preventing a debate and listening to both sides, as laudably democratic only emphasize that the problem was central to the democratic process.

Conclusion

Our primary purpose has been to show the extent of the noise, hubbub, laughter and generally energetic audience participation in the mass citizen gatherings of both the fifth and fourth century. I have emphasised that this was embraced as part of the democratic process by those orators right in the thick of the deliberations of assembly or juries, not merely a ploy of anti-democratic criticism. If we turn back, then, to the more orderly written records of the Athenian democracy and the debates about the nature of Athenian engagement with the products of literacy, there is an apparently stark contrast. There is a fascinating disjuncture between these scenes in the Assembly or law-courts, throngs of bystanders, shouting, laughter and plentiful audience participation, and the dry decrees issued in the name of 'demos and boule' which issue forth in written record, all beginning 'ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ, the tribe of X (Leontis etc.) was in prytany, Y was secretary, Z proposed'. Did the Athenians operate an elaborate and sophisticated political system with careful written records made and when at all necessary, duly consulted? Or something more disorderly? Or something combining both? I would suggest that we think in terms of a dynamic relationship between the two, exploring the possibility that the nature of Assembly activity affected the very significance of the written texts.

In part, it depends where you look, whether to the stone decrees and accounts, or to the evidence of debate, crowds and uproar in open-air meetings. The shouting and laughter, the ability of the audience to shout a man off the *bema*, and these cases we have been examining here, are significant in themselves in reconstructing the character of Athenian politics. They seem also to cast back an oblique light on the role of the written texts (as well as on the role of the orators); similarly the written texts cast a different light on these scenes in the open-air meetings. In *Olynthian* III 14, Demosthenes exclaimed, 'There is no point passing decrees and laws if you don't act on them'. In the conflict between Demosthenes and Aeschines, Demosthenes had to keep producing Assembly decrees and *boule* resolutions as well as witnesses: these are interesting in terms of the relation of the democracy to its written records, as well as to a sense that written records are increasingly important: but the process may also reveal another angle, as if the written records were a check, a permanent marker and a control on the exuberance and waves of emotion in the Assembly which voted them (as well as a control on his opponent). The democratic written records are not simply administrative documents: they control or pin down democratic decisions and the names of the oath-takers, proposers and secretaries are there too as further markers. Written records can potentially be an act of faith, an attempt to impose order or to pretend to control.[49] Their contexts include that of the fluidity of day-to-day politics and the performances in the mass democratic assemblies. The dynamics of mass assemblies and audiences alert us to the strange difficulties of direct democracy, and they imply a sometimes tense relationship between the oral business of the democracy and its written records. The skilled rhetoric of the trained orators was all very well, but they could not predict the behaviour of the people in Assembly, and they had to persuade day after day, and to a different combination of Athenian citizens each time. Perhaps the written records of decrees and laws provided an oasis of apparent order and calm and a statement of authority all the more necessarily amidst the swirl of crowds in the direct democracy: a search for unmoving stability in the midst of the '*plethos*'. The Assembly might deliberately disdain the laws, as they did in 405, but at least the written texts were lying there as a safeguard and a permanent record if anyone cared to use them.

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[49] See Levi-Strauss in particular: C. Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*, transl. Weightman (1976) 392–393.

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PART III

GREEK & ROMAN RELIGIOUS TEXTS

CHAPTER NINE

HEXAMETRICAL INCANTATIONS AS ORAL AND WRITTEN PHENOMENA

Christopher Faraone

Words, especially well crafted or set in special meters or rhythms, can have a powerful impact on sentient beings, both divine and human. This idea is, of course, a central tenet of most human societies and it was important to the ancient Greeks, who were especially conscious of the need to cultivate the science of rhetoric and who in many ways became obsessed with its special power. That words can likewise affect or influence the natural world is a more difficult proposition for most moderns to accept, but this too was a popular idea among the Greeks. We hear, for instance, of Orpheus, a mythical hexametrical poet, who moved trees and boulders with his songs and of Empedocles, the famous Sicilian poet and charismatic, who in his own verses claims to know how to heal the sick and control the weather by means of his poetry. And the recent publication or republication of a series of inscribed lead amulets from Crete and Magna Graeca provides for the first time important new evidence that the Greeks in the late-classical period used hexametrical verses in a similar manner to ward off danger from their houses and persons. Parallels, moreover, between these new texts and previously known literary accounts allow us to see where and how contemporary authors quote or paraphrase traditional charms and how these charms change from one area of Greece to another and from one time period to the next. A propos of this volume, I discuss these hexametrical incantations as both oral and written phenomena, beginning with the growing evidence that the Greeks from the fifth-century onwards used such incantations for a variety of purposes. As we shall see, variations in these texts point to an even older (and now invisible) oral pre-history. The inscribed lead amulets, on the other hand, are themselves obvious testimony to an entirely new phenomenon: the special power of these same incantations once they are preserved in writing. I close my paper by discussing how one of the Sicilian amulets emphatically calls attention to itself as a text that is powerful precisely because it is written down.

Let us begin by looking at the evidence for the oral performance of incantations. In the earliest strata of Greek literature we find several references to the practice of singing incantations. In the *Odyssey*, for example, we are told how the sons of Autolykos bound up the wounded thigh of Odysseus and then stopped it from bleeding with an incantation (ἐπαιοδῇ δ' αἷμα … ἔσχεθον).[1] And Pindar tells us how Aphrodite "for the first time ever" taught Jason how to use the *iunx*-wheel and "supplicatory-incantations" (λιτάς τ' ἐπαιοδάς) to seduce Medea.[2] There are stories about the first binding curses that likewise serve as foundation myths to explain and to some degree justify the existence of these spells in daily Greek life. Aeschylus, for example, enacts the "song from the Furies that binds the wits" (Eumenides 331: ὕμνος ἐξ Ἐρινύων δέσμιος φρενῶν), which aims at disorienting Orestes and preventing him from arguing in his own defense during the trial at the end of the play. This scene seems to provide an *aition* for the well-documented use of binding spells launched by litigants against the mental and speaking faculties of their opponents in Athenian courts of law.[3] Pindar suggests a similar *aition* when he has the young Pelops pray to Poseidon to bind his deadly rival in an upcoming chariot race, in a story that explains why the Greeks race chariots at the Olympic Games and presumably also why rival charioteers use binding spells against one another.[4] Perhaps most importantly in each of these narratives the incantation is entirely efficacious: Odysseus' leg stops bleeding, Medea falls in love with Jason, Orestes is unable to defend himself at trial (Apollo must step in), and Oenomaus fails, for the first time, to win his macabre race.[5] The earliest Greek poets, in short, tell us or show us plainly that oral incantations, presumably like those being used in their own day, were being cast in the

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[1] *Odyssey* 19:455–458. Renehan (1992) provides bibliography and the most recent discussion.

[2] *Pythian* 4.213–219. For discussion see Faraone (1999) 56–58 and (2002) 87–88.

[3] Faraone (1985) 150–154.

[4] *Olympian* 1.75–78: "… shackle (πέδασον) the brazen spear of Oinomaeus / speed me (πόρευσον) upon the swiftest chariots / to Alis and bring me close (πέλασον) to victory!" For full discussion see Howe (1991) 72–83, who cites the earlier bibliography; cf. also Fisker (1990) ad loc., and Hanson (2000) 25–26. Instone (1996) 109 points out the alliteration. See Howe (1991) 78–80 and Heintz (1999) 40 for a century-long modern debate about an alternate version of the story in Pausanias (6.20), according to which Pelops buried some magical material near the far turning post of the racetrack, a place where many *defixiones* have been discovered in Roman-era racetracks in Rome, Carthage, Hadrumentum and Antioch.

[5] Faraone (2002) 87–88.

days of the heroes, and in some instances they were even the inventions of divinities like Aphrodite and the Furies, whose incantations serve as *aitia* for human magical practices, much the same as the Greeks claimed that Athena had invented the horse's bridle or Demeter had taught mortals the cultivation of grain.[6]

In all three cases where Aeschylus and Pindar describe or paraphrase an incantation, they do so in a lyric meter. This allows us to learn much about the content of contemporary spells and their social context, but it also throws up a potential impediment to our understanding of their poetic form, since we know from the later magical tradition that most poetic charms were cast in dactylic hexameters, with a few examples in iambic trimeters. We do have, however, a few instances in which a poet quotes or paraphrases a charm in hexameters. Near the beginning of the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*, for example, Demeter disguises herself as an old woman looking for employment as a nurse for a young child and boasts about her knowledge of protective magic:

> θρέψω, κοὔ μιν ἔολπα κακοφραδίῃσι τιθήνης
> οὔτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐπηλυσίη δηλήσεται οὔθ᾽ ὑποταμνόν·
> οἶδα γὰρ ἀντίτομον μέγα φέρτερον ὑλοτόμοιο,
> οἶδα δ᾽ ἐπηλυσίης πολυπήμονος ἐσθλὸν ἐρυσμόν.
>
> 228 ὑποταμνόν M: ὑπόταμνον Allen et alii: ὑποτάμνων Ignarra, Delatte
>
> I will nurse him, and I do not expect—through any weak-mindedness of his nurse—that witchcraft or an "undercutter" will harm him, for I know an antidote far stronger than a "woodcutter" and I know an excellent defense against woeful witchcraft.[7]

In her boast here the goddess imitates a popular magical charm, both in its form and in its content. The words "undercutter" (ὑποταμνόν) and "woodcutter" (ὑλοτόμος) are, for instance, unattested elsewhere and were most probably the folk-names of demons thought to cause teething pains in the gums of infants,[8] and the term ἐπηλυσίη, here meaning the "attack" or "assault" of a demon, sickness or spell, appears only one other time in early Greek poetry in a nearly identical construction in the

[6] Graf (1997) 93.

[7] Homeric *Hymn to Demeter* 227–230; see Faraone (2001a) for the text and translation used here. For the significance of Demeter's claim to knowledge of healing magic see Richardson (1974) 229–231 and Scarpi (1976) 159–173.

[8] Allen (1895) 13 in a brief note and then again in Allen, Halliday, and Sikes (1936) 155–156. Faraone (2001a) defends Allen's thesis against Richardson and others.

Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*, where it refers to the apotropaic power of a tortoise who stands at the doorway.[9]

Scholars have also stressed the incantatory form of these verses, signaled by such devices as the repetition of words and sounds, chiasmus and the anaphora of the verb οἶδα—a claim to knowledge, which elsewhere in archaic hexameter poetry is limited to special kinds of song, for example: that of the Muses (*Theogony* 27–28) or the Sirens (*Odyssey* 12. 189–191).[10] The second line of Demeter's boast is also strikingly similar in structure to the penultimate line of a late-classical incantation inscribed on a lead amulet from Crete: *οὔ* με καταχρίστ[ωι *δ*]*ηλήσεται οὔτ'* ἐπενίκτ[ωι] ("… shall not harm me with ointment or with application or with drink or with incantation").[11] Similar verses appear on two other fragmentary lead amulets of roughly the same date from Selinus and Locri, which seem to claim that female sorcerers (*polypharmakoi*) will not harm the patient:

> [οὐ]κ ἂν δειλήσ{ετ}αιτ' {οὐδεὶς} οὐδ' αἰ πολυφάρ[μακοι (Selinus)
>
> οὔ κα δαλέσαιτο οὐδ' α[ἰ πολυφάρμακοι (Locri).[12]

The amulets and Demeter's boast, then, share two striking similarities: all are concerned with protective magic and all use very similar wording (οὔ … δηλήσεται οὔτ') to name the dangers that will be kept away by the hexametric spells.

Should we assume, then, that the epigraphic texts are in some way quoting or alluding to the authoritative boast of Demeter in the hymn? This is unlikely. I have shown elsewhere that the use of verses from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as magical charms does not begin until the Roman

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[9] *Hymn to Hermes* 37: ἐπηλυσίης πολυπήμονος ἔσσεαι ἔχμα. Significantly, the young Hermes finds the tortoise "at the gates of the courtyard" (line 26) a popular place in the Greek magical tradition to set up apotropaic herbs, inscriptions and images; see Faraone (1992b) 3–9. Allen, Halliday, and Sikes (1936) 282–283 give later examples of the power of the tortoise against witchcraft and illness (e.g., Pliny *NH* 32.4) and hailstones (Africanus apud *Geoponica* 1.14.8).

[10] Richardson (1974) ad loc.

[11] Guarducci (1939) 223–225 no. 7 gives brief comments and bibliography. Of the earlier work, much valuable information can still be got from the discussions of Wünsch (1900) 73–85 and Maas (1944), but for the best text, see Jordan (1992) 191–194, whose text and translation I give here; the uncorrected text is: ὅ με καταχρίστ[ωι δ]ηλήσετοι οὔτε ἐπηνίκτ[ωι] // οὔτε πατῶι [οὔ]τ' ἐπατωγῆι.

[12] Jordan (2000a). These texts are also very similar in a few other parts, most importantly: the famous *Aski Kataski* formula, which is now understood to be a narrative about a child leading a goat at milking time.

period.[13] And since the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter* seems to have been composed rather late—in the middle of the sixth-century at the earliest—and is very rarely quoted in antiquity, the possibility of Demeter's boast providing a literary *model* for these late fifth-century amulets seems even more remote. Indeed this judgment is confirmed by important variations between the different versions regarding potential dangers:

Demeter	"undercutter", "woodcutter", witchcraft (attacks against babies)
Crete	unguent, application, drink, incantation
Locri / Selinus	female sorcerers

We might also compare the use of the dative in the Cretan text with the nominative used in all the other texts to indicate the source of danger, and the different placement of the verb *dêlêsomai* in the hexametrical line or variations in its tense and mood. In short, it is impossible to claim that the lead amulets quote or even allude directly to the boast of Demeter and it is far more likely that the author of the Homeric hymn is, like Pindar or Aeschylus, drawing on a popular tradition of hexametrical incantations for dramatic or poetic reasons. Indeed, the stability of the poetic and rhetorical form of this protective incantation is remarkable, seeing how it survives intact down until the Hellenistic period, where we find echoes of or allusions to it at the start the hexametrical version of the Hippocratic oath and at the beginning of a Theocritean *Idyll* that pointedly compares the healing power of hexametrical poetry and medicine.[14]

This variety in content and wording, but close similarity in general semantic form and purpose suggest the freedom and elasticity of oral composition, presumably by individual poet-healers, who adapt this protective incantation to whatever specific illnesses and audiences they meet. It is not, in short, unlike the oral composer of hexametrical epics or hymns, who adapts his narrative or praise to the situation at hand, without changing the key points or overall shape of a traditional type-scene or generic trope. The chronological and geographical diversity of the evidence suggests, moreover, that protective hexametrical verses of this type were known in the late-classical and Hellenistic periods in places as widespread as Athens, Crete, Sicily, Calabria, and the island of Cos,

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[13] Faraone (1996) 83–86.

[14] Metrical version of the Hippocratic Oath (Heiberg [1927] 5) and Theocritus *Idyll* 11.1–6. See Faraone (2006) 75–90 for discussion.

and that the composer of the *Homeric Hymn* knew this tradition and employed it in Demeter's speech to make her self-presentation as a wet nurse more believable, since throughout antiquity wet nurses and midwives were both thought to be knowledgeable in various forms of magic.[15] We should not, on the other hand, ignore some hints of regional affinities or differences within this tradition. The extant amulets, for instance, appear only in Magna Graeca and Crete, areas closely connected with charismatic poet-healers, like Empedocles and Epimenides, and with "Orphic" gold tablets, some of which contain discrepancies arising—as Richard Janko has shown—from oral composition and reperformance for a time before they get written down in the late classical period in their various local renditions.[16]

Athenian comedies and satyr-plays also supply information about the form and content of incantations in the late-classical period. In Euripides' *Cyclops*, for instance, the frightened satyr-chorus refuse to follow Odysseus' suggestion that they take up a firebrand in their own hands and twist it into the eye of the Cyclops (630–631), the standard version of the story as recounted by Homer. Instead, they offer an alternative by which they can avoid close contact with the sleeping Polyphemus (646–648):

> ἀλλ' οἶδ' ἐπῳδὴν Ὀρφέως ἀγαθὴν πάνυ,
> ὥστ' αὐτόματον τὸν δαλὸν ἐς τὸ κρανιον
> στείχονθ' ὑφάπτειν τὸν μονῶπα παῖδα γῆς.
>
> But I know an entirely excellent incantation of Orpheus,
> so that on its own accord the burning brand moves towards his skull and
> sets afire the one-eyed child of earth.[17]

The satyrs begin by boasting of their knowledge of magic as well as the efficacy of their incantation, much the same as Demeter does in here hymn, as the comparison below shows:

> *ἀλλ' οἶδ' ἐπῳδὴν* Ὀρφέως *ἀγαθὴν πάνυ* (*Cyclops* 646)
>
> ("But I know an entirely excellent incantation of Orpheus")

[15] Think for example of Phaedra's nurse in Euripides' *Hippolytus*.

[16] Janko (1984) discusses evidence for the oral performance of Zuntz' B-Series of the tablets. For general discussion and full bibliography on the tablets, see the recent collections by Graf and Johnston (2007) and Bernabé and San Cristóbal (2008). See also Ferrari's contribution to this volume.

[17] See Faraone (2008) for full discussion, including how the content of this paraphrased charm recalls Orphic theogonic poetry that describes how Zeus destroys the Titans (the children of the Earth) with his thunderbolts.

οἶδα δ' ἐπηλυσίης πολυπήμονος *ἐσθλὸν ἐρυσμόν.*
(*Hymn to Demeter* 229)

("... and I know an excellent defense against woeful witchcraft")

The satyrs also use the term *epôidê*, which (as we have seen) regularly appears in literary descriptions of incantations, from Homer to Pindar.

We find the same word *epôidê* at the end of a short hexametrical fragment from a lost play of Aristophanes:

ὀσφὺν δ' ἐξ ἄκρων διακίγκλισον ἠΰτε κίγκλου
ἀνδρὸς πρεσβύτου· ⟨σὺ⟩ *τέλει δ' ἀγαθὴν ἐπαοιδήν*

Jiggle from its foundations the rear end of the old man just like a jiggle-bird and *bring to perfection an excellent incantation.*[18]

Dactylic hexameters are extremely rare in Attic comedy and when they do appear they almost always involve some form of parody. Although scholars had long suspected that this couplet was a spoof on a hexametrical oracle, it is, in fact, the conclusion of a parody of a hexametrical love-charm that ended with a paroemiac well known from a series of later erotic spells, for example, these verses from *PGM* XX, a first-century BCE papyrus handbook:

πότνια θεά, ... *τέλεσόν* μ[οι] *τελέαν ἐπαοιδήν* (col. i.26–27)
πότνια⟩ Κυπρογένεια *τέλει τελέαν ἐπαοιδήν*[19] (col. ii. 25)

"Lady goddess ... *bring to perfection* for me *a perfect incantation*"
"⟨Lady⟩ Cyprogeneia, *bring to perfection a perfect incantation*"

I suggest, moreover, that when the satyr-chorus in Euripides' *Cyclops* claim that they know "an entirely excellent incantation" (646: ἐπῳδὴν ... ἀγαθὴν πάνυ) they, too, are echoing or alluding to this popular hexametrical coda. It is interesting to note, moreover, that whereas the later versions of the coda from papyri found in Egypt all refer to a "perfect incantation", both Aristophanes and Euripides use the phrase "excellent incantation", suggesting perhaps that they knew an earlier classical version of the incantation or perhaps a local Athenian one. Indeed, Demeter's claim to know "an excellent defense" (230: ἐσθλὸν ἐρυσμόν) against witchcraft also appears at the end of a verse and thus may also allude to this same Attic version of the coda, which boasts the excellence, rather than the perfection, of the incantation. There is,

[18] Ael. *N.A.* 12.9 = Aristophanes *Amphiaraus* fr. 29 (K-A). For the text in the second line, see Faraone (1992a) 325 n. 27.

[19] Faraone (1992a) 320–327.

then, good reason to think that when the satyrs boast that they "know an entirely excellent incantation of Orpheus" they are, like Demeter, mimicking the language of a hexametrical magical charm known to Euripides and to his audience.

Throughout this paper I have pressed the argument that literary texts and inscribed lead amulets of the late archaic and early classic periods can be used to reconstruct a much earlier oral tradition of hexametrical incantations that shows some important local variations, for example the Attic insistence that a charm is "excellent" rather than "perfect", or the focus of protective magic on demons that cut the gums of babies, rather than noxious ointments or drinks. But in light of the theme of this volume, I close this brief study by stressing how in the late classical period these same hexametrical incantations begin to be treated as written phenomena as well. This is, of course, implicit in the very existence of the inscribed lead amulets discussed earlier, and it is made quite explicit in the text of the lead amulet from Selinus, which begins:

> ὅ̣στις τῶν[δ]ʼ ἱερῶν ἔπεων ἀρίσημα καλύψει
> γράμματα κασσιτέρωι κεκολαμμένα λᾶος ἐν οἴκωι,
> οὔ νιμ πημανέουσι ὅσα τρέφει εὐρεῖα χθών
> οὐδʼ ὅσα πόντωι βόσκει ἀγάστονος Ἀμφιτρίτη{ς}
>
> 2 Janko; κολαψας tab.; 3 Jordan; κοκολαμμενα tab.
>
> Whosoever hides in a house of stone the letters of these holy verses visibly inscribed in tin, neither the beasts shall harm him, however many the broad earth rears, nor however many loud-groaning Amphitrite nourishes in the sea.

In the last two lines, we see in the formula "neither X nor Y shall harm him" yet another version of the boast formula discussed earlier, but here the boast is not (as in the case of the Demeter or the satyrs) about an oral performer's expert knowledge of incantations. Indeed, these four verses (which do not appear on the other extant amulets) claim that the efficacy of the incantation lies solely in its physical presence as a text, a point the author heavily emphasizes by devoting nearly all of the first two verses to a detailed description of the letters, the verses, the act of inscription and the specific medium of the tablet, here described as "tin", a metal frequently confused in antiquity with lead.

This late-classical self-consciousness about writing has an instructive parallel from the contemporary Orphic gold-tablets mentioned earlier. Since Zuntz' B-tablets themselves tell us to recite a crucial portion of the

text to the gatekeepers of the underworld,[20] scholars have usually (and rightly) thought that the surviving inscribed tablets were designed to jog the memory of the person once they had descended into Hades. But in recent years scholars have come to realize that some of these "Gold Leaves" may have also served as amulets that protected people while they were still alive.[21] Two of the earliest Orphic tablets were, for example, found in graves rolled up like amulets, whereas we would have expected all of these texts to be placed unrolled in the grave for easy consultation. A third tablet from Petelia (see Figure A), although inscribed in handwriting that dates to the fourth-century BCE, was found sealed in an amulet case dating to the Roman period, suggesting that it was a family heirloom passed down through the generations for half a millennium.[22] Martin West has, moreover, plausibly restored the two fragmentary verses that appear at the very end of Petelia tablet as follows:

> Μνημοσύνης τόδε (?)θρῖον·[23] ἐπεὶ ἂν μέλλῃισι θανεῖσθαι
> [ἐν πίνακι χρυσέῳ] τόδε γρα[ψάτω ἠδὲ φορείτω].
>
> This is the (?)leaf of Memory. Whenever he (i.e. the initiate) is about to die, let him write this [on a golden tablet and carry it].[24]

Here we are told that the text is to be inscribed when someone "is about to die", a phrase that commentators rightly understand to mean that at this point death is inescapable and the verses on the tablet will be recited in the underworld. I suggest, however, that (just as we saw in the four verses quoted from the start of the Selinuntine amulet) the new epigraphic habit of inscribing these previously memorized texts on gold tablets leads to a novel consideration of these verses as a palpable and powerful written text. Indeed, the very fact that the final owner of the Petelia tablet seems to have inherited his gold tablet and wore it round his

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[20] Zuntz (1971).

[21] See Kotansky (1991) 114–115 and (1994) 107–122 no. 27.

[22] A fourth tablet—Kotansky (1994) no. 27, found at Rome and dating to the second-century CE—was inscribed with a short, hybrid version of the text and includes, like most traditional amulets, the name of its owner, Caecilia Secundina; it, too, was tightly folded up in a manner that suggests it was sealed in an amulet case.

[23] The tablet has ẹριον; other suggestions include ἠρίον ("tomb") or σρῖον (Laconian dialect for θρῖον). A related gold tablet—inscribed some seven centuries later for a Roman noblewoman named Caecilia Secundina (see n. 22)—reads: Μνημοσύνας τόδε δῶρον, ἀοίδιμον ἀνθρώποισιν. See Janko (1984) 91–92 and Kotansky (1994) 107–122 for discussion.

[24] I give the text and translation of Janko (1984) with the addition of the supplements to the second line by West (1975).

neck in a standard amulet case suggests that he, at least, and presumably a long line ancestors interpreted the Greek text differently to mean that the verses would protect him whenever it seemed that death was threatening, for example, in the form of a serious illness or a difficult situation on a battlefield. Otherwise it is hard to explain why the Petelia tablet was not found unrolled in a fourth-century BCE grave, where it would have been the most useful as a passport for its dead owner.

I suggest, then, that the spread of the technology of writing encouraged the composer of the Selinuntine amulet and the owner of the gold-tablet from Petelia to think about hexametrical incantations in new ways. The apparently repeated use of the Petelia tablet as an ancestral amulet suggests that in some quarters, at least, the process of inscription leads to a shift in use from orally performed passwords to inscribed amulet, and the opening lines of the lead amulet from Selinous shows how one author adapted the traditional boast about the personal knowledge of the oral-composer ("*I* know an excellent defense against ...") to the automatic and somewhat mechanical effect of the new technology of writing ("Whoever hides the letters of these holy verses ..."). Another crucial difference between the oral and written versions is the boast that oral performers (e.g. Demeter and the satyrs) make about their own expert knowledge of magical technique: "I know" they stress "an excellent incantation" or "an excellent defense". There follows, then, a prediction of the efficacy of the oral spell: nothing shall harm the baby and the torch will fly of its own accord into the eye of the sleeping Cyclops. In the written version of the Selinuntine amulet, however, the special knowledge of the speaker is entirely elided and replaced by one's ability to attach the text of the incantation to an object: "whosoever hides in a house of stone these letters visibly inscribed in tin ...."

The Greeks do not, however, with the introduction of writing abandon the oral performance of metrical incantations entirely, as we can see in the so-called Philinna papyrus, which dates to the time of Augustus and seems to be an anthology of hexametrical incantations used for medical problems:

> [7–8] ας Σύρας ⟨Γ⟩αδαρηνῆς [ἐπαοιδή] πρὸς πᾶν κατάκαυμα
>
> [⟨σεμνοτάτης δὲ⟩ θεᾶς παῖς μ]υστοδόκος κατεκα[ύθη,
> ἀκρ]οτάτῳ δ᾽ ἐν ὄρει κατεκαύθη· ⟨πῦρ δ᾽ ἐλάφυξεν⟩
> ἑπτὰ λύκων κρήνας, ἑπτ᾽ ἄρκτων, ἑπτὰ λεόντων·
>
> ἑπτὰ δὲ παρθενικαὶ κυανώπιδες ἤρυσαν ὕδωρ
> κάλπισι κυανέαις καὶ ἐκοίμισαν ἀκάματον πῦρ.

Φιλίννης Θε[σσ]αλῆς ἐπαοιδὴ π[ρὸς] κεφαλῆς π[ό]νον.

φεῦγ' ὀδύν[η] κεφαλῆς φεύγει δὲ [λέων] ὑπὸ πέτ[ρα]ν·
φεύγουσιν δὲ [λύ]κοι, φεύγ[ουσι] δὲ μώνυχες [ἵπ]ποι
[ἱέμενοι] πληγαῖς ὑπ' [ἐμῆς τελέας ἐπαοιδῆς]

The [incantation] of [ ]a, the Syrian woman from Gadara for every inflammation:

[The son of the ⟨most august⟩ goddess,] the initiate was scorched. On the highest mountain he was scorched. ⟨The fire gulped down⟩ seven springs of wolves, seven of bears, seven of lions, but seven maidens with dark-blue eyes drew water with jugs of lapis lazuli and quieted the untiring fire.

The incantation of Philinna from Thessaly for headache:

Flee headache! [Lion] flees under a rock! Wolves flee and single-hooved horses flee propelled by the blows of my perfect charm![25]

Since there are no directions (as we saw in the Selinuntine amulet) for inscribing these charms on a particular medium, such as tin, we must imagine that they were performed orally. On the other hand, it is surely significant that this papyrus mimics so closely an invention of the Greeks in the Hellenistic period that stresses the materiality of texts: the poetic anthology which was designed to isolate individual poems like flowers in an eclectic garland, each poem marked off by *paragraphoi* and by a rubric which records the author's name and birthplace or ethnicity, as well as the purpose of the charm itself.[26] Note also, that although Demeter's boast and the lead amulets contain within their verses crucial information about the target of their incantations, for example the demons that cause teething pains in babies, here the purpose of the incantation must be described in a prose rubric and the boast about its efficacy has disappeared entirely.

I have tried to trace, then, the use of oral hexametrical incantations in the late archaic and classical period in both our literary and epigraphic evidence and to note how they change when they get written down. Especially noteworthy is the elision of the authority and power of the oral performer, whose emphatic boast to special knowledge seems to have been a crucial part of the incantation itself. There are, however, no instructions for any accompanying rituals in the oral version, because the practitioner

[25] *PGM* XX. See Maas (1942) for text and full commentary.
[26] Faraone (2001b).

presumably knows them and performs them without comment. The written versions, on the other hand, elide the boast about special knowledge and need to add special instructions as to when, where and on what media the hexameters should be inscribed. We have also seen at least one example of the persistence of oral versions of such spells down into the late-Hellenistic period.

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

Figure A: Petelia Amulet Case.
A. Bernabé and A.I.J. San Cristóbal [2008], fig. 22

CHAPTER TEN

ORAL BRICOLAGE AND RITUAL CONTEXT IN THE GOLDEN TABLETS

Franco Ferrari

The golden tablets, which have been found all over the Greek world, have been identified as a kind of passport put in the mouth or upon the chest of an initiate to enable his/her successful transition to the afterlife. They have been studied at length and have been ranked and published by the editors according to varying criteria (thematic similarity, alleged time of composition, geographical spread). In this paper, I would like to address two related questions, which have divided scholarly opinion: first, whether and to what extent we should keep and respect the epichoric textual variants or reconstruct an original model, of which the individual documents would be more or less corrupted accounts; and, second, whether and to what extent we can (or must) try to reconstruct special cultural and religious contexts that could explain the different attitudes of the poetic I and the relationship between actors and spectators involved in rituals of which we otherwise have scant evidence.

Oral Bricolage

As regards the first issue, I will discuss those tables that refer to underworld routes which the soul of the dead person had to cover with the aid of more or less detailed instructions. One group of leaves (the first section of the first group in Pugliese Carratelli's 2001 edition: I A) points out to the initiate first a spring near a white cypress, which is to be avoided, and then a second stream running from the lake of Mnemosyne, where the dead person can refresh himself/herself after answering the question "What are you seeking in the darkness of murky Hades?", which is put to him/her by the guardians of the stream. In another group (II Pugliese Carratelli) we find no mention of either spring or lake, but the dead person is given instructions about what he/she ought to say in front of

Persephone and other gods of the underworld in order to enter the goddess' meadows and groves.

The question of the origin of the first group has been approached in two different ways: some scholars have emphasized the local and temporal specificity of the individual texts,[1] others have tried to reconstruct a common pattern which should explain every single variant, as peculiar it may be.[2] Richard Janko has made the most coherent attempt at reconstructing a lost archetype for the group I A (and I B),[3] and some of his remarks about the tablets are highly valuable and should be accepted. The nature of the evidence at our disposal allows one to postulate as an origin the existence of a thematic pattern in hexameters whose diction is clearly reminiscent of the epic tradition. Indeed, many local variants seem to be due to the process of oral transmission and memorization, as shown by the presence of anticipations, repetitions, meaningless sounds, and formulaic clauses, which are replaced by others having the same or a similar sense.

This does not prove, however, that in a given place and at a given time someone compiled a standard model on which all the versions of group I A known to us would depend. Instead one can assume a process by which a certain type of text (a fluid 'palaeotype' rather than a fixed 'archetype') came gradually into existence thanks to the unbroken interaction between oral memorization and written recording. In this connection I would like to focus on the introduction or preamble of the leaves of group I A, where the dead person is talked about in the third person and where there is, at the very beginning, the well known epitaphic formula: "This is the grave of . . .".

Until 1974, when the Hipponion leaf was made known, the only example of a preamble was that of the tablet from Petelia (today Stromboli, Calabria), first published in 1836. The preamble, fragmentary as it is and placed only after the main text, is the following (F 476.12–14 Bernabé):

> Μνημοσύ]νης τόδε δ[ῶρον ἐπεὶ ἂν μέλλῃσι] θανεῖσθ[αι
>   . . . .]τοδεγραψ[
>   . . . .]τογλωϲειπα σκότος ἀμφικαλύψας.

> This is the gift of Memory, when [. . .] is about to die
>   . . . wrote(?) this . . .
>   . . . after having wrapped up in darkness.

---

[1] Pugliese Carratelli (1974), Burkert (1975), Di Benedetto (2004), Edmonds (2004) 83, Graf-Johnston (2007) 137–164.

[2] West (1975), Janko (1984), Merkelbach (1999).

[3] Janko (1984).

I write, with M. Marcovich, τόδε δ[ῶρον in the first line, not τόδ⟨ε⟩ ἔρ[γον as proposed by M. Guarducci and A. Bernabé, both on palaeographical grounds and by comparison with Μνημοσύνης τόδε δῶρον on line 3 of the leaf for Caecilia Secundina (F 491) and with Plat. *Theaet.* 191c–d, where the wax inside our soul upon which we try to remember what we have seen, heard or thought, is also said to be Memory's gift (δῶρον … τῆς Μουσῶν μνητρὸς Μνημοσύνης).[4]

The preamble of the Hipponion tablet, by contrast, only consists of one line (F 474.1):

> Μναμοσύνας τόδε ἠρίον ἐπεὶ ἂμ μέλλῃσι θανεῖσθαι
>
> τόδε ἠρίον Pugliese Carratelli (1974): ΤΟΔΕΕΡΙΟΝ lam.; τόδε ἔργον Burkert, Bernabé
>
> This is the tomb of Memory when […] is about to die.[5]

This verse raises questions both about its meaning and its metrical shape: Mnemosyne is, obviously, not the name of the deceased person, and the scanning of ἠρίον as disyllabic is hard to defend.[6] The crucial point, however, is a different one: to which stage of the textual transmission

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[4] Here the trace following]νης τόδε has been read in different ways as the deciphering of some letters has been made uncertain by the abrasion process which damaged the rim of the leaf. Both Franz (1836) and Zuntz (1971) read ν[, but Pugliese Carratelli (2001) 46–47 has given ι[as a fact, asserting that "nel breve spazio dopo l'E v'è soltanto un tratto verticale isolato e poi una lieve abrasione della lamina". Obviously his diagnosis, based on a direct reassessment of the evidence, cannot be questioned in itself, but it is to be noted that, as we can see from the digital image published by Tortorelli Ghidini (2006), the "asta verticale" slopes down from left to right, just as in the second stroke of the Δ in the preceding τόδε, and therefore can hardly suggest an *iota*. Instead such a stroke could be well understood as the remainder of a *delta*, the left half and the base of which have been vanished by way of the abrasion just as the lower part of the preceding E. So, to my view, we are justified in reading τόδε δ[ῶρον, as Marcovich (1976) 223 did (but without any regard to palaeographic aspects). See also Ferrari (2008) 10–13.

[5] After Μναμοσύνας the leaf has ΤΟΔΕΕΡΙΟΝ, which has been variously interpreted or emended: τόδε ἠρίον Pugliese Carratelli (1974), who in his 2001 edition has accepted his own correction τόδε ἱερόν; τόδε ἱρόν Di Benedetto (followed by Tortorelli Ghidini (2006) 62 and 114–116); τόδε ἔριον (Luppe and Gallavotti); τόδε ἔργον (Burkert, Ebert); τόδε θρῖον (M. West). Anyway, if we leave out the very strange comparison of the leaf with a thread of wool, Pugliese Carratelli's earlier reading (for ἠρίον cf. Hom. *Il.* 23.126, Posidipp. 51.3 A.-B., Theocr. 2.13, Alcae. Mess. *AP* 7.429.7, adesp. *AP* 7.225.3) is very likely what the Hipponion engraver, who used the sign E both for ε and η, intended to record.

[6] About the consonantalization (but mostly with proper names) of ι and υ between a consonant and another vowel in the same word see West (1982) 14 and Martinelli (1997)

should these difficulties be ascribed? The nominal phrase "this (is) the tomb of Memory" *does* make sense (Mnemosyne may be imagined as buried inside the leaf inasmuch as the leaf itself is the repository of the goddess' instructions[7]) and the wording seems to have been carefully formulated. Therefore, against the practice of almost all editors, the text should not be corrected, but accepted as an epichoric innovation against an earlier and different pattern.

The Entella tablet too, first published in 1994, presents us with a preamble that differs from the other two versions:

ἐπεὶ ἂν μέλ]λῃσι θανεῖσθαι
μ]εμνημέ⟨ν⟩ος ἥρως
] σκότος ἀμφικαλύψαι

] … when is about to die …
] the remembering hero
] to wrap him up in darkness.

Though very badly preserved, the new document has given us for the first time the subject of μέλλῃσι θανεῖσθαι in the form of μ]εμνημέ⟨ν⟩ος ἥρως.

In order to reconstruct his lost 'archetype', Janko has suggested that] μεμνημέ⟨ν⟩ος ἥρως in l. 2 is compatible with the remainder of the second line of the preamble on the Petelia leaf, that is]τοδεγραψ[. He thus proposes as the original line (with ἐν χρυσίῳ already suggested by M. Guarducci in 1985):[8]

ἐν χρυσίωι] τόδε γρα[ψάσθω μεμνημένος ἥρως

let the hero recall and get this engraved on gold,

Bernabé and Jiménez in their 2007 English edition have actually printed this text, but its metrical shape is strange inasmuch as the central caesura is not bridged by a long and 'heavy' word, as is the rule.[9] Besides, it seems very difficult to reconcile the act of the initiate in engraving the leaf with a time at which the dead person is introduced as already wrapped in darkness.[10]

49–50. Instead the hiatus between τόδε and ἠρίον (perhaps from ϝηρίον, cf. got. *warjan*) is traditional, cf. Hom. *Il.* 23.126 μέγα ἠρίον.

[7] This metaphor is found, just with ἠρίον, in Themist. *Or.* 4.59d ἠρία τῶν ψυχῶν τὰς βίβλους (see Giangrande (1993) 241–242).

[8] *Apud* Bernabé-Jiménez (2007) I: 251–252.

[9] See Kirk (1985) 20.

[10] As for the very obscure letters which on the Petelia leaf precede σκότος, Janko has

One could imagine that the line of which]τοδεγραψ[was part, contained a sentence where the dying woman was identified as the person who kept with herself such a text, because she has recorded it or because it has been recorded for her. I could think of a beginning like ἣ χρυσίον] τόδ' ἔγραψ[ε(ν) or ᾗ χρυσίον] τόδ' ἔγραψ[α.[11] However, even if on the ground of the new evidence we grasp the overall design of the preamble (this leaf with its instructions is Mnemosyne's gift for a hero able to remember when he is about to die and the Moira has wrapped him/her up in darkness), we cannot reconstruct the exact wording of an original version from it.

We can detect another aspect of such a continuous *bricolage* on the part of the compilers of the single leaves comparing the last two lines (15–16) of the Hipponion tablet with the last line of the Petelia leaf (11):

> καὶ δὴ καὶ σὺ πιὼν ὁδὸν ἔρχεαι, ἅν τε καὶ ἄλλοι
> μύσται καὶ βάκχοι ἱερὰν στείχουσι κλε⟨ε⟩ινοί.
> (Hipponian tablet, 15–16)
>
> And you too, having drunk, will go along the holy road
> on which other glorious initiates and *bacchoi* travel.
>
> καὶ τότ' ἔπειτ' ἄ[λλοισι μεθ'] ἡρώεσσιν ἀνάξει[ς]. (Petelia leaf, line 11)
>
> And thereafter you will rule over the other heroes.

M. West (1975) preferred the wording of the Petelia leaf over the Hipponion version, which he left out of his ideal archetype. Janko, however, included all three lines in his model, because, in his view, they outline two successive stages in the linear progression of the initiate: first, he goes along a holy road together with his fellows; then, at the end of his journey, he has a claim on ruling "among the other heroes".[12]

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suggested to read μή μίν γ' ἐκ]πάγλως ὑπά[γ]οι "lest *the murk* cover him and *lead him down in dread*" on the ground of a new deciphering of the tablet (]κογλωϲυπα[ ]ω), but anyway]πα (in ἐκ]πάγλως) is far from]κο (Janko's reading) or]το (Pugliese Carratelli's reading), and ἐκπάγλως ὑπάγοι would be a very strange expression to denote a frightening descent to the underworld (and it is to be remembered that ὑπάγω usually means "lead under" or "lead on", not "lead down").

For my part, I would guess (with σκότος, as often, as neuter) Μοῖρα δέ οἱ θάνά]τον κλώσῃ σκότος ἀμφικαλύψας "and Moira has spun for her the thread of death wrapping her in darkness" (cf. Hom. *Od.* 8.579 ἐπεκλώσαντο δ' ὄλεθρον and the well attested epic formula τὸν δὲ σκότος ὄσσε κάλυψεν).

[11] ἔγραψ[ε iam Comparetti, ἔγραψ[α iam Diels.

[12] Janko (1984) 97.

Since, however, in epic diction μεθ᾽ ἡρώεσσιν ἀνάξεις implies ruling not only *among* but also *over* the other heroes (cf. Hom. *Il.* 4.61 σὺ δὲ πᾶσι μετ᾽ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνάσσεις and 14.94, 18.366, 23.471, *Od.* 7.23),[13] the juxtaposition of the two versions would entail the coexistence of two incompatible views: on the one hand, the fellowship of supporters of the same belief (ἄλλοι | μύσται can be compared to ὄλβιοι ἄλλοι in the last line of the first Pelinna's leaf: F 485.7), on the other the mirage of an isolated rulership, such as scorned by Achilles in Hom. *Od.* 11.489–491:

> βουλοίμην κ᾽ ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ,
> ἀνδρὶ παρ᾽ ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη,
> ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν.
>
> I would prefer to be attached to the soil as a paid servant
> in the house of a poor man devoid of great substance,
> than to be a king over the deceased.[14]

Indeed, the Petelia wording discloses a perspective as consistent in itself (a kind of complimentary homage for a woman of exceptional prestige) as disagreeing with the more egalitarian outlook of the Hipponion tablet.

The variants we have found in these examples rule out the possibility of reconstructing any 'archetype' and may lead us to wonder whether an 'archetype' ever really existed. As the very existence of these *Totenpässe* shows, interest in writing played an important role in the mystery tradition, but this does not mean that someone established once and for all, in a particular and unrepeatable way, a written model from which all versions known to us derive. I suggest a different approach: to reconstruct from our evidence a more flexible model that accounts for the wide range of common traits in our texts without suppressing alternatives and variations; a lost 'paleotype', as I would like to call it, to be understood not as a physical reality but as a shadow, as it were, cast by the totality of our evidence.

[13] See Di Benedetto (2004) 299 ff., who remarks the contradiction by which, if we put together the versions of Hipponion and Petelia, "l'iniziato che è il destinatario della laminetta prima andrebbe per la stessa via che percorrono altri *mystai* e *bacchoi* (…) e poi, finito il percorso (…) gli esiti si diversificherebbero". See also Tortorelli Ghidini (2006) 67 and 126–127.

[14] This parallel has been quoted by Di Benedetto (2004).

Ritual Contexts

One of the main requirements in order to identify the ritual contexts in which and for which such texts were produced is to determine who within the tablets is talking to whom. But before one can answer this question, two preliminary questions have to be resolved: does a given text hold in itself the signals that could help us determine its context? And, if so, are these signals consistent with one other?

The first of these two questions I would answer in the affirmative: it is likely that a text contains in itself a good measure of the stage-directions of its ritual performance. The golden leaves of Pugliese Carratelli's group II were found in Thurii and Pelinna, those of group IA in Hipponion, Petelia, Entella, Pharsalos, those of group IB in Crete and Thessaly. As important as the oral and written traditions (*katabaseis*, *hieroi logoi*) shared by members of a certain religious movement must have been, the large circulation through space and time of these texts shows that different mystic groups used them exploiting their pragmatic signals and, conversely, that they had been originally composed with a view of their possible use, with proper adjustments, in different contexts.

Obviously, it is not the individual text that reveals its dramatic design: it acquires meaning and provides information on its execution, when compared with other similar texts and the cultural area to which it belonged. It is the underground network of the implicit signs that can disclose the coordinates of a system rooted in certain situations and contexts, especially as the transcription of these texts developed and the narrow surface of the expensive leaves required the selection of sequences that were considered over time more important against a broader repertoire.

This ritual contexts underlying our evidence may be illustrated by two ivy-shaped leaves found in Pelinna (Thessaly) on the chest of a woman and first published in 1987. The following is the more comprehensive text of the two nearly identical tablets (F 485 = II B 3):[15]

Νῦν ἔθανες καὶ νῦν ἐγένου, τρισόλβιε, ἄματι τῷδε.
εἰπεῖν Φερσεφόνᾳ σ' ὅτι Β⟨άκ⟩χιος αὐτὸς ἔλυσε.
ταῦρος εἰς γάλα ἔθορες.
αἶψα εἰς γ⟨ά⟩λα ἔθορες.

[15] On l. 7 I read with Pugliese Carratelli (2001) and Graf-Johnston (2007) κἀπιμένει σ' ὑπὸ γῆν τέλε' ἅσσαπερ ὄλβιοι ἄλλοι, not καὶ σὺ μὲν εἶς ὑπὸ γῆν τελέσας ἅπερ ὄλβιοι ἄλλοι (Bernabé (2005) and Bernabé-Jiménez (2007)).

κριὸς εἰς γάλ' ἔπεσ⟨ες⟩.
οἶνον ἔχεις εὐδ⟨α⟩ίμον⟨α⟩ τιμή⟨ν⟩.
κἀπιμένει σ' ὑπὸ γῆν τέλε' ἅσσαπερ ὄλβιοι ἄλλοι.

4 αἶψα] αἴξ Lloyd-Jones, fort. recte

Now you have died and now you have come into being, O thrice happy one,
on this same day. Tell Persephone that Bacchus himself released you.
Bull, you jumped into milk.
Quickly, you jumped into milk.
Ram, you fell into milk.
You have wine as your fortunate honor. And below the earth
there are ready for you the same rites as for the other blessed ones.
(Trans. S.I. Johnston)

It has been debated whether the occasion of the performance was a mystery ceremony or a funeral rite, and if the speaker was an underworld figure, the tablet itself, a priest, or a group of fellow initiates. The person addressed is clearly the dead person, because the beginning openly refers to her time of death.[16] The emphatic position of "now" (νῦν) is picked up by "on this day" (ἄματι τῷδε) at the end of the first line, and in the last line there is the spatial reference to a place "below the earth" (ὑπὸ γῆν).

Furthermore, as witnessed by one of the leaves of Timpone Piccolo (F 488.5: "I have flown out of the heavy, painful circle"), the suffering from which Bacchus can release a mortal being (l. 2) is the cycle of the migrations of souls, the "going round" (περιήλυσις) mentioned by Herodotus in connection with the alleged Egyptian origin of metempsychosis (2.123.2). If the Pelinna woman were not yet deceased, how could she be asked to tell Persephone she has been released by Bacchus? The dialogue between the initiate and the Queen of the Chthonian Ones implies both the initiate's death and her arrival before the goddess.

The dialogue between Persephone and the dead can be detected elsewhere as well, both in the three leaves (F 488–490) from Timpone Piccolo that start with the words "I come pure from the pure, Queen of the Chtonian ones" (ἔρχομαι ἐκ κοθαρῶν κοθαρά, χθονίων βασίλεια), and in the tablet from Magoula Mati (near Pherai, Thessaly), recently published by R. Parker and M. Stamatopoulou.[17] Here the dead person asks a god (most likely Persephone) that he or she be sent to the bands of the other initiates because on earth he or she was a follower of Demeter and the Mountain Mother (no. 28 Graf-Johnston):

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[16] See Segal (1990) 413–414.

[17] For the text and the cultic background see Ferrari-Prauscello (2007).

πέμπε με πρὸς μυστῶν θιάσους· ἔχω ὄργια [σεμνὰ
Δήμητρος χθονίας τελ⟨έσαι⟩ καὶ Μητρὸς ὀρεί[ας.

1 suppl. Parker-Stamatopoulou 2 τελ⟨έσαι⟩ supplevi: ΤΕΛΗ lam.; ⟨τε⟩ τέλη Parker-Stamatopoulou, Burkert; τελέσας Battezzato, D'Alessio

Send me to the bands of initiates: I am able to perform the [holy]
rites of Demeter Chthonia and Mountain Mother.

Having established that the person addressed is the deceased, we should try to determine who the speaker is in the Pelinna tablets. The reply to this question, in my view, cannot be unequivocal. The voice which says "Now you have died and now you have come into being" addresses the dead maenad during the funeral rites, before her journey to the underworld, and invites her to report to Persephone that Bacchus himself (the Orphic Dionysus, son of Persephone and Zeus) delivered her from the guilt that all human beings owe to Kore for the Titans' murder of the baby Dionysus.[18]

By contrast, the voice which utters the next sentences and assures the dead that below the earth the same rites are ready for her as for the other blessed ones, is speaking (fictionally, of course) at a moment when she is no longer a mortal being. Thanks to the chthonian verdict she has become a bull and a ram fallen into milk and has drunk the wine of the blessed ones. Therefore, I think, two speakers follow one another in the Pelinna tablets. The first speaker is an earthly voice which, like the didactic voice of the tablets of group I A, aims at instructing the dead about her future journey; the second speaker is an underworld voice (most likely Persephone's[19]), which declares that this mortal being has attained once and for all a new, godlike state.

This doubling of voices in the Telinna tablets seems to be detectable in the leaf of Thurii's Timpone Grande (F 487 = II B 2) as well:

Ἀλλ' ὁπόταν ψυχὴ προλίπῃ φάος ἀελίοιο,
δεξιὸν Ε.ΘΙΑΣ δ' ἐξι⟨έ⟩ναι πεφυλαγμένον εὖ μάλα πάντα·
χαῖρε παθὼν τὸ πάθημα, τὸ δ' οὔπω πρόσθ' ἐπεπόνθεις·
θεὸς ἐγένου 'ξ ἀνθρώπου, ἔριφος ἐς γάλ' ἔπετες.
χαῖρ⟨ε⟩ χαῖρε· δεξιὰν ὁδοιπόρ⟨ει⟩
λειμῶνάς θ' ἱερούς καὶ ἄλσεα Φερσεφονείας.

5 ὁδοιπόρ⟨ει⟩ Zuntz, ὁδοιπορ⟨ῶν⟩ Comparetti

[18] Cf. F 489.4 and 490.4 ποινὰν ἀνταπέτεισ' ἔργων οὐ δικαίων, F 493 ἄποινος γὰρ ὁ μύστης and Pind. fr. 133.1 Maehl. ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος.

[19] See Cole (2003) 211: "Persefone is the one who decides".

But as soon as the soul has left the light of the sun,
go to the right [...] being very careful of all things.
'Greetings, you who have suffered the painful thing;
you have never endured this before.
You have become a god instead of a mortal. A kid you fell into milk.
Rejoice, rejoice. Journey on the right-hand road
to holy meadows and groves of Persephone.' (Trans. S.I. Johnston)

Here too the beginning (ll. 1–2) has a prescriptive tenor (go to the right!), but the following lines are a series of joyous utterances. Within this frame the χαῖρε at the beginning of l. 3, taken up wih anadiplosis at the beginning of l. 5, cannot be, as many scholars have supposed, a farewell greeting, because it relates to a time when the initiate has completed his/her journey. Therefore, χαῖρε must mean 'welcome!' here, just as the χαῖρε the anonymous goddess addresses to her young guest in Parmenides' poem (28 B 1.26 D.-K.). So the Timpone Grande tablet must be read, no less than the Pelinna leaves, as a succession of two voices:[20] the voice of the leader of the funeral rites and the voice of the Queen of the dead.

In both cases the first voice speaks in recitative dactylic hexameters, while the second voice resorts to lyric sequences which for the most part are syncopated iambics, a rhythm originally used in hymns connected with festivals for Demeter, Persephone, and Dionysus. They adhere to the following metrical scheme:[21]

Pelinna I, ll. 3–7:

ταῦρος εἰς γάλ' ἔθορες,	–⏑–⏑⏑⏑–	cr ⏑⏑ cr
αἶψ' εἰς γάλ'ἔθορες,	––⏑⏑⏑–	sp ⏑⏑ cr
κριὸς εἰς γάλ' ἔπεσες.	–⏑–⏑⏑⏑–	cr ⏑⏑ cr
οἶνον ἔχεις εὐδ⟨α⟩ίμον⟨α⟩ τιμήν.	–⏑⏑–––⏑⏑––	2adon
κἀπιμένει σ' ὑπὸ γῆν τέλέ ἅσσαπερ ὄλβιοι ἄλλοι.		6da

Timpone Grande, ll. 3–6:

χαῖρε παθὼν τὸ πάθημα τὸ δ' οὔπω π[ρ]όσθ' ἐπεπόνθεις		6da
θεὸς ἐγένου 'ξ ἀνθρώπου·	⏑⏑⏑⏑––––	ia mol
ἔριφος ἐς γάλ' ἔπετες	⏑⏑⏑–⏑⏑⏑–‖	⏑⏑ cr ⏑⏑ cr
χαῖρε χαῖρε δεξιὰν ὁδοιπόρει	–⏑–⏑–⏑–⏑–⏑–	cr 2ia
λειμῶνάς θ' ἱεροὺς καὶ ἄλσεα Φερσεφονείας.		6da

[20] See Bernabé-Jiménez (2007) 96.
[21] For the metrical abbreviations see West (1982) xi–xii.

Suffice it to quote what is perhaps the earliest surviving example of syncopated iambics, a song ascribed to Archilochus for the two Eleusinian goddesses (F 322 W.²):

Δήμητρος ἁγνῆς καὶ Κόρης	– – ⏑ – – – ⏑ –	2ia
τὴν πανήγυριν σέβων	– ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ –	cr ia

… celebrating the public festival
of holy Demeter and her Daughter.[22]

The rhythmical shifting detectable in the leaves of Pelinna and Timpone Grande thus seems intended to mark the change of enunciation that is characteristic of the staging of these texts, split into two contrasting scenarios: the earthly funeral setting and the blissful entrance into a chthonian realm of pure delight.

In short, it seems fair to say that the communicative ways expressed in the different tablets, as well as the rhythmic forms used at each occasion and the way in which single thematic points appear to have been selected and developed, helped to establish different scenarios and different pragmatic purposes of these texts, which only in their whole ritual frame disclosed their fullest meaning.

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22 Cf. also Aristoph. *Th.* 985–1000, *Ra.* 386–395 and 398–403, Athen. 14.622b and see Gentili-Lomiento (2003) 132.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

GREEK HYMNS FROM PERFORMANCE TO STONE

Mark Alonge

Although Greek ritual hymns were performed orally, we encounter them, of course, through the medium of writing. Some survive quoted in literary texts, while many more are preserved in inscriptions. How—and, more important, why—did these songs come to be textualized, and, in particular, inscribed? The following survey of inscribed hymns suggests that despite the permanence that inscribing affords, a hymn's textualization rarely represents its canonization within a ritual liturgy.[1] There is very little evidence that inscriptions served as aids to performance or as a means of preserving hymns for future performances. Instead, hymns seem to have been inscribed most often to commemorate a particular *past* performance, perhaps the hymn's only performance. The event, rather than the song, seems to have been the object of memorialization.

Inscribed Hymns

For some hymns, the steps from its composition and initial oral performance to its textualization were both few and short; some hymns, for example, were inscribed, as best we can tell, soon after their first, and maybe only, performance. One such example is the paean of Philodamus of Skarpheia, composed for the annual Theoxenia festival at Delphi and inscribed there around 340 BC.[2] The paean is followed on its stele by a Delphic honorary decree explaining that the Delphians had granted special privileges to Philodamus and his brothers as a show of gratitude for their contribution of this very paean to Dionysus. These honors were

[1] This is not to say that hymns were never canonized; for example, a sacred law from Stratonicea revives the annual performance of 'the customary hymn' for Hecate (*LSAM* 69, ll. 16–17 τὸν συνήϑη ὕμνον). But canonization happened through other, especially oral, processes. Moreover, the inscribing of a hymn did not preclude its replacement in a later iteration of the same festival.

[2] For Philodamus' paean to Dionysus, see now Furley and Bremer (2001) no. 2.5.

given and, presumably, inscribed during the poet's lifetime, perhaps even in the immediate wake of the performance of Philodamus' paean. We can imagine a simple process of transmission: the poet submitted a written version of the paean to the Delphian authorities for their archives, and it, or a copy recorded in the archived (and primary) version of the honorary decree, served as the basis for the written exemplar the mason used as his model.

Moreover, while Philodamus' poetry is what attracts our attention, it was probably the bestowal of honors that prompted the textualization of this paean. Other inscriptions at Delphi attest to honors given to poets who composed new ritual songs for the rich Delphic festival calendar, and there is at least one other example of song(s) and honorary decree being inscribed together, in the case of Aristonous of Corinth.[3] An honorary decree for Aristonous and two of his hymns form part of a large-scale inscribing project, consisting of at least sixteen honorary decrees across at least three stones. The honorary decree explicitly recognizes Aristonous for 'the hymns,' texts of which follow the decree: a paean immediately below the decree and a hymn to Hestia on what must have been the adjacent stele.[4] Aristonous' shared status as a Delphic honoree justifies his inclusion with the fifteen other men, and the texts of the two songs provide proof of the poet's worthiness of such recognition. I suggest Philodamus' paean was also committed to writing primarily as an adjunct to his honorary decree, even though the paean comes before the decree on his stele. The ordering of texts should not be taken to reflect

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[3] *FD* 3:2, no. 78, for example, is an honorary decree of the late third century BC for the poet Cleochares of Athens, for composing a processional song, paean, and hymn for Delphi's Theoxenia festival. Aristonous: *FD* 3:2, 190 (decree), 191 (paean), 192 (hymn to Hestia); Furley and Bremer (2001) nos. 2.4, 2.3.

[4] The set of inscriptions is *FD* 3:2, nos. 176–193 (Pl. XIII, 3–5). They were all inscribed by the same hand in the third century, and the stelai are of uniform dimensions. Aristonous' hymn to Hestia is followed by an honorary decree, proof that the decree for Aristonous and his two hymns were fully incorporated within what appears to be a project to gather together disparate honorary inscriptions, each originally on its own stele, and recopy them as a group. Except for Aristonous', all of these honorary decrees were passed in the first half of the third century BC, but only two under the same archon. Aristonous stands out in this group, not only because of the inclusion of his two hymns, but also because his decree is by far the oldest, dating to around 340 BC. Daux speculates that all the honorary decrees in this collection honor poets, but only Aristonous is explicitly identified as such ([1942/3] 139 n. 3). Presumably Aristonous' decree and hymns were originally published, like Philodamus', around the time of the hymns' composition, and on their own stele, but with the decree preceding the two hymns, while in Philodamus' case the decree follows his paean.

the relative importance of the two parts of the inscription. The desire to memorialize the honors each poet received seems to be the primary impetus for these acts of inscription.

In contrast to Philodamus' paean, some hymns waited centuries before being committed to text, at least the text in which they survive today. For example, our only text of Sophocles' paean to Asclepius (420 BC) dates 600 years after its composition: an inscription on a re-used choregic monument records both the paean and a list of the *paianistai* who performed it in Imperial Athens in what was probably a revival performance, around 200 AD.[5] Not unlike the cases of Aristonous and Philodamus, the inscription of Sophocles' paean seems to have had less to do with a desire to preserve the song than to commemorate the event. We do not know how Sophocles' paean was transmitted from the late 5th century BC to the early third AD. There is no way of knowing whether Sophocles' paean continued to be performed after 420 BC, or for how long; there may very well have been an 'oral' phase of its transmission, a period when the paean was known predominantly through successive, regular reperformance, that is, *as a song*. But the circumstances of the late inscription of Sophocles' paean put in doubt the idea that it was continuously performed from Sophocles' own day down to that of these *paianistai*, in the early third century AD. Although we could come up with a host of reasons why this particular Imperial-period performance was deemed worthy of recording in an inscription, the most likely is that it was a revival performance, after a (long) period of the paean not being performed. And such a break in regular performance precludes an entirely oral transmission of Sophocles' paean. The performance of these Imperial *paianistai*, then, would have required resorting to a text of the paean. The Asklepieion in Athens perhaps maintained a copy of Sophocles' paean in its archives. Another possibility is that a paean by a poet as renowned as Sophocles could have circulated in written form, in a book, which then provided the source text for the Imperial performance memorialized in the inscription.[6]

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[5] On the monument, see Oliver (1936), Geagan (1991). On the paean, Furley and Bremer (2001) no. 7.3.

[6] We do not typically think of books as potential sources for inscriptions, but there are examples, such as many of the dedications in the Lindian Chronicle (on which see Higbie [2003]). Also, Wade-Gery has argued that a late antique inscription at Megara of a Persian War epigram attributed to Simonides was not a reinscription of a 5th-century original, but instead its source was a book of Simonidean epigrams (Wade-Gery [1933] 96; see also Tod [1946–1948] no. 20).

Even though Sophocles' paean came to be inscribed only many years after its composition, the process of its textualization was nevertheless relatively straightforward. The paean to Hygieia by Ariphron of Sicyon had a far more complicated history, however:

Ὑγίεια βροτοῖσι πρεσβίστα μακάρων, μετὰ σεῦ
ναίοιμι τὸ λειπόμενον βιοτᾶς, σὺ δέ μοι πρόφρων ξυνείης·
εἰ γάρ τις ἢ πλούτου χάρις ἢ τεκέων
ἢ τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληίδος ἀρχᾶς ἢ πόθων
οὓς κρυφίοις Ἀφροδίτας ἕρκεσιν θηρεύομεν,
ἢ εἴ τις ἄλλα θεόθεν ἀνθρώποισι τέρψις ἢ πόνων
ἀμπνοὰ πέφανται,
μετὰ σεῖο, μάκαιρ' Ὑγίεια,
τέθαλε καὶ λάμπει Χαρίτων ὀάροις·
σέθεν δὲ χωρὶς οὔτις εὐδαίμων ἔφυ.

Health, most cherished of gods for men, with you
I pray to live the remainder of my life, and you be kind to me!
If there is any joy in wealth or children
or in kingly power which elevates men to gods, or in desires
which we pursue with all the subterfuge of Aphrodite,
or if the gods grant humans any other pleasures or relief from miseries,
in your presence, blessed Health,
they thrive and shine, endowed with charm.
But without you no one's life is happy.[7]

Ariphron was a late classical or early Hellenistic poet, but all attestations of his paean date to the second or third century AD. These sources include two inscriptions, one from Attica and one from Epidaurus, and six quotations or paraphrases in ancient literary texts (Athenaeus, Lucian, Maximus, Sextus Empiricus and Plutarch).[8] Not all of the differences between the extant versions of the paean should be discounted as mere scribal error or as divergences from an original, as Page and others treat

[7] Furley and Bremer (2001) no. 6.3; *PMG* 813. The translation is that of Furley and Bremer.

[8] Inscriptions: Attica (so-called Kassel Stone), *IG* II^2 4533, ll. 9–18 (3rd cent. AD); Epidaurus (sanctuary of Asclepius), *IG* IV^2 1, 132 (2nd/3rd cent. AD). Athenaeus quotes Ariphron's paean in full (15.701f–702b). Lucian (*de lapsu* 6) and Maximus of Tyre (7.1a) quote ll. 1–2. Sextus Empiricus (*adversus mathematicos* 11.49) quotes ll. 3–4, 10, attributing them to Licymnius of Chios; Sextus alters the syntax, from conditional to interrogative, and some of the vocabulary: *τίς γὰρ* πλούτου χάρις ἢ τοκήων/ ἢ τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώπου βασιληΐδος ἀρχᾶς;/ σέθεν δὲ χωρὶς οὔ τις εὐδαίμων ἔφυ ('For what pleasure is there of wealth or of parents or in the kingly rule of a godlike mortal? But without you there is no happy man.'). Plutarch paraphrases ll. 3–4 twice (*moralia* 450b, 479a). Ariphron's paean is also quoted in full in a 13th-century manuscript (Ottobonianus gr. 59).

them. If the hymn was as well known as Lucian says—'very'—, some of these differences may be products of oral transmission, resulting in new versions which take on lives of their own, while still notionally being 'Ariphron's paean.'[9] The Kassel Stone inscription, for example, replaces *kryphiois* ('[with] secret [snares]', line 5) with an otherwise unprecedented epithet for Aphrodite, 'Wedded' (*Zygiês*), changing the tone substantially, by removing what was perhaps understood as a reference to adultery and instead creating an uncharacteristically domesticated goddess of love.[10]

The Palaikastro Hymn

Against this background sketch of the range of combinations of oral and textual processes of transmission, I would like to consider one inscribed ritual hymn in particular: the so-called Hymn of the Curetes,[11] a hymn to Dictaean Zeus found at his sanctuary on the eastern coast of Crete at Palaikastro, where a large Minoan harbor town continues to be excavated:

ἰὼ μέγιστε κοῦρε, χαῖρέ μοι, Κρόνειε, *refrain*
πανκρατὲς γάνους, βέβακες δαιμόνων ἁγώμενος
Δίκταν εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἕρπε καὶ γέγαθι μολπᾷ·
τάν τοι κρέκομεν πακτίσι μείξαντες ἅμ' αὐλοῖσιν, *stanza 1*
καὶ στάντες ἀείδομεν τεὸν ἀμφὶ βωμὸν εὐερκῆ.
ἰὼ μέγι[στε κ]οῦρε, χαῖρέ μοι, Κρόνειε,
πανκρα[τὲς γάνους, βέβακες δ]αιμόνων ἁγώμενος

[9] The Erythraean Paean (Furley and Bremer [2001] no. 6.1) is another hymn, whose rich history is evidenced through multiple attestations: four inscriptions, all from different locations—Erythrae, Athens, Ptolemais, Dion—, and covering a long period of time—the Erythraean copy dates to the 4th century BC, and the rest to the 1st or 2nd century AD. While the four copies for the most part agree, there are subtle discrepancies in content and dialect, especially between the classical copy and the three Imperial copies as a group. Moreover, the late Hellenistic inscribed paean of Macedonicus betrays an awareness of a version of the Erythraean Paean (Furley and Bremer [2001] no. 7.5). I would like to thank Christopher Faraone for sharing with me some of the results of his research on this material.

[10] The Kassel Stone, nevertheless, has many clear errors in it; Kirchner (*IG* II^2 4533) judiciously distinguishes legitimate differences in the song itself (e.g., vocabulary, syntax) from these scribal errors (particularly misspelling). The errors on the Kassel Stone are too grave to allow for Furley and Bremer's suggestion that it 'records texts to be sung in a certain order in the course of a day's worship,' if by that they mean that the inscription itself was the liturgical script ([2001] I, 268).

[11] *IC* III.2.2; Furley and Bremer (2001) no. 1.1; *editio princeps*: Bosanquet (1910), Murray (1910). The restorations used here are by Bosanquet and Murray, except as follows: l. 19 (Bowra); ll. 20, 25b (Wilamowitz); l. 24 (West).

Δίκταν εἰς ἐνι[αυτὸν ἕρπ]ε καὶ γέγαθι μολπᾷ.
ἔνθα γάρ σέ, παῖδ' ἄμ⟨β⟩ρ⟨ο⟩τον ἀσπιδ[ηφόροι τροφῆες] *stanza 2*
πὰρ Ῥέας λαβόντες πό⟨δ⟩α κ[ρούοντες ἀπέκρυψαν.]
[ἰὼ μέγιστε κοῦρε, χαῖρέ μοι, Κρόνειε,]
[πανκρατὲς γάνους, βέβακες δαιμόνων ἁγώμενος]
[Δίκταν εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἕρπε καὶ γέγαθι μολπᾷ.]
[one line missing] *stanza 3*
[- - - - - - - - - - - - τ]⟨ᾶ⟩ς κ⟨α⟩λᾶς Ἀο(ῦ)ς.
[ἰὼ μέγιστε κοῦρε, χαῖρέ μοι, Κ]ρόνειε,
πανκρατὲς γάν[ους, βέβακες δαιμόνω]ν ἁγώμενος
Δίκταν εἰς ἐνι[αυτὸν ἕρπε κα]ὶ γέγαθι μολπᾷ.
[ἄγροι δὲ β]ρύον κατῆτος καὶ βροτο(ὺ)ς Δίκα κατῆχε *stanza 4*
[καὶ πάντα δι]ῆπε ⟨ζ⟩ώ⟨ϊ⟩' ἁ φίλολβος Εἰρή⟨ν⟩α.
[ἰὼ μέγιστε κοῦρε, χαῖρέ μοι, Κρόνειε,]
πανκρατὲς γάν[ους, βέβακες δαιμόνων ἁγώ]μενος
Δίκταν εἰς ἐ[νιαυτὸν ἕρπε καὶ γέ]γαθι μολπᾷ.
ἀ[λλ' ἄναξ, θόρ' ἐς στα]μνία καὶ θόρ' εὔποκ' ⟨ἐ⟩[ς ποίμνια] *stanza 5*
[κἐς λάϊ]α καρπῶν θόρε κἐς τελεσφ[όρο(υ)ς οἴκο(υ)ς.]
ἰὼ μέγιστε κοῦρε, χαῖρέ μοι, Κρ[όνειε,]
πανκρατὲς γάνους, βέβακες [δαιμό]νων ἁγώμενος
Δίκταν εἰς ἐνι[αυτὸν] ἕρπε καὶ γέγαθι μολπᾷ.
[θόρε κἐς] πόληας ἁμῶν, θόρε κἐς ποντοφόρο(υ)ς νᾶας, *stanza 6*
θόρε κἐς ν[έο(υ)ς πο]λείτ⟨α⟩ς θόρε κἐς Θέμιν κα[λάν.]
[ἰὼ μέγιστε] κοῦρε, χαῖρέ μοι, Κρόνειε,
πανκρατὲς γάνους, βέβακ[ες δαιμόνων ἁγ]ώμενος
Δίκταν εἰς ἐνι[αυτὸν ἕρπε καὶ γέγαθι] μολπᾷ.

O supreme child of Cronus, my salutations! Almighty over refreshment, you have arrived leading the gods. Come to Dicte at the turn of the year and take pleasure in our song.

We weave it for you with lyres, having blended it with pipes, and we sing having taken our places around your well-walled altar.

O supreme child of Cronus, my salutations! Almighty over refreshment, you have arrived leading the gods. Come to Dicte at the turn of the year and take pleasure in our song.

For that's where, your shield[-bearing guardians] received you, an immortal child, from Rhea and [beating] their foot, [kept you hidden.]

O supreme child of Cronus, my salutations! Almighty over refreshment, you have arrived leading the gods. Come to Dicte at the turn of the year and take pleasure in our song.

[one line missing]
. . . of the beautiful dawn.

O supreme child of Cronus, my salutations! Almighty over refreshment, you have arrived leading the gods. Come to Dicte at the turn of the year and take pleasure in our song.

[The fields] were teeming year by year and Justice held sway among mortals, and Peace, who loves wealth, [governed all] creatures.

> O supreme child of Cronus, my salutations! Almighty over refreshment, you have arrived leading the gods. Come to Dicte at the turn of the year and take pleasure in our song.
>
> [But, lord, leap into our wine jars,] and leap into our fleecy [flocks,] and into our [fields] of fruit leap, and into [our homes] made thereby productive.
>
> O supreme child of Cronus, my salutations! Almighty over refreshment, you have arrived leading the gods. Come to Dicte at the turn of the year and take pleasure in our song.
>
> [And leap into] our cities and leap into our seaborne ships, and leap into our [young] citizens and leap into beautiful Themis.
>
> O supreme child of Cronus, my salutations! Almighty over refreshment, you have arrived leading the gods. Come to Dicte at the turn of the year and take pleasure in our song.

The Hymn consists of six short stanzas and a slightly longer refrain, which begins the Hymn and occurs seven times. The refrain is the invocation: Zeus, who is here addressed as the child of Cronus, is invited to his annual festival at Dicte, where he can expect to be entertained by the chorus' performance of this very hymn. The first stanza describes the performance around the sacrificial altar and the second establishes the connection between Zeus and this place: here Zeus was entrusted to the Curetes to raise and protect him. The third stanza is lost, and the fourth describes a past condition of perfect prosperity, probably the result of either Zeus' first visit to Dicte as an infant or his eventual coming to power in adulthood. The fifth and sixth stanzas ask Zeus to bless various aspects of his worshippers' lives, in other words, to reproduce that perfect state described in the fourth stanza.

The stele on which the Hymn survives is fragmentary, as is the text, but fortunately for us it took two tries to get the Hymn (more or less) properly inscribed. The back of the stele preserves a first, unfinished attempt at inscribing the Hymn. This copy of the Hymn (B) is riddled with errors, but these are not the typical kinds of transcribing errors we find in inscriptions, but rather errors made by a semi-literate engraver who has misconstrued dozens of letter-shapes in his working copy, resulting in many impossible letter-sequences.[12] Despite the errors on Side B we are able to discern four spelling discrepancies between the two copies.[13]

[12] Many editors have suggested the engraver of Side B was illiterate, but he appears at the very least to have been familiar with the shapes of the letters of the Greek alphabet, even if he could not recognize (or perhaps did not care) that he had made so many mistakes.

[13] **Bold** indicates spelling I have adopted in my text of the Hymn above: line 3 ἐς A,

Ideally we would be able to establish one set of these four spellings as uniformly superior (i.e., either all those from A or all those from B), but the problem still lacks a solution.[14]

While the Palaikastro inscription dates ca. 200 AD, there is not a single scholar who has argued that the *composition* of this hymn to Zeus is that late. The consensus opinion is that the Hymn was composed—and inscribed—in the early Hellenistic period, and our copy of the Hymn is a later re-inscription. Only a minority of scholars have supported an earlier date for the Hymn's composition, for example Wilamowitz (classical) and Jebb (archaic), but these opinions should not be dismissed out of hand, since the sanctuary of Dictaean Zeus at Palaikastro was founded as a cult site in the 8th century BC, and presumably even then the worshippers sang something—if not the Hymn, at least *a* hymn.[15]

The favored Hellenistic date for the Hymn is not built on terribly firm ground. Murray, in the *editio princeps*, suggested a date ca. 300 BC, based on meter and language, which he considered post-classical in flavor. Other judgments on philological grounds have run along similar lines. Historical considerations also favor the Hellenistic period, at least because activity at and interest in the Zeus sanctuary at Palaikastro were particularly intense in the third and second centuries, according to the archaeological and epigraphic record.[16] The request in the final stanza of the Hymn to bless 'our *cities*' fits well with our other evidence from Palaikastro, which suggests that the Zeus sanctuary was a regional cult center for eastern Cretan cities, but this might have been no less true in the fourth or earlier centuries than for the third and second.[17] However, a Hellenistic monumentalization of the Hymn, if that is not too grandiose

εἰς B; line 3 **μολπᾶι** A, μολπάν B; line 5 οὐερκῆ A, **εὐερκῆ** B; lines 25, 29, 30 **κἐς** A, καί ’ς (KAIC) B.

[14] While I tentatively prefer the Side B readings, I have been unable to find an adequate explanation to account for all four of the spelling changes on Side A, and have adopted the textual eclecticism of previous editors.

[15] A few scholars have assumed an even earlier version of our hymn, or at least a precursor, that goes back to the pre-Greek Minoan prehistory of the island, for example Evans, according to whom the Palaikastro Hymn is merely a translation from Minoan into Greek ([1912] 288), and West ([1965] 157). Contrary to virtually everything that has been written about the Palaikastro Hymn, I have no faith whatsoever in the Minoan pedigree of either the Hymn itself or the cult of Zeus for which it was composed (see Alonge [2008]).

[16] Spyridakis (1970).

[17] Chaniotis (1988), Prent (2005) 532–551. The cities associated with the Zeus sanctuary are Praisos, Itanos and Hierapytna.

a term, would fit well with the epigraphic and archaeological evidence for Hellenistic modifications and refurbishing of the Zeus sanctuary.[18]

Finally on the question of dating, West argued, quite ingeniously, that the orthography of the Imperial inscription should reflect the orthography of the original copy, whether written or inscribed.[19] The appearance of omicron for secondary long-/o/ alongside both omega and the *-ou-* diphthong—and possibly epsilon for secondary long-/e/ alongside eta on Side A—best fit the epigraphy of third-century BC Crete, and East Crete specifically.[20] However, I must admit, I do not know of another Cretan inscription, from any period, that combines all three of these spellings of long-/o/.[21] The orthography is, at any rate, entirely unsuitable for 200 AD. In conclusion, our circumstantial evidence from a variety of sources points to the third century BC as the most likely time when the Palaikastro Hymn as we have it took shape and was committed to writing.

Unlike others who have treated the Hymn as a unified composition, Bowra has taken a different approach in an often overlooked article, in which he proposes that the refrain might be older than the stanzas, the former classical, the latter Hellenistic.[22] Bowra's main reason for thinking the refrain and stanzas are of different dates is a difference in the handling of the meter: there are more metrical liberties taken in the stanzas, and this kind of freedom Bowra associates with Hellenistic rather than classical poetry. According to Bowra, the refrain would have remained

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18 On the archaeology, see Thorne and Prent (2000); *IC* III.2.1 records second-century refurbishment of the Zeus sanctuary under the auspices of Hierapytna.

19 West (1965) 151.

20 West dates the orthography of the Hymn to the 4th or 3rd century BC ([1965] 11); Bartonek, however, argues that the multiple representations of long-/e/ and long-/o/ do not appear in Cretan inscriptions until the 3rd century, under the influence of the Doric koine ([1966] 55–57); cf. Bechtel (1921–1924) II, 680–682. The fact that the situation is particularly complicated in Hellenistic East Crete, and at Itanos in particular, may reflect increased contacts with the Aegean facilitated by the Ptolemaic presence in East Crete at Itanos, which also happens to be the closest city-state to the Palaikastro sanctuary.

21 The mixed spelling conventions of the inscription could also be due in part to the fact that we are dealing with a poem. Inscribed poetry does not look as local, in dialect and orthography, as prose inscriptions (Buck [1923], Mickey [1981]). The orthography of the inscription of the Palaikastro Hymn might reflect a blending of literary Doric, traditional for choral lyric songs, and local Cretan practice, which would explain why we are unable to identify any perfect analogues: there is no other inscribed lyric poetry from Crete. Nevertheless, early editors of the Hymn, including Wilamowitz, 'cretanized' the spelling of the Hymn, altering *koure*, standard in lyric poetry, to *kôre*, because in Cretan inscriptions we find *Kôrêtes* and *Dioskôroi*. Most editors, however, concede that the dialect of the Hymn is essentially literary Doric, Furley and Bremer being recent exceptions.

22 Bowra (1970).

unchanged, while the stanzas would have been renewed—how often is anyone's guess. While Bowra does not say so explicitly, I infer that he thinks the refrain of the Hymn was transmitted orally, let us say for the sake of argument until the 3rd century BC, when the stanzas took their final form and the whole song was inscribed, or at least committed to writing for the first time. While I do think that Bowra is quite possibly correct, I imagine the stanzas being renewed as a set, perhaps even every year, but Bowra instead posits a gradual evolution of the stanzas, a poetic analogue to the gradual replacement of the original wooden columns of the temple of Hera at Olympia. In support of his gradualist model, Bowra cites what he sees as a 'shift in the meaning' of the phrase *thor' es*/*thore kes* from the fifth stanza to the sixth, or, as Nilsson put it, a shift from an earlier, literal to a later, metaphorical use of the expression.[23] Commentators typically interpret *thor' es* as having sexual overtones and therefore think it appropriate in the fifth stanza where fertility is at issue. In the sixth stanza, however, the success that is prayed for is not obviously linked to reproduction.[24] According to Bowra, therefore, we can observe between the final two stanzas an evolution in the conception of the god in process during the life of the Hymn, as Zeus' domain expands beyond fertility to success in general. I would argue, however, that the fifth and sixth stanzas work as a pair to form a cohesive unit, to correspond, albeit in a more elaborated form, to the fourth stanza, and therefore the final two stanzas should not date to different periods or belong to different incarnations of the Hymn, even if we admit that the expression *thor' es* is more ambitiously applied in the sixth stanza.[25]

I would like to explore Bowra's suggestion about the refrain of the Palaikastro Hymn further, as it has wider implications, I think, than Bowra recognized. According to Bowra, the refrain 'embodies what matters most in the rite,' the summoning of the god.[26] The stanzas support and amplify that effort, but they play second fiddle to the Hymn's prominent refrain. If Bowra is right that the refrain was the constant element

[23] Bowra (1970) 198, Nilsson (1950) 550.

[24] But Guarducci suggests a connotation for *thor' es* that is closer to 'permeate' than Nilsson's 'impregnate' ([1939] 17–18); cf. the opening of Aratus' *Phaenomena*, in which the roads, markets, sea, and harbors are 'full of Zeus' (line 2: μεσταὶ δὲ Διός).

[25] According to West, when the poet 'reverts' to ionic *a minore* in the sixth stanza of the Hymn, 'he is perhaps evoking a more traditional atmosphere' ([1982] 11–12). The archaizing meter may be used in the final stanza to give legitimacy to the extended applications of *thor' es* in the final stanza.

[26] Bowra (1970) 182.

from performance to performance, while the stanzas were mutable and replaced from time to time, we can imagine that the refrain in some sense would come to represent the Hymn. The refrain would not only form a stable framework on which the rest of the Hymn could be constructed, but the refrain, then, would also connect the performance of an updated version of the Hymn with the history of past performances, and thereby give the new performance a claim to being 'traditional.' In this scenario the refrain, and perhaps only the refrain, is transmitted orally—not because that is less burdensome than remembering a full rendition of the Hymn, but because the refrain is the essential element of the Hymn, its signature, while any particular set of stanzas is dispensable.

The possibility that in this Cretan case the refrain could, as it were, become synonymous with the Hymn suggests that other short 'hymns' that survive might in fact be traditional refrains, the essential core, surviving orally, around which local ritual hymns were recomposed for reperformance. The best candidate is the hymn of the women of Elis for Dionysus, quoted by Plutarch but usually dated to the archaic period:

> ἐλθεῖν, ἥρω Διόνυσε,
> Ἀλείων ἐς ναὸν
> ἁγνὸν σὺν Χαρίτεσσιν,
> ἐς ναὸν,
> τῷ βοέῳ ποδὶ θύων,
> ἄξιε ταῦρε, ἄξιε ταῦρε.

> Come, hero Dionysus,
> to the holy temple of the Eleans
> along with the Graces,
> to the temple,
> raging with your bovine foot,
> worthy bull, worthy bull.[27]

The Elean hymn and the Palaikastro refrain share many similarities of form and content, and like the Palaikastro refrain, the song of the Elean women lacks two important features we expect in a complete Greek hymn—the *argumentum* (the explanation of the connection the god has with the place or community) and the *petitio* (the request proper). We

[27] PMG 871 (Plutarch *quaestiones graecae* 36 [*moralia* 299b]); Furley and Bremer (2001) no. 12.1. After Plutarch quotes the first five lines, he says, 'They then chant twice, "worthy bull."' (εἶτα δὶς ἐπᾴδουσιν 'ἄξιε ταῦρε'). While scholars often translate *epadousin* as 'sing as a refrain,' *axie taure* is not a refrain in the sense of an utterance which repeats between stanzas like the refrain in the Palaikastro Hymn—what we call the 'chorus' of a modern popular song, and what the ancient Greeks called an *ephymnion*.

do not know how Plutarch became acquainted with the song of the Elean women—it could very well have been transmitted orally down to Plutarch's day as a traditional song (or part thereof), or Plutarch might have come across it quoted in, for example, one of the several local histories of Elis (*Eliaka*) we know of, although perhaps only after the song had survived for some time through oral means.

To review: our best guess is that the Palaikastro Hymn took shape as we have it in the 3rd century BC, and was committed to writing at that time—possibly on stone, but maybe only in a copy that was stored in an archive (either at the sanctuary or in one of the nearby cities). This 3rd-century text was the basis for the extant Imperial inscription. The Palaikastro Hymn may have been composed in its entirety in the Hellenistic period, as many scholars believe, or it might be the result of a more complicated process, through which the traditional refrain was transmitted orally for a couple of centuries, while the stanzas were either replaced in a piecemeal fashion over time (with the rest also preserved orally through reperformance) or recomposed as a set every so often, maybe even every year. Whatever the history of the Hymn and however long that history was, there is one thing we are sure about: it was inscribed in the early third century AD. But what happened between the third century BC and the early third century AD is anyone's guess. The last time we hear of the Zeus sanctuary is at the end of the 2nd century BC, and there is virtually no archaeological evidence for late Hellenistic or Imperial activity at Palaikastro other than the stele which preserves the Hymn.

Why Inscribe a Hymn?

Finally: the motivation for inscribing hymns. Some inscribed hymns, as we have seen, are conveniently accompanied by additional text which explains the purpose of committing the hymn to writing. I have already mentioned the inscriptions from Delphi which combine an honorary decree for a poet with a copy of his song(s) which earned the poet the honors bestowed upon him (Philodamus and Aristonous). And the late inscription of Sophocles' paean apparently commemorated a revival performance, as indicated by the list of *paianistai* inscribed with it. The copy of the Erythraean Paean inscribed in 97 AD at Ptolemais in Egypt is headed with a notice that the local sanctuary of Asclepius and Hygieia had been restored, the implication being that this paean was performed

at the ceremony celebrating that restoration.[28] Again, the hymn is not inscribed for its own sake, but to commemorate a particular performance of it at an important event.

In other cases it seems that hymns were inscribed as dedications or as thank-offerings, even as physical tokens of the gods' favorable reception of hymnic performance. Three hymns to Isis, composed by a certain Isidorus and inscribed ca. 85 BC on a gate of a sanctuary to the goddess in the Fayum, fall into this category.[29] The second hymn is followed by a postscript, which I take to be contemporary with the inscribing of the three hymns and to apply to all of them as a group. The postscript states, 'The gods heard my prayers and hymns and gave me in return the reward of happiness.'[30] Isidorus had his hymns inscribed in the sanctuary as testimony to the power of the gods they honor, gods who respond graciously to being celebrated in hymnic performance. The pattern that emerges from the hymns considered so far, all of which have some kind of accompanying text, is that inscribing hymns was a retrospective act, for the purpose of commemorative display, rather than as a vehicle of transmission with an eye to future performance.

If hymns had been inscribed primarily with future performances in mind, we might expect to find more of them quoted in inscribed sacred laws that deal with hymnic performance. While one *lex sacra* from Erythrae does include the text of the paean, whose performance it mandates, it is very unusual to find hymns quoted prescriptively in inscribed sacred laws.[31] Admittedly, since inscribed sacred laws are secondary copies of the primary, archived texts of these laws, they would only include a hymn included in the original law, which rarely would have been thought necessary. But the act of inscribing provides an opportunity for creating a composite document, by publishing texts together that were previously separate. When a sacred law about hymn-singing, for example, was set up on stone, that would have been an opportunity to publish a text of the

28 Furley and Bremer (2001) II, 164–165 (including text of prescript).

29 Vanderlip (1972); Bernand (1969) no. 175. Isidorus' fourth 'hymn,' is of a different character from the rest and was composed for inscription.

30 εὐχῶν ἤδ' ὕμνων τε θεοὶ κλύοντες ἐμεῖο | ἀνταπέδωκαν ἐμοὶ εὐθυμίαν χάριτα (Bernand [1969] no. 175, II.33–34). Vanderlip asserts that the postscript was 'undoubtedly' a later addition ([1972] 48), but the mention of 'hearing' should refer to the hymns as songs, not as texts. Nor is there any reason to think the postscript was a secondary addition on the basis of the epigraphy (cf. Vanderlip [1972] Pl. 7).

31 *LSAM* 24 (380–360 BC); a paean is to be performed the day after incubation in the sanctuary of Apollo and Asclepius. Only the beginning of the paean is preserved in this fragmentary inscription (Side A, lines 36–38).

hymn in question along with the law, on the same stone—just as at Delphi inscriptions brought Aristonous and Philodamus' hymns together with their honorary decrees, probably for the first time. But there is little evidence to suggest that ancient Greeks were interested in inscribing hymns for the purpose of preserving them for future performance. For example, an inscribed *lex sacra* from Stratonicea establishes the daily singing of a new hymn.[32] In this particular case the absence of the new hymn from the law itself can be easily explained: the hymn had not yet been composed, when the law was first formulated.[33] However, if publishing a prescriptive text of the hymn had been a priority, inscribing the sacred law would have been the ideal occasion to accomplish that goal.[34] In ancient Greece, textualization, at least on stone, was rarely pursued as a means of transmitting hymns for future performance. At Stratonicea, and elsewhere, hymns were preserved through other means, especially the (oral) training of the ritual choruses who would perform them.

Explaining the Palaikastro Inscription

For inscribed hymns accompanied by a framing text, we can discern a pattern, that hymns were not quoted with future performances in mind, but typically in order to commemorate past events at which the hymn was sung. But many hymns were inscribed without a framing text, as is the case, for example, with the Palaikastro Hymn. All we have is the hymn itself. In suggesting why this Hellenistic hymn was inscribed in the Imperial period, we would be justified to begin from the general tendency observed so far, namely that inscriptions of hymns are not prescriptive. Perhaps there was a revival performance of the Palaikastro

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32 *LSAM* 69 (late second cent. AD); Chaniotis (2003) 186–189.

33 As indicated by the subjunctive in the relative clause: the chorus of boys 'will sing the hymn that Sosandros, the secretary, son of Diomedes, composes' (ᾄσονται ὕμνον, ὃν ἂν συντάξῃ Σώσανδρος Διομήδους ὁ γραμματεύς [*LSAM* 69, ll. 9–10]).

34 Furley and Bremer suggest that the paean of Isyllus (Epidaurus, 325–320 BC) was inscribed precisely under these conditions, to accompany the sacred law establishing the rite during which the paean was to be performed ([2001] I, 237); Isyllus' paean: Furley and Bremer (2001) no. 6.4 (sacred law: ll. 10–26, paean: ll. 37–61). However, there is no explicit mention of the paean in the sacred law, or of the rite in the paean. According to the Delphic oracle, '[Isyllus] would be better off if he inscribed the paean, both now and in the future,' (λώϊόν οἵ κα εἶμεν ἀγγράγοντι καὶ αὐτίκα καὶ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον ll. 35–36).

Hymn, like Sophocles' paean.[35] In fact, Bosanquet suggested that a local crisis prompted the revival of the Palaikastro Hymn.[36] Perhaps, then, the hymn was inscribed to commemorate the success of its reperformance in gaining Zeus' help against whatever emergency the worshippers were facing.[37]

There is, however, another possible explanation for the Palaikastro Hymn's inscription, which deserves serious consideration: maybe there was no Imperial performance of the Palaikastro Hymn at all. In other words, the act of inscribing the hymn may bear no relationship to choral activity at the local Zeus sanctuary, but rather the Palaikastro inscription could simply be a text on display. Wagman, in his study of the Epidaurian hymn collection, an inscribing project of the late second or early third century AD, makes an argument along these very lines.[38] Wagman argues that the inscribing of this compilation of hymns, heterogenous in date of composition, style, meter, and performance occasion—both liturgical songs and contest pieces appear—, had no relationship to performance at all. Rather, these hymns were inscribed as a collection in order to put the musical history of Epidaurus on display, and we cannot draw any conclusions about their performance at Epidaurus from that act of inscription.[39] Wagman's argument suggests that Greek hymns could lead double lives, as oral songs and inscribed texts, independent of each other. An inscription of a hymn, especially a late inscription of an old hymn, might not depend on oral performance of the hymn at all, neither commemorating a recent performance nor prescribing a future one. In the case of the Palaikastro inscription, then, we may very well be

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35 On the revival of old hymns during the Second Sophistic, a trend to which the Imperial Palaikastro inscription could very well belong, see Bowie (2006), Chaniotis (2003).

36 Bosanquet (1910) 354.

37 The possibility that the inscription reflects a resumption of its *annual* singing, i.e., that the inscription represents a renewed canonization of the Palaikastro Hymn in the Imperial period is diminished both by the utter lack of Roman archaeological material from the sanctuary and by our analysis of the hymns for which there is evidence concerning the circumstances of their inscription.

38 Wagman (1995) 38–40, and personal communication. The Epidaurian hymn collection: *IG* IV^2 1, 129–135, SEG 30.390 (Furley and Bremer [2001] nos. 6.2, 6.3, 6.5, 6.7).

39 Furley and Bremer, however, accept the hypothesis that the Epidaurian collection presents the hymns in the order they are to be sung, since the hymn to Athena (*IG* IV^2 1, 134) is preceded by the heading 'at the third hour' ([2001] I, 268). Only the hymn to Athena is accompanied by such a notation, and the nature of the collection is disparate enough to warn us against generalizing too much from what might be specific to only one of the hymns.

dealing with a hymnic text that is neither the script for, or transcript of, a performance. Therefore, we should take seriously what we do have—a monument of Imperial date—and consider why Greeks in eastern Crete might have thought this hymn was worth putting on stone for display in the early third century AD.

The cultural currents of the Second Sophistic provide a suggestive lens for making sense of the Palaikastro Hymn's late inscription. Interest in old, often obsolete, local traditions was booming during the Second Sophistic, not only because of a new antiquarian sensibility, but also out of a desire to promote a local claim to authentic Greekness, in response to incorporation within the vast Roman Empire.[40] The preoccupations of the Second Sophistic explain both the revival performance of Sophocles' paean in Athens and the compiling of the Epidaurian hymns, advertising the rich and venerable cultural heritage of the sanctuary of Asclepius, and also, I would argue, the inscription of the Palaikastro Hymn.[41] More specifically, the display of the Palaikastro Hymn appears to have been motivated by the importance of the myth of Zeus' birth for local identity and local prestige both within Crete and within the wider Greek world under the Roman Empire. The myth of Zeus' birth and upbringing at Dicte is the *raison d'être* of the cult at Palaikastro, and stands front and center in the Palaikastro Hymn. The display of the hymn, then, stakes a claim, the more important for being contested—not only on the island but, increasingly, elsewhere in the Aegean. Ida in central Crete had long competed with East Cretan Dicte over Zeus' infancy, and Ida gained international popularity as a tourist destination under the Roman Empire. The reassertion of local tradition and local pride that the Palaikastro inscription represents might be a response to the ascendancy of an old regional rival. But even beyond that, the inscription could represent a response to competition at an Empire-wide scale. Integration into the Roman Empire brought cities into greater contact with each other and the incompatibility of many of their old local myths would have been apparent. The publication of the Palaikastro Hymn should be understood within the context of competitive myth-making and rival claims to mythic prestige that resulted from the entire Greek

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[40] Swain 1996.

[41] Prestige of a kind not altogether different from that sought by means of the Epidaurian collection was almost certainly the goal of putting an inscription of Pindar's hymn to Ammon on public display in the god's sanctuary in Libya, although we cannot be sure when that stele was set up (Pausanias 9.16.1).

world being brought together within the Roman Empire. Moreover, the Palaikastro Hymn, being an 'old' hymn, would be all the better suited to this competition among rival local traditions, since its air of antiquity, enhanced by its strange and old-fashioned orthography, would bolster the strength of the local Dictaean claim.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

ANNALES MAXIMI: WRITING, MEMORY, AND RELIGIOUS PERFORMANCE IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

Ana Rodriguez-Mayorgas

The *annales maximi* was the most important record kept by the pontiffs in the Roman Republic. Unfortunately little is known about them. We do not have any direct evidence, only some scattered citations mainly in Latin writings. The two authors who make a report with some detail, Cicero and Servius, never saw the annals in use.[1] In *De Oratore* (2.2.52), Cicero argues that *history began as a mere compilation of annals, on which account, and in order to preserve the general traditions, from the earliest period of the city down to the pontificate of Publius Mucius, each High Priest used to commit to writing all the events of his year of office, and record them on a white surface, and post up the tablet at his house, that all men might have liberty to acquaint themselves therewith, and to this day those records are known as the Pontifical Chronicles*.[2] Publius Mucius Scaevola was a supreme pontiff from 130 BC to the date of his death in 115 BC, so Cicero never saw the *tabula* posted, but he could obtain reliable information on the elaboration of the annals. Thus, it is no doubt accurate that the *pontifex maximus* was in charge of a record that was annually displayed at his home.[3] As we shall see, it is not so certain that Cicero fully understood the original purpose of the record, which was not banned or cancelled but simply died out, most probably because it had become meaningless by the end of the second century BC.

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[1] The citations were collected by Frier (1979) and later edited and commented by Chassignet (1996).

[2] Cic. *de Orat.* 2.2.52: *erat enim historia nihil aliud nisi annalium confectio, cuius rei, memoriaeque publicae retinendae causa, ab initio rerum Romanarum usque ad P. Mucium pontificen maximum, res omnes singulorum annorum mandabat litteris pontifex maximus, referebatque in album, et proponebat tabulam domi, postestas ut esset populo cognoscendi, hique etiam nunc Annales Maximi nominatur*.

[3] This could be the *Regia* in the Forum or, as Frier (1999) 87 suggests, the *domus publica* on the Via Sacra.

In respect to Servius, his report reconciles mostly with Cicero's, adding that the annals were collected in eighty books (*libros*).[4] Following Mommsen most scholars attribute this edition to Scaevola himself although there is no supporting evidence. For this reason, Bruce Frier has argued convincingly that, since there is no testimony of this edition in Republican authors and the idea of revising and editing the old records, such as the Sibylline books and the *Fasti Capitolini*, characterizes Augustus' policy, it is not unlikely that the final compilation of the *annales maximi* in eighty books dates to that moment.[5] In any case, considering the extant citations of this last edition, it seems to have passed unnoticed to ancient writers, whether because of its restricted access or because it was not thought to offer new information.[6]

The date of the *annales*' onset is even more difficult to ascertain. Cicero states vaguely that they existed *ab initio rerum Romanarum*. The consensus has always been that the *annales maximi* must have commenced at the beginning of the Republic and that the later citations of the pontifical record regarding the regal period might have been inserted some time up to the edition in eighty books.[7] A testimony from Cicero provides significant evidence pointing to the existence of the record around 400 BC. It is stated in *De Republica* (1.25) that *apud Ennium et in maximis annalibus* a solar eclipse was recorded 350 years after Rome's foundation. Most probably the annals did not date any event *ab urbe condita* (since the foundation of the city) but according to magistracies as the consulship, so the span from the consular date to the beginning of the city might have been worked out by adding the regal period. In all likelihood, that is how Rome was thought to have been founded on the second year of the seventh Olympiad (i.e. 751/750 BC).[8] Following Polybius, Cicero accepted

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[4] Serv. *A.* 1.373: *ita autem annales conficiebantur: tabulam dealbatam quotannis pontifex maximus habuit, in qua praescriptis consulum nominibus et aliorum magistratuum digna memoratu notare consueverat domi militiaeque terra marique gesta per singulos dies. Cuius diligentiae annuos commentarios in octoginta libros veteres retulerunt, eosque a pontificibus maximis a quibus fiebant annales maximos appellarunt.*

[5] Frier (1999) 193–200.

[6] There are three citations in Aulus Gellius (2.11.1–4; 4.5.1–6; 11.1–9) and three in Ps.-Aurelius Victor's *Origo Gentis Romanae* (17.3; 17.5; 18.3). Frier (1999) 39–40 considers them to stem from Verrius Flaccus' works. However, Badian (1966 11–13) considers that the late Republican publication of the *annales maximi* somehow influenced annalists like Gn. Gellius or L. Calpurnius Piso, whereas other scholars such as Elizabeth Rawson (1971) 165 believes that Roman historians never drew on this record.

[7] Bouché-Leclerq (1871) 253–260; Frier (1999) 107–119.

[8] This is, indeed, Dionysius' method (*A.R.* 1.74–75.3). However, some scholars

in *De republica* this foundational date, which situates the solar eclipse in approximately 401 BC.[9] More recently, Jörg Rüpke has argued that the *annales maximi* were created in 249 BC by Ti. Coruncanius, the first plebeian supreme pontiff, and that Scaevola not only ended the record but also fabricated out of questionable notices and imagination the section predating Coruncanius' pontificate in the last edition.[10] This argument is based on the lack of any reliable information on priesthood holders in the sources, namely Livy. Although an attractive hypothesis, it seems too extreme to deduce that the inaccurate list of priests before Coruncanius is evidence of the inexistence of the record until that time. It seems more likely, as it has been always maintained, that the *annales maximi* were set up at some point in the fifth BC.

Chronology is not the only controversial aspect about the pontiffs' record. It is unclear how the information written down on the board was stored and took the final shape of eighty books; and our ignorance on ancient archival methods leaves us clueless. The reference to an *album* and a *tabula dealbata*, in Cicero and in Servius respectively, could lead us to assume that the board was a temporary medium that every year was whitened and refilled with new information. In addition, it seems difficult to envision the accumulation of wood boards kept in storage for centuries.[11] Therefore, scholars have looked for an intermediate stage between the *tabula* and the later edition. Bucher's suggestion that the record was annually transferred to a bronze multiple-plate inscription, posted in the pontiff's house as well, is appealing but faces the lack of any reference in the sources, which is especially significant in the case of Cicero who would have heard of this display, if not seen it himself.[12] Another suggested alternative has been the existence of a parallel record written also by these priests. This is the most widely accepted hypothesis, although there is no agreement about its content. For some scholars such as Mommsen, after the Gallic sack of the city the pontiffs, drawing on the varied archival material at their disposal, began to elaborate a *liber annalis*. Finished by the end of the fourth c. BC, this book would have offered a general approach to Roman history including the regal period.

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maintain that the reference point to date Rome's foundation was the fall of Troy. See Feeney (2007) 90.

9 Walbank (1957) 665–669.

10 Rüpke (1993).

11 Frier (1999) 100–101. On the contrary, Crake (1940 386) considers plausible the preservation of the original *tabulae*.

12 Bucher (1995) 32–34.

This *liber* would represent the first edition of the *annales maximi* prior to the definitive eighty book version.[13] For others, however, the simultaneous registration would simply mean transferring the data from the whitened board to a permanent record.[14] A third possibility has been pointed out by Rüpke. Assuming that the pontifical *commentarii* and the *annales* is one and the same record, the German scholar maintains that the *tabula* posted annually was just an excerpt of this register. Surprising as it might seem, this hypothesis suitably accounts for Cicero's description of the pontiff's activity in two steps before the display: *res omnes* (...) *mandabat litteris pontifex maximorum, referebatque in album* (...).[15]

Admittedly, even though none of these theories can be fully substantiated, some of them might share the truth. Initially the report might not have been immediately moved to a permanent medium, or it was so every certain number of years; thus the wood boards remained stacked for a while. This would account for the fact that some authors refer to the *tabulae* in plural.[16] Later on both records could be kept simultaneously so that the board became a transcription of the continuous report, as Cicero's description seems to imply; and at some point a section on the regal period was introduced. Actually not much more can be asserted on the transmission of the *annales maximi*. It seems reasonable to assume that over the three or four hundred years that the *annales maximi* were elaborated, there must have been some changes in their preservation. Unfortunately, in the present state of our knowledge, we can only speculate about them, and that is not the aim of this paper. However, there are some facts that can be considered undeniable, namely that the record produced by the supreme pontiff was exhibited publicly and preserved until the late second c. BC. For what reason the Roman priests were involved in this activity will be the question addressed in the remainder of the paper.

Making Information Public?

Doubtless one of the most intriguing aspects of the *annales maximi* is the purpose of its recording and display. The prevailing view highlights the

[13] Mommsen (1856) 432–438.
[14] Soltau (1971) 10–16.
[15] Rüpke (1993) 173; Scheid (1994) 152.
[16] Dion. *A.R.* 1.73.1: *hieraî déltoi*; Macr. 3.2.17: *tabulas*. However, according to G. Cavallo (1992 98–99) Dionysius' expression alludes to a book of boards or codex.

informative function fulfilled by the wood boards.[17] Posted in a noticeable location, the house of the supreme pontiff, they provided an annual report on the most significant events concerning Rome. Cicero's account of the pontiffs' activity in *De Oratore* clearly supports this assumption, since he asserts that the *annales* were exhibited so that the people had the power to know (*potestas cognoscendi*) what had happened. To reinforce this interpretation, the *annales* are compared with other records that became public and accessible to everyone in the early Republic, one example being the Twelve Tables, the first legislative code of Rome. Other important records that had always been within the realm of the pontiffs' knowledge were also published around 304 BC by Gnaeus Flavius, scribe of Appius Claudius: the calendar (*fasti*) that detailed the days *nefasti* when legal business was not allowed, and the actions at law (*legis actiones*), the collection of formulae to be pronounced in court in order to initiate a legal action. Shortly afterwards, around the mid-third c. BC, the first plebeian supreme pontiff, Tiberius Coruncanius, started to give public legal instruction, which actively contributed to create a group of non-priests legal experts. In this context, the display of the *annales maximi* is seen as another step in the policy of publicity followed by the Roman state, or more specifically by the pontifical college.

There is no question that posting a document in a noticeable location is meant to make it public and knowable to anyone and everyone. If the pontiffs decided to exhibit the annual account on the wall of their residence, they intended, at least, to let the population know about its existence. However, a reconsideration on the nature of the record might question the assumption that its display implied the political determination of revealing information to the public. According to Cicero and Servius, the pontiffs recorded annually everything that happened. Using a common expression of Roman historiography, Servius even asserts that the priests wrote down whatever was worth remembering (*digna memoratu*) that took place in peace and in war, in Rome or abroad (*domi militiaeque terra marique*).[18] The content of the record will be more thoroughly examined later on. By now, we will accept the general conception based on these authors that the annals collected events of some interest for the Romans; or to put it in Frier's words *the* tabula *was a sort of gazette of events impinging on State and populace.*[19] If the content was a summary

[17] Frier (1999) 93–96; Rüpke (1993).
[18] Frier (1999) 91–92.
[19] Frier (1999) 94–95.

of incidents which occurred in Rome or to the Romans, that information can be hardly considered restricted or reserved in anyway as it was in the above-mentioned examples of the Twelve Tables, the calendar and the legal formulae. The three of them recorded specific data or knowledge that had been transmitted orally within the pontifical college until it was committed to writing. On the contrary, most inhabitants of the city would be informed of the appointment of new magistrates or of military defeats without the need for checking a record. It is difficult to picture the *tabula* as a privileged source of information.

Other factors should be also taken into consideration in this regard, namely the population size and the literacy rate of the ancient city of Rome in Republican times. Relying upon scarce and elusive evidence, both factors can only be assessed with vague estimates. Nonetheless, the figures are worth mentioning. According to C. Ampolo and T. Cornell the city of Rome and its territory must have had approximately 35,000 inhabitants by the end of the sixth c. BC, a plausible figure for an important Italian city-state in the archaic period. On the other hand, W. Harris estimates that in the early Republic only 1 or 2 per cent of the population (in any case below 10 per cent) must have been in some degree literate.[20] Although these figures could be debatable and qualified, they unmistakably indicate that very few people could read by themselves the *tabula*, and that Rome's still reduced dimensions hardly made it necessary to announce news by written reports. These arguments become more compelling if compared with the situation in the late Republic. By the end of the second c. BC, when Mucius Scaevola resolved to terminate the *annales maximi*, Rome had a bigger and more literate population, and not only had it conquered Italy but created provinces from Spain to Asia. If the *tabula* had an informative purpose, why end it when Roman affairs embraced the whole Mediterranean and news concerning the integrity and defense of the Empire were produced every year?

Still another fact might be illuminating in this respect. The *annales maximi* have been compared to the *acta diurna* of the Senate and of the people of Rome that Iulius Caesar set up as consul in 59 BC.[21] The first ones, cancelled by Augustus afterwards, comprised the discussions and resolutions issued by the Senate. The latter seem to have recorded the remarkable events which occurred in the city and continued throughout imperial times, reaching even the provinces where they were read by the

[20] Ampolo (1980) 15–31; Cornell (1995) 243–248; Harris (1989) 158.

[21] Suet. *Caes.* 20.1; Bats (1994) 19–43.

army.[22] As C. Moatti has aptly argued, the publication of the *acta senatus* is one of a series of political measures that in the late Republic intended to make Roman magistrates and senators responsible for their opinions, and give an account of their acts.[23] Making public the content of the Senate's sessions definitely contributed to the transparency of decision-making. On the other hand, the *acta populi*, that kept people informed of the major incidents and events in the city and abroad, were more similar to the *annales maximi* as traditionally conceived. Therefore, it is striking that, being supreme pontiff since 63 BC, Caesar would not have resumed the writing of the annals, if they had actually been an official report of the kind of the *acta*, and would have established instead a new tradition. In fact, the evident disconnection between both records shows that, on the contrary, they differed in nature and purpose.

Prodigies and Expiations

Thus, the idea of the annals as a newsletter that disseminated official information in the early Republic does not fit with the historical context. If we turn now to examine more thoroughly what it is known about its content, we will hopefully have more evidence to inquire about its purpose. Cicero and Servius openly envisioned the *tabula* as a historical chronicle and they did not have any doubt that one could find in it the kind of material that concerned the annalists. This is probably the notion of the *annales maximi* that prevailed since the late Republic when the record had no public dimension anymore and it was thought to be the precedent for the annalistic tradition. But it should not be immediately assumed that originally the *tabula* matched an historical report. Moreover, there is no evidence to claim that the first historical works were influenced in content or shape by the *annales maximi*, as G. Verbrugghe has convincingly stated.[24]

Besides Cicero and Servius' reports, there are other testimonies, mainly from Latin authors, that might offer some indication of the kind of data contained in the *annales*. It is noteworthy to stress that the only one of these writers who was contemporary with the *annales*, and therefore was supposed to have an immediate knowledge, is Cato the Elder. In

22 Tac. *Ann*. 16.22.
23 Moatti (1997) 204–208.
24 Verbrugghe (1989) 212–213.

the fourth book of his *Origines*, Cato declares not to *care to write what appears on the tablet of the high priest: how often grain was dear, how often darkness, or something else, obscured the light of sun or moon*. From Cato's assertion, it can be deduced that the pontiffs recorded astronomical events such as eclipses and staple shortages due perhaps to natural causes.[25] His comment overtly downplays the importance of the *annales* as a relevant source for historical and antiquarian work, but there is no reason to doubt its accuracy. In fact, the other two citations of the *annales* concern the same phenomena.[26] We already mentioned Cicero's notice of a solar eclipse that would have happened around 400 BC. In addition, Aulus Gellius reports on lightning that struck the statue of Horatio Cocles located in the Forum, and on the wrong advice for the atonement given by the haruspices in order to mislead the Romans.[27] The deception was discovered, the foreign priests were punished and the prodigy was properly expiated. Leaving aside the story of the Etruscan treachery, the core of the reference is again an untoward event that the Romans interpreted as the sign of divine disaffection.[28]

It seems certain, therefore, that the pontiffs noted down occurrences that were considered to show a divine message, prodigies that needed to be atoned for so that Rome could maintain the gods' favor. Romans thought that their gods communicated with them through abnormal and disastrous events, such as a plague, a thunderbolt or a significant military defeat, which had to be counteracted by means of ceremonies or sacrifices.[29] Reportedly, the Senate had the ultimate responsibility for deciding how to proceed. Nonetheless, it never acted alone, but resorted to religious specialists. To understand the meaning of a prodigy and to determine its accurate *procuratio* required the expertise of the pontiffs, notwithstanding the fact that other civil magistrates like the consul would carry it out. Nevertheless, it is well known that they were not alone in this task. The *Xviri* (originally *IIviri*) *sacris faciundis* looked after the Sibylline books, a collection of oracles that were consulted by these magistrates in

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[25] Cato *Orig.* 4.1 Chassignet (= Gellius 2.28.6): *Non lubet scribere quod in tabula apud pontificem maximum est, quotiens annona cara, quotiens lunae out solis lumine caligo aut quid obstiterit.* For all that has been said, we find difficult to accept that this passage shows that the *tabula* displayed information of practical interest concerning the requirements of commercial and agricultural life, as it has been asserted (Gentili/Cerri 1988 91–92).

[26] Since the citations of the *annales maximi* regarding the regal period were most likely introduced later, they are excluded from this survey.

[27] Gellius 4.5.1–6.

[28] This is supposed to be late Republican fabrication. See Frier (1999) 56–64.

[29] Bouché-Leclerq (1871) 174–190; Bloch (1963) 137–151; Rasmussen (2003) 35–52.

cases of disaster, and generally oversaw the foreign cults. Although a college itself, they were under the supreme pontiff's supervision. Besides, the haruspices, experts in the Etruscan art of divination, could be also summoned to interpret a prodigy, as Gellius' passage shows, namely when meteorological phenomena or abnormal births were detected.[30] However, ancient authors agree in stressing that the pontiffs were the supreme priests of Rome, whose duties were to supervise the right performance of the ceremonies and to give advice as regards the cult of the gods. Livy explicitly asserts that they were also in charge of determining which prodigies should be expiated, and in his work, *Ab urbe condita*, it is stated that the measures to atone for the unusual events were accomplished according to the pontiffs' decision, *ex decreto pontificum*.[31] It is then widely accepted that, given the pontiffs' involvement in the *procuratio prodigorum*, this kind of event must have been extensively recorded in the *annales maximi* that they elaborated.[32]

The role played by the prodigies in the pontiffs' record led R. Drews to propose an attractive theory for the demise of the *annales maximi*.[33] According to him, the *tabula* was a religious report of prodigies and expiations kept by the priests in order to provide future generations with cases that might help resolve particularly complex situations. But in the late Republic belief in the divine origin of abnormal events and the resort to traditional ways of expiations had lost ground, at least among the ruling class. In 97 BC, the Senate accepted to ban human sacrifices that had been common from early times as a means of appeasing the gods. Also in the 90s BC the drowning in the sea of hermaphrodite creatures stopped. In addition, the sources convey the idea that some Romans did not take heed anymore to this kind of divine communication. Livy declared that *as a result of the same disregard that leads men generally to suppose nowadays that the gods foretell nothing, no portents at all are reported officially, or recorded in our histories* (43.13.1). And in

[30] MacBain (1982) 50–59.

[31] Liv. 1.20.5–7; Dion. *A.R.* 2.73; Plut., *Numa*, 9.1. Scheid (1994) 154; Liv. 24.44.9; 27.37.4; 33. 44. 1; 39.22.4; 40.45.3.

[32] However, Rüpke (1993) 173 rejects the idea that reported prodigies were noted down in the *annales maximi*, and maintains that it was the consul or the praetor who acknowledged and announced prodigies and that only subsequently the case was handed to the priests. In any case, the evidence in support of the traditional view seems indisputable. He also holds that the *tabula* reported future events. For a refutation see Scheid (1998) 201–206.

[33] Drews (1988) 296–299.

De Divinatione, Cicero argues against the traditional belief in prodigies such as eclipses (2.6.17). For Drews these are all indications that the role of the pontiffs as supervisors of prodigies and expiations must have lost relevance and, therefore, the *annales maximi* became aimless and were abandoned.

Drews' suggestion that a change in Roman faith was involved in the disappearance of the *tabula* is extremely convincing. Certainly, prodigies kept being detected and tackled by the priests throughout imperial times. However, an assessment of the abnormal events reported in our sources clearly indicates a steady decrease in their number from the mid-second century BC with a temporary rise from the 130's to the Social War and in the 50's and 40's.[34] For some of those awe-inspiring phenomena another explanation was found. Thus before the battle of Pydna in 168 BC the military tribune Gaius Gallus predicted and announced to the troops that an eclipse of moon would happen soon; and he specifically asked them not to take it as a prodigy because there was a natural explanation for it.[35] In addition, another trend had modified also the traditional Roman religion. From the Second Punic War onwards a new kind of portent attracted increasing attention: certain occurrences were taken not as the result of the gods' discontent but as omens of future events whether favorable or unfavorable. Thus, the prodigies announcing the gods' stance towards Rome had to give way to a new element in the art of divination, which in Rome was linked mainly to the haruspices.[36]

Therefore, it seems certain that the loss of popularity of prodigies, at least among certain social groups in Rome, could not leave untouched one of the religious duties of the pontiffs that was more linked to them, the writing of the *annales maximi*. What remains to be proven, however, is whether the record was a mere list of portents for consultation as Robert Drews suggested. We have already seen that it is quite unlikely that the wood board should have been used as a bulletin of news posted to be read. However, it has also been suggested that the informative character of the annals concerned not the whole population but exclusively the priests or some other political institution, that is to say, it was an administrative document. In this respect, John Scheid has argued that provided the Senate's involvement in the *procuratio prodigorum* and the counseling role played by the pontiffs, the annals might have been the annual report

[34] MacBain (1982) 80–106.
[35] Liv. 44.37.5–7.
[36] Bloch (1963) 155–171.

that these priests presented to the assembly at the beginning of the year when the new consuls took their vows.[37]

The most accepted view stresses the need of having a wide collection of cases in order to make decisions about future portents.[38] The possibility that the *annales maximi* were sometimes revised to find precedents or similar cases cannot be completely ruled out, although surprisingly there is no indication in the sources to any customary consultation of this record. In fact, only one reference in Livy explicitly alludes to an astonishing event, a massive poisoning in 331 BC, whose appropriate expiation was found in *memoria ex Annalibus repetita*.[39] Thus, it cannot be denied that the record was consulted. Nonetheless, the annual structure of the record must have prevented a regular and continuous use. Since the entries were not arranged by type or category of prodigy, the search of a particular case must have relied on human memory or on reading the entire record. In this respect, it is noteworthy that in other ancient cultures such as the Mesopotamian, the concern for the meaning of divine signs led to elaborate collections of omens that evolved into complex treatises in the first millennium BC. Mesopotamians believed that the future could be read in many events and phenomena. Therefore, they started gathering historical cases and eventually came to create an abstract knowledge on divination.[40] In Rome, neither was there such a theoretical approach to prodigies or omens, nor was there even a classification of them meant basically for a practical aim. If that had been the case, the *annales maximi* would have taken another shape. Only in the late Republic there seems to be an interest in systematizing religious knowledge as the works of Nigidius Figulus or Varro reveal, but their purpose was antiquarian.[41]

Priesthood, Writing and Ritual

In fact, the *annales maximi* is not the only case of a Roman religious record whose goal is far from being intelligible. As J. North has rightly

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[37] Scheid (1998) 208–220.

[38] Drews (1988) 296; Frier (1999) 98.

[39] Liv. 8.18.11–12. Frier (1999) 99–100 cites another passage from Livy (27.8.8–9) where there is no portent involved but the *flamen* rights that are claimed to be based in tradition instead of in *exoletis vetustate Annalium exemplis*.

[40] Bottéro (1974).

[41] Rawson (1985) 298–316; Moatti (1997) 109–115.

pointed out, in Republican times priests were closely linked to writing *libri* and *commentarii*. They claimed to derive their authority partly from the books they kept and it is not unlikely that originally their writing abilities, in a society mostly illiterate, were an unavoidable condition to carry out their duties. But when it comes to determining the practical use of those priestly records as in the case of the *annales*, the sources do not offer the slightest clue.[42] Actually, this fact is not so puzzling as it could seem considering what is known about archival practices in ancient Rome. In the temples of Saturn, and that of Ceres, Liber and Libera in Campus Martius, the documents were simply stored and most likely not classified or filed in any rational manner so that information could be easily retrieved, at least until the times of Augustus.[43] It is interesting that regarding the case of Athens, Rosalind Thomas argues the same about the Metröon and goes on to assert that it is one thing to produce written records and another to go back and consistently refer to them in practical life.[44] It would take a documentary mind relying above all on the written word for that.

All these considerations lead us to conclude that it is most unlikely that the *annales maximi* were intended to be an administrative reference report for the priests to know how to proceed. On the contrary, pontiffs must have relied upon expertise when facing unusual situations the same way they did not learn to perform their tasks through texts but experience.[45] This experience-centered religious practice that does not make use of writing in order to catalogue potentially useful cases could be seen in clear contradiction with the well-known Roman thoroughness for correct performance of ritual. Theoretically, writing could have established a complex casuistry. However, there is a remarkable example of religious record in Rome showing that this contradiction was not so for Romans and providing at the same time a comparable instance for the study of the *annales maximi*. The corpus of inscriptions of the Arval Brethren is the only Roman religious record that has come down to us.[46] It comprises more than a hundred stone epigraphs, found near Rome in a sacred grove,

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[42] North (1998 45–50) analyses the only two cases where the books of the priests are cited as a source. For the *reconditi libri* of the augurs see Lindersky (1985). Solely the Sibylline books have a clear purpose. See Scheid (1998).

[43] Culham (1989); Moatti (1997) 121–129.

[44] Thomas (1989) 71–81. She draws on the work of M.T. Clanchy (1979) for Modern England.

[45] Scheid (1990a) 11.

[46] Paladino (1988); Scheid (1990b).

which date from the first three centuries AD. The college was in charge of the cult of the goddess Dea Dia but they also performed sacrifices in honor of the imperial family. The texts recorded the religious activities of the priests similarly to the inscriptional accounts of the Secular Games. Mary Beard's analysis of the inscriptions produced compelling conclusions.[47] The most significant one is that many elements of the rituals carried out by the Arval brothers varied over the years. The fact openly calls into question the renowned invariability of Roman ceremonies and, what is more revealing, it shows that the priests paid no heed to the inscriptions to make sure that the rituals were faithfully repeated every year. Writing did not prevent change, because it did not have a practical purpose. In this respect, Mary Beard has convincingly argued that the Arval epigraphs had a symbolic or ritual aim. The writing itself of the text was a meaningful act irrespective of the prospective readers. It was part of the ritual activities of the priests.

This interpretation is not far-fetched. There are other examples in the ancient world where writing lacks an immediate informative purpose but fulfils a performative function, for instance the *tabellae defixionum*, curses written on lead sheets that were intentionally folded and concealed in tombs or shrines.[48] In Rome the bronze boards containing legislation and posted in sacred places were not expected to spread out the law but to symbolize it permanently.[49] And recently it has even been argued that far from being a procedure secondary to ceremonies and assemblies, official writing on *tabulae* by a magistrate required a ritual process essential to assure the validity and effectiveness of its content, that is to say it was an integral part of the decision making.[50]

Do the *annales maximi* fall under the category of ritual writing like the Arval inscriptions? Admittedly, there are some differences between both records.[51] Perhaps the only one that might actually undermine the comparison is that the Arval brothers made use of a permanent and monumental medium such as stone, whereas the pontiffs posted simply a wood board, a *dealbata tabula* that might have been reused. On the other hand, a couple of striking similarities should be taken into consideration. Firstly, the report of both colleges was annual and

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[47] Beard (1985).

[48] Gager (1992); Ogden (1999).

[49] Williamson (1987) 160–183. However, There is also in imperial times evidence of a determination to make legislation readable. See Corbier (2006) 47–48.

[50] Meyer (2004) 92–107.

[51] North (1998) 55.

probably the consular dating headed the *tabula* as in the case of the Arval inscriptions.[52] In addition, both reports were publicly displayed. These two aspects, especially the latter, allow us to consider that this evidence might help understand the case of the *annales maximi*. The Arval *acta* also give us a clear idea of the importance of writing in the Roman priestly colleges. Very little is known about the Arval Brethren and it was likely not one of the most relevant priesthoods in Rome. Nonetheless, the inscriptions evince the remarkable role played by the written word among ritual activities.

What can be concluded about the *annales maximi* from what has been analysed hitherto? It has to be admitted that given the scarce evidence available, only a reasonable hypothesis can be reached. Nonetheless if this is based on the sure facts known from the sources, and not on hypothetical suppositions themselves, we can be sure to approach the original meaning of the *annales*. The record was made by the pontiffs and it had an annual frequency. It is not clear whether the report was written once a year or the information was added steadily—which Servius' expression *per singulos dies* could support. In any case, the religious year starting on January 1st was a temporal frame meaningful enough as to impose a break.[53] It should not be forgotten that time was under the scrutiny of the pontiffs. In fact, until Caesar's reform that introduced the solar calendar, the pontiffs determined which days were *fasti* or *nefasti*, and when feasts were celebrated. In 304 BC, the calendar was committed to writing but it remained a responsibility of the pontiffs, who every year had still to decide, for instance, on the intercalation of some days in February to redress the imbalance with solar time. Only Caesar's introduction of a fixed temporal framework made the calendar rational and potentially independent from the pontiffs.[54]

[52] In his definition Servius, indeed, asserts that the pontiffs wrote their report *praescriptis consulum nominibus et aliorum magistratuum* (1.373). See Frier (1999) 88. See next footnote.

[53] I agree with G.P. Verbrugghe (1989) 212–214 that as priests the pontiffs must have followed the religious year. He rightly remarks that the magisterial year did not coincide with the religious one until 153 BC, when new magistrates started to enter office on 1st January. See Feeney (2007) 167–172. This means that the *tabula* originally would contain the names of successive magistrates. Servius' assertion that the *tabula* started with the consuls' names made perfectly sense in imperial times when both temporal frameworks coincided.

[54] Bouchè-Leclerq (1871) 230–238; Brind'Amour (1983); Laurence/Smith (1995–1996) 136–141; Moatti (1997) 135–136; Feeney (2007) 151–156.

Written by priests and containing prodigies and portents, the *annales maximi* was unquestionably a religious record. Sometimes this fact is overlooked by the assumption, based on the evidence of Cicero and Servius, that the *tabula* simply announced every remarkable event that happened in Rome. It would seem rather a historical report. Actually, both assertions do not preclude each other, even if these Roman authors had a historiographical approach to the *annales* that has to be qualified. Nonetheless, it is certain that the pontiffs must have written down more than prodigies in the *tabula*. Cicero is supposed to have had trustworthy information and he never hinted that the record was a register of abnormal events or of ritual activities to atone for them. Even if this could have been originally the bulk of the report, by the second c. BC its content had expanded so that later writers could appreciate it as a historical source. As we see it, the key to understanding the content of the *annales maximi* lies in the role of the pontiffs as mediators between gods and men.

As it was said, prodigies were considered divine signs. Some of them concerned only individuals, but others occurred in public places or were remarkable enough as to affect the whole community. They were basically negative omens in the sense that they indicated the gods' displeasure towards the Romans, which most times was blamed on a mistake or omission in the performance of rituals and ceremonies. In order to mend the error, the priests recommended the proceedings to follow, which usually involved a sacrifice of expiation and reenactment of the ritual.[55] Without this measure, Rome could not count on the gods' support, that is to say the *pax deorum* was not restored. This peaceful relationship between gods and humans was the cornerstone of Roman religion. As John Scheid has remarked, the only religious belief held by the Romans was that the gods were their gracious and caring partners whose benevolence had to be maintained through worship and rite.[56] If Rome's future depended on divine protection, it makes sense that priests as the pontiffs, who knew how to undo ritual mistakes to re-establish order, gained so much prestige. It is also conceivable that Rome's fortune was comprehended and accepted as the result of this relationship. Favourable events to Rome conveyed divine fondness, whereas unfortunate occurrences meant the opposite and had to be redressed.

It is our contention that the *annales maximi* have to be understood in this context of divine protection and Roman fate. The prodigies were the

[55] Scheid (2002) 98–99.
[56] Scheid (2002) 144.

most relevant elements in this communication, but not the only ones. Every disaster or success in civic life or international affairs must have been meaningful and attracted the attention of the pontiffs whose main role was to watch over the religious behaviour of the Romans in order to secure the gods' protection.[57] Therefore the *annales* must have contained the report of Rome's ups and downs seen from this religious perspective. In this respect John Scheid has described the *annales maximi* as a religious history of Rome's relation to its gods.[58] It was indeed a religious document, although it is not certain that it was historiographical in any sense. Later authors such as Cicero envisioned it as the precedent of Roman annalistic tradition, but this is clearly an anachronistic assumption, the same way that Cicero's assertion that the *tabula* was displayed to inform the population is more tuned with the political context of the late Republic, as we have seen, than with the fifth or fourth centuries BC.[59] Furthermore, it should be remembered that when the *annales maximi* were first set up there were no historians or written histories in Rome, which makes it especially difficult to argue any historical approach to the past at that time in the city.

In fact, considering the process of elaboration of the record, this one cannot be viewed as a historical report since it lacked an overall narrative structure. The only concern of the pontiffs was the present affairs of the city (not to understand Rome's past), and the *tabula* was filled in, and somehow stored, annually. The piled *tabulae* or reports all together did not make a historical discourse. For that, a revision of the complete data would be necessary in order to offer a general account spanning from the beginning to the current date. In other words, an interpretation would be needed.[60] But no evidence or testimony supports that this was the case. Most likely the reports were accumulated in the supreme pontiff's house receiving no further attention until they were edited in eighty books and supplemented with an introduction on the origins of Rome. Therefore the *annales maximi* were a religious document that was not intended to report current events to the population, or to gather information for

[57] Thus, John North (1989) 613 considers that the pontiffs exercised power in the most sensitive of all areas of ritual communication between men and gods. However, Mary Beard (1990) 36–40 confers exclusively to the augurs the role of mediators between humans and gods in Roman religion, arguing that only they had a direct communication with the divine, and she leaves the pontiffs in the background.

[58] Scheid (1994) 155.

[59] This is something already remarked by Wiseman (1994) 4.

[60] Cook (1988) 21; Danto (1989) 53–98.

prospective religious use. The *tabula* addressed present affairs seen from the perspective of the changeable relationship of Rome to its gods, and it did not offer any historical account.

Undoubtedly the status of writing in early Rome is also a major element in grasping this record. In the fifth and fourth centuries BC writing was mainly used by magistrates and priests. Written documents such as treaties, laws, or the census were issued by official authorities. Since there is testimony of domestic writing in Latium, it probably would be erroneous to assume that the alphabet was a prerogative of the Roman aristocracy in office. But the evidence of this private writing consists only of short messages on pottery, mainly names, which amounts to a rather insignificant use.[61] Therefore texts and inscriptions were related primarily to the exercise of power. In addition, writing was barely visible in public spaces. Only some laws such as the Twelve Tables and a few inscriptions were in full view of everyone. The *tabula* of the pontiffs was another exception.

Thus the pontifical record must have been a symbol of the college's power and a manifestation of its members' involvement in maintaining the *pax deorum*. Given its relation to religious ceremonies and especially to expiation rites, it is difficult not to envision the *annales* as part of the ritual activities of the pontiffs. The above-mentioned case of the Arval inscriptions offers a compelling parallel and it gives support to the hypothesis that watching over the divine protection of Rome implied also keeping a record of its manifestations. John Scheid has argued that in Rome every ritual public performance led to a detailed written document such as the Arval inscriptions or the Secular Games commentaries. It was itself part of the rite as well as a reminder of the accomplished performance.[62] Admittedly, not every prodigy was expiated by pontiffs and the *annales* might have comprised more than an account of ceremonies and rites. In a word, we do not know to what extent the elaboration of the *tabula* was included in a particular ritual procedure. Notwithstanding these facts, it seems convincing that committing to writing every step in this dialogue with the gods gave evidence of Rome's good behaviour and eventual success. The written word must have been seen as a warrant of Rome's effort to fulfil its part, and it also contributed to it. In addition,

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[61] Poucet (1989); Cornell (1991) 21–22. Cornell rightly argues that regarding literacy in early Rome, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Nonetheless, the use of literacy must have been notably inferior to the late Republic.

[62] Scheid (1990) 6.

writing and displaying the *tabula* was a means of reinforcing, and representing at the same time, the pontiffs' control over Rome's fate. They possessed expertise and knowledge to assure that the city could count on divine favour, of which the *tabula* must have been a testimony. It is noteworthy also that the reports were not disposed of once the year had elapsed and Rome faced new circumstances. Instead, they were kept and subsequently gathered in an eighty book edition. As we have seen, this fact cannot be simply attributed to the need for consulting religious past events. The explanation probably lies in the symbolic value of the archive as testimony of the college's power and continuity.[63] This must have embodied a sort of memory of the city's religious status where past and present witnessed the undying fate of Rome.

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[63] Moatti (2003) 29–43 rightly attributes this need of legitimacy to the maintenance of the public archives in Rome.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

HOMER THE PROPHET: HOMERIC VERSES AND DIVINATION IN THE *HOMEROMANTEION*

Andromache Karanika

The surviving magical papyri are only a few of an originally vast number. They constitute an important testimony not only for the study of ancient magic and religion, but even more for the study of cultural practices, beliefs and values, and of how antiquity received, used, and understood early Greek literature. In my paper, I investigate the complex relation between orality and literacy by analyzing a set of magical papyri that quote disconnected and seemingly out of context Homeric verses.[1] This set is generally referred to as the *homeromanteion*, the 'Homer oracle,' and can be dated around the fourth or fifth century CE.[2] It is a list of 216 verses from Homer, possibly from a type of manual directed to give oracular responses to daily concerns and inquiries about the future. It is commonly thought that they were used as fortune verses addressing either specific questions or in a function that could be similar to a daily horoscope, for general consultation and guidance.[3] The magical papyri have mostly been discussed from the perspective of ancient magic and its practices. I want to shift the focus towards the communication that was overtly established with the early epic tradition and towards the status and use of the *homeromanteion* in late antiquity and early Byzantium. This opens up a larger question of the survival and use of early Greek

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[1] *Papyri Graecae Magicae* 7. 1–148 Preisendanz (vol. 2), papyrus in London, British Museum *P.Lond.* 121. I would like to thank Ruth Scodel and Elizabeth Minchin for their helpful comments and their corrections of the English text.

[2] With respect to the date of the papyrus, I follow Maltomimi (1995). While I print and follow the numbers and sequence of the lines of the Preisendanz text, the text in Maltomimi (1995) 111–118 will be important to my arguments. Maltomimi (1995) 108 dates the papyrus *P.Lond. 121* around the fourth or fifth century CE whereas Preisendanz had dated it in the 3rd century and Kenyon in third or fourth century CE. Maltomimi (1995) offers a revised text after consultation of the text preserved in the following papyri: *P.Bon. 3e* and *P.Oxy. 3831*.

[3] Betz (1986) 118–119.

epic verses by possibly wider audiences that read and even performed them in a way that relates to popular culture of their time.

In this paper I discuss the *homeromanteion* by first looking at instances where Homeric verses are quoted in a larger narrative in contexts of divination. It is also important to compare the Homeric lines in the *homeromanteion* with the use of Homer for ritual purposes elsewhere in the magical papyri. I then compare this compilation of lines with similar *sortes* and other divination practices and propose a reading of the *homeromanteion* as a full manual and document in its own right, at the same time attempting to explain why these verses were included in it. Because of the very nature of the topic of divination, any scholarly approach today to texts that possibly relate to divination as a practice uses interdisciplinary methodology that unites the analysis of literature, religion, history, anthropology and sociology of the ancient world.[4] The *homeromanteion* poses questions regarding the re-shuffling and re-use of poetry taken from Homer. In a rather unorthodox way, I shall look at the *Nachleben* of certain lines in times closer to the *homeromanteion*, with a focus on the early byzantine Homeric centos. The coincidence that certain lines are found both in centos and in the *homeromanteion* supports a reading in which the *homeromanteion* becomes and reads as a text which has its own body and can claim its own position in the history of ancient literature and hermeneutics.

Homer and Divination

In the *homeromanteion*, Homeric verses are reproduced out of context and are re-contextualized in a manner that is not related to any internal textual narrative but are rather adjusted to external parameters. They acquire a rich social function by becoming part of the late antique person's life with all its uncertainties and anxieties. Homeric diction offers two important aspects that enrich magical practices: a learned authority and the power of tradition. Divination interacts forcefully with uses of tradition and notions of authority. As David Frankfurter remarks, "divination always involves the creative use of tradition: that is some degree of *authority*, of recognizability, that can be brought to bear on the situation

[4] Cf. Flower (2008) 21 on the seer in ancient Greece, a topic which "rests at the cusp of literature and history."

at hand."[5] An overt interaction with Homeric poetry brings all that in one: tradition, recognizability, and authority. Although there are open questions regarding possible uses of these verses, the Homeric corpus offers immense possibilities for multiple readings. The conception of Homer in antiquity as a sage has a long history and is intricately intertwined with the history of literary criticism and philosophical traditions.[6]

The connection between Homeric verses and divination appears already in Plato. In Plato's *Crito* 44b, Socrates in prison tells Crito that he dreamed of a beautiful woman dressed in white who called and addressed him with a Homeric verse: "on the third day you would come to fertile Phthia" (*Iliad* 9.363). This is a dramatic device in Plato, as the line serves to connect Socrates with Achilles, who had a choice between a short life with a death that brings *kleos* or an escape in Thessaly to Phthia. Socrates, who could have also escaped to Thessaly, has a choice between death and escape; such a choice becomes one of the central themes of the dialogue. Yet this dramatic device indicates the early usage of Homeric verses as divinatory device and suggests that these verses had the capacity to be recontextualized in connection with an individual's life.[7] Speech in Plato's narrative is placed inside a dream and is connected with divination through the voice of a woman. The theme of the borrowed voice in Plato, and in particular of a female voice is repeatedly found in contexts of prophecy.[8] The line of the *Iliad* is placed in the mouth of a beautiful female and is quoted by Socrates to validate his decision.[9] Thus, we have multiple levels in authority mediation: a message is mediated to Socrates via an imaginary interlocutor in the form of a verse of Homer.

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[5] Frankfurter (2005) 236.

[6] For the notion of Divine Homer in the background of Neoplatonic Allegory see Lamberton (1986).

[7] See Heim (1892) 514–520, for the use of line *Od.* 4.221 as a *katastaltikos logos* to restrain one's anger. In Iambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 113 = Diels-Kranz *FVS* 31. 1.15, Empedocles once saved his host Anchitos from being murdered by an angry man, as Empedocles struck a restraining chord and recited *Od.* 4.221. See Winkler (1991) 236, note 22.

[8] For women and prophecy see Flower (2008) 211–239. The figure of Diotima in Plato's *Symposium* in this Platonic dialogue and the theme of the borrowed voice present striking analogies with the use of a female figure to express a divinatory comment in *Crito*. Women's engaging role in divination is also present in prominent ritual roles such as the Pythia's in Delphi.

[9] On dramatic devices in Plato and this Homeric line, see Kramer (1988). See also Tarrant (1951) on Plato's use of quotations.

The word *homeromanteion* is featured as the title of the text in *PGM* 7. 1–148 and already suggests the usage of the verses included in this text, that divination (*-manteion*) is to take place with the first element of the word, that is Homer.[10] Through Homeric lines an infinite number of meanings are offered to an infinite number of questions. By assuming a two-fold dialogue between question and answer, we find ourselves at a disadvantage, because the current status of the *homeromanteion* offers only the 'answer' part, missing possible hermeneutic links that would follow the absent 'question' part. So while in Plato the narrative context provides some control over the possible meanings of the verse, this text appears to be inherently open-ended.

If we consider the performative aspect of these lines, then we also have to look at the various possibilities of the equation. As it has been suggested, the process of divination begins when the inquirer rolls dice or knucklebones on the surfaces of which numbers are written.[11] One would roll three different dice, each die having 6 surfaces with the numbers 1–6. Then, one would write the combination of these numbers horizontally, yielding 216 possible verses (1.1.1., 1.1.2, 1.1.3, 2.1.1., 2.1.3. etc).[12] Dice oracles have a long history of presence in oracular practices.[13] A possible example of dice oracles is given in Pausanias (7.25.10):

[10] Likewise, we have words like *oneiromanteion* (divination with dreams, as in *PGM* 7.1009) or *aleuromanteion* and *krithomanteion*, divination with the usage of flour and barley respectively (Eusebius, *Preparatio Evangelica* 5.25.5) and many other types of divination.

[11] See Betz (1986) 118–119: "connected with matters of daily life such as we find in our newspaper horoscopes, the inquirer rolls three dice or knucklebones, each of which has its six surfaces numbered from one to six and is used to select a number from one of the three *vertical* number columns to the left of the Homeric verses (in each column, there are only six numbers to select from, though each occurs thirty-six times); one dice thrown three times would achieve the same purpose. The three numbers selected by this process establish a *horizontal* number column that indicates which verse is to be consulted; e.g. a roll of 1, 3, 6 on the dice would guide the inquirer to no. 18. As is true with oracles in general, most of the responses provide ambiguous answers which leave the exact interpretation up to the reader."

[12] *P.Lond*. 121 in *PGM* 7: 1–148. Fragments of a *homeromanteion* have survived as part of the papyri Bononienses, part of a collection acquired in 1930 by the University of Bologna. See Montevecchi (1953), review by Rees (1954). Maltomimi (1995) has proposed a revised text, to which I shall come back at the end of this paper.

[13] From Hansen (1998) 286–287: "A third kind of oracle with fixed responses was based on the poems of Homer. A single example is preserved in a Greek papyrus of the third or fourth century AD. The consultor cast a cubical die three times, matched the numbers of his throws with the numbers in the papyrus, and identified his oracle. For

καταβάντων δὲ ἐκ Βούρας ὡς ἐπὶ θάλασσαν ποταμός τε Βουραϊκὸς ὀνομαζόμενος καὶ Ἡρακλῆς οὐ μέγας ἐστὶν ἐν σπηλαίῳ· ἐπίκλησις μὲν καὶ τούτου Βουραϊκός, μαντείας δὲ ἐπὶ πίνακί τε καὶ ἀστραγάλοις ἔστι ⟨λαβεῖν⟩. εὔχεται μὲν γὰρ πρὸ τοῦ ἀγάλματος ὁ τῷ θεῷ χρώμενος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ εὐχῇ λαβὼν ἀστραγάλους—οἱ δὲ ἄφθονοι παρὰ τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ κεῖνται—τέσσαρας ἀφίησιν ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης· ἐπὶ δὲ παντὶ ἀστραγάλου σχήματι γεγραμμένα ἐν πίνακι ἐπίτηδες ἐξήγησιν ἔχει.

As you descend from Boura toward the sea there is a river named the Boura and a small image of Herakles in a cave called the Herakles of Boura. You can get oracles there by means of knucklebones and a chart. The person consulting the god says a prayer in front of the statue and after praying takes four knucklebones (they are found in abundance next to Herakles) and casts them on the table. For every knucklebone throw there is inscribed on the chart for this purpose an explanation of the throw.[14]

This passage is important, since it draws our attention to the practice of inscribed interpretation. As Svenbro writes, the inscribed text addresses a reader in a communicative system where the text is present and the author absent.[15] The reader lends his voice to the speech act of the text, except that in this case the speech act of the text is a clearly labeled interpretation constructed either as an answer to a question or as a guiding sentence for someone's social reality. In this way, the interpretative inscription becomes the static point, with the question as the open element. A fixed answer can address multiple inquiries. There is also the possibility that there was no question at all, in which case the verses function like today's horoscopes.

At this juncture it should be stressed that since it is not clear that these lines here bear much resemblance to the rest of the papyri, it may be misleading that they are included in a single edition with all the magical papyri. It is worth looking at some instances where Homer is quoted. Already in the so-called 'Apollonian invocation,' one of the most

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example, if he cast a four, a six and another four, he would get the following oracle taken from Homer's *Iliad* (2.200)

464 Wretch, sit still and listen to the words of others.

The idea underlying all these oracles was a productive one, since oracles of this sort were widespread and found in different forms and formats. Two elements run through them all: a fixed list of oracular messages and a device for sortition, usually a form of dice. Since the user did not pose a specific interrogation, the messages necessarily are general in nature, like the fortunes in Chinese fortune cookies."

[14] Translation from Hansen (1998) 285.

[15] Svenbro (1993) 28–43.

important magical papyri, in a text that seems to be a prayer to Apollo, we see a clear interest in '*epopoiia*' ('divination in epic verses').

> καὶ ὅταν εἰσέλθῃ, ἐρώτα αὐτόν, περὶ οὗ θέλεις, περὶ μαντείας, περὶ ἐποποιίας, περὶ ὀνειροπομπείας, περὶ ὀνειραιτησίας, περὶ ὀνειροκριτίας, περὶ κατακλίσεως, περὶ πάντων, ὅ[σ]ων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ μαγικῇ ἐμπει[ρίᾳ].
> (*PGM* I. 327–331)

> And when he comes, ask him about what you wish, about the art of prophecy, about divination with epic verses (*epopoiia*), about the sending of dreams, about obtaining revelations in dreams, about interpretations of dreams, about causing disease, about everything that is a part of magical knowledge.[16]

Epopoiia, divination in epic style, is regarded, first, as an integral part of magical knowledge and practice (*magike empeiria*), and is, secondly, described as a teachable skill. Epic verses are vested with authority that can relate to people's lives and provide a guide for life. The word is attested earlier in Herodotus (2.116) and Aristotle (*Po.* 1459b8) as synonymous with epic poetry.[17] In the *PGM* collection it is found in the theoretical part, not as part of a spell or divinatory practice; it refers to the act when someone who wants to learn more about how to acquire prophetic skills is instructed about them.

Homer in the Magical Papyri

Epic verses have magical uses beyond divination. One example of the use of a Homeric line comes in a prayer that seeks divine assistance from three Homeric verses, a papyrus from the 4th century.[18]

> Τρίστιχος Ὁμήρου πάρεδρος·

> 'ὣς εἰπὼν τάφροιο διήλασε μώνυχας ἵππους'
> 'ἄνδρας τ' ἀσπαίροντας ἐν ἀργαλέοισι φόνοισιν'
> 'αὐτοὶ δ' ἱδρῶ πολλὸν ἀπενίζοντο θαλάσσῃ.'

> τούτους τοὺς στίχους ἐάν τις ἀποδράσας φορῇ ἐν σιδηρᾷ λάμνῃ, οὐδέποτε εὑρεθήσεται. ὁμοίως τὴν αὐτὴν λάμναν περίαπτε τῷ μέλλοντι

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[16] PGM I (327–331) in Preisendanz, Papyrus in Berlin, Staatliche Museen (*P. Berol.* Inv. 5025, dated to 4th–5th c. CE). Translation by E.N. O'Neill in Betz (1986) 1: 11. The "he" is a reference to Apollo.

[17] For the term *epopoiia* in the meaning of composing epic verses see Lucian's *Zeus Tragodos* (6. 3).

[18] *PGM* IV. 2145–2176. *P. Bibl. Nat. Suppl.* Gr. no. 574.

ἀποθνήσκειν, καὶ πάντα ἀκούσει, ἃ ἐπερωτᾷς. ἐπειδάν τις καταδεδέσθαι νομίζῃ, ἐπιλεγέτω ὕδατι θαλασσίῳ ῥαίνων [....] τε πρὸς ἐπιπομπάς. ἀθλητὴς δὲ ἔχων τὴν λεπίδα ἄλειπτος μένει, ὁμοίως δὲ

καὶ ἡνίοχος φορῶν τὴν λεπίδα σὺν λίθῳ μάγνητι. καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ὡσαύτως. καὶ μονομάχος δὲ ταῦτα φορείτω. καταδίκῳ δὲ σφαγέντι ἁψάμενος εἰπὲ εἰς τὸ οὖς τοὺς στίχους, καὶ ὅσα θέλεις, πάντα σοι ἐρεῖ· σὺ δὲ βαστάξας τὴν λάμναν εἰς τὴν πληγὴν ἕξεις μέγα ἀγαθὸν πρός τε ὑπερέχοντας ἢ δεσπότας ἢ ἑτέρους τινάς· ἔσῃ γὰρ ἔνδοξος,

πιστικός· καὶ δαίμονας καὶ θῆρας ἀποπέμπει. φοβηθήσεταί σε πᾶς, ἐν πολέμῳ

ἄτρωτος ἔσῃ, αἰτήσας λήμψει, ἐπιχαρὴς ἔσῃ, ἀλλαχθήσῃ, ἧς δ' ἂν παράψῃ γυναικὸς ἢ ἀνδρός, φιληθήσει· ἔνδοξος, μακάριος ἔσει, κληρονομίας ἕξεις, εὐτυχήσεις, φάρμακα νικήσεις, καταδέσμους ἀναλύσεις καὶ ἐχθροὺς νικήσεις.

"After saying this, he drove the solid-hoofed horses through the ditch."[19]
"and men gasping out their lives amid the terrible slaughter."[20]
"and they washed off in the sea the sweat that covered them."[21]

If a runaway carries these verses inscribed on an iron lamella, he will never be found. Likewise, attach the same lamella / to pronounce on the point of death, and you will get an answer to everything you ask him. Whenever anyone thinks he is under a spell, let him pronounce the verses while sprinkling with sea water and ... against enchantments. A contestant with the / tablet stays undefeated, just as also a charioteer who carries the tablet along with a lodestone; and the same is true in court; also, these are the things for a gladiator to carry. Attach it to a criminal who has been executed, speak / the verses in his ear, and he will tell you everything you wish. Insert the lamella into his wound, and you will have a great blessing with regard to your superiors and masters and others as well, for you will have honor, / trust. It also keeps off daemons and wild animals. Everyone will fear you, in war you will be invulnerable; when you ask you will receive; you will enjoy favor; your life will change; and you will be loved by any woman or man you have contact with. / You will have honor, happiness;

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19 Hom. *Il.* 10.564 (he = Odysseus).

20 From Hom. *Il.* 10.521, *PGM* differs slightly. Men is the object of "saw" in *Il.* 10.520; in the iliadic narrative, it is a kinsman of Rhesus who "saw."

21 Hom. *Il.* 10.572. They, in the context of Homeric narrative, is Odysseus and Diomedes. These lines also appear in *PGM* 4. 820–823, and 4. 471–473. See Betz (1986) 47 for *PGM* 4.469–470, where the verse from Hom. *Il.* 10.193 (also in *PGM* 4.833–834, is used as a spell to 'get friends' "Let ... seize, lest we become a joy to our enemies"). In the latter, we have the case of a single line functioning as a charm, just like *PGM* 467–468 which gives the line from *Iliad* 8. 424. "Will you dare to raise your mighty spear against Zeus" as a charm to restrain anger (Betz (1986)) 1: 47, translated by R.F. Hock. For usage of Homeric verses as charms or amulets see also Heim (1893) 514–520.

> you will receive inheritances, have good fortune, be unaffected by potions and poison; and you will break spells and conquer your enemies.

In the papyrus, the Homeric part is written with exceptionally large letters.[22] In this particular papyrus there is clear reference to the ritual use of *lamellae* and the power that is believed to derive from inscriptions on them. The specific reference to the use of an iron *lamella*, unusual by contrast with those of silver, gold, tin or lead, can be interpreted further as underlining the relation with war. The iron *lamella* with its inscribed verses will lead to good fortune under the prescribed circumstances. The user should interact with people who have encountered some form of calamity in their lives (are on the verge of death, or have died as a result of execution). The result is promised to be power, invincibility, popularity, honor, happiness, and wealth.

Through metaphor the Homeric verses offer a handbook on how the incantation is to be performed. One notices immediately the repeated use of future tenses to describe what will happen. Ongoing magical activity is presented through future verbs. This is reminiscent of the activity performed by Theocritus' *Farmakeutria* in Idyll II, who uses future verbs about what she will do, thus linking the activity of the present to the outcome of the future.[23]

Let us now focus on the Homeric verses that the papyrus directs to be inscribed on the lamella. They all come from book 10 of the *Iliad*, and are grouped as a set. The first one presents the act of driving the horses through the ditch. The ditch can be understood in a metaphorical way, a passage from one place to another. The second line offers an image of liminality between life and death. The third shows the aftermath of the ritual. The sea that washes off the sweat is the regenerating power. The line 'αὐτοὶ δ' ἱδρῶ πολλὸν ἀπενίζοντο.' ("and they washed off in the sea the sweat that covered them") from Homer *Il.* 10.572 has the exact equivalent in the instructions for magic in lines 2150–2151:

> ἐπειδάν τις καταδεδέσθαι νομίζῃ, ἐπι-
> λεγέτω ὕδατι θαλασσίῳ ῥαίνων.

> Whenever anyone thinks he is under a spell, let him pronounce the verses while sprinkling with sea water and ... against enchantment.

In the lamella described here we have three Homeric verses put in a context that corresponds to performance as magical act. The lamella

[22] Betz (1986) 76.
[23] See Faraone (1995).

becomes the means through which a reverse reciprocity is established between one person who is dying or has already seen a very bad death, as the Homeric lines evoke, and another who performs magic and draws good fortune out of the other person's misfortune. The image of the first line is one of jumping horses that cross a ditch:

> ὣς εἰπὼν τάφροιο διήλασε μώνυχας ἵππους (*Il.* 10.564).
>
> After saying this, he drove the solid-hoofed horses through the ditch.

Horses with uncloven hooves (μώνυχας ἵππους) appear on the short hexametric spell cures which use the "flee" formula in a papyrus from Philinna, Thessaly, which contains a headache remedy.[24] It is possible that symbolic meanings are packed, so that the horses with uncloven hooves represent the imagined enemy or target as is the case with the text of the Philinna papyrus:

> Flee, headache, [lion] flees beneath a rock,
> Wolves flee; horses with uncloven hooves flee
> [and speed] beneath blows [of my perfect charm][25]

The *taphros* can be read as a boundary between life and death, or bad and good fortune. That the spell begins with an image of action, emphatic movement, the horse's jump, gives a symbolic value to the movement from one status to the other for the person who carries the lamella.[26] These verses occur twice in this magical papyrus (*PGM* 4.471–473), with presumably the same function of bringing symbolic meaning in the experienced reality that seeks change from bad to good fortune. Such an interpretation will help us understand better the next part, which presents many Homeric verses stitched together. This is the most problematic section, because the papyrus provides no information about the context of performance and the context of intended use.[27] Although

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[24] Discussed by Faraone (2004) and in Kotansky (1991) 113.

[25] Translation by E.N. O'Neil in Kotansky (1991) 113. On the horses as the encapsulation of the cause of imaginative fear see also Theocritus 15, 40 ("the horse bites" is what the mother says to scare her child), and later remarks in Theocritus 15,58 "A horse and the cold snake I have been afraid of more than anything else since my childhood."

[26] On that see Collins (2008) 220 who discusses the notion of the 'trench' as the representation of a boundary more generally, a notion fitting as the verse here refers to a runaway slave.

[27] See Kotansky (1991) 132, note 61. He mentions the *Homeromanteion* and other *loci PGM* 4. 467–474, 821–824, 830–834, 2145–2240. As he writes (1991:132) "several short recipes in *PGM* 22a also mention making a mullets from verses of Homer. One of these (22a.2–9) = *GMPT*, p. 260) written for hemorrhage, is of interest for comparative study because it mentions *speaking* a verse (*Il.* 1.75) to the blood to stop the flow; but if

analogy works to a certain extent to explain the reasoning and the link between the verses, the action and the projected outcome, at the same time they can be used in a slightly different way towards a contradictory result. As Collins (2008) 222 remarks, "new combinations of magical action are being sought by using different verses together, as well as by enlarging the metaphorical range of the action that is derivable from each of the verses." For example, the reference of the line in *Iliad* 10.572 to sweat can in a different context have sexual associations and be used as an erotic spell.[28] Homeric lines are used with an intended effect in mind, and can be seen against a completely new hermeneutic background, distant from the context of Homeric narrative.[29]

Homeromanteion, the Tradition of Sortes and Other Types of Divination

The hypothesis that the *homeromanteion* was used for divination has several weaknesses. Although it certainly remains the main hypothesis regarding the use of this text, as indeed the title suggests, a number of questions still need to be answered definitively. First of all, earlier references to the use of Homeric material in divination, as with the *Crito* passage mentioned earlier, come from larger literary narratives. Moreover, we face a conspicuous absence of external *testimonia* for such a use, and are only left with comparative evidence from other types of divinatory practices such as *astragalomanteia*, or dice oracles.[30] Late Antiquity offers a variety of styles and functions of divinatory texts from the third century onward in not only Greek, but also Latin, Coptic and Syriac traditions. The various *sortes* refer to the use of different literary texts for divination. The best known of such *sortes* are the *Sortes*

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the patient is ungrateful, another verse (*Il.* 1.96) is to be *written*. So also in lines 11–14 a contraceptive spell is to be inscribed on a papyrus amulet or (it says) even spoken. Examples and discussion are also given in Heim (1893) 514–520." *GMPT* = *Greek Magical Papyri in Translation*, Betz (1986). For the line of *Iliad* 3.40 "would that you be fated to be unborn and to die unmarried" as a contraceptive see Scarborough (1991) 158.

[28] See Collins (2008) 222.

[29] On that see Collins (2008). As he argues (2008) 234 "narrative context largely loses its significance by the fourth century CE, as individual verses are invested with different meanings relevant to the changing social, cultural, and medical circumstances of the users."

[30] Hopfner (1924) 51–56, Heinevetter (1912); on dice-oracles Graf (2005) 51–97.

Astrampsychi (in Greek), the *Sortes Sangallenses* (in Latin) among others.[31] Some of the *sortes*, such as the *sortes Biblicae*, *Sortes Sanctorum*, or the *Sortes Sangallenses* have a christianized content.[32] It is not always clear whether an actual oracle-monger or a diviner would be required for their use. While the *Sortes Astrampsychi* is a set of questions and answers, the *homeromanteion* is, from that perspective, a text only of answers, if we are indeed to assume a double mirror text of questions that the Homeric verses are given as answers.[33] If there was indeed an oracle-monger, his existence opens up a further set of questions regarding the place where this practice may have been carried out. Was it part of divinatory practice in a larger cult center or could it be something that could circulate more privately? Comparative epigraphic evidence points to the possibility that such texts not only had large circulation but also were prominent in certain parts of the ancient Greek world. Epigraphic evidence in Asia Minor suggests a presence of the so-called 'dice-oracles' clearly dated from the 2nd century BCE. The narrator of these oracles addresses an enquirer/reader from another place.[34] The social and religious framework of possible performance is another area of uncertainty.

The randomness of Homeric lines can also suggest bibliomancy. The *locus classicus* for bibliomancy is the passage in Augustine's *Confessions* 8.12 which describes how hearing some children singing (*tolle, lege* are the important words) made him open the Bible and read the first thing that would occur to him, which changed his life.[35] Augustine's use of children in this famous passage is possibly following a tradition on the central role of the child in divination practices.[36] Cicero in his *De*

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[31] The *Sortes Vergilianae* have a long history of references, which according to Katz "begins and ends in fiction", Katz (2004) 258. The equivalent use of Vergilian verses (*Sortes Vergilianae*) in bibliomancy is discussed in detail by Hamilton (1993) and Katz (1994). In Vergil, the underlying notion of the poet's role as a *vates* has led, according to Katz (1994), to the fabrication of the *sortes vergilianae*. For *sortes* see Klingshirn (2005) 100–101. For the *Sortes Astrampsychi* see Stewart (2001), and an English translation in Hansen (1998).

[32] Klingshirn (2005) 116–117.

[33] Potter (1994) 25 writes that the *Sortes Astrampsychi* possibly required the presence of an oracle-monger whose role, however, was very small, only to act as the god's agent and interpreter of the sage Astrampsychus. The same emphasis on authority and tradition is seen here.

[34] On the dice-oracles see the excellent article by Graf (2005).

[35] By first reading the passage in Romans 13.13.

[36] See Johnston (2001) on child as divination.

Divinatione (2.85), with a critical stance towards *sortes*, describes lot divination and the use of children in drawing lots.[37]

To review our threads, in the *homeromanteion* we have scattered Homeric verses, most likely, as the very title suggests, used for divination. We have a number of specific verses that are part of this new compilation of verses. In this respect the *homeromanteion* is very different from the possible practices of bibliomancy, which offers random consultation of entire books. There are also similarities with lot divination, as someone has to draw three different lots, come up with a combination of numbers, and then be referred to the equivalent verse. These verses, like other Homeric lines used for ritual purposes out of context, are re-shuffled and re-used in a new context. Late Antiquity is a time of shifting meanings and "shifting canons", as Ziolkowski put it.[38] The way the Homeric poems were read and interpreted in the second century CE was entirely different from the way they were read two or three centuries later. Similarly, in this period, old literary texts are dismembered and reassembled to create new works with an allegorical meaning or a Christianized plot. Ziolkowski nicely compares the reshuffling of earlier literature with the reutilization of classical material in architecture and art, and sees the centos as the "most extreme literary parallel."[39] A church could have columns and other components from a pagan temple, reliquaries or chests could use small ancient things like gems or coins. The aesthetics of the time are shaped by the re-use of ancient material. The *homeromanteion* does exactly that: it uses older material in a new type of text and a new type of performance. In this light, we could consider the *homeromanteion* as a complete text which has more in common with the practices, context, and background of making cento poems.

Homeromanteion, Homer and Early Byzantine Centos

As Usher writes, the Homeric lines in the *homeromanteion* are "centolike incantations" from the *Greek Magical Papyri* that use lines from Homer.[40]

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[37] On ancient kleromancy and the types of evidence see Grottanelli (2005).

[38] Ziolkowski (2007) 22.

[39] Ziolkowski (2007) 22.

[40] Maltomini (1995). Usher (1997) 305–321. As Usher writes: "Homeric centos are poems made up entirely of verses lifted verbatim, or with only slight modification, from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Only a few have survived antiquity. There exist three short Homeric centos in the *Palatine Anthology* (9.361, 381, 382; cf. Hunger (1978) 98101), a ten line cento about Herakles quoted by Irenaeus (Wilken (1967), and a seven line cento

A cento is like a literary patchwork, a technical term that defines the kind of work made by lines taken from other, usually famous, works. This presupposes a kind of coherence in the new work, which is certainly not the situation here, at least not from a point of view that seeks the reading of a narrative with a beginning, middle and end. Centos have attracted relatively little attention among classical scholars; they have been regarded as a deviation from the main canon of classical texts even though cento poets use this canon extensively.[41] In the case of the *homeromanteion*, coherence within a narrative does not come from the text but from the interaction between the text and its performer and audience. The 216 lines of the *homeromanteion* are not intended to make sense from beginning to end, but each one of them is put against oral external narratives. Each line is 'lifted' away from its original position within Homeric narrative and is re-embedded in new context of performance and meaning.

If we read the papyri from the perspective of performance, then the focus would be on each individual line that is transformed into an open-ended text. However, I want to propose a perspective that comes from the point of view of literacy, if I may say so, and read these lines together as part of a manual. To be more exact, I propose a reading that focuses on the act of writing and a practice of reading aloud. Why would someone, presumably the 'author' of this document, produce this document, as opposed to another that uses a different selection of lines? After all, there is quite a choice among Homeric lines. And any selection would bear some connections with some questions but not with others. An equivalent text, such as the *Sortes Astrampsychi*, presents a set of questions and answers, unlike the *homeromanteion* which only gives the answers, all excerpted from the Homeric poems. The *homeromanteion* appears to be a product of a culture of *literacy*. To be more specific, it appears to be a product of a culture of manuscripts that sees the need of preserving these particular lines possibly used in and for divination. Yet, at the same time, it is also a product of *orality*, if we are to assume that these verses were *uttered* as part of a certain type of *dialogue* and formed a particular kind of *discourse* in a new context of divination.

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grafitto inscribed on the leg of a statue of Memnon in Egypt, which dates from the reign of Hadrian (Bernand (1960) 11113; Bowie (1990) 65. There are also several centolike incantations from the *Greek Magical Papyri* that use lines from Homer (Maltomini (1995)."

[41] On centos in antiquity see Hosterey (2001) 80–83.

If we are to regard the *homeromanteion* as a *sui generis* cento-like text, then it is also worth asking how it relates to other literary patchworks that re-use Homeric fabric in times adjacent to the *homeromanteion*. We also need to consider certain features in the lines of Homer that are in the *homeromanteion*. A closer philological analysis that compares the *homeromanteion* and the cento poem by Eudocia Augusta of the late first half of the 5th century CE can offer some interesting results. Eudocia claims to have composed her poem as a revision of an earlier poem by a certain Patricius. Although Eudocia knew her Homer from a culture of reading and writing, and from manuscripts, her own poem reveals that a modified oral practice was still lively. As Usher remarks in his study of the Homeric centos, Eudocia's proem indicates that "oral/aural factors loom large in the composition and transmission of the centos."[42] Eudocia composed a poem about stories from the Bible made entirely out of Homeric material. She reproduces Homeric lines in new meanings to talk about at the time popular stories ranging from Adam and Eve to the miracles of Jesus, a favorite Byzantine practice. A product of erudition, her cento indicates in various places, as Usher has convincingly argued, that Eudocia is not only a heir to a tradition of literacy but also of orality, through a recontextualized oral performance of Homer.[43] Her poem emphatically begins with an imperative of the verb "hear," a reproduced lines from *Iliad* 17.220 where she urges people to "hear" what her heart urges her to say (*Od.* 8.222):

> Κέκλυτε, μυρία φῦλα περικτιόνων ἀνθρώπων,
> ὄφρ' εἴπω, τά με θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κελεύει.
>
> Listen, thousands of tribes of people who dwell around here
> So that I may utter, what my heart urges me in my breast to say.[44]

A late antique culture of reading aloud and performing a text as a read-aloud text to others softens the discrepancy between literacy and orality. Homeric lines are re-formed and re-set in a byzantine setting of story-telling. The plot of the story is mostly taken from the Bible. Eudocia's poem is nothing else but biblical storytelling using Homeric dress. In her stitching of the stories she presents the themes of speech and listening.[45]

[42] Usher (1998) 9.
[43] Usher (1998) 9.
[44] *Homerocentones* Eudociae Augustae, lines 1 and 5. Unless otherwise indicated, translations from Homeric lines not part of *PGM* and other texts are my own.
[45] On that see Usher (1998) 28 ff. discussing orality and textuality.

With a closer analysis of concordances of the quoted lines in the *homeromanteion*, we note a great coincidence of lines found in both the *homeromanteion* and Eudocia's *cento* poem. The two texts have a total of 39 lines in common, 20 from the *Iliad* and 19 from the *Odyssey*. In addition to those, more lines from the Eudocia text and the Homeromanteion are part of the same extended passage in Homer.[46] Thus, for example, *Iliad* 1.212., found in *PGM* 7.141, is also used by Eudocia (line 488, Usher's edition) in her passage that discusses Jesus' resurrection, presented as a first person speech by Christ. The exact same line is repeated in Eudocia (line 125) for the resurrection of Lazarus:

> ὧδε γὰρ ἐξερέω, τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται·
>
> For so shall I proclaim, and it will be accomplished too.[47]

Likewise, to give one example from the *Odyssey*, line 11.80 from the *Odyssey* is given in the cento as part of Christ's response to the paralytic in Solomon's stoa before the miracle, while also appearing in the *homeromanteion* (number 56. 2–4–2):

> [βδβ ταῦτά τ]οι, ὦ δύστηνε, τ[ελευτήσω τε] καὶ ἔρ̣ξ̣[ω].
>
> These things, unhappy man, will I accomplish and do for you.
>
> (*PGM* 7.56, Betz line 56)

The fact that the two texts, the *homeromanteion* and Eudocia's *homerocentones*, both composed around the same time, have so many lines in common out of the roughly 27000 lines of the Homeric epics combined poses some further questions. It is possible that the authors were well acquainted with certain lines from textbooks or summaries that circulated in those times. Homer occupied an important role in schools of grammar and rhetoric; an educated audience was therefore familiar with these verses, and was possibly also able to recognize and situate these verses in a completely different context. It is possible then that the compiler of the *homeromanteion* knew the same Homer as the erudite empress Eudocia, or knew Homer through similar sources. One could

46 The lines found in both Eudocia's poem and the *homeromanteion* are the following: *Iliad* 1.212; 2.24; 3.41; 4.161; 5.127; 5.408; 6.236; 6.441; 8.413; 9.133; 9.310; 10.383; 11.654; 14.110; 14.212; 15.52; 16.282; 18.121; 22.79; 22.495; *Odyssey* 2.273; 3.216; 6.201; 8.244; 11.80; 11.278; 11.427; 12.342; 13.308; 15.344; 16.161; 17.66; 17.550; 19.360; 20.237; 20.316; 21.207; 21.209; 21.212.

47 *Il.* 1.212 = *PGM* 7.141, Betz line 209. All translations from the *homeromanteion* are from Betz (1986).

even imagine a scenario in which Eudocia herself would know the *homeromanteion* or would be part of the same circles as its compiler.

If indeed the common lines can be attributed to late antique and early byzantine readings of Homer and the way Homer circulated among educated audiences, then we also need to consider how other manuscripts of the *homeromanteion* may relate to the *homerocentones*. The revised text of the *homeromanteion* that Maltomimi proposes in his 1998 article makes the parallel reading with Eudocia's *homerocentones* more intriguing. With help from the texts of the other papyri that preserve a *homeromanteion* (*P. Bon* 3 and *P. Oxy. 3831*), all of which preserve the same lines, he proposes an introduction to the *homeromanteion* with the following lines:

κλῦθι ἄναξ ὅς που Λυκίης ἐν πίονι δήμῳ
εἲς ἢ ἐνὶ Τροίῃ· δύνασαι δὲ σὺ πάντοσ' ἀκούειν
ἀνέρι κηδομένῳ, ὡς νῦν ἐμὲ κῆδος ἱκάνει.
καί μοι τοῦτ' ἀγόρευσον ἐτήτυμον, ὄφρ' ἐῢ εἰδῶ,
ὅττι μάλιστ' ἐθέλω καί τοι φίλον ἔπλετο θυμῷ,

Listen, o Lord who reside in the fertile land of Lycia
Or in Troy; for you have the ability to hear everywhere
A man in sorrow, just as sorrow now reaches me.
And announce this to me in all truth, so that I get to know well
What I mostly wish and what is most pleasing to your heart.[48]

The first three lines all come from *Iliad* 16. 514–516. The fourth line is attested in various places throughout the *Odyssey* (1.174, 4. 645, 13.232, 14.186, 24.258, 24. 297. 24.403). The fifth line is an adaptation with a change of the second person singular verb in *Od.* 18.113 (*etheleis*) to a first person singular verb here (*ethelo*).

The beginning of the *homeromanteion* begins with the same verb as Eudocia's cento, with a small change in the number. While Eudocia addresses in the plural a wide audience of many people (*keklute*), the author of the *homeromanteion* in its proem addresses one person in particular, Apollo, the god of prophecy, in search of inspiration for what will follow (*kluthi*). The fifth line is also reminiscent of Eudocia's fifth line (from *Iliad* 8.6):

ὄφρ' εἴπω τά με θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κελεύει.

So that I may utter what my heart urges me in my breast to say.

48 Unless otherwise indicated all translations are my own.

The similarities in the proems—so to speak—of both the *homeromanteion* and Eudocia's cento are so clear that we could perhaps infer a formulaic way of making an introduction when reshuffling Homer. The cento seems to come as a product of inner 'urging of the heart' which is appropriately placed at the beginning of the new re-shuffled randomized Homeric excerpt.

The same is seen in the brief cento found in *Anthologia Graeca* 9.382. In this poem, the second line reiterates the motif of the heart's urging to speak. The emphasis on verbs of speech at critical points, such as the beginning of a poem, frames the performance axis of the new product:

> Ὦ φίλοι, ἥρωες Δαναοί, θεράποντες Ἄρηος,
> ψεύσομαι ἦ ἔτυμον ἐρέω; κέλεται δέ με θυμός.
> ἀγροῦ ἐπ' ἐσχατιῆς, ὅθι δένδρεα μακρὰ πεφύκει,
> ναίει ἐυπλόκαμος δεινὴ θεὸς αὐδήεσσα,
> ἢ θεὸς ἠὲ γυνή· τοὶ δὲ φθέγγοντο καλεῦντες.
> εἰ δὲ φθεγξαμένου τευ ἢ αὐδήσαντος ἀκούσῃ,
> αὖτις ἀριζήλως εἰρημένα μυθολογεύει.
> ἀλλὰ τίη τοι ταῦτα διεξέρχεσθαι ἕκαστα;
> τὴν δ' οὔτ' ἀθρῆσαι δύναμ' ἀντίον οὔτε νοῆσαι·
> ὁπποῖόν κ' εἴπησθα ἔπος, τοῖόν κ' ἐπακούσαις.[49]

> O Friends, Danaan heroes, servants of Ares, should I lie or say the truth, as my heart urges me? At the most remote place of the land where tall trees grow lives a fair-haired dreadful goddess gifted with speech, either a goddess or a woman, and they called aloud on her. If she hears anyone call or speak, she is eager to repeat what was spoken. But why go through these things in detail? Only I cannot look on her face or perceive her. Whatever sort of word you speak, such would you hear.

The last line of this cento of the *Anthologia Graeca* is also found in the *homeromanteion* in *PGM* 7. 34, Betz line 102 (combination 3–5–6): [γ]ες ὀπ|ποῖόν κ' εἴπη[σθα ἔπος, τοῖόν κ' ἐπακούσα]ις. This is a rephrasing of *Iliad* 20.250: 'Whatever sort of word you speak, such would you hear.' This small cento poem describes Echo, who becomes a metapoetic reference for the making of cento poems.

One more question that is worth exploring further concerns the distinctive features of the lines quoted in the *homeromanteion*. There are some interesting observations that can help us construct further meaning. The largest percentage of all the scattered verses in the papyrus comes from Homeric passages where direct speech is presented in the mouth of

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49 *Anthologia Graeca* 9.382.1–10, text edited by H. Beckby, Munich 1965.

one of the heroes or heroines. Moreover, many of the lines are proverbial. To be more exact, of the 191 lines, 82 are from the *Odyssey*, and 126 from the *Iliad* (there are some formulaic lines that can be found in multiple places, which is why the total of quoted lines from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* exceeds the number of the surviving lines). The most quoted books of the Homeric epics are book 21 of the *Odyssey*, with 20 lines from this book, then book 22 of the *Iliad*, of which 12 lines are quoted, then 11 lines from book 9 of the *Iliad*, 9 lines of book 5 of the *Iliad*, and 8 lines of book 19 of the *Iliad*, and 11 of the *Odyssey*. Moreover, these lines have a long history of recontextualized presence in classical and post-classical authors, such as Plutarch, Cassius Dio, Porphyry and others.

One more observation: the verbs in the quoted lines tend to be imperative (24 lines) optative (17 lines), and future (22 lines).[50]

Here are some examples:

Futures:

52. [βγ]δ ψ[ευστήσ]εις, | οὐδ' αὖτε [τέλος μύθῳ] ἐπιθήσεις
2-3-4. You will play a cheat and not bring your word to fulfillment
(*Iliad* 19.107)

2-6-5. ἄξομα]ι ἀμφοτέροις· ἀλό[χους καὶ κτήμα]τ' ὀπάσσω
2-6-5. wives I will provide for both and furnish possessions.
(*Odyssey* 21.214)

Imperatives:

π]ῖ|[νέ τε, μηδ' ἐρίδαινε μετ' ἀ]νδράσι κουροτέροισιν
3-2-6. drink, and not vie with younger men (*Odyssey* 21. 310)

δβδ ἀλλ' ὄρσευ πο]λεμόνδ' [οἷος πάρος εὔχεαι εἶναι].
4-2-4. Up, rush into battle, the man you have always claimed to be.
(*Iliad* 4.264)

Optatives emphasize open-endedness and invite interpretation. Future tense is quite frequent in poetry (such as Pindar) to describe on-going action (such as dancing or other ritual activity).[51] As Faraone suggests, the use of the future tense probably draws on earlier hexameter incantations and refers to the ritual activity on-going at that very moment. I want to add further that there is an instructive aspect.[52] Futures are used not only to make connections between present and future, but also implic-

[50] Faraone (1995).
[51] Faraone (1995) 2, Calame (1993) 48 where he connects Callimachus' usage of future tense with that of archaic poets as a device to describe on-going process.
[52] Faraone (1995).

itly to instruct the audience. The future is often didactic. How do you give a recipe to someone? While performing the action, (such as cooking) you say, "now I will add the salt to the flour, now I will do this". It is a type of discourse with a clearly labeled didactic component. One could argue that the future is expected, since the audience wants something that pertains to the future. The inherent performativity of the future tense is what makes these verses more plausible to an audience. As for the imperative, if indeed these lines were used for divination or counseling, then the expectation would be that the receiver gets an authoritative utterance about the future.

Conclusion: Poetics and Semiotics of the Homeromanteion

Any interpretation of the *homeromanteion* as it currently survives is based on the reciprocity of answer and question, a concept which invites us to ask to what inquiries the *homeromanteion* responded; how, more precisely, Homer's lines were used from a performance perspective; and how meaning was further constructed. There is certainly a history of allegorical readings of Homer, a strong philological tradition that seeks to differentiate between the *dianoia* and the *epê*, the meaning and words of the poet, as well as Renaissance references to Homeric prophecies that present Homer as a soothsayer.[53] Constant use of half-proverbial tags from Homer by learned and unlearned alike, together with the archaic effect of the mysticism that this language had as late as the 4th or 5th centuries CE, makes scattered Homeric verses the ideal authoritative voice for divination.[54] At the same time, this can be attributed to the position that Homer had in late antique education.

Although this could be the result of educational practices and a tendency to learn quotations from Homer that would have a didactic tone, divination with Homer brings forth the issue of education and performance in a new context. Just as the cento by empress Eudocia emphasizes the act of speech and listening, so the emphasis on futures, imperatives and optatives presents a new type of utterance, a new type of performed Homer, where future tenses, imperatives and optatives are dominant in performative texts. It is not by chance that most of these lines are chopped from Homeric speeches. The context of the narrative

53 Porter (1992) 70–72, Long (1970).

54 Browning (1992).

could possibly be understood by an educated audience, but this is not necessary for the construction of new meaning. Homer continued to be the main textbook throughout antiquity.[55] The pedagogical value recognized in Homer made the Homeric text accessible from Roman times to Byzantium. The schoolmaster's practices changed little in Late Antiquity and continued until the byzantine era. A schoolmaster could randomly select passages from the Homeric text. As Lamberton remarks, the reading aids that the Byzantines would use later "are the kind of texts to which the concept of authorship may have little relevance, because any schoolmaster was capable of modifying or supplementing the work of his predecessors."[56] From the perspective of late antique and early byzantine students, learning would come from dictation by the teacher and repetition of lines. School practices give to Homeric verses a new cycle of orality, no longer a social activity like the archaic performance, yet still part of a lively tradition. That Homer could be like a Vergilian *vates*, the guide to daily questions, brings a new time in the history of Homeric performance. The authors of such scattered verses aspired to provide inspiration and to become meaningful and relevant to the everyday reality.

To sum up: multiple meanings are integral to the semiotics and poetics of texts that preserve Homeric lines as divination. The stoic philosopher Panaetius from Rhodes, as preserved in Athenaeus (14.634c), called Aristarchus the scholar a *mantis*, giving to the word commonly translated as "prophet, seer," the meaning of "interpreter." There is little to separate interpretation and divination in this passage.[57] As Struck remarks, "the poet-prophet axis was a central pillar in the traditional edifice of ancient views on poetry."[58] It is in this light that I call *Homer* of the *homeromanteion* a *mantis*, an interpreter. Interpreting an interpreter is a tricky business that requires contrary routes. Eudocia Augusta, when describing Patricius' poem, which she revised, used the word *hemiteleston* ("half-finished," line 9 of her proem).[59] Such is the doomed nature of any scholarly approach to the *homeromanteion*, since we lack information on its performance circumstances. But we might say that, just as a given text may yield multiple meanings, so too there might be multiple *homeromanteia*.

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[55] Lamberton (1992) 137.

[56] Lamberton (1992) 137.

[57] Panaetius was a student of Crates of Mallos at Pergamon, a rival of Aristarchus. For more details see Porter (1989) 70.

[58] Struck (2005) 151.

[59] Usher (1999) *Praefatio* p. IX, line 9.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

ASSUMING THE MANTLE OF THE GODS: 'UNKNOWABLE NAMES' AND INVOCATIONS IN LATE ANTIQUE THEURGIC RITUAL

Crystal Addey

I am the hearing that is attainable to everything;
I am the speech that cannot be grasped.

Thunder, Perfect Mind[1]

The use of 'unknowable' or so called 'meaningless' names and strings of vowels (*voces magicae*) is well attested within ritual invocations found in religious, magical, and theurgic late antique texts. For example, many such names and vowel-strings are found in the magical handbooks discovered in Egypt and now known under the name of the *Greek Magical Papyri*.[2] The vowel-strings are a written record of a sound sequence, while the names are strange words which do not have any obvious meaning. These names were often referred to as *onomata barbara*, 'non-Greek names/words.' Both were spoken or uttered within ritual contexts, as well as being inscribed upon cult statues and other ritual paraphernalia.[3]

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[1] Robinson (1977) 77. I wish to thank all speakers and participants at the Eighth Biennial Conference on Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World: Orality, Literacy and Religion, held at the University of Nijimegen, 2–6 July 2008, at which this paper was originally presented, for their valuable feedback and discussion. I also wish to thank the organizers of the conference, André Lardinois, Josine Blok and Marc van der Poel, for their warm and generous hospitality and for providing such pleasant and congenial surroundings for the conference. I wish to express my warmest thanks and gratitude to my supervisor, Gillian Clark for reading and commenting on drafts of this chapter. I also wish to thank all participants at the seminar on 'Jamblichos: His Sources and Influence,' held at the Irish Institute of Hellenic Studies, Athens, at which a draft of this paper was presented.

[2] Cf. for example, *PGM* IV.930; 960–965; XIII.762–772; XIII.880–886; ed. Preisendanz (1928–1931). All quotations from the *PGM* are from this edition, unless otherwise stated.

[3] For example, the *Ephesia grammata*, a particular set of mystic letters or unknowable names, were allegedly incised on the famous cult statue of Artemis of Ephesus and were often used in apotropaic rituals, both verbally and as parts of inscribed texts. A story

This points towards the significance both of language and of oral performance within a ritual context. However, the meaning of such 'unknowable' ritual formulae is little discussed in extant sources from antiquity. Iamblichus provides one of the few discussions of the context and operation of 'unknowable' names within the ritual praxis of late antiquity, although he does not refer to the vowel-strings.[4]

Iamblichus was a late antique philosopher who lived in Syria in the third century CE (c.240–c.325 CE), but wrote in Greek. He was a Neoplatonist, a modern term used to describe philosophers of this period who followed and interpreted Plato's philosophy. His treatise, now called *De mysteriis* (*On the Mysteries*), is one of the most extensive surviving late antique works on Graeco-Roman religious practices.[5] This work shows a synthesis of such practices with Egyptian, Chaldaean, and Assyrian ritual practices. Composed between 280 and 305 CE under the pseudonym 'Abammon,' Iamblichus' work answers the questions on religious phenomena posed by the philosopher Porphyry.[6] In this sense, the work functions as a kind of dialogue. Iamblichus was a theurgist, a practitioner of theurgy (θεουργία), which literally means 'god-working.' This was a type of religious ritual which included divination as one of its essential elements. Its central aim was to reawaken the soul's inherent connection with the gods, thus allowing the soul to attain *anagôgê*, the ascent of the soul to the divine, intelligible realm.[7] Thus, Iamblichus' treatise also functions as an explanation of theurgic ritual; his discussion of the names takes place within this context. Iamblichus' *De mysteriis* comprises our central evidence for the operation and scope of theurgic ritual within

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(recorded in later sources: Photius, the *Suda* and Eustathius) speaks of an Ephesian who by wearing the letters tied onto his ankle repeatedly defeated his Milesian rival in boxing; as soon as the amulet was detected and removed the man was soundly defeated. Cf. Kotansky (1991) 111, 126 n. 21, 24.

[4] Iambl. *Myst.*, eds. and trs. Clarke, Dillon, and Hershbell (2003). All quotations and translations of this work are from this edition, unless otherwise specified.

[5] The original title of the work is: *The Reply of the Master Abammon to the Letter of Porphyry to Anebo and the Solutions to the Questions it Contains*. The modern title which the work is now commonly known as, *On the Mysteries of the Egyptians, Chaldaeans and Assyrians* (*De mysteriis Aegyptiorum, Chaldaeorum, Assyriorum*) was coined by Marsilio Ficino in the fifteenth century. Cf. Clarke, Dillon and Hershbell (2003) xlviii.

[6] For its assignation to c.300 CE, cf. Saffrey (1971) 231–233; Athanassiadi (1993) 116 n. 13. For a suggestion of c.280 CE cf. Dillon (1973) 13; 18. On Iamblichus' use of the pseudonym Abammon see Saffrey (1971) 227–239; Clarke, Dillon and Hershbell (2003) xxviii–xxxvii.

[7] Cf. Iambl. *Myst.* 5.22–23; Shaw (1995); Clarke, Dillon and Hershbell (2003) xxvii; Struck (2004) 210–213.

the third century CE.[8] However, it must be noted that, as a Neoplatonist philosopher, Iamblichus was situated within a very specific tradition of philosophical thought and so is clearly not immediately representative of a wider, popular view of late antique ritual in a more general sense. I will use Iamblichus' discussion in order to explore the subtle interplay between language and oral performance which is reflected in the use of 'unknowable' names within theurgy. I will also briefly discuss some parallels with the use of 'unknowable' names within some wider ritual contexts (chiefly attested within the *PGM*) within the religious and cultural milieu of late antiquity.[9]

The 'Unknowable Names': Secret Names of the Gods

The use of 'unknowable names' within the ritual practices of late antiquity has often been overlooked by scholars; those scholars who have examined them have generally treated such ritual uses of language not only as nonsensical, but as compulsive, mechanical and egotistic in that it is generally viewed as presuming to summon, and sometimes even to compel by force, divine presence into the human world.[10] I will argue that the use of the names was not always considered coercive, and was not 'a misguided attempt to define the undefinable.' Within a theurgic context, Iamblichus' broadly Platonic explanation of this ritual language delineates the names as verbal forms of communication with the divine, given by the gods.

Porphyry had raised the obvious objection to this: these strings of sound are meaningless (ἄσημα). They are not language, because they do not signify, they are literally *asêma*; they do not name anything and they

[8] Cf. Shaw (1995) 237–242 on Iamblichus' development of theurgic Platonism. The later Neoplatonist philosopher Proclus (c.410–c.485 CE) was the other major proponent of theurgy within the Neoplatonic tradition whose writings are extant. His work is not discussed in this chapter due to space limitations.

[9] This chapter seeks to develop the research of Cox Miller (1986) 481–505. A caveat must be mentioned here: I do not wish to suggest that Iamblichus would necessarily have approved of or endorsed the practices attested within the *PGM*. In fact, within the *De mysteriis*, Iamblichus frequently condemns the use of antagonistic magical practices by the *goês*, the magician: see, for example, *Myst*. 3.13 (131.4–132.2).

[10] Nock (1929) I.176–194, who describes the magical practitioner using the spells in the *Greek Magical Papyri* as "often as a lien on a god rather than as a means of approach to him" (190); Festugière (1944) 283–309; Behm (1964) 722–723; Dillon (1985) 204; 214; (2007) 40.

do not communicate.[11] Iamblichus replies that they are not 'meaningless,' but unknowable to human beings, although they can become known by certain humans who have the potential to receive their explanations from the gods.[12] He continues, setting forth his view of the 'names':

> … τοῖς μέντοι θεοῖς πάντα σημαντικά ἐστιν οὐ κατὰ ῥητὸν τρόπον, οὐδ' οἷός ἐστιν ὁ διὰ τῶν φαντασιῶν παρ' ἀνθρώποις σημαντικός τε καὶ μηνυτικός, ἀλλ' ἤτοι νοερῶς [κατὰ τὸν θεῖον αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπειον νοῦν] ἢ καὶ ἀφθέγκτως καὶ κρειττόνως καὶ ἁπλουστέρως [καὶ] κατὰ νοῦν τοῖς θεοῖς συνηνωμένος· ἀφαιρεῖν μὲν οὖν χρὴ πάσας ἐπινοίας καὶ λογικὰς διεξόδους ἀπὸ τῶν θείων ὀνομάτων, ἀφαιρεῖν δὲ καὶ τὰς συμφυομένας τῆς φωνῆς πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῇ φύσει πράγματα φυσικὰς ἀπεικασίας.

> … but to the gods they are all significant, not according to an effable mode, nor in such as way that is significant and indicative to the imaginations of human beings, but united to the gods either intellectually or rather ineffably, and in a manner superior and more simple than in accordance with intellect. It is essential, therefore, to remove all considerations of logic from the names of the gods, and to set aside the natural representations of the spoken word to the physical things that exist in nature.[13]

Here we see that within a theurgic context the 'unknowable names' were considered to be the secret names of the gods. That is, they do name the gods but not in the way that ordinary words name things. This accords with the fact that where scholars have been able to decipher extant *onomata barbara* in ancient texts, they seem to be names of divinities in Near Eastern or Egyptian languages.[14] Iamblichus' explanation draws on Platonic philosophy: the Neoplatonists posited a hierarchical, metaphysical structure of the cosmos, with the gods placed near the summit of this hierarchy and successive levels of reality consisting of Intellect (νοῦς) and Soul.[15] Each ontological level of reality is inherent in the preceding levels because it is caused by them.[16] The 'unknowable' names operate on a high level of this hierarchical schema—they are united with the gods in the divine realm and are superior to all human knowledge. However, rather than being irrational they were thought by Iamblichus to be

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[11] Iambl. *Myst.* 7.4 (254.11–12).
[12] Iambl. *Myst.* 7.4 (254.12–255.1); 1.15 (48.4–8). Cf. Shaw (1995) 180.
[13] Iambl. *Myst.* 7.4 (255.1–7).
[14] Cf. Graf (1991) 191; Shaw (1995) 182; Struck (2004) 206–207.
[15] Cf. Dillon (1985) 210; Struck (2004) 207–209.
[16] For the clearest elucidation of this principle in Neoplatonic metaphysics see Procl. *Elements of Theology*, Proposition 18; Proposition 7, ed. Dodds (1933). Cf. also Iambl. *Myst.* 3.20 (148.4–9); 5.20 (227.13–228.2).

supra-rational, placed above the rational; transcending logic rather than lacking it. Iamblichus explains this supra-rational basis for 'unknowable' names:

> Ὅσπερ δέ ἐστι νοερὸς καὶ θεῖος τῆς θείας ὁμοιότητος συμβολικὸς χαρακτήρ, τοῦτον ὑποθετέον ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. Καὶ δὴ κἂν ἄγνωστος ἡμῖν ὑπάρχῃ, αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τὸ σεμνότατον· κρείττων γάρ ἐστιν ἢ ὥστε διαιρεῖσθαι εἰς γνῶσιν.
>
> Thus, the symbolic character of divine similitude, which is intellectual and divine, has to be assumed in the names. And indeed if it is unknowable to us, this very fact is its most sacred aspect: for it is *too excellent to be divided into knowledge*. [my italics][17]

Thus, Iamblichus argues that the names do signify and communicate, but in a way that is appropriate for the gods. Supra-rational vision was thought to represent complete vision of reality, on the ontological level (hypostasis) of Intellect (νοῦς), before it is divided into logical statements.[18] This divine language is non-discursive, paradoxical and enigmatic; it cannot be reduced to logical propositions or statements. The paradoxical character of the names has been shown by Patricia Cox Miller, who has suggested that the *voces magicae* were intended to transcend not only writing but speech itself.[19]

In the statement above, Iamblichus maintains that the divine names have a symbolic character. The word *symbolon*, which is the origin of our modern term 'symbol', was used by Neoplatonist philosophers in a very different way than the modern term, which has connotations of metaphor and superficial likeness.[20] For the Neoplatonists, *symbola* are caused by and linked ontologically with the divine realm: according to them, there are chains of qualities and properties which extend from the gods through each ontological grade of reality right down into the physical world. *Symbola* are the visible imprints of such chains as they are expressed in the manifested cosmos. So, specific herbs, stones and plants, for example, were thought to be *symbola* of specific deities, linked

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[17] Iambl. *Myst.* 7.4 (255.7–11).

[18] In other words, supra-rational vision is vision on the level (hypostasis) of *Nous* (Intellect). Struck (2004) 208, describes *Nous*: "The divine mind [νοῦς] thinks without need for limits or categories or sequential strings of logic. It remains perfectly still; it thinks and knows everything all at once." For a similar view of ritual language as comprising 'utterances filled with power' rather than discursive language which uses logic and argumentation, cf. *Corpus Hermeticum* XVI.2; ed. Scott (1993).

[19] Cox Miller (1986) 490.

[20] Cf. Struck (2004) 204.

to their divine cause and thus used within ritual to invoke the divinity through sympathetic similarity (συμπάθεια).[21] The 'unknowable names' were also considered to be *symbola* which manifest divinity in the physical cosmos: we hear from other Neoplatonists that they were either written down (θέσις) or uttered (ἐκφώνησις) within theurgic ritual.[22] These words had to be correctly pronounced within the ritual: some evidence seems to indicate that the correct manner of uttering them was a professional secret which was orally transmitted.[23] Thus, it seems that the 'names' were located within an oral tradition.[24] However, we know of these 'names' because they were written down, in Greek letters, within the *Greek Magical Papyri*. It may well have been considered safe to write the names down, because to someone without the requisite level of understanding and ritual purity, they would seem meaningless (ἄσημα) and the correct methods of pronunciation and utterance would remain obscure and unknown.

Debating Categories of Language: Natural, Conventional or Divine?

Iamblichus denies that the 'unknowable' names are either natural, in the sense of representing physical or natural objects, or conventional, in the sense of being invented by man and agreed upon among human participants of society.[25] Porphyry had asked Iamblichus, 'But a listener looks to the meaning, so surely all that matters is that the conception remains the same, whatever the kind of words used' (Ἀλλ' ὁ ἀκούων

[21] Cf. Shaw (1995) 162–228; Struck (2004) 210–213.

[22] Procl. *In Ti.* 2.247.25; ed. Diehl (1903–1906); Porph. *apud* August. *De civ. D.* 10.11; ed. Greene (1960); cf. Dodds (1951) 292–293; 305 n. 74; Janowitz (2002) 59; Struck (2004) 225–226.

[23] Marinus, *Life of Proclus*, 28; ed. Saffrey and Segonds (2001); *Suida* s.v. Χαλδαικοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι; ed. Adler (1931). Cf. Psellus, *Epist.* 187, in Dodds (1951) 305 n. 75, where we learn that certain formulae are inoperative εἰ μή τις ταῦτα ἐρεῖ ὑποψέλλῳ τῇ γλώσσῃ ἢ ἑτέρως ὡς ἡ τέχνη διατάττεται.

[24] It is noticeable that Iamblichus does not record the 'unknowable names' (*onomata barbara*) themselves in writing anywhere within the *De mysteriis*, despite his lengthy discussion of their meaning, significance and operation within ritual contexts. To the best of my knowledge, no other Neoplatonist records the 'unknowable names' in writing either, even during sustained discussions of their operation and functions. Cf. Shaw (1995) 183.

[25] The debate as to whether words (and language in general) were natural or conventional originated in Plato's *Cratylus* and was developed by Stoic philosophers, who influenced the later Neoplatonic approach. Cf. Dillon (1985) 207–208.

... πρὸς τὰ σημαινόμενα ἀφορᾷ, ὥστε αὐτάρκης ἡ αὐτὴ μένουσα ἔννοια, κἂν ὁποιονοῦν ὑπάρχῃ τοὔνομα).[26] This implies several ideas about language: words are established by convention and are therefore translatable; different words can preserve the same meaning irrespective of the language that they are spoken in.[27] Iamblichus replies that words are *not* merely established by convention but are idiomatic:[28]

> οὐδὲ γὰρ πάντως τὴν αὐτὴν διασώζει διάνοιαν μεθερμηνευόμενα τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλ' ἔστι τινὰ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔθνος ἰδιώματα, ἀδύνατα εἰς ἄλλο ἔθνος διὰ φωνῆς σημαίνεσθαι· ἔπειτα κἂν εἰ οἷόν τε αὐτὰ μεθερμηνεύειν, ἀλλὰ τήν γε δύναμιν οὐκέτι φυλάττει τὴν αὐτήν· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰ βάρβαρα ὀνόματα πολλὴν μὲν ἔμφασιν πολλὴν δὲ συντομίαν, ἀμφιβολίας τε ἐλάττονος μετέσχηκε καὶ ποικιλίας καὶ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν λέξεων· διὰ πάντα δὴ οὖν ταῦτα συναρμόζει τοῖς κρείττοσιν.
>
> For the names do not exactly preserve the same meaning when they are translated; rather, there are certain idioms in every nation that are impossible to express in the language of another. Moreover, even if one were to translate them, this would not preserve their same power. For the barbarian names possess weightiness and great precision, participating in less ambiguity, variability and multiplicity of expression. For all these reasons, then, they are adapted to the superior beings.[29]

According to Iamblichus, the idiomatic nature of language is based on its relationship to 'real being.' The languages of some peoples are better formulated so as to express and describe truth. This explains Iamblichus' claim that the barbarian names are more accurate and precise in their expression of reality.[30] If they were translated, 'this would not preserve

[26] Iambl. *Myst.* 7.5 (257.1–2). Struck (2004) 206 notes that this point seems to rely on the vision of language that Aristotle articulates in the *De interpretatione*, which posits that words are conventional signs of affections of the soul, which are impressions on the soul made by things out in the world. Languages differ from one race to another, but the affections themselves are the same, just as the reality that produces them is the same for all races.

[27] Iambl. *Myst.* 7.5 (257.1–2). Porphyry's view here matches his argument in the *De Abstinentia*, where he views language as an agreed set of representative noises (based on convention), arguing that we might even understand animals if we could learn and translate their language: *Abst.*, 3.15.2; 3.3.3–5; ed. Patillon and Segonds (1977–1995). Cf. Clark (1999) 119–126; Clarke, Dillon and Hershbell (2003) 299, n. 389; Struck (2004) 206.

[28] Iambl. *Myst.* 7.5 (257.3–6).

[29] Iambl. *Myst.* 7.5 (257.8–14).

[30] For similar claims of the accuracy and precision of the 'unknowable names' and the ritual language of the Egyptians and Chaldaeans and for injunctions against translating the names into other languages, cf. *Corpus Hermeticum* XVI.1b–2; *Chaldaean Oracles* fr. 150; ed. Majercik (1989); Dillon (1985) 205; 210; 211–212; Shaw (1995) 180–181; Struck (2004) 206.

their same power' (τήν γε δύναμιν οὐκέτι φυλάττει τὴν αὐτήν).[31] The power of the names lies in their distinctive images, sounds and in the shape of the letters or characters.

Iamblichus has just endorsed the wisdom of sacred peoples, such as the Egyptians and the Assyrians, and the suitability of their dialect for ritual invocations.[32] Iamblichus' position concurs with what we know of the use of writing in Egyptian religious practices. As Frankfurter has noted, hieroglyphic writing represented cultic, priestly speech and activities since its language was discontinuous with popularly spoken Egyptian: this must have endowed hieroglyphic script with a sacred and ritualistic quality. Furthermore, the pictographic nature of hieroglyphic writing made it distinct from the Greek alphabet of phonetic characters, although phonetic writing with hieroglyphs developed from the pictographic images.[33] Consequently, as Frankfurter maintains, the hieroglyphic character signified the word, or an entire idea or cosmic force.[34] Therefore hieroglyphic script represented the ideal medium for *sympatheia*, since each hieroglyphic character conveyed numerous, concrete meanings which were all expressions of a cosmic force. That is to say, hieroglyphic writing must have seemed to Neoplatonist philosophers to be a more accurate reflection of higher grades of reality. The earlier Neoplatonist philosopher Plotinus states:

> Δοκοῦσι δέ μοι καὶ οἱ Αἰγυπτίων σοφοί … περὶ ὧν ἐβούλοντο διὰ σοφίας δεικνύναι, μὴ τύποις γραμμάτων διεξοδεύουσι λόγους καὶ προτάσεις μηδὲ μιμουμένοις φωνὰς καὶ προφορὰς ἀξιωμάτων κεχρῆσθαι, ἀγάλματα δὲ γράψαντες καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον ἑκάστου πράγματος ἄγαλμα ἐντυπώσαντες ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς τὴν ἐκεῖ ⟨οὐ⟩ διέξοδον ἐμφῆναι, ὡς ἄρα τις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἄγαλμα καὶ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἀθρόον καὶ οὐ διανόησις οὐδὲ βούλευσις.

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[31] The extent to which Iamblichean and Porphyrian views on the nature of language in general differed is debatable, since Iamblichus makes this point specifically in relation to the 'unknowable names' rather than in relation to language in general. Iamblichus' programmatic statements in the *De mysteriis*, detailing his synthesis of Chaldaean, Egyptian and Greek wisdom, suggest that the differences in the views of Iamblichus and Porphyry on the nature of language are differences of *emphasis* rather than absolute differences of opinion. Presumably, Iamblichus must have agreed that *logoi* could be expressed in different languages, to a greater or lesser extent, since he himself writes in Greek about Egyptian theology and philosophy in Book 8 of the *De mysteriis*. The 'unknowable names' are exceptional, since he argues that they transcend *logos*, or reason.

[32] Iambl. *Myst*. 7.4 (256.4–13).

[33] Frankfurter (1994) 190–194.

[34] Frankfurter (1994) 193.

> The wise men of Egypt … when they wished to signify something wisely, did not use the forms of letters which follow the order of words and propositions and imitate sounds and the enunciations of philosophical statements, but by drawing images and inscribing in their temples one particular image of each particular thing, they manifested the non-discursiveness of the intelligible world, that is, that every image is a kind of knowledge and wisdom and is a subject of statements, all together in one, and not discourse or deliberation.[35]

Hieroglyphs are non-discursive images, reflecting the unity of the intelligible world: they are supra-rational and show wisdom before it is divided into discursive thought. Having discussed the metaphysics of the cosmos, including the order of the gods and the role of theurgy, Iamblichus states:

> Ὑφηγήσατο δὲ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν Ἑρμῆς· ἡρμήνευσε δὲ Βίτυς προφήτης Ἄμμωνι βασιλεῖ ἐν ἀδύτοις εὑρὼν ἀναγεγραμμένην ἐν ἱερογλυφικοῖς γράμμασι κατὰ Σάιν τὴν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ· τό τε τοῦ θεοῦ ὄνομα παρέδωκε τὸ διῆκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου·
>
> Hermes also has set out this path; and the prophet Bitys has given an interpretation of it to King Ammon, having discovered it inscribed in hieroglyphic characters in a sanctuary in Sais in Egypt. He has handed down the name of god, which extends throughout the whole cosmos …[36]

The idea that the name of god can extend throughout the entire cosmos is only possible when the name is recorded in non-discursive language which captures the supra-rational, cosmic force of the deity.

Ritual Invocations: Compulsive, Mechanical Commands or Pious Displays of Divine Power?

As noted above, scholars have generally treated the 'unknowable names' and similar ritual uses of language as compulsive, mechanical and coercive, aiming to summon, and sometimes to compel by force, divine presence into the human world.[37] The *Greek Magical Papyri* rituals containing unknowable names are often accompanied by addresses to gods to 'come!' 'guard!' 'save!' and sometimes include words such as 'now! now! quick! quick!' Such methods of invocation could be seen as pleas or requests. However, they have been interpreted by scholars as imperative commands, demonstrating an element of mechanical compulsion.[38] This

[35] Plotinus, *Enn.* 5.8.6.1–9, ed. and trs. Armstrong (1984).
[36] Iambl. *Myst.* 8.5 (267.11–268.3).
[37] Cf. above n. 9.
[38] Struck (2004) 212–213.

apparent compulsion is often assessed negatively by scholars. Patricia Cox Miller has offered a re-assessment of this compulsion as an expression of iconoclastic piety and as a positive form of the compulsive, soul-transforming, enchanting nature of language, originating in the archaic shamanistic tradition of ancient Greece where words were thought to charm, enchant and persuade.[39]

Iamblichus' explanation of the operation of the names within theurgic ritual suggests that they were *not* considered coercive, at least within a theurgic context. Indeed Porphyry had raised just this issue with Iamblichus, who responds:

> οὐ μὴν ἔτι γε δίδομεν ὃ σὺ προσέρριψας ὡς ὁμολογούμενον, ὅτι δι' ἡμῶν ἑλκόμενος ἀνάγκαις ταῖς τῆς κλήσεως ταῦτα ἐπιτελεῖ.
>
> ... we do not accept what you toss in as though agreed upon, that 'it is through being drawn down to us by the necessities of our invocation that the superior being accomplishes these things.'[40]

In a highly Platonic fashion, Iamblichus refutes this claim by appealing to the Neoplatonic hierarchical scheme of the cosmos. He maintains that names and rites do not work through compulsion, since the gods are superior to necessity.[41] Gods are eternal and immortal, and so cannot be 'moved' or changed from one state to another.[42] Thus, it would be impossible for humans to compel the gods. Rather, he claims, the invocations and names *ascend* to the gods through assimilation.[43] Since Iamblichus endorses theurgy as the primary means of spiritual, divine ascent, it seems sensible to begin with his explanation of theurgic ritual:

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[39] Cox Miller (1986) 486–495, states: 'Running through all of these traditions that connect the word with the charm is an emphasis on the power or forcefulness of words. Compulsion, from their perspective, was built into the nature of language ... from the perspective of the therapeutic, soul-transforming word that we have just discussed, the compulsive nature of magical nonsense words is not arrogant but pious. Such language is both the medium and the message of stark reality. It recognises precisely the divine power of words, and it uses language in accordance with languages' own qualities. Speaking to the gods in the gods' own language, the alphabetical words of the magical papyri expose the inner forcefulness of human language ...' (494–495). This ancient tradition connecting the word and the charm as enchanting, soul-transforming and persuasive has been named by the scholar Lain Entralgo (1970) as the 'therapy of the word.'

[40] Iambl. *Myst.* 3.18 (145.4–6).

[41] Iambl. *Myst.* 3.18 (145.6–8; 145.10–13); 2.11 (96.13–97.9).

[42] Iambl. *Myst.* 1.11 (37.13–16); 1.12 (40.15–41.3); 1.14 (45.4–6); 1.15 (48.7–10).

[43] Cf. Iambl. *Myst.*, 1.11 (38.8–10); 1.12 (41.13–42.4; 42.7–13); 1.13 (43.6–9); 1.15 (47.13–48.3).

> … τὸ μὲν ὡς παρ' ἀνθρώπων προσαγόμενον, ὅπερ δὴ τηρεῖ καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν τάξιν ὡς ἔχει φύσεως ἐν τῷ παντί, τὸ δὲ κρατυνόμενον τοῖς θείοις συνθήμασι καὶ ἄνω μετέωρον δι' αὐτῶν τοῖς κρείττοσι συναπτόμενον, περιαγόμενόν τε ἐμμελῶς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνων διακόσμησιν, ὃ δὴ δύναται εἰκότως καὶ τὸ τῶν θεῶν σχῆμα περιτίθεσθαι. Κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην οὖν διαφορὰν εἰκότως καὶ ὡς κρείττονας καλεῖ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς δυνάμεις, καθόσον ἐστὶν ὁ καλῶν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐπιτάττει αὐταῖς αὖθις, ἐπειδὴ περιβάλλεταί πως διὰ τῶν ἀπορρήτων συμβόλων τὸ ἱερατικὸν τῶν θεῶν πρόσχημα.
>
> … on the one hand, it is performed by men, and as such observes our natural rank in the universe; but on the other, it controls divine symbols, and in virtue of them is raised up to union with the higher powers, and directs itself harmoniously in accordance with their dispensation, which enables it quite properly to assume the mantle of the gods. It is in virtue of this distinction, then, that the art both naturally invokes the powers from the universe as superiors, inasmuch as the invoker is a man, and yet on the other hand gives them orders, since it invests itself, by virtue of the ineffable symbols, with the hieratic role of the gods.[44]

Thus, ritual acts have an inherent 'doubleness,' according to Iamblichus: from one perspective, they are performed by humans. Yet, according to Iamblichus, all humans have a divine element in their soul.[45] Theurgic ritual, by using 'unknowable, ineffable *symbola*' such as the unknowable names, activates this divine element of the human soul allowing the soul to 'assume the mantle of the gods' (τὸ τῶν θεῶν σχῆμα περιτίθεσθαι). The ritual utterance operates as a powerful speech-act: enabling the human to assume a divine role by ascending, through similarity, to the divine.[46] Expression and existence are united in such a conception: word *is* action.[47] Yet this process is only possible because of the gods' providential and beneficent nature: they constantly shed their divine light on those who attain insight into them.[48] Iamblichus specifies that the human soul contains 'images of the gods':

[44] Iambl. *Myst.* 4.2 (184.2–10).

[45] Iambl. *Myst.* 1.12 (41.9–13); 1.15 (46.9–12; 47.6–9; 48.2–3).

[46] Shaw (1995) 186–188; Struck (2004) 211, describes the verbal symbol in Iamblichus as follows: 'Like the password of the mysteries, it verifies a mortal's fitness to inhabit a higher plane of reality and to receive the divine.'

[47] Austin's notions of performative utterances and 'speech-acts' seem particularly relevant here. Cf. Austin (1962) 4–11.

[48] Iambl. *Myst.* 1.12 (41.3–8); cf. also 1.12 (40.14–41.2; 42.5–7); 1.14 (44.8–11); 1.15 (49.3–5).

> Καὶ ἔτι ἀθρόαν τὴν μυστικὴν καὶ ἀπόρρητον εἰκόνα τῶν θεῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ διαφυλάττομεν, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δι' αὐτῶν ἀνάγομεν ἐπὶ τοὺς θεούς, καὶ ἀναχθεῖσαν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τοῖς θεοῖς συνάπτομεν.
>
> And, moreover, we preserve in their entirety the mystical and hidden images of the gods in our soul; and we raise our soul up through these towards the gods and, as far as is possible, when it has been elevated, we experience union with the gods.[49]

It seems then, that the 'unknowable names' are a manifestation of the 'hidden images of the gods in our soul' (ἀπόρρητον εἰκόνα τῶν θεῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ). A text in the *Greek Magical Papyri* uses almost identical terminology, referring to the names as 'images of god' (εἴδωλα θεῶν);[50] the same text invokes a deity as he 'whose is the hidden and unspeakable name … [which] cannot be uttered by *human* mouth' (οὗ ἐστιν τὸ κρυπτὸν ὄνομα καὶ ἄρρητον (ἐν ἀν|θρώπου στόματι λαληθῆναι οὐ δύναται)).[51] Rather than human ordering divine, the 'unknowable names' used in ritual involve a process whereby the divine communicates with the divine.[52] Subject and object are dissolved to some extent in Iamblichus' explanation. However, the divine still maintains its transcendence and its causal superiority: in Iamblichean metaphysics, the gods are both transcendent and immanent simultaneously.[53] This paradoxical conception of the divine is reflected in the paradoxical nature of the 'names' themselves. This ascent is conceptualized as enabling the human to participate in divine power, as Iamblichus states:

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[49] Iambl. *Myst.* 7.4 (255.13–256.2).

[50] *PGM* XIII.880–886; *Monas or the Eighth Book of Moses*, trs. Morton Smith in Dieter Betz (1986).

[51] *PGM* XIII.762–772, trs. Morton Smith in Dieter Betz (1986).

[52] Iambl. *Myst.* 1.15 (47.3–9): 'So then, it is neither through faculties nor through organs that the gods receive into themselves our prayers, but rather they embrace within themselves the realizations of the words of good men, and in particular of those which, by virtue of the sacred liturgy, are established within the gods and united to them; for in that case the divine is literally united with itself, and it is not in the way of one person addressing another that it participates in the thought expressed by the prayers.' Cf. E.C. Clarke, J.M. Dillon and J.P. Hershbell (2003), 59, n. 86: 'These would presumably include the various kinds of *voces magicae* recognized in theurgic ritual. This is in accord with the view that Iamblichus expresses elsewhere that theurgic formulae have a special power deriving from the fact that they are in some way divine language, immediately comprehensible to gods, though not to us. It is therefore as if the divine in us is communicating directly with the divine in the universe.'

[53] For Iamblichus' view of the immanence and presence of the gods throughout the cosmos, including the physical world: cf. Iambl. *Myst.* 1.8 (27.7–29.7); 1.9 (29.13–30.2); Struck (2004) 220.

> Ἀλλ' οὐδ' αἱ προσκλήσεις διὰ πάθους συνάπτουσι τοῖς θεοῖς τοὺς ἱερέας· διὰ δὲ τῆς θείας φιλίας τῆς συνεχούσης τὰ πάντα κοινωνίαν παρέχουσι τῆς ἀδιαλύτου συμπλοκῆς· οὐχ ὡς τοὔνομα, ὥς γε οὕτω δόξαι, αὐτόθεν ἐμφαίνει, τὸν νοῦν τῶν θεῶν προσκλίνουσαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθὲς ὡς βούλεται ἀναδιδάσκειν, τὴν γνώμην τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιτηδείαν ἀπεργαζόμεναι πρὸς τὸ μετέχειν τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἀνάγουσαι αὐτὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ διὰ πειθοῦς ἐμμελοῦς συναρμόζουσαι. Ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ὀνόματα θεῶν ἱεροπρεπῆ καὶ τἆλλα θεῖα συνθήματα ἀναγωγὰ ὄντα πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς συνάπτειν αὐτὰς δύναται.
>
> But not even in the case of the invocations is it through the experiencing of passion that they link the priests [i.e. theurgists] to the gods; it is rather in virtue of the divine love which holds together all things that they provide a union of indissoluble involvement—not … inclining the mind of the gods to humans, but rather, as the truth of things itself desires to teach us, *disposing the human mind to participation in the gods, leading it up to the gods and bringing it into accord with them* through harmonious persuasion. And it is for this reason, indeed, *that the sacred names of the gods and other types of divine symbol that have the capacity of raising us up to the gods are enabled to link us to them* [my italics].[54]

Thus, the correct usage of the 'unknowable names' in the appropriate context was considered by Iamblichus to be a pious and divine display of ritual power and creativity. Several scholars have questioned the coercion apparently involved in ritual invocations. Fritz Graf has argued that one of the functions of the names is to act as another name of the deity invoked, thus forming an important part of the invocation, 'By using it the magician makes certain that the god would listen, since he embraced the widest possible sphere of the god's activities and characteristics—a strategy well known from religious prayer.'[55] Thus, the names serve as an ample display of knowledge.[56] Iamblichus' explanation takes this idea to its extremity: the secret names are a display of knowledge and insight

[54] Iambl. *Myst.* 1.12 (42.5–7; 8–13).

[55] Graf (1991) 191. It should noted that Graf does not deny the element of coercion in magical ritual completely, but argues that it is not omnipresent in a manner that would justify taking it as the defining difference between magic and religion (arguing against the Frazerian dichotomy between magic and religion, still an implicitly powerful theory among Classicists). He also shows that the idea of a coercive spell is often used as a 'last resort' by magicians, in circumstances where the invoked divinity does not arrive quickly enough, when the praxis after several repetitions brings no result and when the deity appears threatening and dangerous. He also argues that coercion is most frequently used against daemons and angels rather than gods (194–195).

[56] Graf (1991) 192. In this respect, Graf likens the magician to the initiate of a mystery cult, since both claimed a special relationship with their respective gods, based on revealed knowledge. Cf. also Johnston (2004) 144.

which serve to bring the theurgist into sympathetic alignment with the power of the god invoked, thus enabling them to actively participate in that divine power. Such a process represented the divinization of the human being.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Iamblichus' discussion of the unknowable names describes them as the secret, hidden names of the gods. Rather than being meaningless, the names *do* signify and communicate, but in a way that is appropriate for the gods, which is why they cannot be translated. These names were thought to transcend speech, discourse and logic: their non-discursive nature was said to evoke the paradoxical nature of the gods. Iamblichus argues that they are not coercive: by intoning the names correctly in the appropriate time, place and context, the theurgist connects and activates these *symbola* of the gods with the hidden images of the gods in their soul. This comprises a powerful speech-act which allows the theurgist to participate in divine power. The oral component of the names is important, since methods of intonation and utterance were transmitted secretly through an oral tradition. This may have contributed to the 'names' being recorded in writing since an individual without the requisite level of understanding and purity would regard these words as 'meaningless,' not knowing the correct methods of intonation and the appropriate contexts in which to use them. Thus, the 'unknowable names' reflect a subtle interplay between language and oral performance in the theurgic ritual praxis of late antiquity.

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PART IV

ROMAN LITERATURE

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

PLAUTUS THE THEOLOGIAN

Niall W. Slater

It is now almost 50 years exactly since J. Arthur Hanson published his landmark study, "Plautus as a Sourcebook for Roman Religion."[1] He surely intended his title with a touch of irony: no one understood better than Hanson that the plays were conceived as performances, not as documentary material for social and religious history. At this distance, though, it is easier to see how much the presentation of his at times revolutionary insights into Plautus's religious language and concepts and their relation to contemporary Hellenistic Greek thought about the divine was shaped by the continuing battle to find the "Plautine Elements in Plautus," as the finally translated version of Fraenkel's book puts it.[2]

Hanson's careful documentation demonstrates that the language of Plautus's plays is replete with references to the gods and their activities. His summary of the picture that emerges is worth repeating:

> The stock epithets of the gods postulate their immortality and their power, but seldom their justice and never their omniscience. The concept of a moral divinity, however, underlies the conventional ways of speaking about the interrelations of gods and men. Plautus offers little evidence to support the "contractual" view of Roman religion, and much that implies a more refined notion of the relationship between human virtue and divine favor.[3]

These are all important points, both for historians of religion and for students of the Roman comic stage—and yet they do not fully account for how this religious language was received by, and interacted with, the oral religious culture of the original Roman audience. Hanson is well aware of the fact that Plautus's plays do not just record the language of his age but help make its culture. As he puts it:

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[1] Hanson (1959).
[2] Fraenkel (2007).
[3] Hanson (1959) 100.

> … even if it be demonstrably shown that a specific passage in Plautus is taken from a non-Roman source and does not reflect Roman thought previous to Plautus' time, that passage becomes Roman as soon as it is written down in Latin and subsequently performed before a Roman audience; that is, it becomes part of the milieu of ideas and expressions in the Rome of that age.[4]

It may now be possible to press the notion of oral performance and the contest of ideas a little harder. In the absence of contemporary written accounts from Plautus's Rome, the parallels from Greek and later Roman theatrical culture are certainly suggestive: Aristophanes speaks of songs from comedies being sung again at symposia (*Knights* 526–530) and even has the slaves in the opening of the *Peace* (43–48) reporting dialogue among the spectators about what the giant dung beetle symbolizes. Ovid at *Ars Amatoria* 3.315–318 advises women to add songs heard in the theatre (*audita theatris*) to their personal repertoire, while in the *Fasti* he imagines participants in the festival of Anna Perenna performing songs they have learned from the same source.[5] Performance and audience are in dialogue. Language and concepts written for the stage by the very act of performance circulate in, and become part of, the contemporary oral culture, available for repetition, variation, and interrogation.[6]

Hanson does address one broad issue of audience reception when he contests the notion that Roman comedy, or at least Plautus in particular, was cynical about or critical of conventional notions of anthropomorphic divinities and Roman religious practices. Near the end of his study he puts it plainly thus:

> That Plautus promotes adverse criticism of religion is a surface judgment, based probably on a knowledge of the plot of the *Amphitruo* and a few citations …[7]

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[4] Hanson (1959) 50.

[5] *Fasti* 3. 535–536: *illic et cantant quicquid didicere theatris, / et iactant faciles ad sua verba manus*. Cf. briefly Horsfall (2003) 12–13, and more broadly 64–72; I am grateful to Timothy Moore for the reference.

[6] Thus, while Feeney (1998) 40 rightly notes that "there is no straight line from a performance context to the solution of the problems of belief, authenticity or social function," it does not follow that public dramatic performance in particular is "impossible to ground." Indeed, it offers a particularly fertile ground to study multiple interactions of language and practice.

[7] Hanson (1959) 98.

These includes such passages as the pimp Lycus congratulating himself (prematurely!) for controlling Venus through his sacrifice in the *Poenulus* and the unsympathetic slave Olympio in *Casina* deriding those who simply trust in the gods.[8] His counterexamples come from far more sympathetic characters, such as old Periplectomenus in the *Miles*, who derides the folly of those who blame and find fault with the plans of the gods (*consilia deorum*, 736).

When Hanson judges the religious atmosphere in Plautus to represent, not the "nuministic 'religion of Numa'" but something "more worshipful" than the "gently cynical philosophy of Greek New Comedy,"[9] he seems to place himself near the end of a scholarly tradition of analyzing Roman religion as a story of decline; a strong counter-reaction in favor of a model of "polis-religion," focused on the elite's maintenance of proper ritual or orthopraxy, soon set in.[10] The question, "did the Romans believe in their gods?" was ruled out of order for the next few decades. Now the tide has changed again, and the sufficiency of a solely ritual-based model for Roman religion seems questionable. Yet throughout these various riptides, Hanson's case for a "relationship between human virtue and divine favor" in the Roman mind has still held valid.

A close analysis of various kinds of divinities may suggest an even stronger interpretation. Hanson's own statistics show that references to the gods collectively are far commoner than any individual deity, or even to the four most often cited (Jupiter, Venus, Hercules, and Neptune), taken together.[11] Thus Roman drama seems to lie in the borderlands between other poetic genres, with their interest in personalized divinities, and prose, which tends to speak of "some god" or "the gods" as actants.[12] Both models rub shoulders on the same stage. A number of those references to specific deities are in the form of comparison or identification of human characters with the gods.[13] Not all of those comparisons are flattering, however, and Plautus uses more than one such

[8] *Poenulus* 457–462; *Casina* 345–349.

[9] Hanson (1959) 101.

[10] See the pungent analysis in Ando 2008. ix–xv, esp. x–xii.

[11] Hanson (1959) 62.

[12] See Feeney (1998) 80–83 in particular.

[13] Here again Hanson (1959) 52 drew the sound conclusion that the breadth of this evidence showed early Roman familiarity with the concept of human deification and provided an important background for understanding the later imperial cult. Compare now the discussion in Gradel (2002) 44–49.

comparison to mobilize audience sympathy against the character who would be a god. The negative comparisons are all to Olympians, even though Jupiter often embodies moral as well as divine order. Characters identified with personified powers or abstractions such as Salus and Spes, however, are solely positive forces.

Religio

Part of the problem in framing our questions lies in the notorious difficulty of defining religion in Roman society in terms of both practice and *mentalité*, a problem so severe that some would even deny the existence of a Roman concept of religion. A brief consideration of Plautus's use of the term *religio* nonetheless offers one starting point. The plays preserve three instances of the noun or a related form. In the *Mercator* young Charinus, thinking he has lost his girl, resolves to flee from Athens. His friend Eutychus calls him back:

> EUT. ... aspice ad sinisteram,
> caelum ut est splendore plenum atque ut dei istuc vorti iubent?
> CHAR. religionem illic mi obiecit: recipiam me illuc. ...[14] (879–881)

> EUT. ... Look left and see
> how the heaven glows and the gods bid you turn thither!
> CHAR. He fills me with awe (*religio*) there; I'll go back that way. ...

Eutychus invokes dark clouds in one direction and glowing heavens in another to call his friend back, but is that his manipulation or the gods speaking through nature? Whether Eutychus is wielding or just describing power, *religio* is that to which Charinus responds.

Religio is a more ironized power in the *Curculio*. In the parasite Curculio's narrative of his deception of the soldier, he tells his young patron Phaedromus how at one point:

> postquam hoc mihi narravit, abeo ab illo. revocat me ilico,
> vocat me ad cenam; religio fuit, denegare nolui. (349–350)

> After he told me this, I take off from the guy [the soldier]. He calls me back, invites me to dinner. It was *religio*, I couldn't say no.

[14] The text of Plautus here given is that of Leo, as reprinted by Nixon 1916–1938, except as noted. The variations from Lindsay 1904–1905 all very small, except here at 879, where he prefers *aspicin?—ad sinistram*. The translations are my own.

A generation or two later in Terence, the phrase *religio est* is often taken by commentators to mean "I had scruples," with all the diffidence that the word "scruples" now carries in English.[15] The joke in *Curculio* could work just on that level—after all, accepting dinner invitations *is* a parasite's religion—but another level may be at work. It is only after Curculio accepts this dinner invitation that he learns the soldier is his patron's rival—and therefore the one to be tricked. Does the divine will in this play march on Curculio's stomach?

Finally the *Asinaria* suggests, though again ironically, that women at least can be "too religious."[16] A jealous lover proposes a contract to keep his girl from other males—even gods!

> deam invocet sibi quam lubebit propitiam,
> deum nullum; si magi' religiosa fuerit,
> tibi dicat: tu pro illa ores ut sit propitius. (781–783)

> She may call on any goddess she likes to be favorable—
> but no god! If she's too religious,
> she may tell you, and you may pray on her behalf that the god be favorable.

None of these examples constitutes a theologically rigorous definition of *religio* in Plautus—but they do show it at work. In the first instance, *religio* certainly serves the interests of the happy ending, calling Charinus back from despair and flight. So too does the parasite Curculio's *religio*, even if the audience laughs at it and perhaps the potential religious scruples of the girl in the *Asinaria* as well. More illuminating than discussions of *religio* directly in Plautus is how his characters perceive the actions of the gods—and those who would be gods.

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[15] I am grateful to Peter McG.C. Brown for calling my attention to Terence's usage. At *Heauton Timoroumenos* 228, Barsby (2001) translates *nam nil esse mihi religiost dicere* as "I haven't the nerve to tell her ...," while he takes *Andria* 730, *nova nunc religio in te istaec incessit*, as "You didn't use to be so scrupulous" (cf. Ashmore (1908^2) *ad loc.*, who simply glosses *religio* as "scruple, ἐνθύμιον"). Only Shipp (1960) 180 *ad* 730 acknowledges that perjury, "an offence against the gods," is here at issue.

[16] A source critical approach might suggest that this notion is a remnant of the pattern that Leigh (2004) 99 detects in Greek New Comedy of a "link between cultic activity and self-indulgence in the lives of rich urban women." In Roman comedy, however, no sympathetic character suggests that religious practice is a self-indulgence. A parallel in Terence is of considerable interest here. Sostrata in *Heauton Timoroumenos* 650–651 refers to herself as *ut stultae et misere omnes sumus / religiosae* (where Barsby (2001) again translates "Foolish and desperately superstitious as we mothers all are ..."). She may be apologetic in her phrasing (*misere ... religiosae*), but the *religio* that prompted her to leave her ring with her abandoned child Antiphila makes possible the identification and happy ending. Even in Terence then, *religio* has not become solely "scruples."

Virtute Deum

The power of the gods is a constant theme for characters in Plautus. Hanson notes over twenty different verbs associated with divine activity, most with multiple instances.[17] Rather than skim over this ground again, however, we might re-visit one phrase that in particular links human and divine power: *virtute deum*.[18] Righteous wealth, it turns out, has a double origin in Plautus's Roman world. As the sympathetic old men of both *Aulularia* and *Captivi* put it:[19]

> ego virtute deum et maiorum nostrum dives sum satis.
> (*Au.* 166, *Cap.* 324)
>
> By the power of the gods and our ancestors, I'm rich enough.

The gods and ancestors have thus worked together to put the characters who speak these lines in the position to bring about the play's happy ending. That is just what the young man of *Trinummus* asks of his father:

> edepol, deum virtute dicam, pater, et maiorum et tua
> multa bona bene parta habemus, bene si amico feceris
> ne pigeat fecisse, ut potius pudeat si non feceris. (346–348)
>
> By Pollux, father, I'd say by the power of the gods and the ancestors
> we have enough wealth well gathered by you, if you were to help a friend out,
> it wouldn't discredit you—in fact, it would be a shame if you didn't help.[20]

The comic variation comes in the *Persa*, where the parasite Saturio is speaking to his daughter. She has just lamented that she has no dowry. His response redefines wealth in a characteristically parasitic way:

> pol deum virtute dicam et maiorum meum,
> ne te indotatam dicas, quoi dos sit domi:
> librorum eccillum habeo plenum soracum.
> si hoc adcurassis lepide, cui rei operam damus,
> dabuntur dotis tibi inde sescenti logi,
> atque Attici omnes; nullum Siculum acceperis:
> cum hac dote poteris vel mendico nubere. (390–396)

[17] Hanson (1959) 69–82 treats 16 verbs in details.

[18] Hanson (1959) 64, 74.

[19] Leo athetized this line in the *Captivi* (Lindsay does not), but it is certainly at home there as well.

[20] He repeats the same idea a few lines later: *deum virtute habemus et qui nosmet utamur, pater* ("by the power of the gods, we have the wherewithal to use, father," 355).

By Pollux, let me say that by the power of the gods and my ancestors,
you shouldn't call yourself dowerless: you've got a dowry at home!
Look, I have a basket full of books.
If you take care of this job we have on,
you'll get 600 jokes out of there for yourself,
and all Attic—no Sicilian ones.
With that dowry you could even marry a beggar!

Even in the funhouse mirror of the parasite and his ancestral profession, where words and witticisms constitute wealth, we see the underlying assumptions, what we might call the Roman "prosperity gospel": wealth is the work of both the gods and the ancestors. It is possible to be self-centered or generous in the use of that wealth, and the bias of youth is certainly toward generosity to itself.

The gods in general then favor the Romans, just as that contract promises which Mercury offers the audience in the prologue of the *Amphitruo*.[21] The young lovers tend to believe the gods in particular are on their side—and events bear them out. Even less than innocent lovers may have the gods on their side. In the *Menaechmi*, as Kathleen McCarthy points out, the visiting Menaechmus of Syracuse truthfully swears by "highest Jove and all the gods" (811–812, *summum Iovem / deosque do testes*) that he did not steal the wife's dress—though his Epidamnian brother has perjured himself a few scenes earlier.[22]

Would-be Gods

The clever slaves and their avatars are often seen or see themselves as exerting god-like control over their plays.[23] They can act or be honored as Olympians or as one of the personified abstractions whose worship by the Romans is well attested in Plautus. In *Asinaria* two slaves, Libanus and Leonida, compete for divine honors from their young master Argyrippus:

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[21] *Amphitruo* 1–16. On this contract with the audience, see Slater (1990) 105–107 [= Slater (2000) 185–187], and compare the improvisatory delight Feeney (1998) 27–28 finds in it. While it may seem curious to offer no detailed discussion of the *Amphitruo* in a treatment of Plautine theology, my focus here is on religious language throughout the plays. The plot of the *Amphitruo* is unparalleled in either extant Roman comedy or the surviving titles for other *palliatae* or evidence for Atellan farce, as the excellent treatment of Moore (1998) esp. 108–109 shows.

[22] McCarthy (2000) 57–58, also noting that he goes on to attribute his pretended madness to the gods.

[23] Segal (1968) 132–136 is still very apt.

Arg. … datisne argentum? Lib. si quidem mihi statuam et aram statuis
atque ut deo mi hic immolas bovem: nam ego tibi Salus sum.
Leo. etiam tu, ere, istunc amoves abs te atque ipse me adgredere
atque illa sibi quae hic iusserat mihi statuis supplicasque?
Arg. quem te autem divom nominem? Leo. Fortunam, atque Opsequentem.
Arg. iam istoc es melior. Lib. an quid est homini Salute melius?
Arg. licet laudem Fortunam, tamen ut ne Salutem culpem.
Phil. ecastor ambae sunt bonae. Arg. sciam ubi boni quid dederint.
(711–719)

Argyrippus … Are you giving me the money? Libanus. Sure—if you set up a statue and altar for me
and sacrifice an ox to me, like a god: for I am Salvation for you.
Leonida. Master, won't you get this guy away from you and approach me yourself
and erect for me those honors he ordered for himself and supplicate me?
Arg. But what god shall I call you? Leo. Fortune, in fact the Favorable.
Arg. That's where you're better. Lib. But what's better for a man than Salvation?
Arg. I can praise Fortune, without blaming Salvation.
Philaenium. By Castor they're both good. Arg. I'll know when they deliver something good.

Note Argyrippus's perfectly Roman response: he can worship both.

Even those who cannot qualify as the clever manipulators of plot may lay claim to divine honors. The parasite Ergasilus in the *Captivi* simply brings the report that Hegio's son has returned—but he demands worship nonetheless:

Erg. … ut sacrufices.
Heg. quoi deorum? Erg. mihi hercle, nam ego nunc tibi sum summus Iuppiter,
idem ego sum Salus, Fortuna, Lux, Laetitia, Gaudium.
proin tu deum hunc saturitate facias tranquillum tibi. (862–865)

Erg. You should sacrifice.
Heg. To which of the gods? Erg. To me, by Hercules, for now I'm great Jupiter to you,
and likewise I'm Salvation, Fortune, Light, Happiness, Joy.
So you make this god kindly to you by stuffing him full.

Hanson argues persuasively that many such examples demonstrate "an early Roman familiarity with the concept of human deification"[24] which

[24] Hanson (1959) 69. Cf. now Gradel (2002).

may help us understand the later phenomenon of the imperial cult. The comic repetition and amplification here may seem to us to diminish the specifically religious significance. Ergasilus only brings news; he has not in fact brought the events about. To claim to be Jupiter alone might be bold indeed; his claim to be a whole pantheon sounds ridiculous. And yet at least two more of these gods, Salus and Fortuna, received state cult at Rome, with the temple of Salus first attested in the 4th century.[25] Here we see at work what Denis Feeney calls the "essentially improvisational frame of mind ... behind the state's recognition of a quality as divine"[26] here cheerfully expropriated by a parasite.

It may be even more instructive to look at responses to would-be divinities—or their response to each other. The parasite Saturio, scrounging a meal, hails Toxilus as *O mi Iuppiter/terrestris* (O my Jupiter on earth, *Persa* 99–100). Saturio will get his dinner eventually, though Toxilus makes him (and his daughter) work for it.

Old Lysidamus at *Casina* 203 casts himself as Jupiter (and his wife as Juno), and both their slaves appeal to them as Jupiter and Juno when they get into a physical struggle with each other. Yet this same Jupiter invokes the slave Olympio as a different kind of divinity to him somewhat later in the play:

> Lys. quid agis, mea Salus?
> Ol. esurio hercle, atque adeo hau salubriter. (*Cas.* 801)
>
> Lys. What's up, Salvation mine?
> Ol. I'm starving, by Hercules, and by no means salvifically.

For the master to address the slave as *mea Salus* is by no means unparalleled,[27] but for the play's Jupiter to invoke a Salus who mocks his own deification does suggest a certain instability in the play's pantheon, which the ending will play out.

It is not always good to be Jupiter, as an exchange among young Calidorus, the pimp Ballio, and Pseudolus demonstrates. Calidorus thinks Ballio has changed his mind about selling the girl he loves to another and reacts extravagantly:

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[25] Axtell (1907) 13–14; Marwood (1988) 2–3; Winkler (1995) 16–23. Temple of Salus, vowed 311 BC by C. Junius Bubulcus, begun 306, and dedicated 302: Livy 10. 1. 9 (with Oakley (2005) 53–54 *ad loc.*) and 9. 31–32. Cf. Clark (2007) 84–85.

[26] Feeney (1998) 89. Cf. the still useful Axtell (1907) as well as Clark (2007).

[27] Compare Agorastocles to his slave Milphio at *Poen.* 421: *mi Milphidisce, mea Commoditas, mea Salus*. For "capitalizing" Salus at *Cas.* 801, see Hanson (1959) 68 and 76.

Cal. Pseudole, i accerse hostias,
victumas, lanios, ut ego huic sacruficem summo Iovi;
nam hic mihi nunc est multo potior Iuppiter quam Iuppiter.
Bal. nolo victumas: agninis me extis placari volo.
Cal. propera, quid stas? i accerse agnos. audin quid ait Iuppiter?
Ps. iam hic ero; verum extra portam mi etiam currendum'st prius.
Cal. quid eo? Ps. lanios inde accersam duo cum tintinnabulis,
eadem duo greges virgarum inde ulmearum adegero,
ut hodie ad litationem huic suppetat satias Iovi.
Cal. i in malam crucem! Ps. istuc ibit Iuppiter lenonius.

Ps. 326–335

Cal. Pseudolus, bring offerings,
victims, butchers that I may sacrifice to this highest Jove;
for he's now a much mightier Jupiter to me than Jupiter himself.
Bal. I don't want victims: I prefer to be worshipped with mixed grill.
Cal. Hurry, why hang around? Bring the lambs, don't you hear what Jupiter says?
Ps. I'll be right back; I just have to run outside the gate first.
Cal. Why there? Ps. I'll get two butchers there with bells on,
And two flocks of elm rods from there too,
To make today's sacrifice to this Jupiter extra special.
Cal. Get bent! Ps. Right after his worship Jupiter the pimp.

Gianna Petrone has argued persuasively that it is the still deluded Calidorus who voices the curse at 335 (*i in malam crucem*) in defense of Ballio, rather than Ballio himself (so attributed in earlier editions), as the pimp here mockingly plays "una divinità conciliatrice" for master and servant.[28] Yet this would-be Jupiter quickly shows himself to be the enemy of the happy ending and will, like Lysidamus in the *Casina*, be forcefully displaced by a new, non-Olympian power—the one Calidorus must appeal to for help against Jupiter Lenonius:

Cal. dic utrum Spemne an Salutem te salutem, Pseudole?
Ps. immo utrumque. Cal. Utrumque, salve. (*Ps.* 709–710)

Cal. Tell me, shall I hail you as Hope or Salvation, Pseudolus?
Ps. Well, as both. Cal. Hail, Both!

Pseudolus feigns syncretistic indifference—or Roman pragmatism—but by the play's end he will indeed have overthrown Jupiter Lenonius.

Pietas offers one of the best arguments for Plautine innovation in the treatment of abstract divinity. Hanson cautiously accepted only one

[28] Petrone (1979) 118 [= (2009) 89], also noting Ballio's paratragic and quasi-divine *dum ego vivos vivam* at 337; cf. Lefèvre (1997) 53 n. 214.

example of a character invoking Pietas as a "personalized … semi-divine abstraction"—Planesium's exclamation, *o Pietas mea* at *Curculio* 639, where it is a saving power just like Salus that restores her to her brother and allows her to marry Phaedromus.[29] Yet it became a state cult during Plautus's career: a temple to Pietas was vowed at Rome in 191 BC, though not dedicated until 181.[30] When Ballio in the *Pseudolus* therefore personifies Pietas in starkly physical mockery, he even more sharply characterizes himself: Ballio suggests to Calidorus that (292), if he cannot afford to buy the girl he wants, he can take his Pietas to bed instead. It is intriguing that the three characters in Plautus most often characterized as *pius* are Alcmena in *Amphitruo*, Hanno of the *Poenulus*, and Palaestra (*Rudens*)—two women and a foreigner who embody the comic loyalties to family.

Rudens

The opening of the *Rudens* prologue has often been seen as the clearest and most extensive formulation of Plautus's theology and as a model for divine / human relations. The speaker here, Arcturus, is not an Olympian divinity but claims to one of many stellar representatives of Jupiter:

Arc. qui gentis omnis mariaque et terras movet,
eius sum civis civitate caelitum.
…
… nomen Arcturo est mihi.
…
qui est imperator divom atque hominum Iuppiter,
is nos per gentis alios alia disparat
qui facta hominum moresque, pietatem et fidem
noscamus …
qui falsas litis falsis testimoniis
petunt quique in iure abiurant pecuniam,
eorum referimus nomina exscripta ad Iovem;
cottidie ille scit quis hic quaerat malum:
qui hic litem apisci postulant peiurio
mali, res falsas qui impetrant apud iudicem,
iterum ille eam rem iudicatam iudicat;
maiore multa multat quam litem auferunt.

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[29] Hanson (1959) 93; cf. Clark (2007) 88–98, to which my discussion is much indebted.

[30] Livy 40. 34. 4. As Clark (2007) 89 notes, even though *Pseudolus* can be dated to 191, the discussion of *pietas* in that play is not a reference to the vow, which almost certainly post-dates the production, but evidence for its keen thematic currency.

bonos in aliis tabulis exscriptos habet.
. . .
nihil ei acceptum'st a periuris supplici;

Rud. 1–25

Arc. I am a citizen of that celestial city, ruled by one
Who moves all nations, seas, and lands.
. . .
. . . My name is Arcturus.
. . .
Jupiter who rules both gods and men,
Sends each of us stars through the nations
To learn the deeds and customs of men, their piety
And fidelity . . .
Those who file lying lawsuits with lying testimony
Those who deny their debts on oath,
We write their names down and take them back to Jupiter;
Every day he knows who's plotting evil here:
The scoundrels who try to win a suit by perjury,
Who press false claims before the judge,
He judges their case again;
He fines them much more than they make by the lawsuit.
He has the good ones written down in other tablets.
. . .
He takes no gift from perjurers;

Many points about the operations of divine justice emerge in this fascinating vignette. Particularly notable is the tension between divine writing and human, presumably oral speech: men file false lawsuits supported by lying oral testimonies, while Arcturus writes down the names of the good and the wicked in separate tablets for Jupiter's records. In light of our previous discussions, though, it may be particularly significant that Jupiter does not speak *in propria persona* here, but through a new divinity. Arcturus, like Salus and Spes in other comedies, will be exclusively on the side of the virtuous in this play, bringing about the restoration of the pious Palaestra to her father and her eventual marriage.

Conclusion

Analytic criticism approached the texts of Plautus as a cloudy, cracked window to be looked through in the quest for the purer, clearer, finer Greek plays that lay somewhere behind his Latin surface. Fraenkel invited us to think about Plautus as a poet in his own right, and many have

followed in his wake, though often trying to catch a glimpse of Roman society through a different angle of the window. By grounding the plays in performance, we try to see and *hear* the plays as participants in a discourse—even if the other contemporary voices of the discourse, from the streets to the Senate house, are now lost. Plautus is not merely a sourcebook, a wide-ranging but not particularly selective sampling of the religious language circulating in republican Rome. Whether consciously or not, both by his choice of plot sources to adapt and his descriptions of the plot participants Plautus innovates in his uses of that religious language. It may be the accident of survival that we have just one play with a mythological plot, portraying the gods in action on the comic stage. Nonetheless even passing references to myth's portraits of the gods show that the comic playwright was fully alive to the foibles of the traditional gods as well as their powers. On the other hand, the newer deities such as Salus and Spes had no such narrative associations and thus could be consistently portrayed as helpful to humans. Within Plautus's comic universe, they are consistently associated with the drive toward personal satisfaction and the fulfillment of romantic desires. These scripts do not merely preserve the locutions of archaic Roman oral religious culture. They show us Plautus the Theologian reshaping Roman conceptions of the divine.[31]

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

ORALITY IN LIVY'S REPRESENTATION OF THE DIVINE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A POLYPHONIC NARRATIVE[1]

Vanessa Berger

Livy is well aware that the reality of long-passed events is not accessible to him: he declares in his preface that as far as ancient times are concerned, his history necessarily presents the reader with a mere representation, that is, the image the Romans have of their past.[2] However, because this vision is as significant to his purpose as is the truth, instead of denying that reality, he accepts it and makes it a part of his strategy.

His Rome is a written composition, based mainly on written sources. What is thus left to orality in his work? Scholars started by pointing out the importance of the characters' speeches, where the historian displays his undeniable rhetorical skills. More recently, the role of such speeches in the construction of characters has been analyzed in a very convincing way.[3] I would like to show, in the same perspective, that orality in a broader sense can contribute to building the structure of the whole narrative. The religious field seems particularly relevant to examine in that respect, because religion, piety, and the divine sphere, which represent one of the pillars of Livy's Rome, appear to be given a special status. Quite paradoxically, that status apparently comes from the fact that, generally speaking, what Livy says about them is not based explicitly on precise written (*i.e.* literary) sources.

I will analyze the role Livy ascribes to orality in his representation of the divine sphere. His apparently homogeneous narrative seems to be split between the narrator's account and the characters' speeches. But the

[1] This paper is related to the first chapter of my unpublished dissertation: Babusiaux-Berger (2006). English translations are from the University of Virginia website. I would like to thank Ruth Scodel for her valuable comments and her help in correcting the English.

[2] *Praef.* 6–7.

[3] For the rhetorical skills, see for example Taine (1856) 309–310; Walsh (1961) 219–244 for a rather critical analysis (and a list of judgments by ancient authors in n. 1 p. 219); Bernard (2000) 87. For the role of speeches: Bernard (2000) 87–129.

voices he stages are actually more diverse and their articulation more elaborate. The historian carefully weighs the elements he ascribes to his sources, characters, and audience in his construction of religious passages. These voices have both a general and a specific function. Firstly, they all participate in creating a polyphonic narrative that fits Livy's purpose. Their oral nature is only occasionally emphasized, and the historian's choices do not necessarily reflect reality—they are rather indicative of his strategy. Secondly, each of these voices also enables the historian to build a strong thematic thread or to assert the logical and trustworthy quality of his work.

The Use of Oral Sources

In antiquity, oral sources were supposed to be more reliable than others.[4] However, Livy lived several centuries after the events he wrote about in his extant books. He was thus unable to collect oral testimonies regarding them. In most cases, he was even unable to quote such testimonies collected by his predecessors—they also lived long after the recounted events.

Nevertheless, in book 1 especially, and in connection with anecdotes bearing a religious content, he often uses expressions such as *fama* or *traditur*, which point to an allegedly oral source we could define as "tradition".[5] He never defines this notion clearly, but what he refers to obviously is a common culture, a popular knowledge which, as it spreads verbally, is subject to distortions, and thus unreliable.[6] In reality, this tradition may be oral, but it is also written: we know those anecdotes through various previous authors. So if Livy chooses to ignore that written part and to emphasize tradition's popular and oral origin, it is for his own reasons.

First of all, thanks to this reference to tradition, he enjoys a great freedom. He can suppress, add, or modify meaningful facts in the anecdotes, or favour one account over another without being obliged to justify his choice, because there is no official version. In this way, by using apparently insignificant details, he conveys a very precise philosophy.

[4] Marincola (1997) 63–86, and 99–103 for the narrative of non-contemporary events.

[5] See the Appendix at the end of this paper.

[6] Rumor, another side of *fama*, has been analyzed in the episode of the *Bacchanalia*: Dubourdieu and Lemirre (1997).

"Tradition" enables him to mask his subjectivity. One example: Hannibal is in Spain, on his way to attack Rome. In a dream, he sees a messenger from the gods. This messenger says that he was sent by Jupiter to guide Hannibal to Italy but that the general must not look back. Hannibal follows him, but cannot help turning back. He sees a huge serpent causing terrible damage. The messenger explains that what Hannibal sees is the devastation of Italy but that the future must remain hidden. Hannibal mistakenly rejoices: he does not know that he was only shown the beginning of the war, and that, after he devastates Italy, he will be defeated. Livy introduces his narrative with *fama* and does not mention any variations in the tradition. Variations are attested, however. Most of them pertain to the exact words attributed to the gods. But such words are what express the divinities' part in Hannibal's decision to fight the Romans: do they deceive him or is he careless? A whole philosophy of the gods' role in human life is at stake in the writer's choice.[7]

Besides, insisting on a common culture, on stories that form an alleged common history, is important when you want to build a sense of community or to appeal to this sense. Such stories represent what all the Romans share and what thus defines them as a people. For instance, the story of Romulus and Remus' birth is called a *fama*, as is Horatius Cocles' extraordinary deed;[8] the first anecdote recounts Rome's origins, while the second one stages the patriotism and heroism of ancient Romans—to delay the Etruscans' attack on Rome, Cocles fights them on the only bridge to Rome, while the other Romans are wrecking that very bridge. Both stories help define and justify the city's power over the world, and make this a value shared by all the Romans. The concept of Romanness is fundamental in Livy's work, and the religious anecdotes that are attributed to tradition represent one of its essential components: there is a religious side to every single legend that defines the concept. The part played by oral tradition is therefore essential in the Livian strategy. By resorting to it, the historian avoids referring anecdotes to a specific source or to a precise author. This has two interesting effects. Firstly, the story he tells, coming from nobody in particular, is supposed to come from the people

[7] 21, 22, 5–9 for the dream. Cic., *Diuin.*, I, 24, 49, gives another well-known narrative. See the CUF edition of book 21 (*Tite-Live, Histoire romaine, tome XI*. Paris, les Belles Lettres (1991) 97, n. 4) or Cipriani (1984) 111 sq. for the other versions and their differences.

[8] 1, 4, 6 and 2, 10, 11.

and becomes everybody's story: a story that everybody can tell and that tells of a common past. Everybody can be part of it, which adds to the sense of community.

Secondly, the story seems more and less questionable simultaneously. More, because nothing proves it is true—no written document, sometimes a statue or monument that has conveniently disappeared.[9] Less, because everybody agrees on it; it is accepted and seems to be a dogma nobody will challenge, even if someone does not believe it happened. Such ambiguity is exactly what Livy needs in order to leave the door open for different interpretations. The historian says it in his *Preface*: if the Romans want to ascribe their origin and foundation to the gods, they have the power to do so because they are militarily superior and nothing challenges this claim. As for himself, he does not want to judge.[10] This means that the beginnings of Rome and the *Ab Urbe Condita* are about a representation, not about truth.

The sack of Rome by the Gauls supposedly marks the beginning of a more trustworthy course of events—that is what Livy says in his introduction to Book 6. However, the story of the Lacus Curtius in Book 7 still shows the same uncertainty. The historian gives a second explanation for the name of the lake—he already gave one in Book 1—and concludes with pessimism that he can reach tradition but not truth: "It was from this incident that the designation "The Curtian Gulf" originated, and not from that old-world soldier of Titus Tatius, Curtius Mettius. If any path would lead an inquirer to the truth, we should not shrink from the labour of investigation; as it is, on a matter where antiquity makes certainty impossible, we must adhere to the legend which supplies the more famous derivation of the name".[11]

Thus, though Livy tells faithfully what he found in his sources, he keeps his distance from it. He does not try to confirm the reality of remote episodes nor to prove that they are false, but he simply does not take responsibility for them. He labels such episodes "tradition", and it is up to the reader to interpret them, even if clues to the historian's thoughts are spread throughout some of them. The oral voice of tradition is, then, a

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[9] *e.g.* 1, 36, 5: Attus Navius' statue and the stone he cut with a razor.

[10] *Praef.* 6–7.

[11] 7, 5, 5–6: *Lacum (...) Curtium non ab antiquo illo T. Tati milite Curtio Mettio sed ab hoc appellatum. Cura non deesset, si qua ad uerum uia inquirentem ferret: nunc fama rerum standum est, ubi certam derogat uetustas fidem; et lacus nomen ab hac recentiore insignitius fabula est.*

significant addition to the construction of Livy's Rome and clearly represents a valuable tool for developing his narrative strategy. "We are shown an alternative basis for the construction of Roman history, one that does not use received tradition as evidence from which to reconstruct an accurate and reliable record of the past but presents tradition, rather, as the record of the Romans' own perception of themselves, a record that may be used as the basis for reconstructing and interpreting their identity".[12]

This strategy is a cornerstone in the construction of Livy's authority as an historian, because it allows him to prove that he knows traditions, respects them, and wants to include them in his history. It is a way to mark his insertion in a literary lineage. It is also important for demonstrating his reliability and ability to write history: Livy is not from a senatorial family, and he has no political or military experience, which is a true handicap for an historian of that time.[13] Thus, he needs to legitimize his claims to the status of historian. Paradoxically, dubious "traditions" or voices that recount stories implying the participation of the divine sphere enable him to achieve that aim. By stating that he takes no responsibility for those legends, in which many educated people of his time did not believe anymore, he displays a carefully balanced attitude that builds up his credibility.

This attitude strikingly predominates when it comes to religious matters. In non-religious ones, Livy quotes other authors—mostly to highlight their differences or to discuss shortcomings in their versions, rather than to consolidate his own narrative through their authority.[14] On the contrary, regarding religious subjects and events, the auctorial voice very seldom identifies and discusses its written sources. It rather ascribes to tradition the anecdotes Livy is telling, as we previously saw it, or does not mention any source.[15]

The historian, thus, does not seem to challenge his sources in religious matters. The fact that those anecdotes are what constitute the basis of Roman identity is probably determinant in that respect. Questioning such episodes would undermine the basis of this identity that justifies Rome's destiny. On the contrary, thanks to his careful attitude towards religious anecdotes and facts, Livy is able to preserve these essential

[12] Miles (1995) 55.

[13] Walsh (1961) 140–141 on Livy's attitude towards Valerius Antias and on the way Livy organizes his anecdotes; Miles (1995) 47–54, in particular n. 47; Davies (2004) 62.

[14] Miles (1995) 60 and n. 72.

[15] Babusiaux-Berger (2006) 136–137.

notions. The oral, uncertain voice of tradition is given a fundamentally religious aspect in his text. The reader must then decide how he wants to read the anecdotes. But more peremptory voices appear in the narrative: those of the characters.

The Characters' Speeches

Whether presented directly or indirectly, the characters' speeches are supposed to transcribe the actually spoken words. However, the historian is the one staging them, so he is responsible for what his characters say. Of course, such passages are meant to make the narrative more lively and plausible, but religious topics appear mainly in argumentative speeches. What image of the divine do they give?

Speeches, regardless of whether they are directed to gods or humans, often offer a wide range of religious components. Stereotypical phrases are recurrent in Livy. Some of them include the gods' names. For instance, Hercules' name appears frequently with a profane meaning, while Mars' is often synonymous with war. In reality, most stereotypical calls to the gods seem to be non-religious.[16] Such invocations are merely common expressions in a society permeated by religion. They help to create an "antique" atmosphere by showing that the divine is everywhere, since ancient Romans are supposed to have been a quite religious people. Speeches, that is, the *openly* oral part of Livy's work, are thus determinant in the historian's reconstruction of ancient Rome. On the other hand, the profane use of religious words tends to prove that those words lost, to a certain extent, their strength and meaning.

Even if Roman religion is about gestures and not beliefs,[17] can such gestures—and acts and speeches—be totally separated from thought? Livy's reasoning shows this is impossible. By using religious phrases, his Romans prove that their whole thought works on a religious mode. By this I mean that whatever they are doing and saying, even if they are not engaged in a religious activity, their thought takes into account the religious perspective of those acts and words or the existence of gods who witness them. This is true even though they use those phrases in an automatic and systematic way—it is a reflex. Religion, as described

[16] Babusiaux-Berger (2006) 659–661. Exemples for Hercules: 7, 30, 4; 22, 25, 7. For Mars: 2, 6, 10; 21, 1, 2.

[17] Scheid (1985) 24–26.

by Livy, is a way of thinking and of living, but also a way of speaking, interpreting, and arguing. Livy wants his contemporaries to imagine the speech of early Romans as permeated with religion.

Religious phrases are not the only means of elaborating on divinities or expressing oneself religiously. There are others which are also part of Livy's strategy and enable the historian to show what image the Romans have—or should have—of themselves. Religious arguments are pervasive in speeches because the religious perspective represents a way of interpreting a problem. It enables a speaker to examine a question with a different perspective.

The best example is the speech in which Camillus tries to prevent his fellow citizens from moving to Veii. This speech is said to be especially moving because of religious arguments which make it a *sacrilegium* to leave Rome. Nevertheless, Livy adds, they were not what decided the matter in the end: "It is stated that this speech of Camillus made a profound impression, particularly that part of it which appealed to the religious feelings. But whilst the issue was still uncertain, a sentence, opportunely uttered, decided the matter".[18] Strikingly enough, the decisive event is still a verbal one, and a religious one: an *omen* … This well-known discourse illustrates clearly what religious arguments can do in Livy: they pervade the whole speech and help to structure it. By bringing the divine into the debate, they introduce a completely new dimension and increase the power of persuasion of the speech.

Scipio's discourse to his rebel soldiers in Spain is another excellent example.[19] The rebellion is given the status of a *sacrilegium* (28, 1), a prodigy that cannot be atoned for except by blood (27, 16), an outrage to religion (29, 2). Thus, Scipio demonstrates that the gods favour him, which justifies a harsh punishment of the soldiers and leaves the gods' revenge as an impending threat. Moreover, the speech also confirms Livy's portrayal of the Roman general, specifically, that he has, or pretends to have, a close relationship with the divine—although the historian does not wish to determine whether his character believes in this relationship, or wants to manipulate the Roman people. Whatever the answer might be, the power of words related—even loosely—to religion is asserted. Such passages powerfully contribute to Livy's depiction of

[18] 5, 55, 1: *Mouisse eos Camillus cum alia oratione, tum ea quae ad religiones pertinebat maxime dicitur; sed rem dubiam decreuit uox opportune emissa.*

[19] 28, 27–29.

the piety of early Romans and show how he uses orality in this depiction. This is true even if Livy sometimes disagrees with his characters: he has them express what he does not wish to take responsibility for, either because this is useful for his narrative, or because it suggests another interpretation of facts—Livy frequently chooses to open several doors to his reader—, or because he is not sure his interpretation is correct.

A clear example is given in Book 8 when the consul Torquatus calls to the gods against the breaking of treaties and refuses to satisfy the Latins' claim. Annius, a Latin deputy, blasphemes against Jupiter, and on leaving the meeting, he falls down the stairs. Livy gives a psychological explanation of the event: he attributes it to Annius' anger. The historian prefers to leave the cause of the Latin's death uncertain (he declares that some sources do not talk about it). The same applies to the thunder and storm that followed Torquatus' call to the gods. Livy says this may be true, but could also be a fabrication to prove that the gods were angry. Thus, he keeps his distance from his subject matter, but for obvious reasons, his Torquatus is not so cautious. According to him—he claims it in a loud voice—this incident proves that gods do exist and that they want the war.[20]

Livy emphasizes that Torquatus wants his speech to be heard by the senate and the people, whose consent he needs if he wants the war to be voted, but does not blame him for his partial interpretation of facts. He only stages the manipulation, without commenting on it, or even underlining it. In reality, because Torquatus does not act selfishly but for the good of the Roman people, Livy does not perceive his speech as a manipulation. The consul might be right; nothing speaks against his interpretation. His reaction is quick and clever, just the way the historian wants to depict ancient Romans, and again, in keeping with the character's pious but rough personality.

Livy thus uses his characters' voices to write a polyphonic narrative, and to allow discrepant interpretations to be heard. The subjectivity of the characters' interpretations, underlined by the use of direct speech, still makes them worth examining: those characters are consistently depicted as great men—*summi uiri*—, who act for their fatherland's sake and, as magistrates, speak in its name.

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[20] 8, 6, 1–6.

Like Scipio, Torquatus mainly wants to show by his speech that the gods support him, and indeed, words linked to the divine represent power: when individuals or groups argue a point successfully, or when they can prove they are right religiously, they are entitled to win either the debate, or the battle. The rituals associated with declaring war and concluding treaties, as well as speeches about these subjects, show clearly how important it is for Livy's characters to demonstrate that they deserve the gods' help. It is particularly well-developed in the Samnite wars at the end of the first decade, especially around the defeat at Caudium, in the beginning of Book 9.[21] The discussion of events by each enemy emphasizes their deservedness of the gods' support. In an especially revealing episode, the consul Postumius hits a fetial while pretending to be a Samnite.[22] Words are so powerful that, although the Samnites protest and condemn the lie, they are considered the wrongdoers and as such must be defeated.[23]

A single situation can be examined from different points of view. Even in military matters, the verbal part of the fight is fundamental to the outcome of the conflict. Indeed, the ability to interpret a situation in one's favour—using *exempla* and laws—is regarded by Livy as a desirable quality. When the inhabitants of Praeneste set up their camp close to the Allia River, they boast of their clever choice, presenting it as a bad *omen* for the Romans who formerly were defeated there. The Romans choose to consider things differently. It is not the place of the battle but the name of their enemies that they call an *omen*, because they won many battles against Praenestium.[24] This reasoning entitles them to win the battle, which they do, partly because of the psychological strength it gives them. It does not mean that the interpretation of their enemies was wrong, but simply that there is another valid point of view that can be successfully opposed to the first one. Such an example proves that words are powerful but not reliable and efficacious, since each adversary can invoke their power.

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[21] Livy's work (142 books) has been divided into groups of ten books called decades. We have the first, third, and fourth decades and the first half (uncomplete) of the fifth one. The other ones are lost.

[22] The fetials were priests whose function was primarily diplomatic. They were in charge of the rituals through which Rome declared wars or concluded treaties.

[23] 9, 10–11.

[24] 6, 28, 5–7 for the *Praenestines*' interpretation, 7–9 for the Romans'. Chaplin (2000) 73–105 showed in a more general way the importance of *exempla* in political discourses and the different uses adversaries can make of a single event. The chapter starts with a mention of this passage.

Generally speaking, in Livy's Rome, spoken words are treated as having the same reality and the same value as actual facts. Religious performative speeches are perfect examples of this phenomenon, and one of them is more explicit than the others. Before the battle of Aquilonia, a *pullarius*—the assistant in charge of the sacred chickens—announces that the auspices are favourable; when his nephew reveals that it is a lie, the consul Papirius thanks him but says that because of the favourable words, he will consider the gods' answer positive. He actually wins the battle. But he (or is it Livy?) feels the necessity to confirm his interpretation by pointing out that the bird crowing before him is the sign the gods agree with him.[25] Is it a simple precaution—Livy does like to give several explanations and interpretations for a single fact[26]—or the sign that words do not really hold the same power as facts—would the Romans just try to realize their wishes by verbalizing them? I cannot examine this question here, but the relationship and the balance of power between facts and words is certainly a complex one.

Indeed, words can even be said to influence the course of events, and religious interpretations of facts are to be considered in that perspective. Livy is not the only one to underline the importance of words and a clever interpretation, but he makes it an important feature of the Romans' relationship with gods—and of Rome's success. This is one more point that proves the importance of the role he ascribes to orality in his work. The famous *omen* that occurs before the battle of Sentinum is very clear in that respect: a wolf chases a doe. When she goes towards the Gallic army the wolf, instead of following her, goes towards the Romans. While the Gauls kill the doe, their enemies let the wolf pass through their ranks. Modern studies have shown that allowing the wolf to pass is a religious error, because it reveals a flaw in Rome's defense.[27] But Livy has a soldier turn this mistake into a positive portent, through another interpretation: Mars' wolf is safe whereas the Gallic doe is dead. The Romans win the battle, but once again, the divine sign and its oral interpretation do not explain the victory by themselves: the consul P. Decius Mus gives his life through the ritual of *deuotio* to ensure the Roman victory, which is clearly linked to his act.[28] Several factors thus contribute to the victory and their

[25] The whole episode is told in 10, 40.
[26] For religious manifestations of the fact, called "causal overdetermination", see Levene (1993) 27–30, and Davies (2004) 21–25.
[27] Bayet (1962) and (1971).
[28] 10, 27, 8–9 for the sign and its interpretation, 10, 28–29 for the *deuotio*.

respective weight is not explained. The power of words seems to need something more concrete to lean on. The same logic is apparently at work on a larger scale: several voices join in to build Livy's history.

The Audience's Voice

The last voice to be heard is that of the audience. I will leave the external audience aside, as well as the crowd that watches events, to focus on the invisible gods. All events happen under their eyes—hence an always impending threat to wrongdoers—, and very often, humans call them as witnesses. Their voices are rather rare in Livy's representation of religion. The historian never stages a god's physical intervention on earth. The tradition according to which Mars is Romulus and Remus' father is questioned and Castor's apparition at the battle of Lake Regillus is not recounted. The exception is the short appearance of Hercules in Book 1, but it takes place in mythical times. Tullus Hostilius' death, caused by Jupiter's lightning, can be considered metaphorical.[29] Divine voices are the most concrete manifestations we have of a divine intervention, and once again, their oral nature certainly is no coincidence. They show how cautious Livy is when it comes to the intervention of gods on earth. Of course, the gods' voices are supposed to be heard regularly through auspices, portents, and prodigies, but they also take more unusual forms. Some are heard directly, some are transmitted through an intermediary (like the mouth of a priest, or a written document). The historian seems to use them for two main purposes.

Attributing the introduction of a new religious practice to a divine command is a good way of justifying it. The first example of such an intervention occurs in Book 1 when a voice heard in the Alban Mountains requires an expiation from the Alban people, integrated into the Roman city after their defeat. The Romans also decide to make an expiation of their own by celebrating a *nouemdiale sacrum*, which will become the usual atonement for rains of stones.[30] Livy is very careful when presenting that prodigy, stating that the Roman king had the fact checked because

[29] 1, 4, 2 for Romulus and Remus; instead of Castor's apparition, Livy mentions that a temple is vowed in his honor on the battlefield (2, 20, 13); Hercules: 1, 7; Hostilius' death: 1, 31, 8.

[30] 1, 31, 1–4. It is unclear whether that expiation consisted of nine days of ceremonies or if it was one ceremony taking place on the ninth day. See Dumézil (1974) 458.

he did not believe it was possible. Thus he tries to preserve his own credibility. He does not say that the voice ordered that ritual to take place (there are two traditions: the voice or the haruspices), but it is in any case the ultimate reason why the *nouemdiale sacrum* was established.

The historian is less cautious when explaining the origin of *instauratio*—the reiteration of a ceremony; it was a very common practice used as an expiation.[31] He clearly attributes it to Titus Latinius' dream when Jupiter demands that a ceremony be reiterated because it was done in a manner that he did not like. In the same way, Livy ascribes the first *deuotio* to the dream both consuls had the night before the battle of Veseris (they see a messenger from the gods who says that the victory will be given to the army whose general will vow himself and his enemies to the Manes gods).[32] One wonders whether the ritual really was created at that moment, since its complex rules appear clearly constituted. But Livy chooses to present it that way in order to give the *deuotio* a special meaning and a greater scope, as a ceremony orally prescribed by gods; it is impossible, though, to prove that a dream actually took place, which makes the divine voice a natural object of suspicion. Thanks to this oral component, the episode is thus representative of Livy's strategy of maintaining doubt about the historical reality of divine interventions.[33]

The precautions he takes when speaking of such interventions make his intentions clearer: gods do not talk to mortals. The *Ludi Apollinares* are supposed to be established because of a prophecy found in the *Carmina Marciana*, and lead to reinforce the *ritus Graecus*.[34] But the divine voice is indirect here; there is even a double mediation, that of the *uates* named Marcius, and that of the text he wrote. The same applies to the construction of the *Ara Maxima*, which is built because of Carmenta's prophecy.[35] Carmenta is said to be *interpres deorum*, but the divine utterance is heard, once again, through a second filter, since her son Evander is the one who reveals it to Hercules. Livy does not believe that Juno's statue in Veii talked to express her will nor that Silvanus' voice was heard in the Arsia forest, because these stories are too convenient to be true.[36]

[31] 2, 36.
[32] 8, 6, 9–10.
[33] See Levene (1993) 16–30.
[34] 25, 12, 9–15.
[35] 1, 7, 8–11.
[36] 5, 22, 5–6 and 2, 7, 2–3. See the following page for a more detailed analysis.

Each time, a phrase discreetly expresses his incredulity.[37] This shows that he needs such tales because he still includes them, in spite of his doubts. They enable him to magnify Rome's history and to transcribe accurately the image the Romans have of themselves.

In Carmenta's case, the prophecy actually is more about Rome's greatness than about Hercules' future divine status, which is the main but hidden reason why Livy writes about it. There is certainly, in Hercules' divinization, a reference to Romulus' or even to Augustus'. The story is told in the middle of the narrative of the reign of Romulus—who, as Hercules, has an immortal parent, and deserves by his acts to become a god—, and Augustus is a second Romulus. But the historian discreetly changes the meaning of the anecdote. He is then able to use a traditional tale for his own purpose—the justification of Rome's power and destiny.

As a true Roman, he does not trust stories where a divinity inspires a man. But, by multiplying filters and precautions, he enables the reader to understand the text as the reader prefers: that the gods do interfere in human affairs or that this is only a representation of what happened, or even a mere invention. If readers choose to believe in the divine interventions, such episodes prove that the gods care about Rome's future and greatness. If they choose not to believe in those repeated anecdotes, they are still left with the feeling that Rome's destiny is exceptional and cannot be explained exclusively by rational factors—military superiority, discipline, training, . . . : there is something more to it—a supernatural force? gods? Anecdotes that stage an oral divine intervention enable Livy to create this uncertain feeling.

The historian also uses divine voices to reinforce his narrative thread. For example, all direct divine voices are heard in the first decade, which certainly says something about their credibility. Silvanus' voice in the Arsia forest[38] shows that the gods favour the Romans, but that the power of the young Republic still is very fragile for, according to that voice, the Romans have only one less dead soldier than their enemies. Both notions—divine favour and fragility—are important for the historian's purpose, which is to show that Rome has a special destiny, but also that the Roman people played a decisive part in making that potential destiny come true. As for the voice which forecasts the arrival of the Gauls

[37] *Inde fabulae adiectum est*— "A fable was then added to the story" (my translation)—for the first episode; *Adiciunt miracula huic pugnae*—"The story of the battle was enriched by marvels"—for the second.

[38] 2, 7, 2–3.

in book 5, it reinforces the feeling that the temporary fall of Rome is ineluctable and that events in this book are to be attributed to *fatum*.[39] The Romans' mistakes are so enormous that they cannot only be the result of human failures. A supernatural force is involved. At a turning point in book 5 (just in the middle), it also enables Livy to underline the symmetrical construction of the book: the fall of Veii, the fall of Rome, linked by a single central character, Camillus. It is thus a useful narrative tool for the historian.

In the same book, Livy states that a young Roman asked the statue of Juno at Veiii if she wanted to come to Rome.[40] The historian does not believe that the statue spoke in response, but integrates the tale into his story because it reinforces both the epic and legendary spirit of Book 5 and the idea that the gods are with the Romans. An old enemy of theirs finally becomes an ally, which is a promise of domination for Rome, because of the goddess' name—*Iuno Regina*—and because Veii is symbolically important. Thus divine voices emphasize the importance of the Veian war, thereby contributing to making it a conflict governed by fate. They are strengthened by other elements like the flood of the Alban lake, in keeping with the Livian tendancy to provide one event with several explanations.

The second fatal war is the Second Punic War. Divine voices also are at work there: Hannibal's dream helps to make Livy's narrative an epic, in the wake of many other signals such as the characterization of Scipio as a *fatalis dux*—the only one in the *Ab Urbe Condita* apart from Camillus[41]—, the (divine) predictions or the Sibylline answers (coming from the gods).[42] In those examples, the gods' voices serve to reinforce the narrative thread. Because several passages of such nature are to be found and can be related to similar ones in other parts of the *Ab Urbe Condita*, they turn into a thematic thread that can be followed throughout the whole Livian history; they induce the feeling that a superior power accompanies the Romans, underline the link between piety and success, and present piety as the reason for Rome's superiority.

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[39] 5, 32, 6–7.

[40] 5, 22, 5–6.

[41] Bernard (2000) 338–350; Mineo (2003); Mineo (2006) 222–237 and 298–314.

[42] 22, 53, 6 and 30, 28, 11 (preceeded by *uelut*) for Scipio, 5, 19, 2 for Camillus. Hannibal's dream: 21, 22, 5–9; predictions (*carmina Marciana*): 25, 12; Sibylline answers: 22, 9, 7–10; 23, 11, 2–3 or 29, 10, 4–7.

Conclusion

To conclude, orality plays a surprisingly important and diverse part in Livy's written world. Religious passages particularly show that strategy. Many of the examples I used can be found in the first decade, some in the third one. It is neither a subjective choice nor a mere coincidence, since the expression of religious topics, especially marvellous anecdotes, is more developed in those decades.

Each of the voices at work in the *Ab Urbe Condita* is given a specific function. Building a—mostly implicit—opposition between what is due to written sources and what is due to oral ones serves well Livy's demonstration and interest as an historian. It contributes to the construction of the author's *persona*. The characters' speeches underline the importance of religion and define the nature of its presence in Roman society, thus creating one of the most important thematic threads in Livy's history. Finally, the gods' voices, in a work that does not easily stage divine interventions, prove Rome's special relationship with the gods, and therefore justify its power without Livy having to assert his own authority.

Those various voices therefore help to build a complex and structured narrative, through a very specific image of the divine and the Roman people. Their articulation enables Livy to show some neutrality towards certain types of events, and spare the plurality of interpretations that allows the reader to choose a solution *within* those proposed by the historian, rather than one from outside. Livy wants to write a total history: here is one of the means he uses to achieve that goal. If all the possible interpretations are in his work, the reader does not have to go anywhere else in order to find a satisfactory one. There is no need to be "for Livy" or "against Livy". The audience remains in the historian's power and each individual builds his or her own narrative, in a very modern way.

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Appendix: Words Referring to an Allegedly Oral Tradition

The following table shows how the most common words pointing out the involvement of an oral tradition are distributed in Livy's books. The first decade, and especially, its first half (*i.e.* the first pentad) contains significantly more of these words than the rest of the books.

Fama appears much more often but with different meanings (rumor, . . .). I only included the occurrences where it means "tradition." The second pentad is representative of the rest of the *Ab Urbe Condita*.

decade	*traditur*	*dicitur*	*ferunt*	*fama*
first decade	25	49	67	10
1 – pentads 2 – books	17 / 8 6 / 2 / 1 / 6 / 2 / 2 / 0 / 1 / 3 / 2	27 / 22 8 / 5 / 3 / 7 / 4 / 6 / 5 / 3 / 5 / 3	39 / 28 14 / 5 / 6 / 8 / 6 / 3 / 7 / 5 / 8 / 5	8 / 2 6 / 1 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 0 / 1 / 1 / 0 / 0
third decade	11	8	29	
1 – 2 –	6 / 5 2 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / 2 / 0 / 0 / 2 / 1	5 / 3 1 / 1 / 0 / 1 / 2 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 0 / 2	14 / 15 2 / 8 / 1 / 1 / 2 / 4 / 4 / 0 / 3 / 4	
fourth decade	7	10	10	
fifth decade	6	8	6	

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

DILEMMAS OF PIETAS IN ROMAN DECLAMATION

Bé Breij

This contribution deals with problems of *pietas* in that 'bombastic matter and loud empty phrases, the flatulent and formless flow of words' (*rerum tumore et sententiarum vanissimo strepitu, ventosa istaec et enormis loquacitas*[1])—in other words, declamation. I will first give a brief introduction to this much-maligned genre, then outline the concept of *pietas* in general and its significance in rhetoric in particular. Finally I will bring the two together and discuss the ways in which *pietas* was used in declamation to formulate and come to terms with moral dilemmas, and to test and challenge ethical norms—sometimes to their limits.

Declamation

As in Greece, education in Rome was almost exclusively rhetorical. When the three R's had been mastered at the *ludimagister*'s, the *grammaticus* taught young Romans the exegesis of literature, followed by a number of preliminary exercises in rhetoric (*progymnasmata*) such as *chreia* (instructive saying), *sententia* (maxim) or *locus communis* (commonplace).[2] It was the rhetor who took care of the final part of their training, which sometimes included more advanced *progymnasmata*, but always culminated in declamation.[3] Declamation consisted of two stages: pupils were trained in the art of composing and delivering *suasoriae*—political speeches in the *genus deliberativum*—before they proceeded to what was considered the crowning achievement of an education in rhetoric: the

[1] Petr. 1; 2. Tr. Michael Heseltine.
[2] The standard work on Roman education is still Bonner (1977).
[3] For the territorial disputes between *grammaticus* and *rhetor* see Quint. *Inst.* 2.1 with Reinhardt-Winterbottom (2006) ad loc.

controversia or mock-forensic speech in the *genus iudiciale*.[4] For this purpose, pupils were provided with an assignment containing a fictitous case against the background of one or more (declamatory) laws.[5] An example:

> FORTIS SINE MANIBUS
>
> 1. ADULTERUM CUM ADULTERA QUI DEPREHENDERIT, DUM UTRUMQUE CORPUS INTERFICIAT, SINE FRAUDE SIT.
>
> 2. LICEAT ADULTERIUM IN MATRE ET FILIO VINDICARE
>
> *Vir fortis in bello manus perdidit. Deprendit adulterum cum uxore, ex qua filium adulescentem habebat. Imperavit filio ut occideret; non occidit; adulter effugit. Abdicat filium.*
>
> THE HERO WITHOUT HANDS
>
> 1. WHOEVER CATCHES AN ADULTERER WITH HIS MISTRESS IN THE ACT, PROVIDED THAT HE KILLS BOTH, MAY GO FREE.
>
> 2. A SON TOO MAY PUNISH ADULTERY ON THE PART OF HIS MOTHER.
>
> A hero lost his hands in war. He caught an adulterer with his wife, by whom he had a youthful son. He told the son to do the killing. The son refused. The adulterer fled. The husband now disinherits his son.[6]

Students were given a choice to speak for the prosecution or for the defence, but since they had no opponents, they were expected anyway to think of possible arguments for the opposite party and refute them in their speeches, which meant that to a certain extent, they argued for both parties. Their teachers sometimes helped them with preliminary remarks about the speech's *divisio* (structure and arrangement of arguments) and could offer their own model speeches. And declamation was not only practised by students and their teachers, it was also hugely popular with grown-up members of the elite, who gathered in the literary salons of the Empire to vie with each other in original and sophisticated treatments of the stock themes of *controversiae*.

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[4] This contribution does not discuss *suasoriae* for two reasons: they are less suitable for dealing with moral dilemmas and, more importantly, there are simply too few of them left (seven, against 291 *controversiae*).

[5] Some of these laws are attested, others are Greek, yet others are fictitious. Good surveys of declamatory law are Lanfranchi (1938) and Bonner (1967[2]).

[6] Sen. *Contr.* 1.4, *thema*. Translations are taken from Winterbottom (1974).

In spite of its longevity and ubiquitousness (declamation remained the ancients' foremost tool for higher education until the fall of the Roman Empire), in spite also of the fact that Quintilian thought that declamation was the most effective means for educating orators, declamation was not without its critics. Their main objections were in the earlier-mentioned *rerum tumore et sententiarum vanissimo strepitu*: the bizarre subjects of *controversiae* and the pompous and pathetic style in which they were treated.[7] This criticism was substantial, and may have contributed to the long-standing neglect of declamation by classical scholars. Perhaps it can also account for the scarcity of declamations left to our disposal.[8]

The last decades, however, have seen a revival of interest in declamation. Reliable textual editions have been published and are now in the process of being supplied with commentaries. The *controversiae*, on account of their dual character, are studied from two angles. As school texts, they are investigated for their rhetorical properties and as a source of information on ancient education. They prove proficient in all three means of persuasion: *logos* (argument), *êthos* (the image a speaker wishes to present of himself or his client) and *pathos* (the arousal of emotions, especially indignation and pity). As a belletristic genre practised by the adult elite, they provide a wealth of material on imperial literary culture, which they both absorbed and influenced deeply and lastingly. They abound with ingenious arguments, striking *sententiae*, audacious metaphors, apt quotations and convincing *colores* (motivations or excuses), which tell us a great deal about the literary tastes of the elite. But declamation has a third aspect, which so far has remained all but overlooked. It is found in the bizarre situations populated with stock characters that were criticized so harshly in Antiquity and after, and could be called situational ethics.

[7] Winterbottom (1980) 1–8 gives a survey of ancient criticism of declamation.

[8] All in all, there are four collections left: the Elder Seneca's *Controversiae et Suasoriae* (early first century CE): a collection of highlights from declamations by members of the imperial elite and teachers, arranged in *sententiae* (aphorisms), *divisiones* and *colores* (motivations) brought to bear on 74 themes. This collection also contains seven *suasoriae* (ed. Winterbottom (1974); Håkanson (1989)); the *Minor Declamations* ascribed to Quintilian (early second century): this collection is especially valuable because its brief treatments of 145 themes are accompanied by a teacher's instructions (ed. Winterbottom (1984)); Calpurnius Flaccus' *Declamations*: 53 colourful fourth- or fifth-century excerpts (ed. Sussman (1994)); the 19 *Major Declamations* ascribed to Quintilian, a corpus that came into being in the late second century CE and was given its final draft in the late fourth century; they are the only full *controversiae* we have left (ed. Håkanson (1982)). The dates of these editions reflect a long period of neglect.

Whoever sets forth to write a *controversia* must be prepared to identify with a stock character that is either powerful (rich man, father, husband, war hero) or an underdog (poor man, son, wife, prostitute) and then to imagine himself in extreme circumstances which pose terrible moral dilemmas. A speaker must assume a role to think them through, explore them to their limits, come to terms with them and, if possible, solve them. He becomes familiar with the discourse of power, but also learns to empathise with and stand up for vulnerable members of society. Mary Beard, regarding declamation as Roman mythology, sees declamation's stock characters taking the place of gods and heroes, and declamatory law that of divine sanction. What declamations do then, is 'to construct a fictional world of "traditional tales" for negotiating, and re-negotiating, the fundamental rules of Roman society; they "naturalize the arbitrariness" of those rules by setting them in the context of legal sanction; they offer a vision of higher authority—defined not in terms of divine intervention, but in terms of the social sanction of Roman law; they provide a focus for the re-presentation and constant re-resolution of central Roman/human conflicts that everyday social regulations do not (and *can* not) solve; they offer an arena for learning, practicing and recollecting what it is *to be and think Roman*.'[9] She defines as its main issues: family and sexual conflict, conceptions and problems of private and social behaviour, ideas of the self and personal obligations.[10]

Mythopoesis or situational ethics, it is plain that declamation offers a space for ethical reflection, and as such it can be used—with caution—as a valuable source of ancient Roman discourse on moral issues. Its treatment of the fundamental concept of *pietas* will make this clear.

Pietas

Pietas derives from *pius*, thought to be remotely cognate with *purus*, 'pure' or 'clean'; it denotes a constant, conscientious concern with fulfilling one's duties.[11] Its oldest use, predating the Roman state, is religious, initially referring to one's duties towards the family gods and later including all religious obligations. However when by Cicero's time the word *religio* ('conscientiousness'; 'religious awe') began to be used as a synonym,

[9] Beard (1993) 56.
[10] Beard (1993) 61.
[11] Many thanks to Josine Blok for helping me to hone and nuance this definition.

pietas came to include other areas in which a sense of duty and responsibility was paramount: the family and the state. In his early work *De Inventione* Cicero classifies both concepts under the fundamental, self-evident law of nature (*ius naturae*) before he defines them:

> 'And the law of nature is something which is implanted in us not by opinion, but by a kind of innate instinct; it includes religion, duty, gratitude, revenge, reverence, and truth. Religion is the term applied to the fear and worship of the gods. Duty [*pietas*] warns us to keep our obligations to our country or parents or other kin.'[12]

This does not mean that *pietas* was stripped of its religious connotations, nor that its essence changed with its applications; rather, the specific sense of *pietas* depended on the context in which the word was used. Thus in *De Republica* (a political-philosophical work written 54–51 BCE) 6.16 we find 'revere justice and piety, which are great with respect to parents and other kin, but paramount with respect to your country: such a life is a way to heaven' (*iustitiam cole et pietatem, quae cum magna in parentibus et propinquis, tum in patria maxima est: ea vita via est in caelum*).[13] But in *De Natura Deorum* (a religious-philosophical work from 45/44 BCE) the religious application of *pietas* explicitly returns: 'Piety is justice towards the gods' (*est enim pietas iustitia adversus deos.*)[14]

Touching upon all major areas of their lives, *pietas* was an essential value for the Romans. The first temple dedicated to the goddess *Pietas* was built as early as 181 BCE; soon she also appeared on numerous coins.[15] From the second century BCE *pietas* was used consistently to account for Rome's expansionist politics.[16] Its embodiment was found in Aeneas, 'a man renowned for goodness, renowned for nerve in battle' (*pietate insignis et armis*),[17] because he combined all types of *pietas*: he brought his household gods from Troy, but also his aged father and his little son; he obeyed the gods in his voyage to Italy, and served both his

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[12] Cic. *Inv.* 2.66: … *naturae quidem ius esse, quod nobis non opinio, sed quaedam innata vis adferat, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, veritatem. Religionem eam quae in metu et caerimonia deorum sit appellant; pietatem, quae erga patriam aut parentes aut alios sanguine coniunctos officium conservare moneat* (tr. H.M. Hubbell); see further 2.161; also the contemporary and quite similar *Rhet. Her.* 2.19.

[13] Tr. C. Walker Keyes.

[14] Tr. A.S. Pease. Wagenvoort (1924) 12 reminds that this definition is a translation of Posidonius the Stoic's ἔστιν ἡ ὁσιότης δικαιοσύνη τις πρὸς θεούς.

[15] See the thorough study of Liegle (1967^2), who emphasises the reciprocal character of *pietas* (243).

[16] Wagenvoort (1924) 18–20.

[17] Verg. *Aen.* 6.403; tr. R. Humphries.

old and his new *patria*.[18] It is hardly surprising that he was regarded as a prefiguration for Emperor Augustus, another model of *pietas* who avenged the murder of his adoptive father Julius Caesar and put an end to civil strife. Subsequent emperors usually set great store by having *pius* among their titles.[19]

Pietas in Roman Rhetoric

Since *pietas* was an absolute, sacrosanct value pervading fundamental areas of Roman socio-cultural life, it is hardly surprising that it also figures largely in rhetoric. We encounter the concept in several different contexts. On a meta-rhetorical level, it was an essential part of the philosophical background Cicero tried to (re-)claim for the orator, who ought to be able to speak eloquently about ethical matters:

> He should not confine his study to logic, however, but have a theoretical acquaintance with all the topics of philosophy and practical training in debating them. For philosophy is essential to a full, copious and impressive discussion and exposition of the subjects which so often come up in speeches and are usually treated meagrely, whether they concern religion, death, piety, patriotism, good and evil, virtues and vices, duty, pain, pleasure, or mental disturbances and errors.[20]

Quintilian too wanted the orator to be versed in philosophy, but he focused rather more strongly on the contribution of ethics to the education of the orator as *vir bonus*:

> Will not the orator have a great deal to say about Justice, Courage, Abstinence, Temperance, and Piety? But the good man, who does not merely know these things by word and name, and has not simply heard them with his ears in order to repeat them with his tongue, but has really embraced the virtues themselves in his mind and come to have virtuous sentiments—*he* will not have any problems in ordering his thoughts, and will speak out frankly what he knows.[21]

[18] See Moseley (1925) 388–389; in 397–398 he does argue that Aeneas' religious *pietas* for Vergil was paramount.

[19] Rufus Fears (1981) 827–948; 889–891.

[20] Cic. *Orat.* 118: *Nec vero a dialecticis modo sit instructus sed habeat omnis philosophiae notos ac tractatos locos. Nihil enim de religione, nihil de morte, nihil de pietate, nihil de caritate patriae, nihil de bonis rebus aut malis, nihil de virtutibus aut vitiis, nihil de officio, nihil de dolore, nihil de voluptate, nihil de perturbationibus animi et erroribus, quae saepe cadunt in causas et ieiunius aguntur, nihil, inquam, sine ea scientia quam dixi graviter ample, copiose dici et explicari potest* (tr. H.M. Hubbell); see further *De Orat.* 1.56; 2.67.

[21] *Inst.* 12.2.17: *An de iustitia fortitudine abstinentia temperantia pietate non plurima*

Quintilian's moral demands on orators-to-be were genuine and strict. But at the same time, he realised that a good character can also be useful in a practical sense, because it contributes to *êthos*, i.e. the image or character a speaker wishes to present of himself or his client:

> Finally, *êthos* in all its forms requires a good and even-tempered person. Since the orator needs to demonstrate these qualities, if he can, in his client too, he must at any rate possess, or be thought to possess, them himself. He will thus do the best service to his Causes, as his own good character will lend them credibility. For the man who seems bad when he speaks must inevitably speak badly.[22]

Nor had this escaped Cicero. Among the virtues that furnished *êthos* in his eyes, he explicitly counted *pietas*:

> A potent factor in success, then, is for the characters, principles, conduct and course of life, both of those who are to plead cases and of their clients, to be approved, and conversely those of their opponents condemned (...) It is very helpful to display the tokens of good-nature, kindness, calmness, loyalty [*pietas*] and a disposition that is pleasing and not grasping or covetous.[23]

Êthos is only one of the three classical means of persuasion already defined by Aristotle.[24] The other two are *pathos* (emotion) and *logos* (argument). In practice, *pathos* is by and large limited to feelings incited in the audience, i.e. usually the judge or jury. The two most important emotions are anger (with the accused, about a crime) and pity (for a victim or defendant). Of course acts inspired by *pietas* or, on the contrary, involving a violation of it, were quite suitable for arousing and manipulating emotion.

But *pietas* could also be a source for rational argument or *logos*. We have seen above that *pietas* resorted under the absolute *ius naturae*. In argument it was therefore expedient if one could prove that one had

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dicet orator? Sed ille vir bonus, qui haec non vocibus tantum sibi nota atque nominibus aurium tenus in usum linguae perceperit sed qui virtutes ipsas mente complexus ita sentiet, nec in cogitando laborabit et quod sciet vere dicet (tr. D.A. Russell).

22 Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.18: *Denique ἦθος omne bonum et comem virum poscit. Quas virtutes cum etiam in litigatore debeat orator, si fieri potest, adprobare, utique ipse aut habeat aut habere credatur. Sic proderit plurimum causis, quibus ex sua bonitate faciet fidem. Nam qui dum dicit malus videtur utique male dicit.*

23 *De Orat.* 2.182: *Valet igitur multum ad vincendum probari mores et instituta et facta et vitam eorum, qui agent causas, et eorum, pro quibus, et item improbari adversariorum (...) Facilitatis, liberalitatis, mansuetudinis, pietatis, grati animi, non appetentis, non avidi, signa proferri perutile est* (tr. H. Rackham).

24 Ar. *Rhet.* 1356a.

acted from *pietas*. For precisely because it was a virtue which came in the category of *ius naturae*, it was fundamental and unassailable and put those who could prove that they possessed, or acted from, *pietas*, in the right. Accordingly, it could furnish arguments in lawsuits which, in the rhetorical *status* system for the classification of criminal trials, could be classed under the *constitutio iuridicialis absoluta*. This applied when there was no doubt about a particular act or its perpetrator, but, as the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* defines it, 'when we contend that the act in and of itself, without our drawing on any extraneous considerations, was right.'[25] Quintilian is the first who explicitly mentions *pietas* in connection with his definition of this *status*, which he denotes as *qualitas absoluta* and regards as eminently sustainable:

> 'The only question concerns the act: is it just or not? All justice rests either (1) on nature or (2) on convention. (1) 'Nature' includes whatever is done because of the intrinsic value of the particular action. Under this head come piety, good faith, self-control, and the like.'[26]

It is of course quite fitting that a concept like *pietas*, which for Romans was crucial in all their major relationships of obligation (gods, family and country), should resort under the *ius naturae*. It also stands to reason that because of its great importance, it could contribute to *logos*, *êthos* and *pathos*. And therefore we may expect that it also has great influence on declamation in all its three capacities: rhetorical exercise, literary genre, and exercise in situational ethics.

Pietas in Roman Declamation

If we look at the 291 extant *controversiae*, we find that no fewer than 78 have a substantial concern with *pietas*.[27] At best three of these 78

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[25] *Rhet. Her.* 1.24: *cum id ipsum, quod factum est, ut aliud nihil foris adsumatur, recte factum esse dicemus* (tr. H. Caplan). See also Cic. *Inv.* 2.62 (*constitutio (generalis) negotialis*); cf. *Part.* 42.

[26] *Inst.* 7.4.5–6: *Est enim de re sola quaestio, iusta sit ea necne. Iustum omne continetur natura vel constitutione. Natura, quod fit secundum cuiusque rei dignitatem. Hinc sunt pietas fides continentia et alia.*

[27] I have made this selection simply by tracing occurrences of *pius/pietas* and their antonyms *impius* (*inpius*) and *impietas* (*inpietas*) and then checking if they have a substantial impact on the theme and/or the declamation proper. I leave out of consideration related concepts such as *officium* and *caritas*. Also, I restrict myself to the four extant collections of *controversiae*, leaving aside the seven *suasoriae* preserved by Seneca the Elder, because *pietas* does not play a significant role in any of them.

controversiae explicitly involve *pietas* towards the gods. *Minor Declamation* 323, about an Athenian priest who is charged with bringing aid to the enemy for dedicating a temple destroyed and rebuilt by Alexander the Great, is the only one with a fully religious tenor.[28] Additionally, in Seneca's *Controversia* 10.5 the famous fourth-century painter Parrhasius has allegedly maimed and tortured an Olynthian captive to have a convincing model for Prometheus being punished by Zeus/Jupiter. Because he has supposedly damaged Athens' reputation, he is charged with harming the state.[29] In 10.5.5 it is said that Parrhasius 'has shown lack of piety either in disgracing Jupiter or in imitating him' (*parum pie aut infamavit Iovem aut imitatus est*).[30] Finally, *Major Declamation* 12 contains a brief reference to *impietas* incurred through cannibalism during a famine.[31]

In another trio *pietas* towards the state is a central issue. *Minor Declamation* 254 deals with an exile who returns to his city to report on a tyranny being plotted; in *Minor Declamation* 305 two exiles who have returned *pio furto* ('with a patriotic cheat') are forced by their rich enemy to fight each other to the death. *Minor Declamation* 352 focuses on a young man taking up *pia arma* ('patriotic arms') to help his city, which has been routed twice. In three others[32] *pietas* towards the state is an issue, but one which is overshadowed by *pietas* within father-son relationships.

The remaining 72 *controversiae* are all concerned with *pietas* within the family. This is not so surprising if we take into account the subject matter of declamations, and their prime target group. The latter, we have seen, consisted of upper-class adolescents. Their main social environment was of course their home, and the most important relationships in their lives were those with parents, siblings and friends.

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[28] This becomes clear at once from the teacher's preface: *Quam potest maxima religione iudicum implendus animus est* (*Minor Declamation* 323.1: 'The jury's mind must be filled with religious feeling to all possible extent.' tr. Shackleton Bailey).

[29] Or *laesa res publica*; for the declamatory law involved, which could have a basis in both Greek and Roman attested law, see Bonner (1967^2) 97–98.

[30] Tr. Winterbottom.

[31] *Major Declamation* 12, 10 *nemo adeo adfinis fuit, nemo tam coniunctus, quem pietas abstineret* ('Nobody was so closely related by marriage or by blood, that his ties of devotion caused him to refrain from cannibalism', tr. Sussman). Gods and family seem inseparable here; but this is often the case, as I will argue below.

[32] *Minor Declamation*. 315; Sen. *Controversiae* 1.7 and 7.7.

In fact, in 190 out of the 291 *controversiae* we have left, family relationships are of major importance,[33] either because they occasion a conflict or because they are threatened or damaged from outside. Within this majority of family *controversiae*, it is specifically fathers and sons who determine the theme of 125 texts, and in only ten of those do they have a peaceful relationship. In the other 115 cases it is one marred by enmity, misuse of power or downright hatred. This has to do with the social position of Roman youths, which, although they may have been privileged from a material point of view, was very awkward. As long as their fathers were alive, they were in every respect subject to their *patria potestas*. In practice, this meant that they were not legally entitled to possessions, that their fathers could order them to marry or divorce at will, and were even allowed to kill them with impunity (*vitae necisque potestas*). It is quite natural, then, that these circumstances made their mark on declamatory themes. When declaiming, put-upon sons had the opportunity to take on the role of son to work off their frustrations, or the role of father to enjoy a taste of the absolute power in store for them once they themselves were *patresfamilias*, but they also got a chance to explore the responsibilities that went with the position.[34] Their fathers on the other hand, who liked to declaim in competition with each other and with teachers of rhetoric in theatres and literary salons, could speak to reaffirm their social status or to probe the limits of what was socially and morally acceptable.

It is this type of declamation, centring around family relationships, which is best for uniting all three functions of declamation: rhetorical exercise, literary fiction and situational ethics. And it also offers excellent opportunities for investigating, discussing and arguing from the essential value of *pietas*.

This focus on family situations does not imply however that *pietas* is stripped of its other connotations; *pietas* is a multi-layered but coherent concept with different emphases in different situations. Where family *pietas* prevails, its various other applications (gods and country) cannot be thought away, for it is the whole concept that is such an essential part of

[33] I include the (relatively small) number of declamations focusing on marital problems, but leave aside those concerning other romantic relationships and rape.

[34] For father-son relationships, *patria potestas* and *vitae necisque potestas* in Roman declamation, see Sussman (1995); Vesley (2003); Lentano (2005); Breij (2006); (2007): 45–62.

Roman identity and moral makeup. The following fragment, taken from the defence of a man accused of poisoning his brother, will make this clear:

> For my part, gentlemen, I confess that I am surprised that any laws were made about such heinous crimes or that any mortals could have been found to whom such a suspicion could attach. Could anyone kill his brother? Did not silent nature, the force of blood, stand in the way? Did not Piety, whoever she is, who is certainly believed to exist, put out her hands to block the crimes?[35]

The declamation is first and foremost concerned with a family drama, but the mention of the goddess Pietas evokes a fully religious significance. Furthermore the speaker's dismay that anyone could even be suspected of murdering a relative, and that laws should have been invented to punish such crimes against *pietas*, emphasises its fundamental importance and alludes to its place within *ius naturae*. But in the same declamation, the other connotations still in evidence, *pietas* even appears as a patriotic virtue:

> Did somebody give poison at his hearth, amid the sacred rites of the table, with the immortal gods whom we both worshipped in their garlands, cheerful giver to cheerful taker? (...) As austere antiquity had handed down to us, tables placated hostile feelings and men who had clashed with arms and armies yet reclined in security; the faith of the banquet was their intermediary.[36]

The passages above unite the three areas in which *pietas* manifests itself, and they also show how *pietas* furnishes arguments in this case: on the level of *logos* there is the allusion to *ius naturae*, to the fundamental status of *pietas*, which makes it unimaginable for one brother to kill the other; this argument itself together with the reference to *severa antiquitas* provides the speaker with a worthy *êthos*, while *pathos* is found in the indignant triple rhetorical question in the first fragment

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[35] *Minor Declamation* 321.6–7: *Equidem, iudices, admirari me confiteor aut constitutas esse de tantis sceleribus leges aut ullos inveniri potuisse mortalium in quos caderet ista suspicio. Fratrem suum potuit aliquis occidere? Non obstitit tacita natura, non sanguinis vis? Non sceleribus manus suas obiecit quaecumque est illa, quae certe creditur esse, Pietas?* (tr. Shackleton Bailey).

[36] *Minor Declamation* 321.20–21: *Venenum aliquis inter lares suos, inter sacra mensae, coronatis pariter quos colebamus dis immortalibus, venenum aliquis hilaris hilari dedit? (...) Ut severa nobis antiquitas tradidit, infestos animos placavere mensae, et homines qui inter se armis atque exercitibus conflixerant tuti tamen iacuere media cenae fide.*

and the emphatic repetitions (*inter, hilaris*) in the second. This makes the fragments rhetorically sound, but also rich in literary quality. The third aspect of declamation, situational ethics, is somewhat less in evidence, because *pietas* is presented here as absolute, static, self-evident and in itself unproblematic.

Situational ethics comes more clearly to the fore if *pietas* gives rise to a moral dilemma. This can happen in various ways. Firstly, a protagonist may be landed in a situation where it is difficult for him to keep up his *pietas* in the face of an opposing force, which may be the state, or legal authority, or a superior power within the family—usually his father. Secondly, he may be confronted by incompatible claims being laid to his *pietas*. Thirdly, he may be forced to explore the limits of *pietas*: how much of it may be expected in a given situation? Or, conversely, at what point is it permissible to refuse others one's *pietas*? Finally, involving the *status qualitatis*, an accuser can define a crime specifically as a violation of *pietas*, while on the other hand it can be defended as an act of *pietas*. I will furnish some examples of each; it will turn out that these dilemmas often overlap or go together and besides, that serious exploration and contemplation can go hand in hand with fun and provocation.

I shall first discuss the declamation whose theme I used as an example at the beginning of this contribution, the one about the son who had been asked by his father, the hero without hands, to kill his mother and her paramour, and was disinherited for refusing to do so. As this is one of Seneca's *controversiae*, we have fragments from a large number of speakers; it is striking that 'one colour in favour of the youth was introduced by all declaimers: "I could not kill." '[37] Of course this refusal to kill can only be interpreted as a sign of *pietas*, but this *pietas* is opposed by the force of *patria potestas*: 'he ought, even without his father's orders, to have killed a hero's wife taken in adultery; he ought, seeing that his father did order him, even if the father was himself capable of killing; he ought, because his father ordered him and could not act himself.'[38] On

[37] Sen. *Contr.* 1.4.7: *color pro adulescente unus ab omnibus qui declamaverunt introductus est: 'non potui occidere.'*

[38] Sen. *Contr.* 1.4.6: *Oportuit, etiamsi pater non iuberet, occidere adulteram viri fortis uxorem; oportuit iubente patre, etiamsi ipse posset occidere; oportuit, cum et iuberet et ipse non posset.* The issue *an in omnia patri parendum sit* ('whether a father must always be obeyed') occurs so frequently that it is called a *vetus et explosa quaestio* ('old and discredited topic') already in Sen. *Contr.* 2.1.20; see e.g. Lanfranchi (1938) 246–251 for a collection of samples.

the other hand, to obey his father would also be a kind of *pietas*; in other words, he is also confronted with incompatible claims on his *pietas*: 'Alas for filial affection, look at the parental prayers you stood between!'[39]

A father is the one facing an equally difficult choice in the fifth *Major Declamation* ascribed to Quintilian, which shows a certain resemblance to the biblical story of the prodigal son. Its theme and accompanying law are as follows:

> Aeger Redemptus
>
> Liberi parentes in egestate aut alant aut vinciantur.[40]
>
> *Quidam duos filios habebat, frugi et luxuriosum. Peregre profecti sunt capti a piratis. Luxuriosus languere coepit. Ambo de redemptione scripserunt. Pater universis bonis in nummum redactis profectum est. Dixerunt illi praedones non attulisse illum nisi unius pretium, et eligeret utrum vellet. Aegrum redemit. Qui, dum revertitur, mortuus est. Alter ruptis vinculis fugit. Alimenta poscitur. Contradicit.*
>
> The Case Of The Sick Son Who Was Ransomed
>
> Children must either support destitute parents or be imprisoned.
>
> A certain man had two sons, one frugal, the other a spendthrift. They took a trip abroad and were captured by pirates. The spendthrift son became ill. Both wrote a letter to their father asking to be ransomed. After converting his entire fortune into cash, the father proceeded to them. The pirates then told him that he had only brought enough to ransom one of them, and that he should choose which of the two sons he wanted. He ransomed the sick son, who then died when they returned home. The other son broke out of confinement and escaped. His father demands support, but the son objects.[41]

The speech is for the father, who objects to his son's refusal and again demands support. Of course the father feels that he must defend the choice he made—even if he was forced to: why did he choose a sick, dissolute son over a decent, respectable, healthy one? In his plea, *pietas* occurs again and again as an entity that determined his actions, but

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[39] Sen. *Contr.* 1.4.5: *O misera pietas, inter quae parentum vota constitisti!*

[40] For this declamatory law see e.g. Bonner (1967²) 95–96 and Lanfranchi (1938) 274–282. It had an authentic basis in the Greek γραφὴ κακώσεως τῶν γονέων ('law concerning the maltreatment of parents') and inspired Roman law under the Antonines (see *Dig.* 30.3.5; *Cod. Iust.* 5.25.1–3).

[41] All translations from the *Major Declamations* are either taken from or based on Sussman 1987.

obviously motivated him in several different ways. He begins by saying that he actually preferred the good son:

> What good did my impartial feelings of love [*pietas*] towards my sons accomplish? Even against my will it was clear whose company, whose presence delighted me more. Whether he wants to or not, gentlemen of the jury, even this very complaint of my son's proves what he must admit about his father's state of mind: to become angry because he was not preferred over his brother is the peeve of one who is loved more.[42]

He even goes so far as to make this preference a cause for remorse, which makes it quite plausible that the good son was indeed the one he loved best:

> Who would not suppose that after I heard the terms I at once stripped away my ailing son's chains? Although my admission may displease you, I had to think it over. Amid these inexpressible surges of grief how long, yes, how long a debate did my pathetic emotions of love [*pietas*] hold? And here's something I will never adequately explain away to my son's ghost, and never to my own guilty conscience: that son of mine who was sinking fast was not immediately in my judgment my only son.[43]

Yet further on, the tables are turned. Father loved his sons equally, but circumstances left him with no choice but to ransom the more vulnerable one:

> There is a similar and identical love [*pietas*] towards all one's children, but very often it has special reasons for favouritism towards one. Even with the equality of our love intact, there is something undefinable on account of which in the silent promptings of the heart we love each individual child in their turn as though they were an only child: … in some their misfortunes warm the heart when we can't bear to endure them, and through pity we embrace much more obviously their crippled and deformed bodies. Yet as a whole, a father's love is secure when what is thought to be lacking in one child is supplied in another.[44]

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[42] *Major Declamation* 5.3: *quid profuit individua pietas? erat etiam me nolente manifestum, utrius magis colloquiis, magis laetarer aspectu. velit nolit, iudices, ipsa quoque querela iuvenis, quid de patris fateatur animo, probat: irasci, quod non sit fratri praelatus aegro, impatientia est hominis, quis magis ametur.*

[43] *Major Declamation* 5.4: *quis non putet audita condicione vincula me statim detraxisse languenti? oderitis licet confessionem meam, deliberavi. tenuit inter illos inexplicabiles doloris aestus, quam longum tenuit pietas misera consilium, et, quod numquam satis manibus filii, numquam satis excusabo conscientiae meae, non statim mihi ille deficiens unicus fuit.*

[44] *Major Declamation* 5.12: *par est in omnes liberos eademque pietas, sed habet in aliquo plerumque proprias indulgentiae causas, et salva caritatis aequalitate est quiddam, per quod*

> To tell the truth, there is no difference between children except in the case of their misfortune. Among people who are rendered equal by the nature of your family ties [*pietas*] to them, you wouldn't display a distinction except in the case of suffering.[45]

One could say that the father is inconsistent, first admitting that he loved his good son better, then insisting that they were equal in his affection. On the other hand, both points are valid in themselves, and worth investigating and expatiating upon. The latter, expressed in a *locus communis* in 5.12, may be trite, but will have been relevant for many fathers and sons. Nor will the former, a feeling of remorse occasioned by partiality, have been unfamiliar. The declamation invites speaker and audience to think through these situations and try to come to terms with them. But they are also rhetorically viable, offering two possible stances for coming up with plausible arguments.

A similarly multi-tiered approach is found if we look at the other *pietas*-dilemma present in this declamation. It concerns the question of how much *pietas* the father may expect from his respectable son after abandoning him with the pirates instead of his no-good brother. The father takes three separate approaches to substantiate his claim. The first is, as we have seen above, the assertion that his choice was actually prompted by *pietas* (making it resort, incidentally, under the *qualitas absoluta*: the act was intrinsically good). The second is rather more aggressive: the good son is in his turn accused of lacking in *pietas*:

> In any event, gentlemen of the jury, I was able to provide a justification for ransoming that son by reason of this young man's neglect of his filial duty [*impietas*]. His cruelty furnishes me with the evidence that I seem to have chosen the better son. Yet I shall not make use of the ill will engendered by this circumstance, nor do I choose to defend by means of a formal grievance whatever I did out of passionate, fatherly love [*pietas*].[46]

tacito mentis instinctu singulos rursus tamquam unicos amemus: (...) in quibusdam diliguntur impatientius calamitates, et damna corporum debilitatesque membrorum notabilius miseratione complectimur. salva est tamen universitas, cum, quicquid in ali⟨qu⟩o cessare creditur, in altero restituit alter affectus.

[45] *Major Declamation* 5.14: *non habent profecto, non habent discrimen liberi nisi de calamitate, et inter homines, quos natura pietatis aequavit, differentiam nisi de dolore non explices.*

[46] *Major Declamation* 5.1: *utcumque igitur, iudices, poteram redemptionis illius reddere de praesenti iuvenis impietate rationem, et mihi crudelitas ista praestabat, ut filium viderer elegisse meliorem, non utor tamen occasionis huius invidia, nec quicquid miserae pietatis impatientia feci, querela malo defendere.*

This is not only a relevant ethical principle—scrutinise your own conscience before you get on your moral high horse—but also an important juridical category: that of *relatio criminis*, i.e. cases in which an alleged victim provoked whatever happened and/or is himself guilty of a crime. But in his third approach, the father rises above the conflict. In a *locus communis* he asserts his social and moral superiority as a father:

> Indeed, you, as children, do not provide our support, but, rather, you are paying us back. God knows how much briefer and how much less are these expenses compared to so much for their infancy, for their childhood, and to such numerous and varied outlays for even the most frugal young manhood! ... Would you like to know how much devotion and respect you owe to my title of father? It isn't a good deed for you to feed me, but it is a crime for you to deny me this.[47]

It appears that fatherhood, and the *patria potestas*, enable the father to reverse the situation, making it not a favour or even a duty, but a matter of course that his son should support him. As in many other declamations, attention is called to the absolute and sacrosanct character of fatherhood, creating an occasion to reflect upon a father's role and his power. Rhetorically speaking, the *locus* supplies a strong argument, because it is based on authority.[48]

We can see situational ethics and rhetoric go hand in hand in this declamation, but of course it also has a strong literary character. It manifests itself in the development of a folkloristic theme, which grants opportunities for gruesome and pathetic descriptions, psychological portraits of the three main characters and reflective *loci communes*. On a more detailed level we find an abundance of the stylistic properties associated with the declamatory style: paradoxes, antitheses, metonymia, repetition, alliteration etc.

Literary aspects are also vividly present in *Major Declamations* 18 and 19, which are good examples of *pietas* in cases involving the *status qualitatis*, i.e. cases in which the fact or act under consideration is defended as *pius* (or on the contrary denounced as a violation of *pietas*).[49] *Major*

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[47] *Major Declamation* 5.7: *Parentibus vero liberi non praestatis alimenta, sed redditis. quanto, dii deaeque, breviora, quanto minora pro tot infantiae, tot pueritiae sumptibus, tam variis vel abstinentissimae iuventutis impendiis! ... vultis scire, quantus nomini nostro debeatur affectus, quanta veneratio? non est beneficium quod pascitis, sed est facinus quod negatis.*

[48] For arguments based on attributes of persons, see e.g. Cic. *Inv.* 1.34–36; Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23–31.

[49] For the *status qualitatis*, see p. 336 above.

Declamations 18 and 19 are special for a number of reasons. Not only are they complete, but they have been written by the same author and consist of a speech for the prosecution and for the defence on a single theme. Moreover, the *controversiae* are figured, that is, the speakers try to achieve a hidden goal *via* another, ostensible goal. Quintilian discerns three occasions for figured *controversiae*: if it is dangerous to speak openly or indecent, but also for fun.[50] It is mainly the latter two which determine the theme of *Major Declamations* 18 and 19:

> Infamis In Matrem
>
> Malae tractationis sit actio.
>
> *Speciosum filium, infamem, tamquam incestum cum matre committeret, pater in secreta parte domus torsit et occidit in tormentis. Interrogat illum mater, quid ex filio compererit; nolentem dicere malae tractationis accusat.*
>
> The Case Of The Son Suspected Of Incest With His Mother
>
> Maltreatment may be actionable
>
> A father tortured his handsome son in a secluded part of the house and killed him on the rack, since he suspected him of committing incest with his mother. The mother asked her husband what he had learned from their son. Since he refuses to tell, she accuses her husband of maltreatment.[51]

Both speakers use the formal accusation of maltreatment of the mother to convey different discourses. The father in *Major Declamation* 19 uses his defence against the charge of maltreatment to justify the murder of his son and to substantiate the rumour about the incest. His speech is highly figured and consists of a string of sophisticated innuendo. The accusation on behalf of the mother is its mirror image: the accusation of maltreatment conveys attempts to accuse the father of murder and to invalidate the rumour about incest. But since it tries to do away with the father's insinuations, it is literally a textbook example of how to defuse figured speech. We shall take a look at the construction of figured speech in *Major Declamation* 19 before we witness its mischievous deconstruction in *Major Declamation* 18.

In *Major Declamation* 19, the father defends the murder of his son as resorting under *qualitas absoluta* because it was an act of mercy, inspired by *pietas*:

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[50] *Inst.* 9.2.65–66.

[51] Title, law, and theme of *Major Declamations* 18 and 19.

> I for my part also loved my son, not with kisses, with a woman's weakness, or with tears, but with manly strength, my anguish, and my endurance. I rescued from malice and withdrew from infamy an only son whom I would have saved by my own death in his place had the enemy surrounded him in battle, whom I would have rescued at the cost of losing part of my own body had a sudden fire engulfed him. I also have what I might ascribe to you—natural ties of blood and parental love [*pietas*]: I did a most difficult thing since I didn't kill myself instead.[52]

Pathos abounds and *êthos* too—or so it appears. But if the killing was an act of *pietas*, it was righteous; but if it was righteous, the son must have been guilty of incest. In other words, the passage is in fact a highly figured piece of innuendo.

In *Major Declamation* 18, the killing is condemned as a crime against *pietas*: the reverse side of *qualitas absoluta*. As a result of the murder, the advocate states, regard for fatherhood is destroyed and all respect for family ties annihilated (*consumpta est paterni nominis religio, omnis pietatis sublata reverentia*).[53] A passionate—and surprisingly modern—plea for spontaneous, guileless love makes for *êthos*:

> The closest thing to incest is to fear it will happen. I prefer the naturalness which doesn't dread disgrace, I prefer bared affections and family love [*pietas*] that need no circumspection. Let people believe nothing can be badly construed and nothing be made the subject of gossip about themselves.[54]

But at the same time the author defies the limits of what could be considered morally acceptable, continuing 'let her hold him insatiably and eagerly; rumour is not so important that a mother should love her son, yet be anxious about her modesty' (*teneat insatiabiliter, avide; tanti fama non est, ut amet filium mater sollicitudine pudicae*).[55] Motherly love is in fact described in disturbingly erotic terms:

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[52] 19.4: *et ego amavi filium meum, non osculis, non infirmitate, non lacrimis, sed viribus, dolore, patientia. unicum, quem, si acie clausisset hostis, vicaria morte servassem, si subitum cinxisset incendium, extulissem relicta meorum parte membrorum, eripui malignitati, abstuli famae. habeo, quod inputem tibi, natura, pietas: rem difficillimam feci, quod non me potius occidi.*

[53] 18.14.

[54] 18.10: *prope est ab incesto timere, ne fiat. malo simplicitatem, quae non vereatur infamiam, malo nudos adfectus inconsultamque pietatem; nihil de se fingi, nihil credant posse narrari.*

[55] 18.10.

Indeed, husband, if anybody were to ask me, all mothers love their children as though they have fallen in love with them. You will never see their eyes turn away from their appearance and their face, they comb their hair and adjust their clothing; she sighs when he leaves, rejoices when he returns, she clasps his hands in hers, she hangs from his neck, she is sated neither with his kisses, his conversation, or the pleasure of his company.[56]

Major Declamations 18 and 19 are excellent examples of how in declamation serious probing of moral values can go together with mockery and provocation, of how transgression and inculcation of ethical principles can easily go hand in hand. Like the other samples I discussed, they display a remarkable elasticity and variety in their approach of ethical dilemmas. This is only fitting for a genre so endlessly versatile that it can serve as an exercise in *logos*, *êthos* and *pathos*, as literary entertainment, and as a way to explore ethical concepts.

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[56] 18.10: *Me quidem, marite, si quis interroget, omnes matres liberos suos, tamquam adamaverint, amant. videbis oculos numquam a facie vultuque deflectere, comere caput habitumque componere; suspirare cum recesserint, exultare, cum venerit, conserere manus, pendere cervicibus, non o⟨s⟩culis, non conloquiis, non praesentiae voluptate satiari.*

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PART V

EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

PAUL THE 'HERALD' AND THE 'TEACHER': PAUL'S SELF-IMAGES WITHIN AN ORAL MILIEU

Akio Ito

Paul was not well known among the congregations in Rome: he neither founded the churches in Rome nor had he visited there when he wrote his letter to the Romans. At the time of writing the letter he was planning to undertake a mission to Spain (Rom.15:22–29), for which he was hoping to elicit support from Christians in Rome. To do so Paul had to convince them of the significance of his mission, as well as of his credentials and the gospel he preaches. He explains the gospel of Christ, i.e., the righteousness of God (Rom. 1:17; 3:21,22,25,26; 10:3), in much of the letter.[1]

In the course of his explanation of the gospel, the images of a gospel messenger emerge. 'Herald' and 'teacher' depict an oral communicator of the gospel among other possible images. Each term has its own background. The Jewish Scripture provides us with a background to 'herald,' and the rhetorical practice of diatribe provides us with the background of 'teacher.' First a comment on the relationship between Paul's letter-writing ministry and orality is in order.

While Paul was a gospel preacher, he was also involved in a letter-writing ministry; there are thirteen Pauline epistles in the New Testament.[2] When he could not visit churches to see and talk with his converts in person, he resorted to writing and sending a letter to the people concerned. Although we tend to consider his letter-writing ministry as a

[1] For the purpose of Romans see Jewett (2007) esp. 80–91 and Donfried (1991).

[2] The Pauline letter corpus had fourteen letters in the patristic and medieval periods. In the 16th century, both Roman Catholic and Protestant scholars began to question whether Hebrews was Pauline. Thus the thirteen-letter-corpus is now generally the upper limit. Critical scholars, influenced by F.C. Baur (1792–1860), now accept only seven as undisputedly written by Paul himself. These "Hauptbriefe" are Romans, 1–2 Corithians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians and Philemon. The other letters—Ephesians, Colossians, 2 Thessalonians, 1–2 Timothy, and Titus—are sometimes called "deutero-Pauline." Some think they were written by disciples of Paul.

literary activity and his gospel preaching as oral, a letter was a substitute for oral communication in the ancient world. Therefore, although Paul has placed his idea and message into writing so that his friends at a distance could read and re-read it, letter writing was not a purely literary activity.

It was Paul's practice to employ an amanuensis when he wrote letters.[3] He dictated them rather than write them with his own hand. Having dictated the main body of the letter he took up a pen to summarize main points and write down his autograph (e.g. Gal. 6:11–18). In the case of Romans, we come across a greeting by a certain Tertius, who claims to have written the letter:

> Rom. 16:22:
>
> I Tertius, the writer of the letter, greet you in the Lord.[4]

While Paul was the author and sender of the letter (1:1), Tertius was his amanuensis. Later it was read aloud among Roman congregations. A woman named Phoebe was probably entrusted to deliver the letter to Rome, to visit house churches and read it aloud there. Thus Paul introduces her: 'I recommend to you our sister Phoebe, a deaconess of the church at Cenchrea, that you may receive her in the Lord in a way worthy of the saints and give her any help she may need from you, for she has been a helper[5] of many and of myself as well' (16:1,2). Phoebe was not only the reader and carrier, but was also expected to answer questions raised in response to the letter and add extra explanations if needed.

As a sender Paul was responsible for the content of letters, but was not a writer in a strict sense. He dictated letters, someone else wrote them by hand, and then another person read them aloud to their intended audiences. In that sense Paul's letter-writing ministry can be located somewhere between orality and literacy in distinction to our overwhelmingly literary milieu. It was an integral part of his oral communication of the gospel.

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[3] For details about Paul's use of amanuenses situated in the contemporary literary environment, see Richards (1991).

[4] English translation of the Bible is my own unless otherwise noted.

[5] Note the play on words here: "give her any help … she has been a helper …" (παραστῆτε αὐτῇ … προστάτις) Her primary task must have been to start preparing for Paul's mission to Spain in Rome. See the discussion in Jewett (2007) (esp. 942–948) for the hypothesis that Phoebe is sent with the letter so that she can function as a fund-raiser for Paul's projected mission trip to Spain.

Paul the 'Herald'

1. *Beautiful Feet*

In the *Messiah* composed by Georg Friedrich Händel (1685–1759) a soprano solo sings the refrain: 'How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the gospel of peace, and bring glad tidings of good things.'[6] These words are taken from Rom. 10:15, which reads: "How beautiful are the feet of those who bring good news!" (ὡς ὡραῖοι οἱ πόδες τῶν εὐαγγελιζομένων [τὰ] ἀγαθά). Paul cites these words from the book of Isaiah in the Jewish Scripture, which reads:

> Isa. 52:7:
>
> How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of the one who brings good tidings, who publishes peace, who brings good tidings of good, who publishes salvation, who says to Zion, "Your God reigns."

The citation is found in Paul's argument concerning the universal reach of the gospel message, which is related to his and others' missionary task:

> Rom. 10:13:
>
> For, "Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved."[7]
>
> Rom. 10:14:
>
> How then will they call on him in whom they have not believed?
> And how will they believe in him of whom they have not heard?
> And how will they hear without someone proclaiming?
>
> Rom. 10:15:
>
> And how will they proclaim unless they are sent?
> As it is written, "How beautiful are the feet of those who bring good news!"[8]
>
> Rom. 10:16:
>
> But not all have obeyed the gospel; for Isaiah says, "Lord, who has believed what we heard?"[9]

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[6] No. 38 Song (Soprano 1): How beautiful are the feet. First performed in Dublin in 1742.

[7] Cited from LXX Joel 3:5. LXX stands for the Septuagint, i.e., a version of the Greek translation of the Jewish Scripture, which seems to be used by Paul.

[8] Cited from LXX Isaiah 52:7 and LXX Nahum 1:15.

[9] Cited from Isaiah 53:1. The same Greek word ἀκοή means both 'what we heard' (Rom. 10:16) and 'hearing' in the following verse.

Rom. 10:17:

So faith comes out of hearing, and hearing comes through the word of Christ.

Rom. 10:18:

But I say, have they not heard? Indeed they have;
"Their sound has gone out to all the earth, and their words to the ends of the inhabited (world)."[10]

This passage places Paul's and his co-workers' missionary task within the oral/aural milieu by modeling themselves after the image of the herald in Isaiah.

Paul introduces three modifications to the Septuagint text of Isa. 52:7 to allow him to identify himself and his co-workers with the herald of Isaiah 52.[11] These three modifications are: (1) he omits the phrase 'on the mountains', which specifically refers to the area surrounding Jerusalem. (2) The phrase 'of the one who brings good tidings, who publishes peace' is omitted in order to facilitate the identification of the 'message' with the 'word of Christ' (Rom. 10:16–17). (3) The singular expression of Isaiah ('… of him who brings good tidings [εὐαγγελιζομένου], who publishes peace, who brings good tidings of good [εὐαγγελιζόμενος], who publishes salvation, who says to Zion') is changed into a plural ('… of those who bring good news [εὐαγγελιζομένων]'). By modeling himself and his co-workers after the herald of Isa. 52 Paul apparently emphasizes the oral/aural nature of his missionary activity. Both the voice and the feet are indispensable body parts for a herald; a good, loud voice and strong, fast feet make a good herald. Hence, we can infer that Paul also had the voice in mind even when he simply refers to (beautiful!) feet by citing from Isaiah 52.

The orality of the gospel and Paul's gospel preaching seem to be taken for granted. A herald runs around and brings the good news from the ruler to the people. In the ancient world when there was no other means of mass communication, a herald had to run around and proclaim a public announcement to people living nearby and faraway. The passage Paul cites is found in Isaiah 52 where the Lord addresses the

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10 Cited from LXX Psa. 18:5.

11 For the following I am indebted to Wagner (2002) 173–174. Wagner also draws our attention to Paul's use of the Greek word τὸ εὐαγγέλιον for the first time after 2:16, which 'can only be seen as a deliberate attempt to make the connection with Isaiah's "evangelists" unmistakable' (Wagner [2002] 174).

people of Jerusalem and Israel. The passage concerns the 'liberation' and 'redemption', which climaxes at the return of the Lord, the 'enthronement' of their God on Mount Zion. A herald had to run around in order to circulate the wonderful news of the restoration of the people and the enthronement of 'their God'. The feet of a herald are said to be on the mountains because mountaintops function acoustically as the best place from which to announce good news.

Prior to Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles, there was another herald in the New Testament. The gospel tradition identifies John the Baptist with 'the voice of the one who cries out in the wilderness' of Isa. 40:3, which in the context of Isaiah is understood as prophesying the return of the Jews from exile in Babylon. However, all four evangelists understand 'the voice of one who cries out in the wilderness' as referring to John the Baptist, the precursor of Jesus. John the Baptist was understood to be a herald who prepares the way for the Lord, i.e., the arrival of the Messiah coming after himself. There are two distinct functions of a herald: the 'voice' refers to the one who runs before the king to announce his coming while the one who brings good news to others runs around the villages to proclaim a significant announcement like the enthronement of the king.[12] As a precursor of Jesus, John the Baptist was identified with the voice in the wilderness, and Paul with the herald on the mountains.

2. *The Oral Gospel and the Written Torah*[13]

Having established the oral/aural nature of Paul and others' missionary activities, there are two aspects to which we must turn. First when Paul refers to the Jewish Scripture, he seems to emphasize its written nature. The Greek noun, which literally means 'writing' (γραφή), was typically employed to refer to the Scriptures (as in Rom. 10:11). The expression 'it is written' (γέγραπται) is frequently employed when he cites from the Scriptures (as in Rom. 10:15).

Paul stresses the orality of his gospel against the writtenness of the Torah because he views himself as a herald-like 'prophet'; orality is congenial to prophecy. There was a general tendency to value orality over literacy / written words in the ancient world. Against such a background Paul introduces Lev. 18:5 as the *writing* of Moses about 'the righteousness

[12] Cf. Philo's account of the 'herald' found in *On Joseph* 120.

[13] For details see Ito (2006) 234–260.

from the Torah' in Rom. 10:5 and Deut. 30:12–14 as the *saying* of 'the righteousness from faith' in 10:6–8. With the conviction that he is now living at the time of fulfillment, the *eschaton*, he reinterprets the scriptural 'prophecies,' that, in turn, results in his relatively flexible attitude towards the scriptural text. Even when he employs the expression like 'just as it is written' (καθὼς γέγραπται), his basic attitude and treatment of the texts remains the same. This is due to the divine authority that he recognizes in such biblical texts. In that sense Paul understands these texts introduced with 'it is written' as 'prophetic,' and does not want to stress their written nature. He probably intends to focus on the divine voice speaking through the written 'prophecies.' Almost all his usages of 'it is written' seem to be the so-called 'divine passive,' that is, 'God wrote/has written.' The power of writing is recognizable in the usage of 'it is written.' However, it is extremely difficult to distinguish whether the power derives from the writing in general or from the divine origin of its writing. Probably it is the case that the power was not perceived in the writing itself, but in the authority behind the writing.

It was the case that both prophets and gospel preachers communicated their messages orally. Paul has deliberately formed a contrast between the written Torah and the oral gospel in Romans 10:

> Rom. 10:5:
>
> For Moses *writes* about the righteousness out of the Torah that the person who does them will live in them.
>
> Rom. 10:6:
>
> But the righteousness out of faith *says* thus, 'Do not say in your heart, "Who will ascend into heaven?" ' That is, to bring Christ down.
>
> Rom. 10:7:
>
> Or "Who will descend into the abyss?" That is, to bring Christ up from the dead.
>
> Rom. 10:8:
>
> But what does it say? "The word is near you, in your *mouth* and in your heart." That is, the word of faith which we *proclaim*;
>
> Rom. 10:9:
>
> because, if you confess with your *mouth* that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved.

Rom. 10:10:

For it is believed with his heart for righteousness, and a person confesses with his *mouth* for salvation.

Rom. 10:11:

For the scripture says, "No one who believes in him will be put to shame."

Rom. 10:12:

For there is no distinction between Jew and Greek; for the same Lord is Lord of all, bestowing his riches upon all who call upon him.

The contrast seems to correspond to that between the 'newness of the Spirit' and the 'oldness of the letter' in Rom. 7:6.[14] Orality is congenial to prophecy. When he quotes from Deut. 30:12–14 as the saying of 'the righteousness out of faith' in Rom. 10:6–8, he understands the passage as the 'prophecy' fulfilled in Jesus' earthly life. He reinterprets and quotes it without any reference to the commandment that is the focus of attention in the original context of Deuteronomy. He considers this 'new' interpretation, which deletes part of the deuteronomic passage, as justified, since that obedience to the Torah is understood as having been fulfilled in Jesus' earthly life, above all in his crucifixion. The context of Deuteronomy 30 seems to justify his understanding of the passage as 'prophecy.'[15]

Paul's basic approach to the Torah in Romans 10 seems to tally with his programmatic statement in Rom. 3:20–21. On the basis of Psa. 143 (LXX; 142): 2 he declares that "no flesh will be justified out of works of the Torah before God,"[16] but that "the righteousness of God is now manifested apart from the Torah, while being witnessed by the Torah and the prophets."[17] The saving efficacy of the Torah is explicitly denied while its prophetic function is affirmed. The prophetic nature of the Scripture is emphasized throughout Romans (Cf. 1:2; 4:23–25; 15:4).

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[14] A similar contrast between the Spirit and the letter, in connection with the Mosaic ministry and Paul's ministry, is found in 2 Corinthians 3.

[15] It should be noted that since Paul was living in the tension between 'already' and 'not yet,' his attitude towards Scripture in general is more complex than what is stated above. For instance, while he cites from Deuteronomy 30 without making reference to doing the commandment, elsewhere he can still draw ethical teachings from the Torah (e.g. Romans 12 and 13).

[16] ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σάρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ, Rom. 3.20.

[17] Νυνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ πεφανέρωται, μαρτυρουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν, Rom. 3.21. Cf. Rom. 3:22a: δικαιοσύνη δὲ θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως [Ἰησοῦ] Χριστοῦ εἰς πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας.

Romans 10 occupies a central place within the larger section, chapters 9–11, where Paul struggles with the problem of the Jewish rejection of the gospel; a majority of Paul's Jewish contemporaries did not believe in the gospel, and he is afraid that they are excluded from salvation and eagerly prays for their salvation.[18] Light can be shed on Romans 10 from the perspective of orality and literacy, for Paul's emphasis apparently lies on the oral gospel rather than on the written Torah. He squarely faces the fact that many Jews do not believe in Christ in spite of his gospel proclamation, but his optimistic viewpoint still seems evident in his emphasis on the orality of the gospel. Paul seems to assume that the gospel of Christ is by nature oral. Since there was in Paul's days no official document like the Jewish Scripture for the gospel about Christ, it was proclaimed orally. Paul considered Jews and Gentiles to have free access to the gospel because of its oral nature, as is evident in the citation of LXX Psa. 18:5 in Rom. 10:18.

In conclusion it makes sense to identify John the Baptist with the voice in the wilderness, the herald running prior to the arrival of the king, the precursor of the Messiah, and Paul with the herald announcing good news on the mountains. The value Paul places on orality becomes explicit in his prioritization of the orality of the gospel over the literariness of the Torah.

Paul the 'Teacher'

1. *Diatribe*

The diatribe is a type of discourse employed in the philosophical school. The form of diatribe and the way it functions presuppose a teacher-student relationship. The dialogical elements of the diatribe, which seem to be derived from the Socratic indictment-protreptic process, indicate the oral origin of the diatribe. Though we only gain access to the diatribe of Greek and Roman philosophers through the written records of their teaching, orality is taken for granted in the diatribe. Orality is particularly prominent in Epictetus's *Discourses* since Arrian claims to have recorded Epictetus's lectures with stenography.[19] Diatribes are found in the writings of Bion, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom,

[18] Similarly Wright (2002) 627.
[19] Oldfather (1998) 4–5.

Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, Seneca and Philo of Alexandria.[20] Since there is a wide diversity within diatribal literature, it is difficult to define it precisely. While it is true that there are differences in style, tone and form among these authors, there is also a commonality among them. The differences are derived from the different methods employed by each writer.

The primary criteria often considered to classify these authors as diatribal are: '(1) their common appropriation of a certain body of popular philosophical tradition, and (2) their use of dialogical style together with certain other stylistic or rhetorical features.' To these S.K. Stowers adds the third aspect, i.e., 'the scholastic social setting'.[21]

When we compare the diatribal sections in Romans with the authors above, its similarity, especially with Epictetus, is striking. Following S.K. Stowers we classify the diatribal sections of Romans into two categories, (1) address to an imaginary interlocutor and (2) counter-arguments, i.e., objections and false conclusions.[22] If we can conclude that Paul has made use of diatribal rhetoric in Romans, it follows that Paul is implicitly asserting a teacher-student relationship towards the Christians in Rome. The diatribal sections of Romans will be analyzed according to the categories of address to an imaginary interlocutor and counter-arguments.

2. *Address to an Imaginary Interlocutor*

Among the variety of formal characteristics used to address an interlocutor in the diatribe, two stand out: (1) the author speaks as if he were addressing the imaginary interlocutor rather than his actual audience, and (2) he uses the second person singular while making this address. In chapters 2, 9, 11 and 14 of Romans Paul makes use of the second person singular as if he were addressing someone in front of him, although in reality he is NOT addressing a specific person in the Roman congregation, but only a fictitious interlocutor:[23]

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[20] E.g., Stowers (1981) 48–78.

[21] Stowers (1981) 48.

[22] As is evident in the following analyses, the two categories are not exclusive, can easily overlap.

[23] For Romans and the diatribe Stowers (1981) and Song (2004) are two relevant books to which I am indebted. Stowers argues that Romans is more like a classroom teaching, not a polemic, on the basis of a detailed comparison between Romans and the diatribe, against R. Bultmann (1984) who concludes that Paul's street preaching style is reflected in Romans. Song argues that Romans is not a real letter, but belongs to a genre of diatribe on the basis of his comparison of Romans with Epictetus's *Discourses*.

(1) Romans 2:1–5: The apostrophe to the ignorant and inconsistent judge.

Rom. 2:1—Indicting statement:

'Therefore you (sg.) are without excuse, O person, whoever you (sg.) are who passes judgment. For in that you (sg.) judge the other, you (sg.) are condemning yourself, for you (sg.), the one who passes judgment, practice the same things.'

Rom. 2:2—Indicting statement, a common view:

'But we know that the judgment of God is according to truth upon those who practice such things.'

Rom. 2:3—Indicting rhetorical question:

'But do you (sg.) suppose, O person, who pass judgment on those who practice such things and do them yourself, that you (sg.) will escape the judgment of God?'

Rom. 2:4—Indicting rhetorical question:

'Or (ἢ) do you (sg.) despise the wealth of His kindness and forbearance and patience, not knowing that (ἀγνοῶν ὅτι) the kindness of God is to lead you (sg.) to repentance?'

Rom. 2:5—Indicting statement, which continues the description of the one addressed:

'But by your (sg.) stubbornness and unrepentant heart you (sg.) are treasuring for yourself wrath on the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God.'

Rom. 2:6—Quotation of LXX Psa. 61:13b. A warning of divine retribution.

A number of diatribal characteristics appear in Rom. 2:1–5. The sudden turning to the second person singular in verse 1 is in tune with the style of address to an imaginary interlocutor in the diatribe. Paul makes use of the vocative 'person' (ἄνθρωπε) in verses 1 and 3, which is also used by Epictetus.[24] Verses 3 and 4 provide an example of indicting rhetorical questions, with a verb of thinking expressing the false opinion of the interlocutor (λογίζῃ) and an expression implying the interlocutor's lack of perception (ἀγνοῶν). Verse 5 pronounces a warning of the divine

[24] *Diss.* 1.1.23; 1.2.33; 1.4.10; 1.17.21; 1.18.9. and others. 64 occurrences in the whole of *Discourses* of Epictetus.

judgment upon the imaginary person's moral-religious state, which ends with a quotation of LXX Psa. 61:13b.[25]

(2) Romans 2:17–23: The apostrophe to the proud but inconsistent Jewish teacher.

> Rom. 2:17–20—Protasis of conditional sentence, which breaks off with no apodosis:
>
> 'But if you (sg.) call yourself a Jew and find your comfort in the Torah and boast in God and know his will and approve what is excellent, being educated from the Torah, and have convinced yourself that you (sg.) are a guide of the blind, a light of those in darkness, a tutor of fools, a teacher of children, possessing the embodiment of knowledge and of truth in the Torah—'
>
> Rom. 2:21–22—Four indicting rhetorical questions:
>
> 'The one therefore who teaches the other, do you (sg.) not teach yourself? The one who preaches not to steal, do you (sg.) steal? The one who says not to commit adultery, do you (sg.) commit adultery? The one who abhors idols, do you (sg.) rob temples?'
>
> Rom. 2:23—Indicting statement (or question), further description of addressee:
>
> 'You (sg.) who boast in the Torah, you (sg.) dishonor God through transgressing the Torah'

Again a sudden turning to address the interlocutor is found. Instead of a vocative noun Paul uses a verb in the second person singular, for the interlocutor who is again identified as a Jew. To this Epictetus again provides us with parallels:

> Why did you pride yourself upon things that were not your own? Why did you call yourself a Stoic? (τί Στοϊκὸν ἔλεγες σεαυτόν;, Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.19.19)[26]
>
> That is, if you wish to be a proper sort of philosopher ... If not, you will be no better than we who bear the name of Stoics (Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.7.17).[27]
>
> Why, then, do you call yourself a Stoic? (τί οὖν Στοϊκὸν σαυτὸν εἶναι λέγεις;, Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.24.41).

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[25] Somewhat similar to Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.8.11–14; 3.11.1–2.

[26] Oldfather (1998) 357.

[27] εἰ θέλεις εἶναι φιλόσοφος οἷος δεῖ... εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδὲν διοίσεις ἡμῶν τῶν λεγομένων Στοικῶν—Oldfather (1996) 55.

Although Rom. 2:17–20 form the protasis of a conditional sentence that has no apodosis formally, they describe the self-understanding of the "Jew," while verses 21–22 are indicting rhetorical questions. In other words the overall structure of verses 17–22 follows a statement-question pattern, which is also found in Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.8.11–12 (addressing an imaginary interlocutor) and Seneca, *Epistle* 77.17 (attacking the one who loves luxury). The four indicting rhetorical questions of 21–22 each expose an inconsistency between public statements of the interlocutor and his behavior. A similar pattern of questions with short statements is found in Seneca, *Epistle* 77.18 and Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.1.28. A list of vices in verses 21–23—stealing, adultery, temple robbing and lawbreaking—is another characteristic of diatribal address to the interlocutor, and in a sense presents an apodosis.

(3) Romans 9:19–21: The apostrophe to the one who questions God's judgment.

> Rom. 9:19—Anticipated objection worded as an address to the objector:
>
> 'You (sg.) will say to me: "Then why does God still blame (us)? For who resists his will?" '
>
> Rom. 9:20a—Indicting rhetorical question:
>
> 'But who are you, O person, who talks back to God?'
>
> Rom. 9:20b–21—Indicting rhetorical questions using the metaphor of the potter and the clay:
>
> 'Shall what is formed say to the one who formed it, "Why did you make me like this?" Or does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for noble purposes and some for common use?'

The objection of 9:19 is introduced by 'you (sg.) will say' (ἐρεῖς), which suddenly gives the interlocutor a voice. In response to his objection, he is addressed by the vocative 'person' (ἄνθρωπε) in verse 20. The two rhetorical questions reply to the objection by introducing an image. It is as absurd for a human to question God as it is for clay to question the work of the potter, since God can deal with humans as he pleases, as a potter can do whatever he wants with clay. The rhetorical question in verse 21 involves personification and dialogical discourse, which reflects scriptural passages like Isa. 29:16; 45:9f. (and Wisdom 15:7).[28]

[28] If Paul had Jer. 18:1–11 in mind, it seems as though the clay has some influence over

This and the next passage will be also analyzed in the section (3) as passages (3) and (4).

(4) Romans 11:17–24: The apostrophe to the "wild olive shoot", i.e., pretentious Gentile Christians.

> Rom. 11:17–18a—Conditional sentence with an imperative addressed to the personified wild olive shoot:
>
> 'If some of the branches have been broken off, and you (sg.), though a wild olive shoot, have been grafted in among the others and now share in the nourishing sap from the olive root, do not boast over those branches.'
>
> Rom. 11:18b—Warning about boasting:
>
> 'If you (sg.) would boast, consider that you (sg.) do not support the root, but the root supports you.'
>
> Rom. 11:19—Anticipated objection placed in the mouth of the interlocutor:
>
> 'You (sg.) will say then, "Branches were broken off so that I could be grafted in." '
>
> Rom. 11:20—Answer to objection, warning not to be proud but to be in awe:
>
> 'Granted. But they were broken off because of unbelief, and you (sg.) stand by faith. Do not be arrogant, but be afraid.'
>
> Rom. 11:21–24—Further warnings to the wild olive shoot:
>
> 'For if God did not spare the natural branches, he will not spare you, either. Consider therefore the kindness and sternness of God: sternness to those who fell, but kindness to you, provided that you continue in his kindness. Otherwise, you also will be cut off. And if they do not persist in unbelief, they will be grafted in, for God is able to graft them in again. For if you (sg.) were cut out of an olive tree that is wild by nature, and contrary to nature were grafted into a cultivated olive tree, how much more readily will these, the natural branches, be grafted into their own olive tree!'

Here a metaphor is expanded into an allegory, in which the metaphorical 'wild olive shoot' is personified and addressed. By addressing the olive shoot Paul is clearly admonishing the Gentiles. In this case, as often happens in diatribe, there is often little distance between the real audience

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what the potter fashions, but the verbal correspondence between Rom. 9:20–21 and Isa. 29:16 is so close that the text of Isa. probably dominates the context.

and the fictitious interlocutor. From verse 17 on Paul addresses an imaginary interlocutor with the second person singular. In verses 18 and 20 he admonishes with second person singular imperatives. Verses 21 and 22 warn the imaginary interlocutor. Verse 19 expresses the reply of the imaginary interlocutor to the author.[29]

(5) Epictetus: The tendency for a fictitious interlocutor to be addressed in the diatribe occurs predominantly in the diatribes of Epictetus. There are six passages where he indicts an interlocutor by asking him why he calls himself a Stoic or a philosopher.[30] These passages concern the theme of moral inconsistency, i.e., the discrepancy between his profession as a philosopher and his actual behavior. The teacher singles out the contrast between a philosopher and his inconsistent behavior. Another, but related subject concerns an inconsistent judge. Thus the pretentious and arrogant person is indicted and corrected.[31] This is precisely what Paul is arguing with regard to the 'judge' (Rom. 2:1), the 'Jew' (2:17).

3. *Counter-Arguments: Objections and False Conclusions*

In other passages Paul seems to offer counter-arguments in an imaginary conversation where objections or questions based on falsely inferred conclusions are raised by the interlocutor and then rejected by Paul. Although it is not always easy to discern which sentence is intended to belong either to Paul or to an interlocutor, we can understand that an emphatic denial (e.g., μὴ γένοιτο) reflects Paul's opinion while the rejected question usually belongs to an interlocutor:[32]

(1) Romans 3:1–9.

> Rom. 3:1—*Objection* (Interlocutor):
>
> 'Therefore what is the advantage of the Jew? Or what is the usefulness of circumcision?'
>
> Rom. 3:2—*Answer* (Paul):
>
> 'Much in every respect. For, first, they were entrusted with the oracles of God.

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[29] Also Rom. 14:4,10, which are isolated instances.
[30] *Diss.* 2.13.23; 2.16.32–34; 3.7.17; 3.24.40–41; 2.19.19; 2.9.19.
[31] Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.21.11–12; Plutarch, *Curios.* 515D; Seneca, *Vit. bea.* 27.4.
[32] For the following I am also indebted to S.K. Stowers (1994) 165–166 and 233–234, but with minor modifications.

Rom. 3:3—*Objection* (Interlocutor):

For what? If some were unfaithful, will their unfaith not abrogate the faithfulness of God?'

Rom. 3:4—*Rejection* (Paul):

'By no means! But let God be true, but every person be a liar, as it is written, "That you (sg.) may be justified in your (sg.) words, and prevail when you (sg.) are judged." '

Rom. 3:5—*Objection in the form of a rhetorical question* (Interlocutor):

'But if our unrighteousness demonstrates God's righteousness, what shall we say? Is God unjust, who inflicts wrath? I speak in a human manner.'

Rom. 3:6a—*Rejection* (Paul):

'By no means!'

Rom. 3:6b—*Reason* for rejection (Paul):

'Otherwise how will God judge the world?'

Rom. 3:7–8a—*Objection* (Interlocutor):

'But if the truth of God abounds to his glory through my lie, why am I still judged as a sinner? Also is it not just as we are slandered and just as some allege us to say—"Let us do evil in order that good may come"?'[33]

Rom. 3:8b—*Parenthetical Comment* (Paul):

'Their condemnation is well deserved.'

Rom. 3:9ab—*False Conclusion* (Interlocutor):

'What then? Are we (as Jews) better off?'

Rom. 3:9cd—*Rejection and its Reason* (Paul):

'Not at all! For we have already charged that both Jews and Gentiles are all under sin.'

[33] Alternatively we can understand that Paul begins his statement from the beginning of verse 8, which would assign a whole verse to Paul. Since this is more or less repeated in 6:1, which I assign to Paul's interlocutor, the first half of 3:8 to the interlocutor. It may be the case that the voices of Paul and his interlocutor can overlap at places.

(2) Romans 3:27–4:25: dialogical exchange in the mode of indictment (3:27–4:2) + *exemplum* in the protreptic mode (4:3–25)[34]

Rom. 3:27a—*Inquiry* (Interlocutor):

'Where then is boasting?'

Rom. 3:27b—*Answer* (Paul):

'It was excluded.'

Rom. 3:27cd—*Questions* (Interlocutor):

'Through what principle/Torah? Of works?'

Rom. 3:27e—*Answer* (Paul):

'No, but through the principle/Torah of faith.'

Rom. 3:28—*Reason for Answer* (Paul):

'For we consider that a person is justified by faith apart from works of Torah.'

Rom. 3:29ab—*Questions* (Paul):

'Or is God the God of Jews only? Is he not of Gentiles also?'

Rom. 3:29c—*Answer* (Interlocutor):

'Yes, of Gentiles also,'

Rom. 3:30—*Statement of Basic Principle* (Paul):

'If (εἴπερ) God is indeed one, who will justify the circumcised out of faith(fullness), and will also justify the uncircumcised through the (same) faith(fullness).'

Rom. 3:31a—*False Conclusion* (Interlocutor):

'Do we then nullify Torah through the faith(fullness)?'

Rom. 3:31b—*Rejection* (Paul):

'By no means!'

Rom. 3:31c—*Counterstatement* (Paul):

'On the contrary, we uphold the Torah.'

[34] For the details concerning my interpretation of this passage see Ito (2003).

Rom. 4:1—*Questions* (Paul):

'What then shall we say?[35] Have we found Abraham to be our forefather according to the flesh?'

Rom. 4:2a—*Explanatory Statement* (Paul):

'For if Abraham was justified out of works, he has a reason for boasting.'

Rom. 4:2b–3—*Answer* (Paul):

'But not before God.'

Rom. 4:3–25—*Reason for Answer* (Paul): the Example of Abraham's faith

'For what does the scripture say? "But Abraham believed God and it was reckoned to him as righteousness". '[36]

These false conclusions and objections occupy pivotal points of Paul's argument in Romans, which determine the way the subsequent argument flows. The terminology, style and themes are so similar between diatribal sections of Romans and the diatribe that we can conclude that Paul makes use of diatribal rhetoric in Romans.[37]

Epictetus explicitly refers to Socrates as his ideal of the dialogical method that Socrates 'used to make so clear the consequences which followed from the concepts, that absolutely everyone realized the contradiction involved and gave up the battle.'

SOCRATES "And so does the man who feels envy rejoice in it?"
INTERLOCUTOR "Not at all; but he experiences pain rather than joy." (By the contradiction in terms he has moved the other party to the argument.)
SOCRATES "Very well, does envy seem to you to be feeling of pain at evils? And yet what envy is there of evils?" (Consequently, he has made his opponent say that envy is a feeling of pain at good things.)

[35] Here I follow the punctuation argued by R.B. Hays (1985).

[36] Other examples of dialogical exchanges with objections and false conclusions can be found in Rom. 6.1–3, 15–16, 7.7, 13–14, 9.14–15, 19–20, and 11.1–3, 11, 19–20.

[37] Song has overstated his case when he concludes that Romans is not a real letter, but belongs to a genre of diatribe on the basis of the similarity between Romans and Epictetus. With chapter 16 where Paul sends greetings to so many people in Rome, it is difficult to regard Romans as a diatribe, i.e., a classroom teaching. Although Song argues that chapter 16 was not an original part of Romans, it makes better sense to understand that chapter 16 was deleted in later textual history rather than added. For the details about the textual history of Romans see H. Gamble (1977).

Socrates "Very well, would a man feel envy about matters that did not concern him in the least?"
Interlocutor "Not at all." (*Diss.* 2.12.7–9)

Although Epictetus claims to follow the model of Socrates in his indictment-protreptic process, the difference in context makes a slight difference in function. Socrates' dialogues were considered to be representative of the style and method of censure or indictment. Epictetus has adapted what Socrates conducted with able and prestigious people in society, in order to bring about the transformation of persons in his philosophical school. Epictetus employed the indictment-protreptic mode, not for a polemical purpose, but for the purpose of education. Paul has made it into a vehicle for the gospel teaching to the Christians in Rome.

There are two salient features of the diatribal method: orality is taken for granted and the teacher-student relationship is presupposed. Paul laid out his understanding of the gospel of Christ before the Roman congregations whom he had never visited before. By doing so he was hoping that the church of the imperial capital would become his base for an anticipated mission to Spain (Rom. 15:22–29). It was vital for him to establish a common understanding of the gospel with the church in Rome. To accomplish that purpose he has employed the diatribal method. In other words, Paul presents himself as a gospel teacher to the Christians in Rome.

Conclusion: 'Herald' and 'Teacher'

In this paper I have argued that Paul the apostle to the Gentiles lived and undertook his missionary activities in a primarily oral milieu. At one point he seems to envisage himself as a herald of the gospel on a scriptural basis, mainly from the book of Isaiah, but at other times he employs diatribal rhetoric to explain the gospel of Christ to Christians in Rome as if he were their teacher. He was a herald for those who have not heard the gospel while he was a teacher for those who have already become Christians. Twice 'Paul' employs the words 'herald' and 'apostle' and 'teacher' to refer to his task of an evangelist (1 Tim. 2.7; 2 Tim. 1.11).[38]

[38] Most scholars consider the first and the second epistles to Timothy as pseudonymous on the basis of writing style, vocabulary and Paul's chronology. In 1 Clem.5.6 the word 'herald' (κήρυξ) is employed to describe Paul's preaching activities. The only other

1 Tim. 2.7:

> For this purpose I was appointed a herald and an apostle—I am telling the truth, I am not lying—and a teacher of Gentiles in faith and truth.

2 Tim. 1.11:

> For this purpose I was appointed a herald and an apostle and a teacher.

Since Paul was a former Pharisee, it was natural for him to value orality because Pharisees valued orality and abstained from writing down oral tradition. It was not until AD 200 when rabbis, the successors to Pharisees, began to place the Pharisaic tradition into writing in the form of the *Mishnah*. In no other Pauline epistles do we encounter such a concentration of diatribal sections as in Romans, together with his self-description as a herald. Somehow Paul must have felt it necessary to emphasize the orality of the gospel and employ an oral style of teaching to impress the Roman Christians he had never met before.[39]

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occurrence of the word in the New Testament is 2 Pet. 2.5. We can also mention the last verse of the book of Acts where Paul is described as 'proclaiming (κηρύσσων) the kingdom of God and teaching (διδάσκων) about the Lord Jesus Christ.'

[39] I should like to express my gratitude to the three organizers of the conference and editors of the volume, i.e., Dr. André Lardinois, Dr. Josine Blok and Dr. Marc van der Poel. For this paper I am deeply indebted to Dr. Mark Reasoner of Marian University, who kindly spared time to read earlier drafts and help me improve my English and argument. Needless to say that I am solely responsible for any mistakes still found in the paper.

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CHAPTER NINETEEN

DIVINE VOICE, LITERARY MODELS, AND HUMAN AUTHORITY: PETER AND PAUL IN THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH

James Morrison

This paper will examine the figures of Peter and Paul in the book of Acts with respect to authority, divine instructions, and sacred and secular texts. The authority of these figures fundamentally derives from direct encounters with the divine. To this extent the book of Acts privileges oral exchange. Yet religious and literary texts also play an important role in providing models for what happens to Peter and Paul and in ratifying their status. This paper will explore the dynamic tension between the spoken word and written documents that resides both within the narrative and with respect to this work's composition and reception. Although scriptural and literary models remain central in many ways, it is immediate interaction with the divine which confers special status upon Peter and Paul, comparable to that of the prophets from Hebrew Scripture.

I begin with pivotal moments in the lives of Peter and Paul. These two men have vastly divergent skills in reading and writing, yet for both figures divine presence and oral instruction secure their authority within the early Christian community. I then turn to the connections between Hebrew Scripture and the works of Homer, Plato, and Euripides on the one hand and Luke's narrative on the other. While extraordinary events take place, it is of particular interest that these experiences are endorsed in some sense by reference to written texts. Luke's use of literary allusion in his presentation of Peter and Paul makes clear that their special status is not without biblical and literary precedent. While this sophisticated narrative privileges oral address, Luke's echoes of earlier biblical and literary passages provide a context for the privileging of Peter and Paul. One consequence is the likelihood that Luke intended to address a very broad audience with divergent levels of literacy. Before turning to the figures of Peter and Paul, I would make a few general remarks about the books of Acts.

Luke and the Book of Acts

The book of Acts is concerned with how—after his death—the followers of Jesus promulgated his message and established leadership. In the usual run of affairs authority resides with those who hold priestly office, such as the Sadducees in the Jewish context. Yet in the gospels we meet a different sort of teacher and healer. Jesus is not a priest—in fact, he is challenged by priests, arrested, and executed. In the book of Acts, we turn to his followers, who wish to continue his legacy. Regarding the authority of those who would lead, von Campenhausen has made the distinction between functionary and charismatic types of authority—between 'the champions of the sacral system' and 'witnesses to direct religious experience.'[1] Rather than basing authority on priestly office, the book of Acts privileges face-to-face encounters with the divine in determining who will lead the early followers of Jesus.

For a variety of reasons most scholars assume that the same author—called 'Luke' in the tradition—wrote both the gospel of Luke and the book of Acts: both parts of 'Luke-Acts' (as it is called) are addressed to Theophilus, the preface to Acts refers explicitly back to 'the first account' (τὸν μὲν πρῶτον λόγον—Acts 1.1) concerning what Jesus did and taught, and so on. A high degree of self-consciousness concerning literacy and writing is signaled in the polemical preface to Luke's gospel which explicitly marks it as a written composition, set against other competing written accounts. According to this opening passage, eyewitnesses and 'ministers of the word' taught and *orally* passed on stories and teachings to those, such as Luke, who *wrote* about Jesus (this is explicit: γράψαι—Luke 1.1–4; cf. also Luke 1.63, Acts 8.28–35, e.g.).[2] Let us now examine the major figures of Peter and Paul.

Peter, Illiterate and Uneducated

At one end of the literate/non-literate spectrum is Peter. He is apparently an uneducated fisherman when he and Andrew are recruited by

[1] von Campenhausen (1969) 1. I would like to thank Ruben Dupertuis and Tom McCollough for all their suggestions and encouragement. This paper has also benefited from the valuable queries and responses of those in the audience at the Nijmegen conference in July 2008.

[2] Also Luke's gospel presents the only unambiguous episode in which Jesus himself reads from scripture (Luke 4.16–20).

Jesus (Luke 5.1–11). In Acts Peter (along with John) is called 'illiterate and non-professional' (ἀγράμματοί εἰσιν καὶ ἰδιῶται—Acts 4.13). The combination of *agrammatos* ('illiterate') and *idiôtes* ('unskilled' or 'non-professional') certainly suggests a lack of any formal education.[3] Nevertheless, in claiming that a divine plan has been fulfilled, Peter cites scripture in his preaching:

> [Peter:] 'Brothers, it was necessary that this Scripture should be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit spoke before through the mouth of David concerning Judas, who was guide to those who arrested Jesus ... For it has been written (γέγραπται) in the book of Psalms, "Let his homestead fall desolate; let there be none to inhabit it;" and, "Let another take over his charge." '
> (Acts 1.15–16, 20, citing Psalms 69.25 and 109.8)

Here, according to Peter, the fate of Judas had been foretold in written form in the Psalms.[4] At this point, we should note Peter's familiarity with Hebrew Scripture.

Several experiences endorse Peter's authority. First, Peter followed Jesus as a disciple while he lived. This companionship with Jesus is the essential criterion when the remaining eleven disciples seek a successor for Judas; they agree that it must be someone who spent time with Jesus (Acts 1.21–22). Second, Peter was one of those to whom the resurrected Jesus appeared, described as 'witnesses chosen in advance by God.'[5]

> [Peter:] 'God raised him up the third day, and allowed him to appear, not to the whole people, but to *witnesses chosen in advance* (μάρτυσιν τοῖς προκεχειροτονημένοις) by God, to us, who ate and drank with him after he rose from the dead.' (Acts 10.40–41)

Obviously Peter is a part of this select group. As Funk observes: 'The reports of Jesus' appearances [after the resurrection] to certain followers function in the gospels and letters as commissioning stories.'[6] That is,

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[3] See Harris (1989) 302–303.

[4] For the goal of fulfilling scripture, see also Acts 1.16, 2.25, 3.18, e.g. In one of his letters, Paul says: 'For I delivered to you first of all that which I also received: that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures (κατὰ τὰς γραφάς), that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures (κατὰ τὰς γραφάς), and that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve' (1 Corinthians 15.3–5). Cf. Paul and Silas at Beroa in northern Greece where local Greeks make sure that what these two men claim accords with scripture (Acts 17.11–12; see also James at Acts 15.12–18).

[5] Cf. Acts. 2.32, 3.15.

[6] Funk (1996) 313. von Campenhausen (1969) 18 argues that '[Peter's] encounter with the risen Christ ... provided the decisive impetus, the starting point of his true vocation and genuinely "apostolic" activity.'

these experiences—and Luke's reports of these experiences—serve to endorse particular figures as authoritative leaders.

In addition, Peter—like Jesus—has the ability to heal the lame and the sick (Acts 3.2–10).[7] Of special significance is inspiration by the holy spirit. Luke describes how at a gathering at Pentecost (fifty days after Passover) Peter and his followers are filled with the holy spirit and speak in tongues:

> And suddenly there came from the sky a noise (ἦχος) like that of a powerful driving wind, and it filled all the house where they were sitting. Tongues like fire appeared and were distributed to them, and it sat on each one of them. They were all filled with the holy spirit, and began to speak in other languages (λαλεῖν ἑτέραις γλώσσαις), as the spirit gave them the ability to speak. (Acts 2.2–4)

The scene begins with a supernatural sound: a sudden noise (ἦχος) from the sky, like a strong driving wind that fills a house. There are visions of tongues like fire distributed to each worshipper. The overall effect is a kind of power: they are all filled with the divine spirit and begin to speak in other languages—the presence of the holy spirit grants them this power of utterance.[8]

What had been told about Moses and the prophets in the Hebrew Bible is found now in immediate experience. As Stroumsa notes, 'the expression of the divine spirit, which was traditionally preserved in holy scripture, has now returned to prophetic orality.'[9] Immediately following this event, Peter states:

> 'But this is what has been spoken through the prophet Joel:
> "And it will be in the last days," says God,
> "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh.
> Your sons and your daughters will prophesy.
> . . . And I will show wonders in the sky above,
> and signs on the earth below." ' (Acts 2.16–19)

In quoting the prophet Joel (Joel 2.28–32), Peter makes an explicit claim to Hebrew scriptural precedent. Thus the book of Acts does not reject sacred writings, yet it endorses the personal experience of divine inspira-

[7] See von Campenhausen (1969) 23–24 on how the apostles engage in exorcism, healing—even raising the dead. All these activities are modeled on those undertaken by their leader Jesus.

[8] Barrett (1996) 91 says that 'Speaking with tongues [is] a clear sign of the action of God, present in the work of the Holy Spirit.'

[9] Stroumsa (2003) 159.

tion as an avenue to securing authority within the Christian community, experience modeled on that of earlier Hebrew prophets.

A later experience of Peter's demonstrates a different sort of relationship with sacred text. Cornelius, a Roman centurion, is the first Gentile convert to Christianity described in Acts. Before meeting Cornelius, Peter has a vision in Joppa:

> He saw heaven opened and a certain container coming down to earth, like a great sheet of sail-cloth slung by the four corners, on which were all kinds of four-footed animals and reptiles of the earth, and birds of the sky. And a voice came to him, 'Rise, Peter, kill and eat!' But Peter said, 'No, Lord, for I have never eaten anything profane or unclean (κοινὸν καὶ ἀκάθαρτον).' A voice came to him again the second time, 'What God has made clean, you must not make profane.' This was done three times, and immediately the vessel was taken up into heaven. (Acts 10.11–16)

Here we have a vision and an audition. There appears a heaven-sent vision of animals on a great sheet. Three times it appears and each time a voice commands Peter to eat. Each time Peter resists, for in essence he is being told to ignore Jewish purity laws—and by extension the distinction between Jew and Gentile. He then hears a second order from this voice, 'What God has made clean (ἐκαθάρισεν), you must not make profane (σὺ μὴ κοίνου).' In this case, we might say that the divine voice accompanying the vision has authority that overrides holy scripture (such as the food prohibitions found in Leviticus 11, e.g.).[10] Again important events follow. Peter is taken to Cornelius; the holy spirit comes upon this Gentile and his household and they speak 'in tongues of ecstasy;' this leads to the founding in Caesarea of the first non-Jewish church (10.23–48).

These two passages—the Pentecostal experience and Peter's vision in Joppa—take us in different directions. The first argues that Christianity is the legitimate continuation of Israel (and is said explicitly to follow the template of the Hebrew Bible); the second is more radical for it breaks with a strict following of Jewish law. Wilson argues that, 'the founding of the Caesarean church … is organized largely as a series of *divinely instituted verbal acts* that embody and project the community's mission [my emphasis].'[11] In common, however, we find divine

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[10] Cf. Acts 10.28.

[11] Wilson (2001) 93; he goes on to call the rejection of food purity laws a 'dangerous and ground-breaking development for Christianity' (87).

intervention guiding Peter, which leads to the conversion of both Jews and Gentiles.[12]

The Pharisee Paul

Paul differs from Peter in significant ways. Paul is a Pharisee with detailed knowledge of Jewish law (Acts 22.3, 23.6); he is literate, bilingual, and a Roman citizen (15.22, 17.2). And yet like Peter, Paul's legitimacy as an 'apostle'—his authority as a follower of Jesus—is confirmed by his personal contact with the divine on the road to Damascus.

> As he traveled, it happened that he got close to Damascus, and suddenly a light from the sky flashed all around him (περιήστραψεν). He fell upon the earth, and heard a voice saying to him, 'Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?' And he said, 'Who are you, Lord?' The Lord said, 'I am Jesus whom you are persecuting. But get up and go into the city and it will be told to you what you must do.' And the men traveling with him stood speechless, hearing the voice, but seeing no one. Saul got up from the ground, and although his eyes had been opened, he could not see. They led him by the hand, and brought him into Damascus. For three days, he could not see, and neither ate nor drank. (Acts 9.3–9)

Among the features of Paul's experience are again *visual and aural signs*. A sudden light from heaven flashes around him (περιήστραψεν). When Saul falls to the ground, he hears a voice and an exchange follows. The divine voice asks: 'Why do you persecute me?' When Saul asks, 'Who are you, lord?' the divine figure identifies himself: 'I am Jesus whom you are persecuting.' Then instructions are given: 'Get up, go into the city, it will be told to you what you must do.' Saul does rise from the ground, but although his eyes are open, he cannot see. This powerful encounter with God has blinded him.

Luke next turns to the vision of Ananias who will heal Saul. After receiving his own set of instructions, Ananias hesitates (9.13—we often find the reluctance motif with divine encounters, as with Peter in Joppa), but the voice of God lays emphasis on the commissioning of Saul:[13]

[12] Marguerat (1995) 139 comments on the 'surprising initiative' in God's choice of converts, such as the Ethiopian eunuch, Saul, and Cornelius. Johnson (1986) 207 argues that in the book of Acts, 'The holy spirit is an active power intervening in the progress of the mission, both impelling and guiding it.'

[13] On the reluctance motif, see Wilson (2001) 88 note 52.

> But the Lord said to him, 'Go, for this man is my chosen instrument (σκεῦος ἐκλογῆς) to bear my name before the nations and their kings, and the sons of Israel. For I will show him how many things he must suffer for my name's sake.' (Acts 9.15–16)

There follows yet another dramatic scene when Ananias lays hands on Saul to heal him:

> Laying his hands on him, Ananias said, 'Brother Saul, the Lord sent me, Jesus the one who appeared to you on the road you traveled, so that you may see again and be filled with the Holy Spirit.' And immediately something like scales fell from his eyes, and he could see again. He stood up and was baptized. He took food and was strengthened. (Acts 9.17–19)

The selection of Saul as witness—as a 'chosen instrument' of God—is highlighted in the vision of Ananias, who then serves as a healer, allowing the holy spirit to enter Saul.[14]

Obviously this is a pivotal event in the life of Saul and in the history of the early church. We may well say that Paul—as we now call him—has undergone a role reversal: from persecutor to being persecuted with death threats; from a denier of Christ to a preacher of the new Messiah. These events function as both a conversion and a commissioning: unlike the twelve disciples who accompanied Jesus during his ministry, Paul bears witness on the basis of this personal transformative experience.[15]

Paul recounts these events in his own voice in two later passages in Acts. In the second of these two retrospective accounts (part of Paul's defense to King Agrippa), God speaks directly to him:[16]

> 'And the Lord said, "... For I have appeared to you for a purpose: to appoint you my servant and witness, to testify both to what you have seen and to what you shall yet see of me ... I send you to open their eyes and turn them from darkness to light, from the dominion of Satan to God, so that,

[14] Marguerat (1995) 143 comments that Ananias, as 'mediator,' takes a 'decisive role in the revelation process;' he also finds the following pattern for the prophetic call: divine confrontation; introductory word; commission; objection/resistance; reassurance; sign (143).

[15] For Paul's special role, see Mitchell (2004). For an account in Paul's letters of another of his transformative experiences (in 'third heaven'), see 2 Corinthians 12.1–12; Morray-Jones (1993) makes the argument that this refers to a completely different experience from the one on the Damascus road.

[16] Marguerat (1995) 147 sees Acts 22—the first of the retrospective accounts which makes Paul's commission from Ananias more explicit—as in part an 'affirmation' of Paul's Jewishness.

> by trust in me, they may obtain forgiveness of sins and a place with those whom God has made his own."' (Acts. 26.15–18)

Paul's commission derives solely from the heavenly Jesus—the emphasis lies with these divinely spoken words. In this third account Paul does not even mention his blindness or subsequent healing.[17]

Both Peter and Paul have personal experiences with the divine. Peter may stand as one sort of follower of Jesus who bears witness to all Jesus did, due to personal contact during Jesus' own life and witnessing the resurrected Jesus. Peter is a leader of those first believers—uneducated, but touched by marks of special distinction. The picture of Paul is more complex. He is fully literate yet originally antagonistic to Christians—on his journey to Damascus he was carrying letters to denounce and arrest Christians (9.2). When he tries to join the disciples after his conversion, at first he is met with distrust (9.26)–but he goes on tirelessly to preach and establish churches around the eastern Mediterranean.[18] In spite of these significant differences—Peter as disciple of the living Jesus, Paul as persecutor of the early followers—we find an obvious similarity. Both Peter and Paul serve as apostles—that is, they are missionaries who are vested with direct power from god. Paul grounds his status upon his direct oral encounter—and may well come to see himself as having authority close to if not equal to that of the original disciples.[19] As Potter puts it: '[Paul] could rely upon his personal experience with the divine to guide him in changing the established rules of society.'[20]

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[17] We also learn that Jesus spoke in Hebrew (or perhaps Aramaic) dialect: 'We all fell to the ground and I heard a voice saying to me in Hebrew (τῇ Ἑβραΐδι διαλέκτῳ) "Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me? It is hard for you to kick against goads"' (Acts 26.14). Marguerat (1995) offers a judicious assessment of the three versions of Paul's encounter on the road to Damascus.

[18] Yet as von Campenhausen (1969) 31 says: 'Paul had throughout his life to fight for his message and his standing.'

[19] von Campenhausen (1969) 33 comments: 'With this apostolate from Christ come two things [for Paul]: first, complete autonomy and independence as regards all other human claims and authorities, and secondly, association with the membership of the unique group of those who were "apostles before him" (Gal 1.17).' In his letters—which will not be addressed in this paper—Paul refers to this experience: 'Am I not an apostle? Have I not seen Jesus, your lord?' (1 Corinthians 9.1; cf. 2 Corinthians 12.11 and Galatians 1.1, 1.15–17). Most readers of the New Testament think of Paul as a writer of letters (the oldest documents found in the New Testament), yet the book of Acts—written by Luke, the most literate and cosmopolitan of the gospel writers—never mentions Paul's letters. This may be a further effort to privilege Paul's experience—and his preaching, proselytizing, and converting of others—for which written documents were not essential.

[20] Potter (1994) 214.

New Testament Encounters

In Luke-Acts, as noted above, the experiences of Peter and Paul recall passages from the Hebrew Bible. Before turning to the issue of scriptural and literary reference, I would briefly mention that there are other encounters with the divine in Luke-Acts: two angelic figures appear and speak at Jesus' empty tomb; the resurrected Jesus appears to the eleven disciples (Luke 24.2–10, 24.36–49). Of particular interest is the angel Gabriel appearing to Zachariah, the father of John the Baptist, at the beginning of Luke's gospel. The angel announces the birth of a son, but the priest Zachariah is skeptical (Luke 1.18) and loses his ability to speak:

> [Gabriel:] 'I am Gabriel, who stands in the presence of God and I was sent to speak to you, and to bring you this good news. Behold, you will be silent and not able to speak until the day that these things will happen, because you did not believe my words, which will be fulfilled in their proper time.' (Luke 1.19–20)

Later when he asks for a tablet and writes about his new-born son: 'His name is John' (the name proclaimed by Gabriel), Zachariah regains his ability to speak (Luke 1.59–64). Zachariah is then filled with the holy spirit and prophesies about his son and Jesus.

This episode serves as a kind of doublet for the story of Paul's conversion in Acts (and recollects Daniel's experience at Daniel 9.21–24, 10.15–19). Zachariah and Paul both have contact with the divine; each has some fault (lack of faith, persecution of Christians) and loses either speech or sight; in the end, Zachariah's ability to speak is restored when he follows Gabriel's instructions in naming his child John; Paul is able to see again when healed by Ananias. Such parallelism in Luke's works has frequently been noted.[21]

The Hebrew Prophets

Luke-Acts privileges direct, oral exchange with the divine, yet the irony is that Luke's descriptions of these encounters are built on the basis of literary models, both the Hebrew Bible and non-biblical Greek literature. Let us now look at these models, beginning with Hebrew scriptural parallels

[21] See von Campenhausen (1969) 24 note 64: 'duplication and parallelism are a feature of every aspect of Luke's writing.'

that in some ways set the precedent for the authority bestowed upon Peter and Paul. These allusions are evoked either by precise language or comparable situations in pivotal moments of an individual's or community's existence.

The prophet Ezekiel offers an account of the experience he underwent. As in Acts, we note flashes of fire and a supernatural wind:

> And I looked and behold! *A sweeping wind came from the north and a great cloud on it, and there was brightness round about it and flashes of fire* (πῦρ ἐξάστραπτον); and in the midst of it, as it were, the appearance of amber in the midst of fire, and brightness in it.[22] (Ezekiel 1.4; cf. 1.22–24)

After heavenly signs, a form in human likeness appears on a throne and Ezekiel recounts how he fell on his face in terror:

> This was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord. *And I looked and threw myself on my face, and heard a voice speaking. And it said to me: 'Son of man, stand up on your feet, and I will talk with you.' And a spirit* (πνεῦμα) *came upon me and took me up and raised me and stood me on my feet, and I heard him speaking to me.* And he said to me, 'Son of man, I am sending you to the house of Israel, they who have provoked me.'
> (Ezekiel 2.1–2.3)

Although cowering, Ezekiel is told to stand as a spirit (πνεῦμα) enters him. The angel tells Ezekiel he will be a prophet (2.4–5) and he is given a scroll to eat, as sweet as honey (3.1–4).

Similar features are found in the vision of the prophet Daniel, who also encounters something with human form. He experiences awe, falls onto his face, but then is made to stand.

> And it came to pass, as I, I Daniel, saw the vision, and sought to understand it, that, behold, there stood before me something with the appearance of a man. And I heard the voice of a man between the banks of the Ubal; and he called and said, 'Gabriel, cause that man to understand the vision.' *And he came and stood close to where I was standing; when he came, I was struck with awe and threw myself on my face. And he said to me, 'Understand, Son of man: for this vision is for an appointed time.' And while he spoke with me,*

[22] Virtually nothing of Luke's life is known for certain. This extends to whether he could read Hebrew. In any case, as Fitzmyer (1981) 58 argues, 'most of Luke's quotations from the OT [Old Testament or Hebrew Scripture] are derived from the Greek version, the so-called LXX [Septuagint]'; see also Bruce (1990) 68. For example, Parsons (2007) 101 notes that the Ethiopian eunuch's quotation of Isaiah 53 (at Acts 8.32–33) is 'a verbatim quotation of a Greek version of Isa 53:7–8.' For these reasons, I will follow what Luke appears to have been most familiar with: the third century-BCE Greek (Septuagint) translation of the Hebrew original.

> *I fell to the ground on my face; but he touched me and stood me on my feet.* And he said, 'Behold, I shall make known to you what is to happen at the end of the wrath; for the vision is yet for an appointed time.'
>
> (Daniel 8.15–19)

Later when Daniel is told to seal (σφράγισον) this vision, he falls asleep and becomes weak (Daniel 8.26–27).

These passages in the Hebrew Bible describing the experiences of Ezekiel and Daniel—and those of Moses at Mt. Sinai—serve as paradigms *in terms of a general pattern* for Luke's sanctioning of Peter and Paul as a new generations of prophets.[23] Luke would expect many of his Jewish readers (and auditors) to recall such passages as these when hearing his description of the remarkable experiences of Peter and Paul. But do passages in Luke-Acts go beyond this general recall of certain types of biblical encounters? Let us consider the possibility of specific literary reference to particular passages in Greek literature.

Luke's References to Greek Literature

It has been argued that Luke goes out of his way to Hellenize Christianity in order to make the life and worship of Jesus accessible, particularly to non-Jewish audiences. Luke's gospel is said to portray Jesus in many ways like the philosopher Socrates; in addition, the early followers of Jesus in Acts (with their common property at Acts 2.42–47, 4.32–35) are described with words that recollect the just city in Plato's *Republic*.[24] Further the case has been made that Paul's sea journey to Rome in Acts

[23] Talbert (1997) 43 compares Peter and his followers at Pentecost (Acts 2.1–13) with Moses at Sinai (Exodus 19), pointing also to Philo (*Decalogue* 9.33, 11.46), and says, 'The echoes are unmistakable. Sound, fire, and speech understood by all people were characteristic of the Sinai theophany. The same ingredients are found in the Pentecostal events ... The typology of Acts 2:1–11, then, is that of making a covenant.' von Campenhausen (1969) 25 notes the great importance laid upon the fulfilling of scripture, but makes a distinction: 'The apostles are much more closely akin to the Old Testament prophets who received and took upon themselves word and spirit, the prophetic commission and the prophetic capabilities, at a particular point in their lives, except that now this calling and witness in all its immediacy has a single historical starting-point: the person of the Risen Jesus, which can never pass away, but remains in some sense effectual and contemporary for all Christians and for all the world.'

[24] Sterling (2001) argues that the trial and death of Socrates—his calmness in the face of death, his innocence, his rejection of help—are adopted by Luke in his portrait of Jesus. On allusions to Plato's *Republic*, see Dupertuis (2005).

27 is modeled on Homer's *Odyssey*. MacDonald claims that Paul's trip to Rome and shipwreck at Malta deliberately allude to Odysseus' adventures on his return home to Ithaca. These echoes may have special force, for on the basis of this comparison Paul is shown to be a more successful hero than Odysseus: the Homeric figure returns alone, having lost all his men, while Paul saves (both physically and potentially in spirit) everyone on board ship (27.44, e.g.).[25]

From this perspective we find Luke making use of non-biblical sources (Homer and Plato) as models for his scenes describing Jesus and his followers. These are examples of the phenomenon Roman rhetoricians call *imitatio* which consists of both imitating an earlier text and competing with it in an attempt, in some sense, to surpass the model. This agonistic spirit is captured in Luke's preface where he refers to other writers of narrative but claims accuracy and certainty for his own works (ἀκριβῶς ἀσφάλειαν—Luke 1.3–4).

Euripides' *Bacchae* is another candidate for literary reference in Luke's account of Peter and Paul in Acts. In this play Dionysus appears in disguise in Thebes; he and his followers are arrested and put in prison by the King Pentheus. The god's terrifying appearance to his followers a third of the way through the play provides a model of sorts for divine appearances in Acts. First, there is the divine appearance of Dionysus and manifestation of his power. The group hears a loud voice (κέλαδος), but at first does not see the god; they ask who it is and the god identifies himself.

> CHORUS: What is this cry (κέλαδος)—what is this and from where—of Euios that summoned me?
> DIONYSUS: Io, Io, again I speak, the son of Semele, the son of Zeus!
> (*Bacchae* 578–581)

An earthquake then rocks Pentheus' hall and lightning flashes (*Bacchae* 585–603).

Dionysus then speaks to the chorus of Bacchants. In terror they have fallen to the ground, but the god commands them to rise up.

> DIONYSUS: Women of Asia, thus utterly struck with terror, are you fallen to the ground? You feel, it seems, the Bacchic god shaking apart the house of Pentheus. But raise up your bodies and take courage; rid your flesh of trembling. (*Bacchae* 604–607)

[25] MacDonald (1999). On another of his works, note the caution of Mitchell (2003).

Next we have a description of what has happened, in particular, how the prison has failed to hold those prisoners within:

> DIONYSUS: Did you fall into despair when I was escorted within, thinking that I should be flung into Pentheus' dark dungeons?
> CHORUS: Yes, of course! What protector had I, if you encountered disaster? But how were you set free after your encounter with that unholy man?
> DIONYSUS: Myself I rescued myself, easily, without effort.
> CHORUS: But did he not tie your hands in captive knots?
> DIONYSUS: This was just the ignominy I did him, that he thought he was binding me, but neither touched nor laid hands on me, but fed on empty hopes. (*Bacchae* 610–617)

The 'stranger' (Dionysus in disguise) then gives a narrative account of Dionysus' arrival, the shaking of the palace, and blazing fire (*Bacchae* 621–627). I would maintain that there are two types of literary influence here. The book of Acts may be making a general sort of allusion to Euripides' play based on common elements shared with Hebrew Scripture: the voice of a god who later identifies himself; his appearance and address to his followers accompanied by signs of his power. Here it may be possible to speak of influence in broad terms.

But there may also be a more specific type of literary reference—tied to specific passages. For example, Luke appears to have adapted Euripidean scenes of divine intervention for the prison scenes in Acts. I will focus on the third of these scenes.[26] Paul and Silas are imprisoned at Philippi when an earthquake allows for an escape which they decline.

> And the multitude rose up together against them, and the magistrates tore their clothes off of them, and commanded them to be beaten with rods. After giving them a severe beating, they threw them into prison, ordering the jailer to keep them under close guard, who, having received such an order, threw them into the inner prison, and secured their feet in the stocks. But about midnight Paul and Silas were praying and singing hymns to God, and the prisoners were listening to them. *And suddenly there was a great earthquake, so that the foundations of the prison were shaken; and immediately all the doors were opened, and everyone's bonds were loosened.* And the jailer woke up and saw the prison doors open, then drew his sword and was about to kill himself, supposing that the prisoners had escaped.

[26] Cf. the first prison scene at Acts 5.17–26. For the second scene, an escape by Peter in Acts 12, his chains fall from his hands and the iron gate open by itself (αὐτομάτη—Acts 12.7–10); we might compare the earlier liberation of the Bacchant women in Euripides: 'Of themselves the chains came undone (αὐτόματα … δεσμὰ) from their feet,/and the doors were unbarred without mortal hand' (*Bacchae* 443–448).

> But Paul cried with a loud voice, saying, 'Don't harm yourself, for we are all here!' And he called for lights and sprang in, and, fell down trembling before Paul and Silas, and brought them out and said, 'Masters, what must I do to be saved?' And they said, 'Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved, you and your household.' And they spoke the word of the Lord to him, and to everyone in his house. (Acts 16.22–32)

This scene appears specifically to refer to the release of the stranger from Pentheus' prison in Euripides' play. In both Acts 16 and Euripides' play, there is an arrest and imprisonment of someone introducing a new religion; then an earthquake allows for escape, but the prisoner(s) remains. Of particular relevance is that in Acts, Luke has just told the story of Lydia, who was the first convert to Christianity in Europe (Acts 16.11–15)—this makes an obvious parallel with Dionysus in the play bringing worship of a new god to Europe. But again there is a distinction, this time between the two men who confront the unbound prisoner. In Thebes, Pentheus resists the new god and is destroyed, while the jailer in Philippi accepts the new god and is saved. These similarities suggest that Luke may have expected some in his audience to recollect this specific Euripidean scene.[27]

Finally, I would point to an interesting and controversial parallel. In Euripides, the 'stranger' tells Pentheus:

> 'I would not kick against goads (πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζοιμι) as mortal against gods.' (*Bacchae* 795)

In Paul's second recounting of his Damascus road experience, he says that Jesus tells him:

> 'Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me? It is hard for you to kick against goads (σκληρόν σοι πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζειν)' (Acts 26.14)

The expression 'to kick against goads' means 'to struggle vainly' and is proverbial, yet the similarity of the context—a god addressing an antagonist who has questioned his divinity—argues for serious consideration.[28] In a spirit of *imitatio*, Luke appears to have made Paul's situation recall that of Pentheus, though in this case Paul repents, converts, and evangelizes.[29]

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[27] See MacDonald (2004).

[28] The expression is found in Pindar (*Pythian* 2.94–95) and Aeschylus (*Agamemnon* 1624, *Prometheus Bound* 322–323), e.g. Pentheus is also described as 'fighting against the god'—θεομαχεῖ—45; cf. Acts 5.39: 'do not be found fighting against the gods (θεομάχοι).'

[29] On the similarities between Dionysus and Jesus—and these two literary works—see the discussion in Seaford (2006) 124–126.

None of these references is indisputable—and the only quotation is itself proverbial—yet both Acts and Euripides' play highlight pivotal moments in the course of spreading a new religion. The cumulative evidence of likely parallel passages and scenarios from Homer, Plato, and Euripides leads, I believe, to the conclusion that Luke makes both general allusion to Hebrew scripture and classical Greek literature and specific literary references to certain texts with the expectation that at least some members of his audience would recall the earlier passages. There may be some danger in likening Jesus to Socrates or Paul to Odysseus or the 'pagan' god Dionysus. Evidently Luke found this to be a risk worth taking. It should be pointed out, however, that he not only makes these comparisons but is also at pains to distinguish, say, the experiences of Peter and Paul brought about by Jesus Christ from those of the followers of Dionysus.[30]

Conclusion

So what are Luke's goals in presenting the figures of Peter and Paul as he does?

It has been said that Luke-Acts seeks to wrest Hebrew Scripture from Judaism: the Hebrew Bible's new function is to serve Christianity, now seen as the legitimate continuation of Israel.[31] Clearly there is a fascination with demonstrating that events in Acts are the fulfillment of prophecies from Hebrew Scripture (this is also found in all four gospels). Yet for all his erudition, Luke insists upon the primacy of direct encounters with the divine in order to validate the positions of Peter and Paul. Hebrew Scripture may well be fulfilled—and at a compositional level is able to provide models for Luke—but of highest importance is the immediate personal experience, the commissioning of Peter and Paul conferred by divinely spoken words. All told, we are left with an appreciation that these principal examples of oral encounters in the book of Acts are modeled either on Hebrew scriptural passages or famous episodes from Greek literature.

[30] At Lystra in Asia Minor when the local people believe Barnabas and Paul to be gods and call them Zeus and Hermes, the apostle's reaction is immediate: 'We are men in every way like you and we announce the good news to you that you should turn from these follies and turn to the living god' (Acts 14.15).

[31] It has also been claimed that Luke-Acts is an implacable enemy of Judaism; see Barrett (1996) 84.

At this point we might contemplate the reception of Luke's works. It may seem as though Luke-Acts is directed only at educated readers. And to a certain extent Luke is appealing to an elite audience familiar with either Jewish or Greek texts. But in fact, there may be something for everybody—literate and illiterate, Greek and Jewish, citizen and non-citizen. Let us assume a wide range in levels of literacy: there were small elite groups who could read passages of Hebrew scripture, the letters of Paul, or Homer and Plato. Harris argues for a fairly low literacy rate in the Roman world—less than 10% in this part of the empire—but even if he is correct, many Jews 'could still expect to hear [the Hebrew Bible] read aloud in synagogues once a week on the Sabbath.'[32]

The consequence would be that the vast majority of the Jewish population would have a familiarity with biblical texts—though this familiarity would not be dependent upon the ability to read such texts. Pattison calls this 'an oral type of literacy,' which embraces a special attitude toward written texts *even for those unable to read them*. The words of the laws and the prophets have been written down, they appear on sacred scrolls kept in view in the temple, and those in the elite class (scribes or Pharisees, e.g.) can confirm what is there by looking at these texts and reading them. Yet the retrieval for such passages *for most* is from memory of what was read aloud and heard. Nevertheless, the emphasis *even for the functionally illiterate* is to point to the written text: 'as it is written.'[33]

This oral type of literacy may well be exemplified by the figure of Peter in Luke-Acts. For the illiterate believer (or potential believer) Peter may serve as a model of the uneducated faithful follower of Jesus; for the more educated, Paul fits the bill as literate, bilingual, and well-versed in Jewish law and text. But both sorts of audiences—the more learned Jews and those less educated—would recognize that what Peter and Paul underwent in their lives follows the pattern of the prophets' experience described in Hebrew Scripture.

For the non-Jewish audience, Luke-Acts may also work on at least two levels. For the highly educated, the allusions to Homer, Plato, and Euripides would familiarize the encounters of Peter and Paul, putting scenes in Acts on a par with events described in what was by then considered canonical Greek literature. Yet even for the less educated, echoes of Greek

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[32] Goodman (1994) 107; see Harris (1989) 272.

[33] Pattison (1982) 85. As Fox (1994) 144 says, 'much more was heard and circulated orally than was ever read in private by individuals;' see 140, 148 for his remarks on reading aloud, recitation, and memory.

literature may have been heard. Downing argues that literary and cultural awareness was mediated down the social scale from the higher educated classes through a variety of venues: speeches in courts and the assembly, performances in the theatres of the Hellenized East, Cynic philosophers discoursing on street corners, as well as recitations at after-dinner entertainments which the lower classes attended as servants and slaves, if not as guests. He concludes: 'There is no sign of a culture-gap between the highly literate aristocracy and the masses.'[34]

Luke has made use of literary and religious texts to activate certain responses among different segments of his audience: there are those who would recognize echoes of Hebrew Scripture—some from reading, some from hearing it each week—and some (non-Jewish Greeks) who would recognize parallels from Homer, Plato, or Euripides—again either from reading or (for a larger segment of the population) from argument and performance in public and private gatherings. There are even those educated Hellenized Jews—such as Josephus or from an earlier generation Philo—who would pick up on both classical and biblical references. Luke evidently had great literary ambitions, yet they were always subordinate to his theological purposes.[35] In his allusive manner Luke appeals to the widest possible audience as he authorizes both Peter and Paul, based on their direct contact with a living, speaking god.

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[34] Downing (1988) 229. For the Herodian theatre in Sepphoris (a few miles from Nazareth) and the possibility that Greek tragedy was performed in the first century CE, see Batey (1984).

[35] Fitzmyer (1981) 290.

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CHAPTER TWENTY

SINGING TOGETHER IN CHURCH: AUGUSTINE'S *PSALM AGAINST THE DONATISTS*

Vincent Hunink

The present paper may seem something of a paradox. It focuses on one of the most prolific *writers* of antiquity, St. Augustine. The sheer quantity of his works, the mass of books he wrote, inspires awe or even disbelief. The bulk of his writings comprises no less than sixteen massive volumes of the *Patrologia Latina*.[1] It seems nearly impossible for a single reader to read them completely in his or her lifetime. If anyone can be called an early Christian writer, it is surely Augustine.

On reflection, however, the oral aspect is quite important in a large part of his oeuvre. This is particularly true in the case of his numerous *sermones*, of which some 600 remain.[2] The largest category among them, the *sermones ad populum*, comprises sermons delivered to the church audience at large, in which Augustine explains passages from Scripture or discusses the lives and deeds of saints and martyrs.[3] In these sermons, Augustine employs a plain style of Latin proper to his purpose. Sentences are relatively short and display a syntax that is markedly less complex than in his other works. Much the same goes for word order and choice of vocabulary.[4] The oral setting of the sermons also shows a certain

[1] PL vols. 32–46; vol. 47; and Supplementum 2. For a survey of no fewer than 131 titles, see Van Reisen (2002) 56–60. Information (in Dutch) can also be obtained online: www.augustinus.nl ⟩ Augustinus' werken ⟩ opera omnia. A great number of excellent texts and translations can be obtained freely at www.augustinus.it.

[2] As a whole, the collected volume of these sermons is about three times that of *De civitate Dei*. For numerous years, Augustine preached many times a week, sometimes several times a day. The total number of his original sermons must have been several thousands, perhaps as many as 4,000. For a complete survey of Augustine's sermons, see Pellegrino (1990); cf. also the general remarks by Mechlinksy (2004) 11–20 with references.

[3] In the last few decades, the large corpus of Augustinian sermon texts was even increased due to new finds. Among the recently discovered sermons at Erfurt library, there are sermons on such saints as Cyprian and Perpetua; see Schiller (2008).

[4] The sermons have also been studied on account of their specifically Christian linguistic colour; see Mohrmann (1932).

degree of repetition, and often a relatively loose structure of the text, characterized at many places by associative reasoning and improvisation. The sermons have been studied in general terms, mainly on account of their theological content, but there remains much to be done in terms of their 'oral' aspects. It is only recently that these have raised some interest.[5]

Unclassical Text

Apart from the sermons there are other works by St. Augustine which show clearly oral features. One work stands out here on account of its distinctively oral origins: the so-called *Psalmus contra partem Donati*, the 'Psalm against the Donatists'.[6] After a short description of the structure and background of this rather neglected text, which even specialists of Augustine do not often read, I will discuss its principal aspects as a product of oral performance.

The *Psalmus* is a poem-like text dating from the year 393, intended for the common believers in church. In it Augustine deals at some length with his discussions with the sectarian 'Donatists'. The text is rather long, counting 297 lines, and it has the following structure. After a refrain of one line, *Omnes qui gaudetis de pace, modo uerum iudicate* ('all you who rejoice in peace, now consider what is true'), that will be repeated 21 times, and a prologue of 5 deceptively simple lines, there follow 20 stanzas of 12 lines each, and each starting with subsequent letters of the alphabet ('abecedarian pattern'); this is rounded off with an epilogue of 30 lines.[7] Each line has a strong caesura that divides it into two halves of some eight syllables.[8] Most lines form clear syntactic unities (complete

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[5] Cf. notably Mechlinksy (2004).

[6] The standard edition is now Rosati (1957), also adopted in Finaert/Congar (1963) and Geerlings (1994). The text is based on the critical edition by Lambot (1935), in which the Leiden manuscript Vossianus lat. 8° 69 fol. 68 (from the 9th century) was used for the first time. This manuscript is the only source for the prologue and three other lines, which had all been missing until Lambot's publication. For recent literature on the *Psalmus*, cf. Geerlings (2002), 83 and items mentioned in the present paper, notably Moreno (1999) and Pizzani (2007).

[7] I quote the Latin text of the older editions, as it is still printed in Lambot (1935) and readopted in Hunink (2005). I will shortly return to the discussion about the refrain.

[8] Curiously, Tilley (in Fitzgerald (1999) 688) speaks about two times seven syllables. She also calls the rhyme scheme 'irregular', which it obviously is not: every line ends in the sound -e (occasionally spelled as -ae). Such careless and imprecise remarks are, perhaps, typical of the lack of appreciation and interest generally given to the *Psalmus*. Negative comments about it abound in earlier secondary literature.

sentences) and are marked by rhyme of final -e. The overall impression is one of a decidedly 'unclassical' text.

In the prologue (lines 2–6), Augustine immediately sets the tone, both in terms of style and content. He refers to schismatics who 'tear up', literally, a garment, a simple image for the peace of Christ, and he tries to mobilize the hearers against them. Their name remains unmentioned for a long time; it is only in line 101 that Donatus is first named. To the audience, however, it will be quickly made clear who the targets are.

The conflict with the heretic Donatists is a dispute of theological origin, which gradually broadened to a social conflict as well (the church of Africa as opposed to the church of Rome).[9] Its origins date back to the days of Diocletian (early 4th century). The Donatists blamed the Catholics for obeying the emperor's orders and handing over the sacred books under the threat of death. They saw themselves as clearly distinct from this line of *traditores* ('those who give in [books]'). In Carthage one of the alleged *traditores*, bishop Felix, appointed a certain Caecilianus as archbishop in 311 or 312, whereas the Numidian bishops appointed Majorinus in this same position. Caecilianus could stay in office because he was supported by Constantine, but his position remained disputed. Majorinus was succeeded by Donatus, the man after whom the local opposition was named. The regionally oriented Donatist movement disputed the validity of sacramental acts by Catholics, and thus instituted the practice of 'rebaptism'.

The conflict remained unresolved until Augustine's time. After Augustine was ordained as a priest (391), he first sought dialogue with the movement (which he considered dangerous for the unity of the Church), but the present text shows a rather more polemical stand. In the course of the text, Augustine explains the history of the conflict and adds many details, such as a Donatist attempt to gain the upper hand through an intermediary from Rome, whom they rejected as soon as the outcome did not suit them.

In the *Psalmus*, Augustine speaks as the defender of the Catholic Church. The text is written in the first person plural and has many addresses in the second person plural and descriptions about 'them' in

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[9] This paper is not the proper place for a full theological and historical discussion of Donatism. Cf e.g. Lancel (1999) 602–622 and editions of the Psalmus as mentioned above, note 6.

the third person plural. Some variations are possible: often it is the absent Donatists who are addressed, and in the epilogue it is not Augustine who speaks but Mother Church herself.[10]

In the course of his plea, Augustine combines severe reprimands and harsh criticism with softer notes and even urgent appeals to restore unity, such as in the final speech by Mother Church. In his view, perfection (such as aimed at by the Donatists) was impossible on earth, and in church believers should learn how to support each other's weakness, leaving the final judgement to Christ himself.

Simple or Refined?

Whenever the *Psalm* has attracted scholarly attention, it is because of its form rather than its subject matter. It seems obvious that the *Psalm* is quite unlike Augustine's other, well-known works, such as the *Confessions* and the *City of God*, and indeed unlike anything earlier at all. It is generally regarded as an almost painfully primitive text for the illiterate believers, and so as something at the margin of his works. This is partly due to Augustine himself. In his *Retractationes*, there is an important testimonial about the text, which is worth quoting in full.

> 'Because I wished, too, to familiarize the most lowly people and especially the ignorant and uneducated, with the cause of the Donatists and to impress it on their memory to the best of my ability, I composed a psalm to be sung to them, arranged according to the Latin alphabet, and only as far as the letter *V*, that is, in the so-called abecedarian style. However, I omitted the last three letters, but in their place at the end, I added an epilogue, so to speak, as though Mother Church were addressing them. Moreover, the refrain which is repeated again and again, and the proemium to the cause which we wanted sung, are not in alphabetical order. In fact, the alphabetical order begins after the proemium. Furthermore, I did not want this psalm composed in any form of metrical verse lest the metrical requirements force me [to use] some words which are not familiar to the common people. This psalm begins thus: "All you who delight in peace now judge what is true," which is its refrain.'[11]
>
> (*Retr.* 1,20 (19), trans. Bogan (1968) 86, with a change)

[10] On that passage see notably Springer (1987).

[11] *Volens etiam causam Donatistarum ad ipsius humilissimi uulgi et omnino imperitorum atque idiotarum notitiam peruenire, et eorum quantum fieri posset per nos inhaerere memoriae, Psalmum qui eis cantaretur, per Latinas litteras feci: sed usque ad V litteram. Tales autem Abecedarios appellant. Tres uero ultimas omisi, sed pro eis nouissimum*

So this seems to be a deliberately simple, effective text meant to make rather complex theological subject matter comprehensible to the common, illiterate folk. Throughout the text, the vocabulary is plain and clear, syntax is predominantly simple and easy to follow, and there are many paratactic constructions and repetitions of words. For instance, a brief look at the T-stanza (lines 242–253) about re-baptizing will show a striking lack of variety in both idiom and syntax.[12] This sort of language certainly classifies the *Psalmus* as sub-literary in ancient terms, its style being 'low'.

The text of this famous church Father even shows a number of elements of 'Vulgar Latin'. For instance, some lines end in -*ae*, a certain proof of its pronunciation as -*e*.[13] Unclassical use of the infinitive, of *habere* or a loose use of the second person plural are among the phenomena one comes across.[14] In general, the whole pattern of argumentation seems suited to the occasion of an oral performance: not only is the author as clear and plain as he can, he also does not shun harsh language at the expense of the Donatist enemies.[15]

On the other hand, it must be said that careful analysis shows that the overall form is anything but primitive or careless. Above all, there is the basic pattern of the abecedarian 'psalm' after the Jewish model,[16]

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quasi epilogum adiunxi, tamquam eos mater alloqueretur Ecclesia. Hypopsalma etiam quod responderetur, et prooemium causae, quod nihilominus cantaretur, non sunt in ordine litterarum. Earum quippe ordo incipit post prooemium. Ideo autem non aliquo carminis genere id fieri uolui, ne me necessitas metrica ad aliqua uerba quae uulgo minus sunt usitata compelleret. Iste Psalmus sic incipit: 'Omnes qui gaudetis de pace, modo uerum iudicate', quod eius hypopsalma est.

[12] E.g. repeated sentence or clause beginnings with *quid* (244, 245), with *si (me) maculat* (246, 248, 250); line endings with *fide* (242, 245) or *rebaptizare* (244, 254); repeated words, such as *tu* (246, 248, 253), *sanctus* (143, 249, 250) and forms of *nescire* (248, 250, 252).

[14] Cf. e.g. *Si iudex Christus hoc dicat, quid* habetis *respondere?* (136), … *tunc est tempus* separare (17), *Vestem alienam* conscindas *nemo potest tolerare* (2).

[15] For an example of lines that do not allow for any misunderstanding: cf. *Congregauit multos pisces* omne genus hinc et inde, /*quos cum traxissent ad litus*, tunc *coeperunt separare:* / bonos *in uasa miserunt, reliquos* malos *in mare*. (11–13). Some examples of insulting language are: *Erant Botrus et Caelestius hostes Caeciliano ualde, /* impii, fures, superbi, *de quibus longum est referre* (54–55); *Ipsi tradiderunt libros et nos audent accusare, / ut peius committant* scelus *quam quod commiserunt ante* (26–27); *Custos noster, Deus magne, tu nos potes liberare / a* pseudoprophetis *istis, qui nos quaerunt deuorare* (34–35); … *sed* furor, dolus, tumultus, *qui regnant in falsitate* (78); *Sed superbia uos ligauit in cathedra* pestilentiae (123); '*Vos me quare dimisistis et crucior* de uestra morte?' (290, Mother Church speaking).

[16] Cf. Springer (1984) 67.

with many allusions and quotations from the Gospels, and the abundant use of basic rhetorical instruments such as antithesis, paradox, anaphora, rhetorical questions, change of addressees, and metaphors. In addition, it must be said that the subject matter in itself is not particularly easy. For instance, lines 216–266 deal with the vexed question of rebaptism, and the text also offers some abstruse detail about events in the distant past, such as the embassy from Rome in lines 99–136. All of this must have been quite hard to follow.

It seems that Augustine is consciously mixing 'simple, harsh effects' with 'refined effects of literary styling' to achieve what must have been his aim: to strengthen his own, Catholic audience and keep them from joining the Donatists.[17] The rudest notes must have been effective for the most primitive members of his audience, whereas the literary ornaments must have appealed to those who possessed a little education.

A Carmen After All?

The most important problem regarding the *Psalmus* is, without a doubt, its specific poetical and metrical nature.[18] What is the nature of this text?

Some things it is obviously not: it is not a poem in quantitative metre. There is no way of reading these lines according to a pattern of long and short syllables. As Augustine puts it: this is written *non aliquo carminis genere*. (*Retr.* 1,20).[19]

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[17] Given the polemical, insulting language used against the Donatists, it is hard to believe that Donatists were present in church themselves. If they were, it remains difficult to imagine them being convinced by the speaker. Rather, they would have reacted by persisting in what they saw was their rightful cause. Augustine's formulation *psalmum qui eis cantaretur* in *Retr.* 1,20 (cf. note 11) also suggests that his own faithful were the target audience. On the grammatical interpretation of *eis*, see further below, p. 398.

[18] This has been the main object of research in modern scholarly contributions on the *Psalmus*. As exceptions, one may refer to Alfonsi (1958), whose interest is mainly doctrinal, and the articles by Springer (1984, 1987), which concentrate on literary technique.

[19] A curious attempt to consider the *psalmus* as a classical poem after all, in spite of the evidence from Augustine himself and the *communis opinio* that it is not, may be found in the paper by Pighi (1963). Pighi tries to analyse the lines as dactylic hexameters. For this, he has to assume that all normal prosodical values have been dropped, producing a 'Scheinprosodie' not unlike the verses of Commodian (p. 267). Augustine, then, would use a new form of 'heroic verse' in which only the strong caesura would recall the ancient hexameter, and no scansion would be possible. In the end, one might say, even Pighi gives up the notion of a quantitative metre, as his alleged 'heroic verse' seems hardly more than a form of prose. Pighi's theory has not gained further support, but remarkably Pizzani (2007) 32 still mentions it.

A majority of scholars now argue that the key to understand this poem is the number of syllables: sixteen per verse. The *Psalmus*, then, would be an early example of *rhythmical poetry*, involving a pattern of stressed and non-stressed syllables, with a major role for the natural word accent. The pattern would have to be analysed as a trochaic acatalectic tetrameter.[20] For Augustine then, it is tacitly assumed, a rhythmical pattern would not qualify the text as a *carminis genus*, as a quantitative pattern would do.

There are, however, some major problems. First, many lines do not count exactly 16 syllables, but one or two more or less, especially if all cases of alleged elision and aphaeresis are left out of account. Some fine examples may be found as early as at the start of the poem. According to Augustine's own quotation (cited above), the *hypopsalma* (refrain, line 1) counts 17 syllables: *omnes qui gaudetis de pace, modo uerum iudicate*. In line 2a one would have to read *foeda_st res causam audire* (with aphaeresis of *est*, but without elision of -am) or, conversely, *foeda est res caus_audire*, which sounds even more awkward, to make it count as the first half of 16 syllables. In both cases the metrical pattern can only be applied with some force. Much the same goes for line 4a *uestem alienam conscindas*, and many more lines could be adduced here.

The refrain also shows the ultimate consequence of the notion that the *Psalmus* does have a fixed metrical pattern: the Latin text itself has been changed. All recent editions follow the 'metrically convenient' variant of the Leiden MSS discovered around 1930: *Vos qui gaudetis de pace, modo uerum iudicate* (16 syllables), even though all other *codices* and Augustine himself quote it as starting with *omnes*. In many lines in the Leiden codex, minor and major changes have been adopted so as to make the Latin fit the metrical pattern, and sometimes also softening the tone. A number of them have found their way right until the critical edition by Anastasi.[21]

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[20] Cf, most recently, Pizzani (2007) 31. Among earlier studies arriving at this conclusion, one may mention Vroom (1933) 33–47 and Luiselli (1966) 35–36. Cf. also O'Donnell (2006) 118: 'instead of measuring long and short syllables (...) he counts accented and unaccented syllables'.

[21] For instance, *Erant* Botrus et Caelestius hostes Caeciliano *ualde*, changed to: *Erant et* alii inimici Caeciliano iniusti *ualde* (54), *Multos nunc habetis* prauos, *qui uobis displicent ualde* ⟩ *Multos enim nunc habetis, qui uobis displicent ualde*(88); *Finxerunt se nimis iustos, cum totum uellent* perturbare ⟩ *Finxerunt se nimis iustos, cum totum uellent* turbare (98). In the first 100 lines major examples may be found in lines 21, 23, 29, 52, 64, and 93. Some striking other cases are to be found in lines 116, 120, 142, 191, 222, 279, and 281.

But even then, many of such 'restored' lines present considerable difficulties if one tries to pronounce them according to the alleged rhythmical pattern, since in numerous cases, the metrical ictus would clash with the natural word accent. There seems a certain tendency of correspondence between the two, but not much more.[22]

To return once more to the refrain: here too, there is debate, even among the few defendants of *omnes*. Do we read *omNES qui GAUdeTIS de PAce*, with an extra syllable to mark the start of the refrain,[23] or with elision of -i- *OMnesQUIgauDEt(i)s de PAce*,[24] or without elision (but extra fast, producing two extra short syllables in the same time as one normal syllable!) *OMnesQUIgauDEtis de PAce*?[25] The real answer is: the matter remains impossible to decide.

Meanwhile, I would suggest that the initial question and basic assumptions are wrong. All scholars now agree: this text is not a *carmen*, in the classical sense of a text constructed on the basis of a quantitative, metrical pattern. Instead, it is commonly argued, the text is dominated by a rhythmical pattern. But surely, Augustine would have noticed that this would merely be replacing one strict system with another one, making the text no less a *carmen* but merely another type.[26] I repeat that Augustine explicitly argues that he did not use any form of *carmen* so as to avoid *necessitas metrica* restricting him in his vocabulary. Surely, a *trochaic acatalectic tetrameter* would impose definite limits on his idiom, whether it be taken as a quantitative or a qualitative scheme.

It seems amazing that the scholarly world seems so keen on explaining some sort of a metrical pattern for this text, in spite of all the textual problems this involves, and in spite of Augustine's explicit and indubitable statement that he did *not* write a *carmen*.

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22 Even here, the lines of the prologue can be adduced. 2a would have to be *Et perSOnas ACciPEre*, while line 6 also would be much of a problem. Some have tried to solve the problem by freely assuming that Augustine does not produce all cases of ictus, but only the antepenultimate of each of both cola in a verse; thus Vaccari (1958) 254.

23 Vroom (1933) 23–25.

24 Baxter (1952) 21–22.

25 Moreno (1999) 426–427. Given his terminology ('Ocho tiempos monosilábicos', 'en un mismo tiempo rítmico', 427) one wonders whether Moreno is tacitly reintroducing a quantitative element in his analysis.

26 Augustine was a clever thinker, who also wrote at great length about music; cf. notably his *De Musica*. In book 6 of that work he extensively discusses the various forms of *numerus*; cf. the summary in Jacobsson (2002) lxxxix–xciii.

Psalm

So what did he write? The answer is so simple as to seriously confound scholars. Augustine himself tells that it is not a *carmen* but a *psalm*.[27] This too is the word in the title of the piece.[28] Obviously the term here does not refer specifically to the psalms from Scripture.

As a matter of fact, there is evidence that in Augustine's day new psalms were written for instruction of the masses. For Augustine the 'abecedarian' order, and its Hebrew background, was an essential element of the term.[29] Better still, it is the Donatist movement which seems to have made use of new 'Psalms' for propagandistic purposes, as emerges from a passage in Augustine's letters.[30] About the Donatist Parmenianus, a contemporary of Augustine, it is attested in an anonymous text that he went through the province Africa spreading psalms 'against us'.[31]

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[27] In fact, this elementary point has not been made by scholars who discuss the metre. Chatillon (1955) 120 comes nearest, quoting Raby, (History of christian Latin poetry [n. 30], 22): 'The earlier rhythmical verse was a kind of prose, with no fixed accentual rhythm carried throughout the line, although, as in Augustine's *Psalm*, there might be a regular cadence in the middle and at the end of the line.' Attempts to analyse the *Psalmus* as prose are also briefly discussed by Luiselli (1966) 32–33, who personally favours the analysis as *trochaic octonarii* (p. 36).

[28] Augustine himself refers to it as the *Psalmus contra partem Donati*, with *pars* used in the sense 'party', 'faction' (LSh s.v. II A), and as *Psalmus*; cf. *Retr.* 1,20. The *Indiculum Possidii* refers to it as *Psalmus abecedarius* and several manuscripts in their 'incipit' call it *Abecedarium* with some added words (V: *Abecedarium beati Augustini de Donatistis*; C: *Abecedarium Augustini contra Donatistas*; other variants of the 'incipit' in MSS are listed by Lambot, 318). With all modern editors I assume that the title as it is given by Augustine himself seems the most likely choice.

[29] Cf. *Enarr. in psalm. 118*, serm.32,8 (PL 37,1596). Interestingly, Augustine argues that in the Hebrew psalms, all lines of a stanza start with the same letter, whereas new Greek and Latin texts in the genre only follow the alphabet in the first line of each stanza.

[30] Epist. 55,18,34 … *ita ut Donatistae nos reprehendant, quod sobrie psallimus in ecclesia diuina cantica Prophetarum, cum ipsi ebrietates suas ad canticum psalmorum humano ingenio compositorum, quasi ad tubas exhortationis inflamment.* '… so that the Donatists reproach us because in church we sing the divine songs of the prophets in a sober manner, while they inflame their revelry as if by trumpet calls for the singing of psalms composed by human ingenuity …', transl. McKinnon (1987) 164–165.

[31] Anon. "Praedestinatus" 1,44 (PL 53,600). *Parmenianos a Parmeniano; qui per totam Africam libros contra nos conficiens, et nouos psalmos faciens circumibat, contra quem noster scripsit Optatus.* 'Parmeniani (named) after Parmenianus. He made books against us and wrote new psalms, with which he went round in all Africa.' The anonymous text has often been associated with Augustine, but it does not belong to his genuine works. For some interesting observations on the "Praedestinatus" and its reception of Augustinian thought on heresies, see O'Donnell (2006) 285–286.

So it seems that Augustine merely took over the practice of writing a psalm from the very opponents he attacks.[32] Of course, as many places in his work confirm, he was particularly sensible to the emotional effect of music on the soul, and so he may also have felt personally attracted to the medium of a text that is sung.[33] By all means, in his day the singing of psalms had become very popular.[34]

The logical question then is: how was this psalm performed? And does this give us a clue as to its structure and text? The first question regarding its performance is impossible to answer with certainty. No musical scores have been transmitted, and Augustine never gives a clear cut description of the performance of this sort of psalm. However, there are essentially two sources to obtain further information: a close reading of the testimony about the *psalmus*, and external evidence about Biblical psalms.

To start with the former, the passage in *Retractationes* again produces a few helpful details. First it is clear that the psalm is *sung*: *qui eis cantaretur*. One could discuss *eis*: is this an ablative (or dative) of agent ('that was to be sung by them')? I would suggest it is better and grammatically more natural to take it simply as a dative 'that was to be sung to them', i.e. by one or more singers. For shortly afterwards, it is said about the *hypopsalma* (refrain): *quod responderetur* 'which would be given in answer'. The most reasonable explanation is that the audience at large is supposed to join in singing the simple line in response after each successive stanza. This is a simple method, highly effective to confirm the bond between the author of the psalm and his audience: it is as if they are fighting together against heresy, as if they can support Augustine and the cause of the church, just by singing, time and again: *omnes qui* ..., presumably in exactly the same tone over and over again.

Scattered remarks by Augustine himself elsewhere give an impression of the variety of psalm performances in his days. Psalms could be sung or recited, by the reader or singer, as part of liturgy, as responsorial psalms or with a refrain.[35]

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[32] For this notion cf. e.g. Luiselli (1966) 46–47; Luiselli (1979) 74; Springer (1984) 68. Many scholars also acknowledge Augustine's familiarity with the rhythmical *hymns* of Ambrose, which may have influenced him. However, the hymns do follow a strict metrical scheme, and need not to be taken as a direct model for the *Psalmus*.

[33] Cf. e.g. Elsere (1988) with further references.

[34] Cf. McKinnon (1994) 516–519.

[35] Cf. McKinnon (1987) 153–168. A particularly clear testimony of the use of a psalm verse in response to a singer, is McKinnon's nr 374: Sermo 352,1,2 (PL 39,1548–1550):

About the melody as such little can be said. But when combined with the important detail in *Epist.* 55,18,34[36] that the Donatist psalms were performed in an excessive, loud manner, whereas the normal psalmody is performed *sobrie*, it follows that the *Psalmus contra partem Donati* must have been performed in a natural, calm way. It has been suggested that psalmodizing in Augustine's days may have sounded rather similar to modern practice: reciting a verse in one, constant tone, with a strong pause in the middle and a slight change of tone both before the pause and at the end.[37]

A regular line of psalm could then have sounded like the following (with accents denoting a lowering or raising of pitch):

omnes iniusti non possùnt || *regnum Dei possidére*

or

omnes iniusti non póssunt || *regnum Dei possidère*

Of course additional, small melodic lines or variations seem perfectly possible as well:

omnes iniusti non póssunt || *regnum Dei pòssidére*

omnes iniustí nòn possúnt || *regnum Dei pòssídere.*[38]

A seemingly 'irregular' line with more or less than 16 syllables would easily fit in for the singer, who would simply have to adapt this mode of psalmody by keeping his or her tone for a one or two syllables more or less:

quanto magis pacem Chrísti || *qui conscindit dignus est mòrte*

Such a system is easy and quite flexible, without becoming shapeless or amorphous. It can still be heard in modern performances of psalms

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uox poenitentis agnoscitur in uerbis quibus psallenti respondimus: 'Auerte faciem tuam a peccatis meis, et omnes iniquitates meas dele' 'The penitent's voice can be heard in the words with which we respond to the psalmodist: "Turn away your face from my sins, and destroy all my iniquities." (Ps.50,11).' A remarkable passage about singing of psalms is *De ordine* 1, 21–22, where Licentius, who has given up poetry, sings a psalm at a place where he relieves himself, which greatly annoys Monica, who thinks this behaviour is irreverent.

[36] Quoted above, note 30.

[37] Cf. notably Vroom (1933) 25–27.

[38] These suggestions of possible oral performance are given merely *exempli gratia*, and could be multiplied. They are not meant as reconstructions with a claim to historical truth.

in Gregorian chant. Many readers and singers will also know similar flexible modes of singing lyrics from popular culture, e.g. from pop songs or amateur occasional poems to accompany gifts, which mostly derive their status as songs or poems from their melody or general flow and particularly the rhyme at the end. In the *Psalmus* too, it is the sustained tone and the constant ending in -e (rather than a fixed pattern of either long and short, or stressed and unstressed syllables) which underscores the unity of the line.

I would tentatively suggest that the stanzas, with their essential message, were psalmodized by one, or, more excitingly, two singers (the rhythm and syntax of the lines would be perfect for that).[39] The audience at large then, would answer by singing the refrain, presumably at the top of their voice.

Of course, with its nearly 300 lines the *Psalmus* is rather long. But Augustine actually implies that it was sung at length. For a singer psalmodizing a single stanza loudly and clearly, and the audience to respond, some 90 seconds would seem to suffice.[40] That would bring the performance of the whole *Psalmus* at some 35 minutes. This may seem long but is by no means impossible in church practice in Augustine's time. The sheer length of some of his sermons, some of them extending to several hours, suggests that the average endurance of believers to remain standing and listening must have been quite unlike common practice in most modern churches.

Conclusion

If the suggested manner of singing the text is plausible, and if a much less rigid form for the *psalmus* should be envisaged for the oral performance for which it was intended, this is of some consequence for the constitu-

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[39] That is, one singer would voice the first half of each line, the second singer the latter half. Of course, variations seem possible here too. For example, two (half) choirs rather than two singers might be performing. In addition, one could imagine that during every 12-line stanza, there would be some variation in tone, e.g. a minor raising of the pitch in successive groups of three lines (or 3×4 or 2×6, or even 6×2 lines).

[40] I did a short singing experiment with some colleagues from the Augustinean Institute at Eindhoven, Netherlands (www.augustinus.nl). It was our experience that performing this text was unexpectedly pleasurable and far from tedious or tiresome. I thank Joke Gehlen-Springorum, Annemarie Six-Wienen and Hans van Reisen for their kind assistance.

tion of the text. Earlier editors invariably considered the text as a metrical poem, and accordingly emended the text at many places, particularly after the discovery and publication of the Leiden MS.

It may even be so that the text suffered from attempts to normalize it as early as in the Middle Ages.[41] Of course it is impossible to go beyond the medieval manuscripts, and we cannot reconstruct the *Psalmus* as it must have been in Augustine's days. However, it does seem possible to return to attested older readings that show a greater prosodical variety than is offered in present editions.

Therefore, a new critical edition of the Latin text seems due, based on a different principle than the extant ones, showing the essentially oral nature of the text through some extent of variety and flexibility in the length of lines. That is, as far as the MSS allow us to restore old readings.[42] So in the end, this new attention for orality will affect even our most fundamental approach of any ancient text: the constitution of the text itself.

And perhaps some day, some choir will take up the challenge and perform the *Psalmus* in a concert hall, not to instruct us in abstruse doctrinal matter (for a contemporary audience, the conflict of Catholics and Donatists has become nearly meaningless), but as a work of art.[43]

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41 Cf. Chatillon (1955) 120–121, who suggests that medieval poets could not profit from the liberties of the *Psalm*, and that the type of verse inevitably developed into an increasingly regular, 16-syllable verse.

42 It would not seem a good idea to introduce new emendations or text proposals, so as to make lines more variable in length.

43 The *Psalmus* has partly been set to music by the Hungarian composer Sándor Veress (1907–1992) in 1943–1944. See Schaber (2006) 104–105, who describes it as a 17-minute composition for solo bass, mixed choir, and great orchestra. Obviously, this is rather different from the psalm-like form proposed in this paper. In addition, Veress only used the first strophe (*Abundantia peccatorum* …), with its imagery of good and bad fish that will be sorted out, because of the ethical dimension of these lines in the context of the Second World War.

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